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General Editor’s Introduction

This unique set of interviews with Indian and Pakistani ex-military figures focuses on the wars of 1947–8, 1965 and 1971, as well as the short Kargil ‘war’1 of 1999 and prompts reflection as to whether conflict between India and Pakistan has been, and continues to be, inevitable or whether the cycle of violence can be halted. A key underlying question is whether the poison that was generated by the British-imposed Partition of the subcontinent in 1947 is still working its way through the system of international relations in South Asia.

The Legacy of Partition

Partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947 remains a deeply controversial episode in the process of decolonization and the development of the successor states to the British Raj.2 The Punjab was where the task of partition was most complex to implement, where the greater part of the violence took place – because there were three and not just two competing

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1 Many commentators regard Kargil as a ‘conflict’ or ‘near war’ because total battlefield deaths may not have exceeded the 1,000 figure which is the classical definition of war as an armed conflict.
religions – and where most of the migration of the population in both directions was centred. Moreover, there had been no earlier partition of the Punjab, whereas Bengal had experienced this once before, between 1905 and 1911.

In June 1947, Sir Cyril Radcliffe was appointed by the British government as the chairman of two boundary commissions, one for Punjab, the other for Bengal. He did not arrive in India until 8 July and was given just five weeks to determine a frontier between independent India and the new federal state of West and East Pakistan. Lucy Chester argues that ‘Radcliffe played a greater role in Punjab than in Bengal. In Bengal the final line followed the Congress Plan closely. In Punjab, however, Radcliffe’s line differed significantly from each of the major proposals ... The Punjab parties’ extensive demands had the ironic effect of diminishing their influence over the final boundary and of increasing the importance of the chairman’s role’.

The British, the Congress Party and the Muslim League had, for different reasons, a common purpose, which was to rush through Partition as quickly as possible in 1947. None of the politicians seems to have appreciated that a full-scale movement of population would become difficult to stop. Nehru noted, ‘we saw the fires burning in the Punjab and heard every day of the killings.’ But the plan for partition ‘offered a way out and we took it’. Some small movement of people might be needed to make the boundary workable, but ‘this need not [have] involve[d] any major transfers of population’, he argued.

The odd ones out among the politicians were the Sikh parties, who realized too late how much they had to lose from partition. They alone claimed that a significant transfer of population would be needed to secure their interests, but failed to win the argument. The Panthic Assembly Party, the Working Committee of the Shiromani Akali Dal and the Panthic Pratindhi Board petitioned on 12–14 June 1947 ‘for the transfer of Hindu


7 At a press conference on 14 Nov. 1946, Jinnah stated that ‘the exchange of population would have to be considered seriously as far as possible, especially after this Bihar tragedy’ (Speeches, Statements and Messages of the Quaid-e-Azam, ed. Khurshid Ahmad Khan Yusufi (4 vols., Lahore: Bazm-e-Iqbal, 1996), iv. 2458). Jaswant Singh, Jinnah. India – Partition – Independence (New Delhi: Rupa, 2009), 314.
Radcliffe is often cited as the key person responsible for the unfair treatment that, it is alleged, Pakistan received at the time of Partition. Jinnah’s radio broadcast of 31 August castigated the ‘unjust, incomprehensible, and even perverse award’ of the Boundary Commission. There remain allegations of the ‘theft’ by India of Ferozepur and Gurdaspur. Following the witness of Sir Christopher Beaumont, Mountbatten’s personal secretary, the allegations involving Gurdaspur may be rejected. In contrast, Beaumont was convinced that Mountbatten persuaded Radcliffe of the adverse irrigation effects for Bikaner state if Ferozepur went to Pakistan and that Radcliffe yielded to ‘what he thought was overwhelming political expediency’.13

An elderly Hindu woman said to Nehru in September 1947: ‘Partitions take place in all families. Property changes hands, but it is all arranged peacefully. Why this butchery, loot and abductions? Could you not do it the sensible way families divide [their property]?’14 Lucy Chester concludes that Radcliffe’s boundary for the Punjab was superior to the alternatives proposed at the time but was ‘the flawed product of a deeply flawed process, whose repercussions continue to plague South Asia today’.15 Of the various difficulties that arose, the most serious was the inability of the British authorities to control the outbreak of communal violence prior to the transfer of power and during the paralysis of government that occurred afterwards. In one sense this was inevitable: one of the reasons why the British faced up to an early departure from India was the recognition that if their power was contested, they would no longer be able to rely on the Indian Army or to supply sufficient British troops.

The problem was that Mountbatten himself was initially hopelessly optimistic, securing the [Indian] Cabinet’s approval to the use of maximum force at the earliest possible moment (including air bombing if necessary) if there should be any outbreaks of violence. He told Sir Evan Jenkins, the governor of the Punjab, that ‘the very first attempt at communal war should be utterly and ruthlessly crushed …’. The policy of bombing and machine-gunning culprits from the air, and thus ‘prove[ing] conclusively that communal war was not going to pay’ was never likely to be realistic. As Sir Evan Jenkins retorted, firepower was less important than troop numbers: ‘the lesson of the 1947 disturbances in the Punjab is that once the interlocked communities begin to fight all over the countryside, the only remedy is to employ a very large number of troops.’ Jenkins wanted a force of 20,000 men on a war footing. Instead, the Punjab Boundary Force had only about 7,500 men on active duty, while the former Indian Army had been divided between India and Pakistan and the police force had disintegrated along communal lines. Lucy Chester argues that the political leaders should have made ‘more serious arrangements for a worse-case outcome’, while the British should have ‘allowed adequate time’.16 Her own factors.14 What were these other factors in the Punjab? Were they the location of the Sikh holy shrines? Arthur Henderson, Under-Secretary of State for India, said so in Parliament at Westminster, but Mountbatten had to backtrack, emphasizing the independence of the boundary commission and its freedom to interpret ‘other factors’ on its own.14 Later on, Radcliffe was concerned, Sir Christopher Beaumont recalled, ‘because he had to put this Sikh holy place into Pakistan – at Sheikhupura … Guru Nanak’s birthplace’. But there was no choice. Apart from the Golden Temple at Amritsar, which did play a part in determining that Amritsar should go to India, shrines did not figure in the boundary delineation.15 Beaumont recalled that after contiguous majority areas, ‘water was the key. And railways would come second, and electricity would run third’.16

As Sir Evan Jenkins retorted, firepower was less important than troop numbers: ‘the lesson of the 1947 disturbances in the Punjab is that once the interlocked communities begin to fight all over the countryside, the only remedy is to employ a very large number of troops.’ Jenkins wanted a force of 20,000 men on a war footing. Instead, the Punjab Boundary Force had only about 7,500 men on active duty, while the former Indian Army had been divided between India and Pakistan and the police force had disintegrated along communal lines. Lucy Chester argues that the political leaders should have made ‘more serious arrangements for a worse-case outcome’, while the British should have ‘allowed adequate time’.16 Her own

8 Chester, Borders and Conflict, 39.
9 Ibid., 56, 115.
10 Ibid., 78.
11 Ibid., 80.
12 Ibid., 123.
13 Ibid., 120, 122–3.
14 Shashi B. Sahai, South Asia: From Freedom to Terrorism (New Delhi: Gyan Publishing, 1998), 73.
15 Chester, Borders and Conflict, 200.
16 Ibid., 195–6.
suggestions for improving the implementation of Partition would have required 'a great deal of time, cooperation and political will – precisely the ingredients that were lacking in 1947'.

Violence seemed so imminent that the British judged it impossible to allow more time. Why then was there a pretence that there would be ruthless military intervention to prevent communal violence when there was no prospect of acting in this way? By July 1947, even before the establishment of the successor states of India and Pakistan, Mountbatten's bluff had been called. Mountbatten finally recognized this himself in a statement recorded by Alan Campbell-Johnson, his press secretary.

The Sikhs, he said, had launched an attack just as Gian[i] and Kartar Singh and Tara Singh before the 3rd June had told him they would. Mountbatten had ex postulated with them at the time, stressing that the British would have gone. It would be Indian fighting Indian. But they were adamant, and had in fact observed that they were waiting for us to go. The situation was now out of their control. In an area less than two hundred by one hundred and fifty miles containing some 17,000 inhabited localities and only about the size of Wales, some ten million people were on the move ...

Shortly before the fiftieth anniversary of Partition, Campbell-Johnson gave an interview (27 May 1997) in which he asserted, 'Delays would have caused greater mayhem, not less.' The interim government had virtually collapsed after reaching the political settlement on 3 June 1947. 'How could you govern a country on the verge of Independence under martial law?' 'Once Partition was accepted, including the partition of the Punjab state, the Sikhs were in total revolt. We were dealing with a situation where we feared a collapse of law and order across the subcontinent. More delays only meant more trouble. We ensured that the violence overall affected only 5 per cent of the country.' When the viceroy was told that partitioning Punjab would lead to trouble, 'Mountbatten replied that he had to think of the whole country when making a decision.' One reason why there have been such bitter wars is that deep down no one liked Partition, but they all accepted it.'

Estimates of the number of deaths during the process of partition range from 180,000 to 2 million, 'with most scholars settling on a number between 500,000 and 1 million.' Campbell-Johnson, who was a member of the Emergency Committee set up to monitor the situation in India, states categorically: 'claims have been made that about 500,000 people died during Partition. It was nothing of that sort ... most of the violence took place in a period of two and a half months, during which time about 200,000 people were killed.' In reaction to the 'simmering violence of 1946 and early 1947,' writes Lucy Chester,

17 This was made much worse by Mountbatten's instructions which stated confidentially that the British Army units 'had no operational functions whatsoever, could not be used for internal security purposes and would not be used on the frontier or in the states. There was only one exception: they could be used in an emergency to save British lives' (Yasmin Khan, The Great Partition, The Making of India and Pakistan (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007), 128–9).
Yasmin Khan agrees, arguing that ‘if not entirely responsible for the contending nationalisms that emerged in South Asia (which it certainly contributed to), the British government’s most grievous failure was the shoddy way in which the plan was implemented.’ Partition, she concludes, ‘was the site for, and the origin of, so many of the suspicions and national myths that are deeply rooted in the definition of one state against the other.’

Kashmir: Unfinished Business from the Era of Partition

There are three main perspectives on Kashmir: the Pakistan case prior to October 1947; the Indian case arising from the Instrument of Accession of October 1947; and the modified Indian Kashmir case arising from Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. The concealed hopes or implicit assumptions of the parties depend on which historical perspective is taken as axiomatic. There are those – and this would include many in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir – who are trapped in the mindset of the Pakistan struggle before 1947. For these individuals, there can be no serious concession or compromise on basic principles because Kashmir ‘must be’ part of Pakistan – after all, the letter ‘K’ in the name Pakistan arose from the assumption that Kashmir would be an integral part of the country. In this sense, Choudhary Rahmat Ali is responsible for the Kashmir problem because he it was who in 1933 formulated the name for a Muslim state in the northwest of British India: Kashmir, he assumed, would form part of the new state because of its Muslim majority. The A for Afghanistan has now been lost in one sense since April 2010, with the renaming of North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) ‘Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’. Pakistan has no intention of ever losing that portion of Kashmir it controls as ‘Azad Kashmir’; to stand for election to the Parliament there a candidate must swear prior allegiance to the state of Pakistan. The formula is Kashmir banega Pakistan.

Later he contended: “Pakistan” is both a Persian and an Urdu word. It is composed of letters taken from the names of all our homelands – “Indian” and “Asian”. That is, Punjab, Afghanistan (North West Frontier Province), Kashmir, Iran [this seems absurd: see Jinnah’s comment on 17 May 1947], Sindh (including Kach and Kathiawar), Tukharistan, Afghanistan, and Balochistan. It means the land of the Paks – the spiritually pure and clean. It symbolizes the religious beliefs and ethnical stocks of our people; and it stands for all the territorial constituents of our original Fatherland. It has no other origin and no other meaning; and it does not admit of any other interpretation. Those writers who have tried to interpret it in more than one way have done so either through the love of casuistry, or through ignorance of its inspiration, origin and composition’ (Choudhary Rahmat Ali, Pakistan: the Fatherland of the Pak Nation (Cambridge, 1947)). When spelling out the derivation of the word Pakistan to Mountbatten on 17 May 1947, Jinnah stated that ‘P for was Punjab; A for Afghan (i.e. Pathan or NWFP); K for Kashmir; I for nothing because that letter was not in the word in Urdu; S for Sind and TAN for the last syllable of Baluchistan’ (Alistair Lamb, Kashmir. A Disputed Legacy, 1846–1990 (original edn. Hertingfordbury: Roxford Books, 1991; repr. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 3rd impression, 2006), 107).

Ismail Khan, ‘From NWFP to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’, Dawn (1 April 2010), ‘NWFP officially renamed as Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa’; ibid. (15 April 2010).


22 Ibid., 148.
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(Kashmir will become Pakistan). India had been partitioned on the basis of the two-nations theory, Liaquat Ali Khan contended. Kashmir should become part of Pakistan on the basis of the same theory.27

The second mindset of which we have to take note is of those who are stuck in the attitude of 25–26 October 1947, when the Indian Defence

Before a politician becomes a candidate for the Assembly in this territory declared as Azad, meaning independent, he has to declare he will be loyal to Pakistan.’

At a press conference following the Commonwealth Prime Ministers meeting in London, Liaquat argued: ‘Kashmir was a Muslim country; geographically, economically, culturally it was a part of Pakistan, with all its rivers flowing through and to Pakistan. All the roads led from Kashmir into Pakistan; it was joined to India only by a narrow strip of road which had been constructed since the partition of the Indian sub-continent took place. Mr. Nehru sometimes said that he could not accept partition on the lines of Hindu and Muslim, but the whole partition of the continent took place on that basis’ (M. Rafique Afsal (ed.), Speeches and Statements of Quaid-i-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan, 1941–51 (Research Society of Pakistan: Lahore, 1967), 527 (incomplete)). The Times (17 Jan. 1948), 7. Ibid., 5: ‘The Indian view is that Kashmir is part of the Indian Union; that Indian troops have a right to be there, while Pakistani troops are intruders; that India has the duty of protecting Kashmir from invasion and safeguarding the "legitimate" government headed by Sheikh Abdulla; and that this government cannot be superseded, even temporarily and for the purpose of a plebiscite, by any other authority. Mr. Nehru does not admit that Sheikh Abdulla is opposed by a powerful section of Kashmiri opinion. As he sees it, any opposition is merely factional, stirred up by Pakistan for religious reasons. It is here that the real dispute lies. To Mr. Nehru, as to other advocates of what is called the "secular" state, in which all citizens should have equal rights, without regard to creed, it seems self-evident that the Kashmiris ought to settle their future according to economic, not religious, considerations. Mr. Nehru declared yesterday that if India once accepted the argument that nationality should follow religion, it would mean that forty million Muslims in India and about fifteen million Hindus in Pakistan would become, in effect, second-class citizens, half alien and without any sense of security. Other Indian leaders have said that if Kashmir were to go to Pakistan because it was largely Muslim the whole aspiration of the "secular" state in India would be shattered – and at the back of their minds is the fear that the Muslims in Kashmir would in fact declare themselves in favour of Pakistan. To Indians there is not simply territory at stake, but a principle to which they are pledged … So long as the deadlock lasts there is the risk that widespread in Pakistan will encourage the extremists to demand either a "holy war" or a severance of the Commonwealth bonds.’

Committee discussed the request received from the Maharaja of Kashmir to send troops to oppose the Pakistani tribal raiders who had entered his state. Mountbatten argued that assistance should not be provided before the state had temporarily acceded to India. Pakistan would then have no right to intervene. Nehru questioned Mountbatten’s interpretation, arguing that it would be perfectly legitimate for India to respond to the appeal from the Maharaja’s government. He accepted the principle that a final settlement on accession should only be made after consulting the people of Kashmir.38 At the meeting of the Indian Defence Committee on 26 October, when questioned as to whether the defence of Kashmir was of vital importance to India, Nehru and Patel both contended that it was vital to India’s very existence. Because of common borders with Afghanistan, the USSR and China, the security of Kashmir was vital to the security of India, Nehru told Attlee by telegram.39

We may now never know whether the Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession before or after the Indian Army arrived by air at Srinagar airport, though (in justification of the Pakistan position) Alastair Lamb argues a very convincing case that it could only have been signed after the arrival of Indian troops.30 However, the Indian government claimed in its White Paper of 3 March 1948 that Indian troops were sent to Kashmir by air on 27 October ‘following the signing of the Instrument of Accession the previous night’ and the Instrument of Accession over time has become the legal and constitutional foundation for the Indian position regarding Jammu and Kashmir – the essential point being that although the decision was supposed to be ratified by the populations of their states, the princely rulers were given the right to choose freely between Pakistan or India under


29 Dasgupta, War and Diplomacy, 48, 54.

30 Lamb, Incomplete Partition, 162–3: ‘in other words, because the State of Jammu & Kashmir was already part of India by the morning of 27 October 1947, those Indian troops who then arrived at Srinagar airfield were merely defending what was already India’s.’
the British transfer of power arrangements. Jinnah seems to have been taken by surprise by the last Dogra ruler’s decision regarding accession, but it was predictable given his commitment to his Hindu faith and the propaganda in favour of accession to India undertaken by the RSS leader, M. S. Golwalkar, in a personal meeting with Hari Singh held at the behest of Patel on 17 October 1947. So the position of October 1947 is held to by those in India who argue that the constitutional position of Kashmir was ‘settled’ once and for all by the Instrument of Accession – regardless of the commitments made by Nehru to hold a plebiscite, and the declaration of the United Nations Security Council on 21 April 1948 to this effect. It is, for example, the position of the RSS with regard to Kashmir, although they claim that this is ‘not an appeal to religion but is, on the contrary, an appeal to nationalism and against the tendencies to superimpose religions over nationalism’.

A third mindset is of those who are committed to the position enshrined in the so-called Indira-Sheikh Abdullah accord of 13 November 1974. This was an agreement signed by the representatives of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Abdullah, whereby after a period of eleven years Abdullah once more was to become Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir (that is to say, Indian-administered Kashmir). Clause 1 of the agreement noted that the state of Jammu and Kashmir ‘is a constituent unit of the Union of India’ but ‘in relation with the Union’ was to continue to be governed by Article 370 of the Constitution of India. Though the residuary powers of legislation were to remain with the state of Jammu and Kashmir, Parliament in India would ‘continue to have power to make laws relating towards disclaiming, questioning or disrupting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India or bringing about cession of a part of the territory of India or secession of a part of the territory of India, insult to the Indian National Flag, the Indian National Anthem and the Constitution’. The implications of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution is that except for defence, foreign affairs, finance and communications (matters specified in the Instrument of Accession), the Indian Government requires the agreement of the legislature of Jammu and Kashmir for the application of all other laws. Indian Kashmiris live under a separate set of laws, including those related to citizenship and the ownership of property, and they have different rights compared to other Indians.

To the extent that Kashmiris in Jammu and Kashmir have participated in the Indian general elections, Indian constitutional theory asserts that the population has consented to India’s overarching sovereignty and the application of a plebiscite as envisaged in the United Nations Security Council resolutions has been overtaken by events and is now irrelevant. On the other hand, the application of draconian security legislation in Indian-administered Kashmir, especially the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) adopted in 2002, which was used by the Union and various state governments to mount campaigns against Muslims and to target political opponents, has clearly undermined the autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir. The POTA was repealed shortly after the UPA government came to power in the 2004 general elections. But most of its draconian provisions were either included in the UPA-authored law that replaced it or in the anti-terrorist law rushed through Parliament following the November

32 Ibid., 126.
The huge security apparatus in Indian-administered Kashmir has scarcely been reduced, in spite of the lessening of violence in recent years.

‘The South Asian Palestine’ is a title given to Kashmir by the prominent Kashmiri commentator Basharat Peer.34 His study entitled Curfewed Night: A Frontline Memoir of Life, Love and War in Kashmir has been praised by reviewers for rising above the formidable challenge of telling the stories of Kashmir’s suffering without numbing the reader’s senses. Just one recent verdict on that suffering is the spiralling drug problem resulting from post-traumatic stress disorder. A study by the Sociology Department of Kashmir University reveals that 35 per cent of the youth between 15 and 25 years of age have taken to drugs. Sociologist Dr B. A. Dabla says: “We lost one generation to the gun and we are going to lose the next to drugs.”35

The parallel with Palestine has been taken up by some of the politicians. ‘The resolution of the Palestine issue finds resonance in the just and peaceful struggle of Kashmiri people for self-determination’, the Pakistan Prime Minister, Yousuf Raza Gilani, stated on a visit to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. The ‘People of Palestine and ... Kashmir are fighting for their just right of self-determination’, Gilani contended. Drawing further comparison between Kashmir and Palestine, Gilani stated that peace would not prevail in South Asia and the Middle East unless the problems of Kashmir and Palestine were solved.36

There is no doubt that in the complexity of the attempts to find solutions and the risk they pose to the world community as festering unre-

2008 terrorist atrocity in Mumbai. The huge security apparatus in Indian-administered Kashmir has scarcely been reduced, in spite of the lessening of violence in recent years.

36 http://news.oneindia.in/2010/02/15/gilani-equates-kashmir-with-palestine.html. The Indian report noted that this statement was ‘in line with [Pakistan’s] obsession with Kashmir’.

solved problems,37 the two cases are of comparable importance. There the apparent parallelism between them may cease, however. For all the rhetoric of journalists and politicians, the contrasts between the Kashmir and the Palestine disputes are more apparent than the similarities. They arose from the historic differences in the British role in the two lands prior to 1947 and the fact that the British refused to partition Palestine before they left.38 Sumantra Bose writes that

in the Israeli-Palestinian case, the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state on a territory that closely approximates the pre-June 1967 borders between Israel and the occupied territories, with its capital in east Jerusalem, is the sine qua non of a settlement. The idea of a single, bi-national state of Israel/Palestine39 is deeply infeasible in light of history and of contemporary realities, and it violates the essence of the creed of self-determination of both peoples.40

In contrast, it is precisely the underlying unity of Kashmir and the common Kashmir identity – the legacy of Kashmiriyat – and the fact that, 37 ‘Frozen conflicts don’t stay frozen, and windows of opportunity to make real progress towards solutions don’t come often. Stalling on such opportunities can be perilous,’ comments Sumantra Bose, ‘Kashmir – missed chances for peace’: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7576393.stm.
38 Lucy Chester writes: ‘the most striking difference of all lay in Britain’s handling of partition negotiations, for there was only a last-minute discussion of partition in South Asia, in contrast with a decade of debate in Palestine. As a result, there was only one boundary commission in South Asia, while numerous commissions advanced various boundary proposals in Palestine. And yet despite these lengthy discussions of partition, the British refused to implement any partition whatsoever as they withdrew from Palestine, while in South Asia Britain imposed a hastily drawn line [a line which did not affect Kashmir itself] in the final days of its rule’ (Lucy Chester, ‘Boundary Commissions as tools to safeguard British interests at the end of empire’, Journal of Historical Geography, 14 (2008), 494–515, at 495).
in flagrant violation of the British-established rules for the accession of princely states in 1947, the people were not consulted, which has fuelled the self-determination argument. Even so, as Chitralekha Zutshi argues, ‘ultimately the Kashmir question has been so problematic because it does not fit the one state-one nation-one religion trope that has defined South Asia in the post-colonial era.’ Zutshi stresses that Kashmiri nationalism has been ‘as reluctant to accommodate regional and religious differences, and multiple visions of nationalism within Kashmir, as its Indian and Pakistani counterparts.’ Zutshi considers that ‘political solutions to the “Kashmir problem” will be abortive until nationalist narratives – Indian, Pakistani and Kashmiri – that are primarily responsible for its intractability, are dismantled.’ This will be neither easy nor fast, given the extraordinary range of opinions that can be brought to bear on the subject of the conflict, for example, within Jammu province.43

Kashmir may, in reality, be a more difficult nut to crack than even Palestine. India rejects third-party mediation, and the United States is therefore unable to act as anything more than a covert honest broker. There is no infrastructure for peacemaking, since the largest role that India has been prepared to concede for Kashmiris is separate talks between the factions rejecting violence and the Indian government.44 This means that any consensus reached can easily be overturned by an extremist group which has no seat at the table. Moreover, as Muqtedar Khan has noted, ‘the political development of both India and Pakistan makes peace negotiations a two-level game. [This] means that not only will the two parties have to negotiate terms with each other, they also will have to negotiate their own positions with opposition factions.’45

There is also the obstacle posed by Kashmiri diversity. If Kashmiris were to be invited to a joint negotiating table, they would have to reach an internal consensus first. This is more easily said than done. The astonishing range of views is one of the points that emerges most clearly from the recent opinion poll held on either side of the Line of Control which was financed by Saif al Islam Qadhafi. In the view of Robert Bradnock, ‘the poll shows that there is more room than many had anticipated in Kashmiri opinion itself for negotiation. The bigger question is whether the governments of India and Pakistan have the confidence, the power and the goodwill to meet the urgent aspirations of the Kashmiris for a peaceful and permanent settlement.’46

There are three UN resolutions bearing on the plebiscite: the Security Council Resolution of 21 April 1948, an enabling resolution that authorized formation of the UN commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) as well as spelling out in detail the conditions for plebiscite; UNCIP Resolution 995 of 13 Aug. 1948, which only very briefly and vaguely endorsed the idea of Kashmiri self-determination; and UNCIP Resolution 1196 of 5 Jan. 1949, which spelt out the conditions for the plebiscite in detail; see Robert G. Wirsing, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 58; also Wirsing, Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2003). ‘That the plebiscite was agreed upon in a world body, such as the United Nations’, writes Victoria Schofield, ‘meant that those Kashmiris who were opposed to union with India came to expect international support for what they perceived to be their right of self-determination’ (Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict. India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 87).

41 Apart from UNSCR, 47 of 21 April 1948, the letter of Mountbatten accepting the Instrument of Accession dated 27 Oct. 1947, the telegrams of Nehru dated 27 and 31 Oct. 1947 and Nehru’s broadcast on All-India Radio on 2 Nov. 1947 were explicit on this point: see Fahmida Ashraf, Jammu and Kashmir Dispute: Examining Various Proposals for Its Resolution (Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies Papers 20, 2002), 11–12, 46–9. There were three UN resolutions bearing on the plebiscite: the Security Council Resolution of 21 April 1948, an enabling resolution that authorized formation of the UN commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) as well as spelling out in detail the conditions for plebiscite; UNCIP Resolution 995 of 13 Aug. 1948, which only very briefly and vaguely endorsed the idea of Kashmiri self-determination; and UNCIP Resolution 1196 of 5 Jan. 1949, which spelt out the conditions for the plebiscite in detail; see Robert G. Wirsing, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 58; also Wirsing, Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2003). ‘That the plebiscite was agreed upon in a world body, such as the United Nations’, writes Victoria Schofield, ‘meant that those Kashmiris who were opposed to union with India came to expect international support for what they perceived to be their right of self-determination’ (Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict. India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 87).


44 ‘We want to take the dialogue process forward. We are ready to talk to representatives of all sections who are opposed to terrorism and violence.’ Indian PM Mannohan Singh renews Kashmir talks of fer’, BBC News (8 June 2010): http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/10261715.stm.


There are voices which lay claim to complete autonomy for Kashmir – free from both Pakistan and India – but these are siren voices, since they fail to take into account the fact that both Pakistan and India lay a territorial claim to the whole of Kashmir according to its pre-accession borders of 1947, while in order to avoid war each state has been prepared to acquiesce in a de facto modification of its full claim by accepting the reality of the Line of Control. The Line of Control, however, is not an agreed international border. Nor, Pakistan has always argued, is the status quo represented by the Line of Control an acceptable solution to the Kashmir problem. As one commentator and lobbyist puts it, ‘no settlement ... will hold unless it is explicitly based on the principle of self-determination and erases the so-called line of control, which is in reality the line of conflict.’

Conversely, Dr Manmohan Singh, the Prime Minister of India, asserts that ‘there can be no redrawing of borders in Jammu and Kashmir’ – which seems to preclude any serious move towards a permanent settlement.

Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mountbatten’s press secretary whose interview given about a year before his death in 1998 has already been quoted on the question of Partition, had firm views on the failure of India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir dispute. ‘I don’t believe that there has ever been a firm will by both sides to resolve the Kashmir dispute’, he asserted. ‘For Pakistan, Kashmir was part of a bigger game plan, at least before the creation of Bangladesh [in 1971], to link up the East and West wings of the new country. So for the Pakistanis, the idea was to keep the crisis going, there are bigger issues involved.’ For its part, India, too, had reasons not to wish to settle the issue. ‘The Indian view was that one day Pakistan will collapse and it was worth keeping the dispute going. And the temptation has been to keep the dispute going, and it has been kept going for 50 years.’ Thirteen years after Campbell-Johnson’s death, the situation has scarcely changed.

Competing Strategic Cultures: I. India

Although none of the interviewees uses this language, what is being discussed by the ex-military figures interviewed in this book are the rival and conflicting strategic cultures of the two states. There is no single accepted definition of ‘strategic culture’. Jeannie L. Johnson, writing for the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office of the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency, defines it thus: ‘strategic culture is that set of shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behaviour derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives.’

Peter R. Lavoy adds to the equation the role of strategic elites, whom he calls myth makers, who ‘operate within the constraints of both the international environment and their nation’s political culture, but they are not helpless prisoners of these two confining structures; they have some degree of freedom to reorient and expand the internal and external boundaries of their behaviour.’

48 Campbell-Johnson added: ‘I would have thought that after the creation of Bangladesh, Kashmir isn’t really worth fighting for. I expect Kashmir to be partitioned, some day if not right now.’ http://www.rediff.com/freedom/13alan2.htm. Campbell-Johnson also argued: ‘Mountbatten clearly believed that the Act of Accession was to be signed by the [ruler] concerned. He should consider the religion of the majority of his people, but if he didn’t, his decision was final.’ http://www.rediff.com/freedom/13alan1.htm.


Though recognizing that India is ‘perhaps the strongest of all the states in the region’, T. V. Paul characterizes it as a ‘strong-weak’ or even ‘soft’ state.51 David Malone and Rohan Mukherjee concur: ‘the heart of the paradox’, they assert, ‘lies in the fact that although internationally India is emerging as a strong state that is increasingly tilting the global balance of power in Asia’s favour, it is domestically a relatively weak state, compared to other great powers, with multiple security challenges.’52 The authors agree with earlier writers such as Bhiku Parekh who argued that whereas Nehru (prime minister 1947–64) gave India a ‘distinct moral voice’ in the world, in more recent times the focus has been on a new pragmatism, with emphasis on economic and military power in foreign policy. The danger is that ‘without a strong moral thread to bind the identity of its citizens, the Indian state risks undermining its own cohesiveness and security.’ There is, however, little sign, the authors contend, ‘that those who formulate India’s security policies are capable of bringing any level of cohesion into the numerous conceptions of Indian identity that interact (and often clash) within the Indian polity.’53

What is clear is that after the sudden – and from the Indian perspective, unwanted – collapse of the USSR in 1991, India has become a fearful state: fearful of making concessions to its aggrieved regions and minorities. The fear is that any concessions which confer greater autonomy could lead to an unravelling of the Indian Union. Instead, the response is the repression of discontent, a policy which could prove counter-productive in the medium term.54 Even Jaswant Singh, the former foreign minister of the BJP-led government, mentions the possibility of a ‘third partition’ if the grievances of minorities are not addressed.55

Why is India apparently bereft of strategic vision? Malone and Mukherjee argue that although political fragmentation diminishes state capacity, ‘the emergence of multiple small yet powerful players creates space for alternative foreign policy ideologies. As fragmentation proceeds … foreign policy becomes devoid of any single guiding principle of ideology.’ By default, policy is based on interests rather than ideology and becomes the lowest common denominator policy.56 Indian foreign policy, the authors contend, ‘has become largely reactive in nature. It is criticized at home and abroad for lacking vision and a unified strategy for India’s role in the world.’57

It is against these comments that Prime Minister Vajpayee’s rationale to the Indian Parliament a fortnight after India’s nuclear tests on 27 May 1998 should be read. The touchstone that guided India in making the correct choice was national security, he affirmed. ‘These tests are a continuation of the policies set into motion that put this country on the path of self-reliance and independence of thought and action.’ India was now a nuclear weapons state.

This is a reality that cannot be denied. It is not a confirmation that we seek, nor is it a status for others to grant. It is an endowment to the nation by our scientists and engineers. It is India’s due, [the] right of one-sixth of humankind. Our strengthened capability adds to our strength of responsibility. We do not intend to use these weapons

53 Ibid., 158.
55 Though he was expelled from the BJP for his comments, Jaswant Singh, Jinnah, India – Partition – Independence (New Delhi: Rupa, 2009), 479: ‘which is why some voices of Muslim protest now go to the extent of speaking of a “Third Partition”, the second being the birth of Bangladesh.’ Ibid., 481, where he talks of the ‘unfinished agenda of partition’.
56 Malone and Mukherjee, ‘Polity, Security and Foreign Policy in Contemporary India’, 161.
57 Ibid., 163. For the argument that the BJP failed to achieve a realist alternative to the Nehruvian tradition, see Sreeram S. Chaulia, ‘BJP, India’s Foreign Policy and the “Realist Alternative” to the Nehruvian Tradition’, International Politics, 39 (2002), 235–34.
for aggression, or for mounting threats against any country; these are weapons of self-defence, to ensure that India is not subjected to nuclear threats or coercion. We do not intend to engage in an arms race ....

The prime minister concluded by emphasizing the national consensus on the issue, ‘the sensibilities and obligations of an ancient civilization, a sense of responsibility and restraint, but a restraint born of the assurance of action, not of doubts and apprehension.’ His hope was in the new millennium India would ‘take its rightful place in the international community.’

Following the Indian Prime Minister’s statement to the Lok Sabha, the Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh, produced Defending India (1999), a justification of the policy of Indian ‘realism’ that had culminated in the nuclear tests in May 1998. ‘An examination of the first fifty years of Indian independence,’ he wrote, ‘reveals that the country’s moralistic nuclear policy and restraint did not pay any measurable dividends. Consequently, this resulted in resentment within the country; a feeling grew that India was being discriminated against.’ In the totality of state power ‘nuclear weapons as a currency’ was still operational ‘in large parts of the globe.’ India therefore had no choice but to update and revalidate the capacity that had been demonstrated 24 years earlier, in the ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ of 1974. India was committed to a ‘no-first-use’ agreement with ‘any country, bilaterally or in a collective forum’ and had no intention of engaging in an arms race. These points were summarized in India’s draft nuclear doctrine discussed by the National Security Board and submitted to the Government of India in August–September 1999.

Writing in 2001, Rajesh Basrur provides an over-generous assessment of India’s strategic culture. He argues that

there is every reason to expect that Indian strategic culture will retain its propensity for negotiated solutions to adversarial nuclear–strategic relationships. At the same time, the longstanding preference for universal non-discriminatory disarmament remains integral to this strategic culture. Though often derided by critics as unrealistic or even self-serving, India’s consistent advocacy of global solutions is consistent with its original open-door policy on nuclear weapons: unless everyone closes the nuclear door, it is not in India’s interests to do so. The readiness to negotiate equitable arms control both bilaterally and multilaterally gives to Indian strategic culture a positive feature. In contrast to the constraining effects observed above, we find here an enabling effect: strategic culture facilitates arms control and hence the building of stable strategic relationships.

The reality is otherwise. First, India has consistently rejected Pakistan’s overtures to make South Asia a nuclear-free zone. Secondly, a fierce arms race has been fuelled by India’s military spending. Because its economy is several times the size of that of Pakistan, India can allocate a lower percentage of its national budget on defence (14.1 per cent in 2007, as against 17.5 per cent in Pakistan) yet spend far more on its military. Between 2000 and 2007, India doubled its defence expenditure from $10.5 billion to $23.2 billion per annum. Pakistan tried to keep pace, increasing spending from $2.7 billion to $4.5 billion. In the view of Owen Bennett-Jones, ‘India is totally committed to the South Asian arms race and the gap is likely to become even wider ... The different absolute spending levels are reflected not only in the number of men in the two countries’ armed forces but also in the amount of military hardware available to those men.’

Prime Minister Vajpayee announced to the Lok Sabha on 27 May 1998 that India did not intend to engage in an arms race. The facts speak otherwise, when $133 million dollars was spent by India on the military in the first seven years of the twenty-first century.

60 Dixit, India-Pakistan in War and Peace, 345.
62 This is documented in Rizwana Abbasi’s companion volume in this series. The official view is given by Naeem Salik, The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence. Pakistan’s Perspective (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009).
In the same speech, Prime Minister Vajpayee stated that India’s nuclear weapons were not intended for mounting threats against any country but were ‘weapons of self-defence’. His Defence Minister, George Fernandes, described India’s military posture as ‘a non-aggressive, non-provocative [one] based on the philosophy of defensive defence’. Is this consistent with the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine formulated in 2004 and expounded publicly by Lieutenant-General Deepak Kapoor in 2009? Those Indian ex-military who were interviewed on this point tended to downplay this innovation, which – following US questioning of the doctrine – was officially repudiated by Kapoor’s successor, General V. K. Singh, who stated in September 2010: ‘There is nothing called “Cold Start”. As part of our overall strategy, we have a number of contingencies and options, depending on what the aggressor does. In recent years, we’ve been improving our systems with respect to mobilization, but our basic military posture is defensive.’

Though the denial by General V. K. Singh is plausible, it flies against the evidence that, since the failure of Operation Parakram (Operation Victory) in 2002, when the Indian Army failed to provide a timely threat to Pakistan in spite of its massive mobilization, the emphasis has been on achieving a multiple, rapid strike capability, before counter-mobilization and international political pressure could deny India the fruits of its offensive. The Indian Army developed its new limited war doctrine in order to respond to the specific challenges posed by Pakistan’s proxy war strategy. For one commentator, writing in 2007–8, Cold Start ‘remains more of a concept than a reality. Recent military exercises and associated organizational changes indicate that even though the Indian Army has made progress toward developing an operational Cold Start capability, much work remains.’ The doctrine represents a significant advance in India’s conventional capabilities, but ‘it also risks provoking or escalating a crisis on the subcontinent that could breach the nuclear threshold.’ The disengagement of India’s political leadership from security issues remains a cause for concern, since it might turn to an apparent limited war strategy during a subsequent crisis without having evaluated the potentially disastrous consequences.65

Competing Strategic Cultures: II. Pakistan

‘Pakistan was a weak state from the beginning’, writes Lawrence Ziring, ‘made weaker by its formation in two parts separated by a thousand miles of Indian domain. The collapse of the two-winged state hardly more than twenty-three years after independence was not unanticipated ....’ State failure occurred in 1971,66 as a result of a civil war, though Bangladesh might not have achieved its independence had it not been midwifed by massive Indian intervention: Lieutenant-General Jagjit Singh Aurora was given the job of destroying the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan and half a million men to complete the task. The USSR provided the necessary


65 Walter C. Ladwig III, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine’, International Security 32/3 (2007–8), 148–90. The US Ambassador to India, Tim Roemer, according to a cable leaked by WikiLeaks, doubted whether India ever intended to implement the doctrine. He wrote: ‘even if the plan is never actually implemented – and there is considerable question as to GOI intent to ever implement it – news of Cold Start’s existence has already paid dividends to Indian policymakers by providing reassurance to the Indian public that the GOI has the means to punish Pakistan for attacks on Indian soil without triggering potentially mutually-assured nuclear destruction. From the Indian perspective, the unimplemented plan has the added virtue of accentuating Pakistani discomfiture and angst, which in theory may have some deterrent value.’ ‘India “unlikely” to deploy Cold Start against Pakistan’, Dawn (3 Dec. 2010): http://www.dawn.com/2010/12/03/india-%E2%80%98unlikely%E2%80%99-to-deploy-cold-start-against-pakistan.html.

military supplies and crucial political backing at the United Nations. As J. N. Dixit argues, ‘had there not been a Soviet veto, President Nixon’s pro-Pakistan tilt would have found expression in a Security Council initiative that would have aborted the Bangladesh freedom struggle and resulted in a monumental strategic setback for India.’ 67 Instead, India humiliated its rival and captured 74,000 prisoners of war68 as hostage for a settlement on its terms – the Simla Agreement of 1972.

Indian policymakers’ long-cherished aspiration of breaking up Pakistan coincided with Bangladesh’s struggle for independence, which was driven chiefly by the language issue. As one Bangladeshi historian comments: ‘a section of the Indian intelligentsia has always tried to disprove the religion-based two-nations theory on the basis of which India was partitioned in 1947. Bangladesh’s war of liberation provided them with the tool to vindicate their proposition and they exploited it well.’69 Indira Gandhi’s statement before the Lok Sabha, immediately after the Bangladesh war, lends credence to this view: ‘The war with Pakistan and the emergence of Bangla Desh,’ she claimed, ‘… falsified the two-nation theory and vindicated our principles of secularism.’ In reality, the principles of secularism would only have been ‘vindicated’ had Bangladesh chosen voluntarily to return to the Indian Union, which it had no intention of doing.70 What 1971 demonstrated was that the Pakistan federation of 1947 was unworkable if mutually hostile political parties captured the majority of seats in the assemblies of the constituent parts of the confederation. The breakdown only became irrevocable when the largely West Pakistan military lost discipline and engaged in mass murder. The trials of those responsible, authorized in Bangladesh on 25 March 2010, are yet to take place.

Many of the ex-military on the Indian side denounce Bhutto’s alleged ‘duplicity’ at the Simla negotiations in 1972. Indira Gandhi and her advisors pressed for a formal agreement recognizing the Line of Control in Kashmir as a de jure border and that the release of Pakistani PoWs and the evacuation of occupied Pakistani territory should be conditional on this. Bhutto and the Pakistani negotiators refused to agree. A private meeting between Indira Gandhi and Bhutto was organized at which he requested that his undertakings on the Line of Control should not be included in the form of a written agreement. Bhutto argued that if this were done, it would endanger his survival and the establishment of democratic rule in Pakistan. Instead, he proposed that after he had integrated Pakistan-administered Kashmir and the other related territories of the old princely state of Jammu and Kashmir on the Pakistani side within the federal territories of Pakistan, the Line of Control would gradually be converted into a de jure border.71

India believed that the Simla Agreement was the answer to regularizing relations between Pakistan and India without third-party mediation.72 For Pakistan, however, the role of India in the war of 1971 and the Simla Agreement served only to confirm its suspicions that India had, all
along, sought to break up the Pakistan union and would do so again if the opportunity arose. It is important to note that Bhutto was encouraged in this position – if not in his resulting strategy – by Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State. ‘My basic perception of India,’ Kissinger told Bhutto in 1976, is that she sooner or later will have another go at Pakistan, regardless of the Soviet viewpoint, although the Soviets would certainly come to the assistance of India. As long as this Prime Minister [Indira Gandhi] is in office, the danger persists. I myself heard her say that the Northwest Frontier Province really belongs to India, and there is no way to get to them except through the Punjab.73

J. N. Dixit contends that ‘within two-and-a-half years of his assuming power in Pakistan, by the end of 1974, the moderation and rationalism in Bhutto’s approach to India had disappeared’ and he reverted to his ‘adversarial mindset.’74 In fact, there was scarcely any change in Bhutto’s approach: he summoned Pakistan’s 263 top scientists to a secret meeting at Multan on 20 January 1972 and instructed them that the country required a nuclear weapon within three years. He undertook to provide the necessary resources and facilities for the task. The change in policy was a consequence of the break-up of the Pakistan union in December 1971, not a reaction to India’s allegedly ‘peaceful’ nuclear test at Pokhran on 18 May 1974.75 The Indian test merely gave Bhutto the opportunity to provide a public justification for his decision two years earlier: ‘even if we have to eat grass, we will make nuclear bombs,’ he told a press conference after the announcement of the Indian test. Pakistan would never fall prey to India’s nuclear blackmail, he declared. The US ambassador to New Delhi, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, called the Indian PNE (peaceful nuclear explosion) ‘a huge mistake’, pre-

73 Memorandum of Conversation. The Secretary’s Meeting with Prime Minister Bhutto, 26 February 1976, p. 27. Downloadable from URL: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB193/index.htm.
74 Dixit, India-Pakistan in War and Peace, 235.
75 Dixit’s chronology is at fault here: ibid., 234.
76 As was correctly pointed out subsequently in India (though only in a news conference as late as 1999), there can be no such thing as a PNE. Moynihan stated: ‘now in a decade’s time, some Pakistani general will call you up and say I have four nuclear weapons and I want Kashmir. If not, we will drop them on you and we will all meet in heaven. And then what will you do?’ (George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb. The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, repr. 2001), 186).
can only be done through a competitive strategy that extends over the decades ... From a geo-strategic perspective, as far as India is concerned, Kashmir is a holding operation, even in the absence of an effective competitive strategy. If India holds on to Kashmir for another fifteen or twenty years, Pakistan will destroy itself, even without India doing anything substantial to secure this end.

This is a widely shared strategic assessment, and it is interesting to note that in its projections for Asia 2020 the US Department of Defense comes up with four alternative scenarios for Pakistan's future: "near collapse"; "paralyzed"; "anarchy in Pakistan" followed by its "incremental accession" to India; and "Pakistan disappears" with the emergence of a "South Asian superstate." The core of India's strategy of response must be to impose unbearable costs on Pakistan, Sahni contends. 'This can be done through major defence expenditure and upgrading[ing] that forces an unsustainable competition on Pakistan; and through a parallel thrust to strengthen the Indian economy – and weaken Pakistan's. Economic initiatives would also require a point-to-point competition with Pakistan on its strongest economic products, exports and services, in the international arena.'

Not every Indian analyst would subscribe to the fevered worldview of Ajai Sahni. There are, however, sufficient indicators for Pakistan to maintain its guard against India, to the frustration of the United States, which would like to see larger force deployments against the Taliban on the Afghanistan border and in the tribal areas. Can the United States help secure an insecure state? The question was posed in a report for the US Air Force in 2010. The report makes depressing reading, with the authors arguing that the prospects are indeed very slender that Pakistan has the capacity to change its course, and it is far from obvious that the United States, even with the new focus on civilian institutions, will have any meaningful role in helping Pakistan save itself .... Pakistan is unlikely to comprehensively crack down on militancy and reverse course on an instrument of foreign policy it has long used. Pakistan's political system is broken, with few prospects for reversing course, leaving little hope that one day competent civilian leadership will emerge to exert control over the most dangerous aspects of the state.

The authors argue that, 'given the numerous and salient US security interests engaged in Pakistan, the United States should seriously consider what the lineaments of a contingency plan for Pakistan may be ....' In other words, it should 'begin learning to think the unthinkable.'

It is argued here that this is too pessimistic a verdict. Former US Ambassador William B. Milam sounds a more convincing note when he argues that 'Pakistan is not a failed state .... But it is a country of failed politics with a failed political class.' The need for wide-ranging, structural political and constitutional reform is paramount. For Pakistan to enjoy a brighter future there has to be a period of sustained peace in South Asia. But before this can happen, Pakistan has to win its own war against militancy both along the border with Afghanistan and in counter-insurgency operations.

80 Here Sahni cites 'Asia 2015,' Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), 1999 Summer Study Final Report, Organized by the Advisor to the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment, 25 July – 4 August 1999, Newport, Rhode Island, pp. 81–91: 'The United States of America uses its B-2 bombers in the year 2012 to launch conventional air-strikes to destroy Pakistani nuclear facilities in a bid to prevent the nukes from falling into the wrong hands. The extraordinary US action follows an unsuccessful Indian conventional attack on Pakistani nukes, and a retaliatory Pakistani nuclear strike against Indian border forces. This sparks the disintegration and disappearance of Pakistan, and creation of an expanded Indian Confederation or Superstate.' Total anarchy prevails in Pakistan. The Indian army moves in to restore order. As the country disintegrates, Pakistan's regions accede incrementally to India. The Sindhi, Baluch, and North West Frontier Province parliaments vote to join an Indian-led confederation. An Indian Confederation emerges. Isolated Punjab is compelled to join the confederation and merges with its Indian counterpart to form a greater Punjab province within the confederation.' Quoted with some glee by an extreme Hindu right-wing website: http://www.hindutva.org/future.html.

82 Ibid., 201.
Introduction

One of the editors, Tridivesh Singh Maini, is the representative in India of the Institute of Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD), an independent not-for-profit organization in the United States headed by former US Ambassador John W. McDonald. In 1995, Ambassador McDonald was visited by two lieutenants-general, one from Pakistan and one from India. They had just retired from the military and were in Washington DC for a month when they heard about IMTD. ‘They came to see me and within two minutes asked me to solve the Kashmir conflict. I laughed and said I can’t do that,’ Ambassador McDonald recalls. ‘Still, these were very serious men with a great deal at stake. The countries had fought three bloody wars against each other over Kashmir.’ The Generals approached IMTD, he continues, ‘because we are a small and non-threatening NGO with the international legitimacy necessary to intervene.’

Two years passed before IMTD was able to raise the funds. Then, in 1997, IMTD went to New Delhi, Bombay and Lahore and over the next several years developed relationships and carried out training in Track Three Diplomacy with the business community in India and separately in Pakistan. IMTD urged both communities to invest and reinvest in both sides of the Kashmir problem. On 7 April 2000, Ambassador McDonald was invited to make a speech in a refugee camp in Azad Kashmir just outside the capital city of Muzaffarabad. A thousand refugees were there who had fled from the Indian side. The ambassador spoke about the politicians’ bus trip which had taken place the year before. The Prime Minister of India took a bus from New Delhi and went to Lahore and met the Prime Minister of Pakistan to discuss Kashmir, but nothing materialized. ‘So I proposed on that day in 2000 that we start a people’s bus just for

operations against the Pakistan Taliban. The Zardari government – or its successor, if it cannot act with commitment and authority – must convince the sceptical Pakistan public that ‘domestic terrorism and insurgency is indigenous (rather than the working of the CIA or New Delhi) and constitutes an urgent and serious threat to the nation.’ That battle to convince hearts and minds has yet to begin in earnest.

84 Steve Breyman and Aneel Salman, ‘Reaping the Whirlwind: Pakistani Counter-insurgency Campaigns, 2004–2010’, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 34/2 (2010), 65–85, at 81. Also Seth G. Jones and C. Christine Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan (Santa Monica, Arlington and Pittsburgh: Rand National Security Research Division, 2010). Jones and Fair contend that ‘a key objective of U.S. policy must be to alter Pakistan’s strategic calculus and end its support to militant groups’ (ibid., 140). Ibid., 118, on the need for ‘empirically verifiable metrics in eliminating militant groups operating in and from Pakistan’. For the accusation that some elements associated with the ISI were involved in the planning of the Mumbai attacks, see Jason Burke, ‘Pakistan intelligence services “aided Mumbai terror attacks”’, Guardian (18 Oct. 2010). However, the reports rely on the interrogation of David Headley, a Pakistani-American militant held in the United States, by Indian security officials over a period of 14 hours. Headley may well have been simply telling the Indian investigators what they wanted to hear, namely that ‘the ISI … had no ambiguity in understanding the necessity to strike India.’ The aim of the agency, Headley allegedly stated, was ‘controlling further split[s] in the Kashmir-based outfits, providing them a sense of achievement and shifting … the theatre of violence from the domestic soil of Pakistan to India.’ Jason Burke writes that ‘Headley describes the ISI director-general, Lt-General Shuja Pasha, visiting a key senior militant from LeT [Lashkar-e-Taiba] in prison after the attacks in a bid “to understand” the operation, implying that, as many western security agencies suspect, the top ranks of the agency were unaware of at least the scale of the planned strike.’ The government of Pakistan has repeatedly denied the involvement of any security official in the Mumbai attacks.
Introduction

It is difficult to emphasize sufficiently the uniqueness, importance and timeliness of this volume. Relations between Pakistan and India were strained from the outset as a result of the events of Partition in 1947, when the mass migration of the populations in opposite directions and the slaughter that occurred on both sides led to mutual recrimination. The ideology of Pakistan was predicated on the idea that Muslims and Hindus formed in some way two 'separate nations' (the 'two nations theory') and a constitution which proclaimed Pakistan as an Islamic Republic was likely to emerge at a future date (though it remained – and continues to remain – a controversial subject, as the first constitution of 1956 has been replaced more than once and constitutional amendments are still being discussed today).

Once Dr Ambedkar had drafted India's constitution by 1950, it was clear that India would – as had been expected – be committed to the principle of 'secularism', which in the context of the subcontinent meant Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Jains, Buddhists and others living side by side without religious discrimination and, at least in principle, without the ascendancy of any one religion over the others. In practice, Hindus were in the numerical ascendancy and have appropriated many of the most important and politically sensitive positions, while Muslims have been treated as second-class citizens. Indeed, the poor status enjoyed by the religious minorities is a matter of concern in both India and Pakistan.

The former British-controlled Army of India was divided at Partition in 1947 on the basis of roughly one third to Pakistan and two thirds to India. Tensions between the two states rapidly developed into war over Kashmir in 1947–8, and there were further wars in 1965 and 1971, the latter leading to the independence of former East Pakistan as Bangladesh (an event which was master-minded by the Indian Army and was very much in India's strategic interests). There were further crises between India and Pakistan in 1999 over Kargil (usually termed the Kargil war) and in 2002 following the attack on the Indian Parliament the previous December by terrorists allegedly trained in Pakistan. But by this stage the two states, as a result of nuclear tests held in 1998, were declared nuclear powers, and the stakes for the rest of the world were very high if open conflict were to...

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1 The story is recounted at http://imtd.server295.com/?page_id=1084.

the people of Kashmir who had not been able to visit each other since 1947, states the ambassador. The people in Azad Kashmir thought it was a wonderful idea. The travel restrictions from Pakistan-controlled Kashmir to Indian-controlled Kashmir stem from differences in travel documents needed to cross the border. India insisted that Kashmiris had to obtain a visa to enter India. In Azad Kashmir there was an insistence that Kashmir was still a disputed territory according to international law and therefore Kashmiris would only have to provide local identity documents for travel. As a result, travel between the two territories of Kashmir had been halted since Partition in 1947.

After the proposal, the IMTD team flew back to Washington and returned to work on other projects. The ambassador continued to make speeches about the people’s bus and had the idea publicized in the press in India and Pakistan every time he visited the subcontinent. Five years to the day, on 7 April 2005, the first people’s bus took to the road, when 31 passengers from Muzaffarabad and 19 from Srinagar crossed the Line of Control with only local identity travel documents. The Prime Minister of India and the head of the Congress Party flew to Srinagar to wave goodbye to the bus. The Prime Minister of Pakistan met the bus from the other side in Muzaffarabad, Azad Kashmir.

The bus exchange between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad is still taking place and now they have added trucks and there is even a railway crossing. ‘So we were able to change the whole concept of the subcontinent by this first rebuilding-confidence project. And it has been working ever since,’ states Ambassador McDonald.

Tridivesh Singh Maini recalls that part of the inspiration for this book arose from the history of this incident, and the fact that the original impetus for change had arisen not from politicians but from ex-military figures in Pakistan and India. Subsequently, he carried out the interviews with all the Indian ex-military figures for this volume, while his colleague in Pakistan, Tahir Malik, carried out all but one of the interviews with Pakistani ex-military figures (Brigadier Shaukat Qadir was interviewed by Richard Bonney).

The story is recounted at http://imtd.server295.com/?page_id=1084.
break out once more as it had done in the past. Since 2004 there has been
a ‘composite peace process’ in progress but the process has been stalled
since the terrorist attack on Mumbai in 2008, which again was blamed
by the Indian government on a group operating from Pakistan, albeit not
with the support of the Pakistan government.

This book has no rival in the field, since interviews with senior military
figures who are retired usually are undertaken on an individual and ad hoc
basis. There are studies of the Pakistani and Indian armies as institutions,
and in the case of Pakistan as a force in politics. But there is very little
literature on the views of the military on the security challenges facing
South Asia, yet this is of obvious importance given their experience and
understanding of the issues at stake.

Can one of the most volatile regions of the world emerge from the
present state of stalled peace negotiations and enjoy the fruits of a true
peace? What are the long-standing issues at dispute between the two coun-
tries? Are they so profound, and so deeply rooted, that ‘peace’ itself will
remain elusive and the best that can be expected between the two nuclear
powers is an armed truce? What role is to be attributed to religious and
ideological division, and what to territorial disputes and disputes over water
resources? Does the possession of nuclear weapons by the two states act as
a force for stability – because the risks of any conflict leading to nuclear
retaliation are too high to be considered – or are nuclear weapons
profoundly destabilizing?

Many issues thus arise from the reflections of senior military person-
nel about the history of conflict between the two countries. There is no
unanimity of views. On the contrary, a surprising – almost astonishing
– diversity of views between ‘warmongers’ and ‘peacemakers’ emerges.
The intractability of the problems is thus matched by a variety of possible
responses to the prospect of peaceful engagement and dialogue between
India and Pakistan.

Finally, a note on the methodology for the interviews. The Editors
recognize that the choice of interviewees was largely adventitious – we
interviewed those who we found were willing to have their views made
known to the public – as was the choice of questions. If the interviewee had
heard Jinnah’s speeches in the 1940s – as was the case with Major-General
Syed Wajahat Husain – then it made sense to ask him about the contrast
between the type of Islam stressed by the Founding Father of Pakistan
compared with that of President Zia-ul-Haq and his Islamization policies.
Where an interviewee had some knowledge of the back channel negotia-
tions between India and Pakistan – as was the case with Major-General
Ashok K. Mehta – it was appropriate to ask him for his reflections on
the peace process. We have ended up with 26 interviews, 13 Indian and 13
Pakistani, which reflect a wide diversity of viewpoints, and we have not
sought to impose any editorial control over the views expressed except with
respect to factual accuracy.

The Editors wish to express their gratitude to Brian Cloughley for his
invaluable advice and assistance to this project.
Biographies of the Three Editors

TAHIR MALIK is a writer and journalist born in Lahore. He is fluent in English, Urdu, Punjabi and Hindi. He gained his first Master in Journalism from the University of the Punjab (Pakistan) and a second MSc (in Mass Communications) from Oklahoma State University, US. He has behind him more than twenty years of journalistic involvement in electronic and print media in Pakistan and the USA. In addition to his role in the media, he has contributed as an expert, analyst, adviser, teacher, writer, trainer and researcher in numerous positions. He has written on Pakistani affairs and politics, US affairs, the Pakistan–India relationship, the Pakistan–West alliance, the Muslim world and world peace in American and Pakistani newspapers as a freelance writer, contributor, analyst and columnist since 1986. His first book was Humanity amidst Insanity (Delhi: UBS, 2008) co-authored with Tridivesh Singh Maini and Pakistani journalist Ali Malik. The book narrates some of the positive episodes during Partition – instances where Muslims rescued non-Muslims and vice versa – and is perhaps the first book which systematically highlights such positive episodes. He has also given various local and international lectures and presentations on the Pakistan–India relationship, the Muslim world and the Pakistani media. He has been a member of the Federation of Electronic Journalists (Pakistan), EMRA (Electronic Media Reporters Welfare Association), the Lahore Press Club, the Punjab Union of Journalists and Pakistan–India peace initiatives.

TRIDIVESH SINGH MAINI is an Associate Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), New Delhi. He graduated from the University of Sheffield in Great Britain in 2002 and received an MA in International Development from the School of International Service, Washington DC, in 2004. He has authored South Asian Cooperation and the Role of the Punjabs (2007), and co-authored Humanity Amidst Insanity: Hope During
and After the Indo-Pak Partition (2008) with Tahir Malik and Ali Farooq Malik. Before joining ORF, Maini worked as a senior staff writer with *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, and as a research associate with the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. While working with *The Indian Express*, he wrote a weekly column entitled ‘Printline Pakistan’.


List of Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AJ&amp;K</td>
<td>Azad Jammu and Kashmir (Pakistan-administered)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BJP</td>
<td>Bharatiya Janata Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSF</td>
<td>Border Security Force (India)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCS</td>
<td>Centre for Civil Society (India)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organization (dissolved 1979)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGS</td>
<td>Chief of General Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>COAS</td>
<td>Chief of the Army Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Pakistan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>Inter-Services Intelligence [Directorate] (Pakistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J&amp;K</td>
<td>Jammu and Kashmir (Indian-administered)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JeM</td>
<td>Jaish-e-Mohammad (militant organization)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JuD</td>
<td>Jamaat-ud-Dawa</td>
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<tr>
<td>LeT</td>
<td>Lashkar-e-Taiba (militant organization)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LoC</td>
<td>Line of Control (operational between Indian- and Pakistan-administered Kashmir)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLA</td>
<td>Member of Legislative Assembly (India)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDA</td>
<td>National Democratic Alliance (India)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>North-West Frontier Province (Pakistan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organization of the Islamic Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>People’s Democratic Party (Pakistan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PML(N)</td>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz [Sharif])</td>
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<tr>
<td>POK</td>
<td>Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (or Azad Kashmir)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Pakistan Peoples Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAW</td>
<td>Research and Analysis Wing (India)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSS</td>
<td>Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Volunteer Organization, India)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAARC</td>
<td>South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCIP</td>
<td>United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>Uttar Pradesh</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPA</td>
<td>United Progressive Alliance (India)</td>
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Kashmir (UNMOGIP, Map No. 3928 Rev. 14, November 2010, reproduced by permission of the United Nations Publications Board)

PART I
Indian Interviewees
Interviewee Biographies: India

Lieutenant-General Gagandeep Bakshi

Lieutenant-General Bakshi was commissioned into the Indian Army on 14 November 1971, into the Jammu and Kashmir Rifles. He commanded his battalion in active operations in Kargil in 1999 and was awarded the Vishisht Seva Medal (VSM). Later he commanded a brigade in counter-terrorist operations in the rugged mountains of Kishtwar (2000–2) and was awarded the Sena Medal for his services. Bakshi subsequently commanded the Romeo Force, which was set up to carry out counter-insurgency operations in the Rajouri–Punch districts of Jammu and Kashmir. He is a prolific writer on matters military and non-military and has published seventeen books and over 70 papers in many research journals. His articles have also been published in various national newspapers. Currently he is the associate editor of the Indian Military Review. He has taught at the Indian Military Academy, Dehradun, the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington and the National Defence College, New Delhi.

Major-General Dipankar Banerjee

Major-General Banerjee, currently Director of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), New Delhi, was commissioned in the Indian Army in 1960 and had four periods of service in Jammu and Kashmir: in 1960–5, 1976–8, 1985–6 and 1990–2. He was Senior Fellow and later Deputy Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis from 1992 to 1996. In 1996 he set up the IPCS and was Executive Director of the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies from 1999 to 2002. Banerjee is an expert on disarmament studies, non-proliferation issues, confidence-
Indian Interviewees

Rasool Mirza. During Partition, on his return from Iraq, he was deputed for a while in the Punjab police as an assistant superintendent and was responsible for providing safe passage to Muslim refugees. Then, in 1949, he was posted as adjutant in the Assam regimental centre at Shillong. In 1965, a year after the Chinese invasion, he raised the 5th Battalion of the Assam Regiment and commanded a unit in the 1965 war in the Dera Baba Nanak area. In 1971 he fought in the Fazilka Sector.

Lieutenant-General Kamaleshwar Dawar

Lieutenant-General Dawar was commissioned in the Indian Army in 1963 in the 7th Light Cavalry. His last appointment was as first Chief of the Defence Intelligence Agency and as Deputy Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff. He is a recipient of the Param Vishisht and the Ati Vishisht medals. He has served in all theatres of operations since his commissioning in 1963 and was also wounded in action in the 1965 war. He was a squadron commander in the 1971 war in the western sector. He has also served in Kashmir.

Brigadier S. S. Chowdhary

Brigadier Chowdhary is a retired officer from the Assam Regiment and is settled in Chandigarh. His ancestral village is Kahuta, now home to Pakistan's nuclear research centre, but he was born in Kullu (now in Himachal Pradesh) in 1923. Chowdhary was commissioned into the Indian Army in 1944, into the 8th Punjab Regiment which at Partition became part of the Pakistani Army and was later absorbed in the Baloch Regiment. He served in the 8th Punjab regimental centre at Lahore in 1945–6. The brigadier has vivid memories of the Cripps Mission visiting the centre in early 1946. In 1946, Chowdhary, who was then a captain, was transferred to Shaiba, Iraq, which is about 15 miles from Basra. Later he was posted to the command supply depot headed by a Punjabi Muslim officer, Ghulam building measures, security sector reforms, military doctrines, counter-insurgency and China's military policy and strategy. Banerjee attended the Staff College in Camberley, UK, and the National Defence College, New Delhi. The retired major-general was also a member of the International Advisory Group of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva, and a consultant to the UN Group of Government Experts on Conventional Arms. He led the campaign for the global elimination of landmines and addressed the plenary session at the treaty signing conference at Ottawa in December 1997. Banerjee was involved with the UN Secretary-General's High Level Panel in 2004 and he convened and organized the South Asian consultation of the High Level Panel at Delhi. Currently he conducts and supervises the series of India–Pakistan High Level Track Two dialogues supported by the UK, convenes the Consortium of South Asian Think Tanks (COSATT), leads an India–China strategic dialogue supported by the McArthur Foundation’s Asian Security Initiative, conducts the annual India–NATO strategic dialogue and a nuclear security project amongst senior strategists of India–China–Pakistan under the Nuclear Threat Initiative, and several others.

Brigadier Satish Kumar Issar

Born on 17 January 1937, at Rawalpindi (now in Pakistan), Brigadier Issar, VSM, was educated in Lahore and New Delhi. In July 1957, he joined the Indian Military College (now the Indian Military Academy), Dehradun, for two years pre-commission training, at the end of which, he was commissioned on 7 June 1959 in the Kumaon Regiment. Brigadier Issar retired on 31 January 1991, after nearly 32 years of distinguished service, including several periods in Jammu and Kashmir at different periods between 1961 and 1982. Brigadier Issar has compiled an illustrated history of his regiment, The Images of Valour and Triumphs (2005), and has also written

Lieutenant-General J. F. R. Jacob

Lieutenant-General Jacob, a Baghdadi Jew, was born in Calcutta and educated at school in the Darjeeling Hills. He then went to St Xavier’s college in Calcutta for his bachelor’s degree. He cut short his studies to fight in World War II, joining the army in October 1941. He was commissioned in the Regiment of Artillery in 1942. Jacob served with his regiment in the Middle East in 1942–3 and from there moved with it to the Arakan in Burma. He took part in the operations in the Mayu Range and the various assault landings down the coast of Burma. Jacob was wounded in action during the operations. After the Japanese surrender, he took part in operations in Sumatra to reinstall the Dutch. He returned to India in November 1946. He was sent to England in November 1946 to attend the Gunnery Staff Course at the School of Artillery. He returned to India immediately after Independence, to teach at the Artillery School. He was promoted to lieutenant-colonel responsible for raising 3 Field Regiment in 1956. He graduated from the Advanced Artillery and Missile course at Fort Sill, US, in 1959–60. On returning to India in 1959 he was posted as operations officer at Headquarters Western Command in 1960. In May 1961, he was posted as an instructor at the Staff College, Wellington, where he taught for three years. He then commanded the 3rd Artillery Brigade in Ladakh from 1963 to 1964, followed by commanding the Artillery School and 168 Infantry Brigade in Jammu and Kashmir. He assumed command of the 12th Infantry Division in Rajasthan in 1967 and from there moved as Chief of Staff to Headquarters (Eastern Command) in 1969, where he had responsibility for dealing with the Naxalite insurgency in West Bengal. By mid-1971, the Naxalite movement had ended in Bengal.

In 1971, Jacob was made responsible for the planning, logistics and the conduct of the operations for the secession of Bangladesh. He directly negotiated with General A. A. K. Niazi, the Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Eastern Army, on the instrument of surrender drafted by him and unconfirmed by Delhi. The ceasefire proposed by Niazi under the auspices of the United Nations was converted into an unconditional public surrender of the Pakistani Army. Jacob authored a bestseller, Surrender at Dhaka – The Birth of a Nation (1997), which has been translated into Chinese, Thai, Bengali, Hebrew, Arabic and Persian. Regarding the 1971 war, Jacob states in his book: ‘the swift offensive launched by the Indian Army on 4 December 1971, culminating in the surrender of the Pakistani Eastern Command within a mere thirteen days is surely the greatest military feat in our history.’ After the 1971 war Jacob was promoted to command the Eastern Army at Fort William, Calcutta. He was responsible for the reorientation of counter-insurgency operations in Nagaland and Mizoram. Many believe that as a result of the operations, the insurgents in Nagaland came to the negotiating table to sign the Shillong Accord. Jacob retired from the Indian Army on 31 July 1978. He was appointed Governor of Goa in 1998. In his nineteen-month tenure he had to dismiss four governments and impose president’s rule for a period of four months. Later, in 2000, he was made governor of Punjab. Jacob has also been responsible for pushing for greater cooperation between India and Israel and has visited Israel on a number of occasions.

General A. S. Kalkat

General Kalkat was commissioned in 8th Gorkha Rifles in June 1955. He has held some important positions in the Indian Army, including Commander, Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), Sri Lanka, between 1988 and 1990. Kalkat received the VashiShit Seva Medal for gallantry in the 1971 war. Kalkat has received many other medals such as the Ati VashiShit Seva Medal for the disarming of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) Mutiny in
1980 and the Param Vishisht Seva Medal for his handling of the Bombay Riots and the Lattur Earthquake Relief Operations in 1993. Kalkat takes keen interest in research pertaining to security issues and has had numerous academic appointments including the chairmanship of the International Council for Conflict Resolution. Currently he is Director Emeritus, Centre for Joint Warfare Studies.

Major-General Harwant Krishnan

Major-General Krishnan was commissioned in 1969 in the 4th Gorkha Regiment after graduating from the National Defence Academy at Pune. He has also undertaken an MSc in Defence Studies from the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington. He witnessed the 1971 war as a young captain. Krishnan, who retired as DG Resettlement in 2007, has held important assignments such as India’s defence attaché in Germany, Switzerland and Austria from 2001 to 2004. Harwant Krishnan was also GOC in Kashmir (2004–2006), when the Srinagar–Muzzafarabad road was re-opened for the bus link across the LoC. Later on, General Krishnan set up a disaster management team to deal with the severe earthquake in 2005. After retirement he settled down in Panchkula, near Chandigarh, and is the director of the Pine Hills EcoCamp (Badog, Himachal Pradesh) which is an ecotourism enterprise (a Himachal government public–private initiative) managed by senior army veterans.

General V. P. Malik

General Malik was born on 1 November 1939 at Dera Ismail Khan, North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), now in Pakistan. He was commissioned in the Sikh Light Infantry on 7 June 1959. He saw action in the 1962 Indo–China War in the Ladakh Sector. He commanded the 10th Sikh Light Infantry on the Indo–China border and played an active role in counter-insurgency (COIN) operations in Nagaland from 1974 to 1977. Malik was Chief of the Army Staff of the Indian Army from 1 October 1997 to 30 September 2000. Concurrently, he was also chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee from 1 January 1999 to 30 September 2000. Malik was Army Chief during the Kargil war in 1999 and oversaw Operation Vijay, the counter-attack on the Pakistan forces.

A graduate of the Defence Services Staff College and Madras University, General Malik is an alumnus of the National Defence College, New Delhi. He has authored several papers on defence planning and security issues, and addressed many national and international seminars, civil and military institutions, universities and industrial organizations in India and abroad. General Malik was awarded the Ati Vishisht Seva Medal in 1986, and the Param Vishisht Seva Medal, the highest national award for distinguished service, in 1996. His Majesty the King of Nepal appointed him Honorary Chief of the Royal Nepal Army in 1997. In 1999–2000, the general was given an ‘Excellence in Leadership’ award by the Atur Foundation, Pune, a ‘Distinguished Fellowship’ by the Institute of Directors, New Delhi, and the ‘Pride of the Nation’ award by the Doon Citizens’ Council. He is the author of *Kargil: from Surprise to Victory* (2006).

Major-General Ashok K. Mehta

Major-General Mehta was commissioned in the 5th Gorkha Rifles in 1957. He took part in all military operations undertaken by India except the 1947 war in Jammu and Kashmir and the 1962 China war, when he was on a peace-keeping mission in Congo (Zaire). He followed courses at Fort Leavenworth, US, in 1975 and the Royal College of Defence Studies, UK, in 1974. He is a founder member of the Defence Planning Staff, now the Integrated Defence Staff, of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. His last assignment was General Officer Commanding, Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) South, in Sri Lanka. Mehta has been convenor of the Friedrich
Lieutenant-General Satish Nambiar

Lieutenant-General Nambiar was born in Mumbai on 30 August 1936, and was educated in Pune and Mumbai. Nambiar was commissioned on 15 December 1957 from the Indian Military Academy, Dehradun, into the 20th Battalion of the Maratha Light Infantry and was awarded the Vir Chakra for bravery in the 1971 war. Later, Nambiar was appointed Director-General of Military Operations, in which capacity he led two defence delegations in discussions with Pakistani counterparts: in the meetings held in April 1991 at New Delhi, Nambiar negotiated an agreement (which still holds) pertaining to the exchange of information between the two countries on the conduct of military exercises and aircraft flights in the proximity of the border, as also communications between naval vessels at sea, and in September 1991 at Islamabad, he negotiated an end to hostile action between the two countries along the LoC in the Poonch Sector. He was the director of the United Services Institution of India from 1 July 1996 to 31 December 2008. In November 2003, Nambiar was nominated by Kofi Annan, the then Secretary-General of the UN, to serve on a sixteen-member High Level Panel on 'Threats, Challenges and Change' that produced a report entitled A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. This report formed the basis of the UN Secretary-General's report to the 2005 World Summit. General Nambiar has also authored chapters in international publications on security-related issues. He was awarded the Vishisht Seva Medal. In 1986, he played an important role in writing, planning and conducting the biggest-ever Army operational exercise – Brasstacks. For this, he was awarded the Ati Vishisht Seva Medal (AVSM).

Lieutenant-General Vijay Oberoi

Lieutenant-General Oberoi who retired as Vice Chief of Army Staff, was born in pre-Partition India in Jhelum (now in Pakistan) and commissioned in the Maratha Regiment in 1961. He lost his left leg as a result of wounds in the 1965 war and was the first person with such a disability to be given command of a battalion. A graduate of the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, Oberoi completed his postgraduate studies in Defence Studies at Madras University. When he was Director-General of Military Operations he had the opportunity to interact with General Pervez Musharraf who was his counterpart in Pakistan. After retirement, Oberoi had the chance to visit Pakistan in 2003 as part of a Track Two delegation. He is a regular contributor to magazines and newspapers and has edited a number of books on security-related issues. He was the founding director of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, until November 2007. This centre studies, amongst many other areas, strategic issues pertaining to the India–Pakistan relationship. He has been awarded the Vishisht Seva Medal. In 1986, he played an important role in writing, planning and conducting the biggest-ever Army operational exercise – Brasstacks. For this, he was awarded the Ati Vishisht Seva Medal (AVSM). Oberoi also set up the War Wounded Foundation, which works towards the rehabilitation of the war disabled.

1 Ashok K. Mehta, ’Avoiding Another Great Game: India, Pakistan and Afghanistan can cooperate, not compete, for peace and prosperity in the region’, Wall Street Journal online (11 Jan. 2010): <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487045010457465121915350060.html>
Lieutenant-General S. K. Sinha

Born in 1926, Lieutenant-General Sinha graduated with honours from Patna University in 1943 and joined the army soon afterwards. He passed out as the best cadet from the Officers’ Training School, Belgaum, earning the commandant’s baton, the wartime equivalent of the sword of honour. Sinha was commissioned in the Jat Regiment and participated in combat operations during World War II in Burma and in Indonesia. After Independence, he was transferred to the 5th Gorkha Rifles. He was involved in the first India–Pakistan war from day one, 27 October 1947, and was intimately connected with the conduct of operations throughout that war. In addition to his normal work as Staff Officer Operations, he was given the responsibility for organizing the airlift of troops and stores in civilian Dakotas from Delhi to Srinagar. Eight hundred sorties were flown in fifteen days. He was secretary of the Indian delegation at a conference of India and Pakistan, convened by the UN to delineate the 450-mile-long ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir. Sinha secured the top position at the Defence Services Staff College in 1953 and again at the Joint Services Staff College in the UK in 1962. He has operated at all levels of command in the army, having commanded a battalion in Ladakh, a brigade in Manipur, a division in both Assam and Kashmir, a corps in Punjab and a field army in the Western theatre. He has held key staff appointments including adjutant-general and director of military intelligence. He was awarded the Param Vishisht Seva Medal (PVSM) in 1973. He quit the army in 1983 when he was serving as Vice-Chief of Army Staff on being passed over for appointment as Army Chief. In 1990, he was appointed India’s ambassador to Nepal when Indo–Nepali relations had hit their nadir in the wake of the lapsed trade and transit treaty. In 1997, Sinha was appointed governor of Assam, when insurgency was at its peak in that state. Finally, in 2003, he was appointed governor of Jammu and Kashmir. He is a prolific writer. His latest book *Guarding India’s Integrity: A Proactive Governor Speaks* (2009), covers his tenure as governor of Assam and of Jammu and Kashmir.

The Interviews: India

Lieutenant-General Gagandeep Bakshi

*Did you have any negative views about Pakistan before you joined the army?*

I was born in 1950, so obviously I have no memories of Partition. However, I have heard lots of horror stories. The negative image about Pakistan was reinforced as a result of my first-hand dealings with Pakistan units on the LoC, terrorism in Punjab stoked by Pakistan’s intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and of course five years non-stop in Jammu and Kashmir between 2000 and 2005 fighting terrorists and seeing their atrocities at first hand. That country [Pakistan], and primarily its military–ISI complex, has made itself a perpetual pain in the neck.

*What memories do you have of the wars in which you have been engaged?*

I joined the Jammu and Kashmir Rifles regiment a few days before the 1971 war broke out. My batch took the worst casualties. I participated in major skirmishes with the Pakistani Army in the Kargil Sector. I took an extensive part in counter-terrorist operations in J&K as a brigade and divisional commander. My experiences would take a few books to narrate! I do hope to get down to writing them sometime in the future. It would not be incorrect to remark that the 1971 war was a historic military victory and the peak of Indian military power in conventional terms.
Having witnessed the 1971 war from such close quarters, do you believe that the Simla Agreement was a blunder?

I think India was a bit too generous in 1972, and gave in to Pakistan's 'Versailles syndrome'. The right move at that time would have been to convert the Line of Control into the border after the 1971 victory.

Did the army feel that the Simla Agreement was a blunder?

The vast majority of the Indian Army thought that the Simla Agreement would work. Pakistan actually remained quiet until the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, when the US elevated it to 'frontline state' status.

Do you think that Jammu and Kashmir is a communal problem? To what degree have the Kashmiri Muslims been alienated in your view, and if so why?

You must understand the stakes involved in J&K. There are a 150 million Muslims in India who opted to stay back at the time of Partition. How can we permit barely 5 million Muslims of the Valley to secede on a purely communal agenda? It will unravel the basis of India as a secular republic. It is a major issue of principle and there can be no compromise. Only the Muslims of the Valley were alienated, primarily by 3,000 agents provocateurs sent in by Pakistan along with returning refugees from 1947–8 (accepted by Sheikh Abdullah) – that too in downtown Srinagar, Sopore etc. Muslims from other parts of the Valley are not alienated from the mainstream.

1 By this is meant that Pakistan argued that if it was treated as disadvantageously as was Germany after 1918 by the Treaty of Versailles, then it would sow the seeds of future conflict with India.

What in your view is the appropriate solution to Kashmir?

In my mind there is no doubt that the LoC should be recognized as the international border.

Have you ever had the opportunity to interact with retired Pakistani Army officers?

I have had no opportunity to interact with retired Pakistani officers. Frankly, I consider such exercises a waste of time.

What led you to publish books on the Pakistani Army?

I was keen to warn the nation about the perils of being too soft on Pakistan, to build up opinion in favour of building 'overmatching' military capabilities that can deter Pakistan from its asymmetric adventurism. Because of this, I thought it appropriate to write on issues pertaining to the Indo–Pakistan relationship.

In your view, should India have acted differently during the Kargil conflict?

Not necessarily. However, after clearing the bulk of intruders from the heights overlooking Kargil, India should have struck across the Line of Control to make them recoil fully.

Do you think that General Musharraf was sincere regarding the overtures he made on Kashmir?

Well, I think that the General was partially sincere. Pakistan always engages in double think. Strategic and tactical duplicity is an ingrained national ethos of the Pakistan state.
**Indian Interviewees**

What is your opinion on the Cold Start doctrine? Is it tactically sound?

My view is that the Cold Start doctrine is not in tune with our strategic culture. Cold Start basically means that ground forces lead with the least amount of preparation. In my opinion, it would be appropriate to follow the 1971 model, which was to prepare slow and strike fast.

What are your views on Afghanistan, and its influence on the India–Pakistan relationship?

Afghanistan is another area of strategic competition. We cannot permit Pakistan to dominate that country and make it a virtual colony.

In your view is India becoming a ‘soft state’?

Yes, in my view India is becoming a ‘soft state’, as it was in the pre-1962 era. The Nehruvian elite laid inordinate emphasis on soft power and personalized diplomacy. The current leadership is laying inordinate emphasis on economic growth as an end in itself. It is failing to translate economic power into usable hard military power. Into the bargain, it is opening huge windows of vulnerability with China and encouraging Pakistan to continue unabated its asymmetric war against India.

Do the civil and military leadership differ in their attitude towards Pakistan?

There has been a difference in approach since the 1990s. I am of the opinion that the present government has been far too soft on Pakistan – largely under American pressure. Since the 1990s, there has been an inordinate amount of emphasis on economic power as a panacea for all problems. As a result of this focus on mere economic power, military capabilities have begun to be ignored.

In your opinion, should India have reacted differently after the Mumbai attacks?

Pakistan should have been taught a lesson for Mumbai. The failure to do so will only invite more Mumbais.

What is your view on the future of India–Pakistan relations?

Very bleak. India will have to react very strongly in the eventuality of another Mumbai. There is no other way to end this problem.

Major-General Dipankar Banerjee

Before joining the Indian Army, did you have any preconceived biases against Pakistan?

I never had any hatred for Pakistan. This is in spite of the fact that I come from Bengal, a province which was partitioned along religious lines and was witness to the carnage of both Muslims and Hindus. Even after joining the military I did not develop any acrimony against Pakistan as a country.

Are there any memories of the 1965 and 1971 wars which are etched in your memory?

In the 1965 war my battalion was posted in the Jammu–Sialkot Sector and it penetrated furthest, and was within a mile of Sialkot. The unit remained there until 1966. This was the phase in which Pakistan witnessed a high trajectory of economic growth, approximately 5.5 per cent, as a result of Ayub Khan's economic policies. On the other hand, India during this period was still...
You have served in Kashmir in various capacities: how do you view the problem? Do you subscribe to the view that it is a communal problem?

Yes, I have served in Kashmir in numerous capacities. First as a young officer, and then in 1990 as a major-general I commanded the 8th Mountain Division. This was a time when the insurgency was at its height. I would not agree with the view that the Kashmir problem is or was a communal problem. In fact the Islam practised in Kashmir was of a Sufi type and was inclusive. By the mid-1970s however, the influence of Wahhabi Islam began to grow in the Valley. A lot of the funding for madrasas which spread the Wahhabi philosophy also came from countries like Saudi Arabia. Alienation in Kashmir was encouraged by this growth of fundamentalist Wahhabi Islam. India's handling of the political situation in the 1980s further exacerbated tensions. The dismissal of a democratic government led by Farooq Abdullah did not help matters and further ingrained a sense of alienation. Both these developments resulted in the alienation of the local population and helped Pakistan to stir up trouble in the Valley.

What do you think would be a realistic solution to the Kashmir issue?

The EU solution: no change of borders but these should become irrelevant to our daily or routine interaction. This also may be called the 'Manmohan solution', to which by 2007 Musharraf and Kasuri had come around, though with modifications. But it did provide a basis for further negotiations, which failed to happen because of Pakistan's domestic situation, the lawyers' movement and Musharraf's downfall.3

Have you had the opportunity to interact with retired Pakistani Army officers?

I set up the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in 1996 and ever since then I have had the opportunity to interact with retired army officers like General Jehangir Karamat and General Talat Masood and have developed a personal rapport. The Institute has also been involved in research projects with various other institutes. From 1999 until 2002, I was director of the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS) and in this capacity, too, I interacted with foreign ministers and chiefs of army staff from various South Asian countries including Pakistan. I have been involved in numerous confidence-building measures as director of RCSS and in my present position as director of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.

How would you describe your overall experience of interacting with retired officers?

Having interacted with Indian and Pakistani Army officers, I can say without any doubt that they get along very well at a personal level. Some of my best friends have in fact been Pakistanis. In my capacity as director of RCSS, Colombo, I helped many Pakistanis. However, I would like to make it clear that positions are polarized and even antagonistic on many contentious issues.
What sort of responses have you received to the Track Two measures initiated by yourself in various capacities?

Our series of Track Two measures – and we have some more in the pipeline – have been useful. But I would like to add that these can only have limited objectives.

Do you think India’s reaction to the Mumbai attacks was appropriate?

India showed remarkable restraint in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks, even though there was clear evidence that the attack had been instigated by Pakistan. I think reacting diplomatically was the right thing to do. In any case, two nuclear powers cannot clash militarily. India’s restrained reaction ensured that the tensions were reduced. A retaliatory military offensive would have only heightened the tensions and would have been counter-productive. Internationally also India sent the right message and displayed great sagacity and wisdom by not resorting to any knee-jerk reactions which could have been detrimental for both India and Pakistan.

How would you view the Cold Start doctrine?

With both India and Pakistan having turned nuclear in 1998, the use of military force against Pakistan is no longer an option. The mobilization and deployment of the army entails massive expenditure, as was illustrated by Operation Parakram in 2002, when a large number of troops were deployed at the borders in the aftermath of the attack on India’s Parliament. In this situation, the army, which has to contend with a hostile power in the form of Pakistan, has come up with the Cold Start doctrine. The Indian Army is fairly convinced that a Cold Start doctrine is a contingency that it should have with regard to Pakistan. To the best of my knowledge they have developed this as a credible option. If I were to comment on the Pakistani response, it has definitely alarmed the latter, as it is weaker than India and is at fault and does deserve some sort of punishment.

Does the military and political establishment differ on issues relating to national security?

Well, in a democracy, there are bound to be differences over certain issues. That said, the Indian Army is a non-political army, which has no political responsibility, and at the end of the day obeys the orders of the political leadership.

Do you subscribe to the view that India is a ‘soft state’?

No, I do not believe that India is a ‘soft state’. First, of course you must define a ‘soft state’. Is it right to indulge in a tit-for-tat, military-related policy, countering Pakistan-sponsored terrorism through sponsoring terrorism in Pakistan and deploying our nuclear assets whenever we feel we have been threatened or attacked by proxy? These are not rational responses and would be counter-productive. Regrettably, our options are not many, but we are not what I would define as a ‘soft state’.

Do you think the Afghanistan issue will exacerbate India–Pakistan tensions?

Afghanistan is definitely an area of concern and it is bound to have a negative impact on the already tense India–Pakistan relationship. Things are in an absolute flux. One can only wait and watch as to what policy the Obama regime embarks upon in the months to come. On the whole I would be sceptical with regard to any change for the positive in Afghanistan.

If you were to comment on the future of India–Pakistan relations, both in the long term and short term, what would you predict?

In the short term, our relations will remain bad and I do not see this changing in the near future. Long-term relations need to be good, but whether
both sides can develop the requisite policies to make it work is a big question. Present developments do not give any logical reason to be hopeful, but one can and should perhaps remain optimistic, but remain prepared for all possibilities.

Brigadier S. S. Chowdhary

What memories do you have of interactions with Muslim officers, who later became part of the Pakistani Army?

In the pre-Partition days Muslim and non-Muslim officers got along reasonably well; this was even more so in the case of Punjabi officers. It would not be incorrect to say that, before 1947, religious identities did not result in any sort of acrimony or bias. When I was posted at the 8th Punjab regimental centre, Lahore, Major Nazar Mohammed Khan, who was known to my brother, was extremely helpful and kind. Later on, when I was posted, as a captain, in Shaiba, Iraq, in 1946, I was part of the control supply depot whose OC was Major Ghulam Rasool Mirza, with whom I developed a very close friendship in a short span of time.

Did the declaration of Partition have any impact on the relationship between Muslim and non-Muslim officers?

Even after it became clear that Partition was on the cards and that the Muslims of India would be getting their own homeland, Muslims and non-Muslims continued to have cordial relations. During the period of bloodshed and violence, the British ensured that the utmost discipline was maintained and for this purpose unpleasant discussions were avoided. Major G. R. Mirza’s attitude towards us did not change at all and he maintained an equally cordial relationship with us. Ultimately, on my own request, I was repatriated to India in a ship by the name of Versova. In spite of all the acrimony back home, Major G. R. Mirza was gracious enough to give a warm send-off. I remember that on our way back, we were not allowed to disembark at Karachi and were taken to Bombay, before being reported to headquarters for posting.

You were part of the Punjab police and responsible for the security of Muslim refugees. How did you handle this assignment, especially when your own family was migrating from the other side?

Yes, army officers were in great demand for various duties including law and order. I, along with a dozen officers, was sent on deputation to the Punjab Government as part of the Punjab police. I was posted as Additional SP of Rohtak (now Haryana, then part of Punjab). I remember having been interviewed by the then Governor of Punjab, Sir Chandu Lal Trivedi, before I was actually assigned this job. In my capacity as ASP of Rohtak, it was decided that I would be responsible for the safe evacuation of Muslim refugees in the district. Most of these Muslims belonged to what is called the Ranghar caste and hailed from twelve villages, one of them being Kalanaur. I might mention that while my family had to flee from Kahuta, one of the places worst hit by the riots, I was free of prejudices and was keen to perform the duty assigned to me with the utmost sincerity and dedication. I might also add that, as a consequence of staying in Lahore for a year, from 1945 to 1946, I had developed great reverence for the liberal teachings of Hazrat Mian Mir, a great Sufi saint. As a result of this I did not have any adverse feelings against Muslims, unlike many others who were witness to the ravages of Partition. I did not lose my rationality and when the time actually came to rescue the lives of innocent Muslims, I did so. Some time around the end of September 1947, caravans of Muslim refugees from the twelve Ranghar Muslim villages started moving from near Rohtak towards Hussainiwala. During this period, some Hindu refugees who had migrated from Multan Division, an area which witnessed barbaric rioting, were in a mood to seek vengeance for their suffering. These Hindu refugees urged me to disarm these Muslims, so that the former could loot the latter.
I dealt firmly with the Hindu refugees and made it unequivocally clear that I would not tolerate any lawless behaviour from them. In fact on one or two occasions we had to resort to firing on the Hindu crowds, when things got out of hand. Eventually, however, I was able to accomplish the task of ensuring the safe passage of the Muslim refugees.

**Did Partition make you prejudiced against Pakistan?**

In the immediate aftermath of Partition, there was some degree of ill will towards Pakistan, and Pakistan’s invasion of Kashmir in 1947 did not help things. But with time, the acrimony did lessen. The 1965 war, however, reinforced hostility towards Pakistan.

**What memories do you have of the 1965 and 1971 wars?**

In the 1965 war I was posted in the Dera Baba Nanak Sector. On the whole, I think India was caught by surprise by the heavy armoured attack in Chhamb in this war, and Pakistan definitely had an advantage over India with regard to Spitfires and other equipment. India retaliated by attacking vigorously across the international border in the Lahore Sector. This shook the Pakistani Army completely. Despite the fact that the Pakistani Army was equipped with the latest American weaponry, including Patton tanks, and the Indian Army had old weapons and World War II-vintage Centurion tanks, yet hard training after the 1962 debacle and superior generalship from General Harbaksh, who was given a free hand by Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, helped India to gain the upper hand. The Indians were able to destroy a significant portion of the Pakistani Army’s tank strength at Bhikhiwind.

During the 1971 war I was posted in Fazilka. During this war, India fought very well and defeated Pakistan convincingly. In the diplomatic and political spheres, the then Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi played her cards extremely well and let the Army Chief Sam Manekshaw plan the war and coordinate the war resources as required. The Chief chose the timing and resources. The overall objective was to destroy the Pakistan war machine in East Pakistan. While doing so, there was also an emphasis on maintaining aggressive defence in the West and to nibble at whatever territory we could. In the east, the operations were conducted admirably and all the resistance was overcome expeditiously. Ninety-six thousand PoWs were captured and treated very well by India.4 Pakistan on the other hand did not have the grace to release Indian PoWs and a soldier from the 5th Assam, Captain Suri, was captured and never released. While India won convincingly, 1971 had two adverse results. First, the Pakistani Army developed a deeper hostility for India and these prejudices still exist. At a strategic level too it was a blunder as earlier on Pakistan had been engrossed in dealing with its internal squabbles. The break-up gave it more time to strategize an anti-India policy by the name of Operation Tupac. The architect of this was General Zia-ul-Haq.5

**Have you ever had the chance to interact with Pakistani Army officers since Partition?**

On a visit to Pakistan in February 2007 I had the opportunity to interact with a few army officers including General Tikka Khan’s son, who was extremely polite and respectful towards me. His native place was also Kahuta, and we interacted in the dialect of that region. I also interacted with a few other army officers and I must make the point that while they were all civilized and courteous, they have diametrically opposing views on a number of issues, specifically Kashmir.

4 For the revised figures, see the General Editor’s Introduction.
5 ‘Operation Tupac’ was the designation for a three-part action plan for covertly supporting militants in Kashmir, initiated in 1988 following the failure of Operation Gibraltar. The designation is derived from Tupac Amaru II (1742–81), Marquis of Oropesa, who led a failed war of liberation in Peru against Spanish rule which resulted in his execution. The objectives of Operation Tupac were to destabilize India; to utilize a spy network to act as an instrument of sabotage; and to exploit the porous borders with Nepal and Bangladesh to set up bases for the conduct of operations.
Do you agree with the view that India has become a ‘soft state’?

India has certainly become a ‘soft state’. Up to the demise of Indira Gandhi, India was treated better externally and internally. Strong and determined nations like the US, the UK, France and China have all managed to overcome and control difficult terrorist problems by timely, coordinated and firm action. India, unfortunately, only issues loud but hollow threats. When the time for action comes, democracy, vote bank politics and vested interests take precedence over the national interest. After the attack on the Parliament, we deployed the army on the border for eleven months, carrying out what was called ‘Operation Parakram’ and then tamely withdrew – under international pressure. This deployment resulted in heavy casualties in men and material. There are many such examples, like the killing of eighteen Border Security Force (BSF) men by the Bangladesh Rifles about a decade back and the hijacking of the Indian Airlines plane, where the Indian reaction was extremely cowardly. Unless we adopt a policy of expeditious, coordinated and firm action, the situation will not improve. India would do well to learn from Israel.

What in your view is the likely future relationship between India and Pakistan?

There should be no doubt about the fact that, with both countries having gone nuclear in 1998, war is no longer an option. The need of the hour is for a political settlement, and, while the Kashmir dispute cannot be avoided forever, it is important to ensure that this issue does not obstruct progress in other areas such as trade, cultural exchanges and sports events. There is an immense scope for trade between the two countries and during my visits to Lahore I got the feeling that there is an appetite for stronger economic ties with India. The current trade sent via third countries like Dubai is not helping either side. More and more trade should be encouraged through the border posts of Hussainiwala and Wagah.

Having grown up in pre-Partition Punjab, where the bond of Punjabiat was quite strong, I also feel that closer ties between the two Punjabs should

Does the Indian political leadership and military establishment differ over issues of national security? When did the fissures emerge?

India is the only democracy wherein the Cabinet rules with the help of a well-entrenched bureaucracy, and all the top professionals are made to work through the bureaucratic controls. Until the Indira Gandhi era, it was always the case that the Prime Minister maintained a direct link with the Service Chiefs and respected their position. After her, the decline began and the armed forces have been progressively downgraded. In the earlier days, during emergencies and crises such as the 26/11 [2008] terror attacks, the army automatically took charge of all operations. There was never any delay or confusion. Now the politicians–bureaucrats–police nexus functions, and the results are there for all to see. India is the only country wherein the bureaucracy functions as an intermediary between the armed forces and the Cabinet. Until we adopt the Chief of Defence Staff system, we will continue to suffer. We must provide status and power to the armed forces – as was the case before the 1970s.

Were you satisfied with your visits to Pakistan?

Yes, I was more than satisfied with my visits to Pakistan, in January 2006 and February 2007. Seeing the acrimony between India and Pakistan, I was sceptical about getting an opportunity to visit Pakistan. Fortunately, I was able to do so and would say that my experience was on the whole pleasant. I was extremely happy that I had a chance to pay obeisance at the historic Sikh shrines of Punja Sahib and Nankana Sahib during my first visit, while during the course of my second visit, I could pay obeisance at Nankana Sahib. My wife, Darshan Chowdhary, was also extremely happy to visit Lahore, her home town, after a gap of nearly 60 years. People were extremely warm and hospitable and there seems to be a revival of Punjabiat, or the concept of Punjabi brotherhood. I was disappointed by two things, however: first, my erstwhile regiment – the 8th Punjab – had been merged into the Baloch regiment; and secondly, I could not trace any of my old friends like G. R. Mirza.
be encouraged and apart from giving a fillip to closer cultural ties between the two provinces, it is also important to liberalize the visa regime for individuals over a certain age who want to visit their erstwhile homes. I think both countries need to show some magnanimity on this issue. Coming to the thorny issues, I think it is important for both sides to sit down and honestly discuss the Kashmir issue and in the process they should endeavour to come up with a solution which is acceptable to India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri people. In spite of being a patriotic Indian and a retired soldier, I feel that Pakistan’s misgivings on Kashmir need to be addressed by the Indian leadership. India and Pakistan were making good progress on Kashmir during the Musharraf period, but the lawyers’ movement, the removal of Musharraf from the position of president and the Mumbai attacks have brought things back to square one. On the issue of terrorism, Pakistan needs to take concrete action against the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks and all such terrorist activities. I think precious little has been done by Pakistan to punish individuals such as Hafiz Saeed of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). In such a situation it is extremely tough for India to carry on business as usual. Finally, I think both India and Pakistan need to rein in religious fundamentalists. While in Pakistan, religious fundamentalism is on the rise, in India too individuals such as Bal Thackeray are wreaking havoc and are harming our society. For any meaningful relationship to develop between the two sides, it is important that the fundamentalists are kept on a tight leash.

6 See the Appendices on Kashmir.
7 The Pakistan government clamped down on LeT in 2002; however, the LeT was covertly allowed to function under the guidance of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD).

Lieutenant-General Kamaleshwar Dawar

What memories do you have of the 1965 and 1971 wars?

I have had the privilege of participating both in the 1965 and 1971 operations against Pakistan in the Lahore and Shakargarh sectors respectively with my regiment, the battle-renowned 7th Light Cavalry. While carrying out an attack inside Pakistan territory in 1965, I was wounded in action. During 1965 I was a young troop leader with Squadron 2IC while in 1971 I was commanding a squadron. There are many common lessons which emerge from these two operations both at the tactical and the strategic levels.

A country should go to war with a clear strategic aim and not merely be forced into one. Though this eventuality always exists, yet all eventualities/options must be war-gamed in peace so that the element of surprise for the enemy is not there. India was drawn into the 1965 operations because of the Pakistan misadventures in Kutch in early 1965 and later its failed attempt to raise an insurrection in the Kashmir Valley in mid-1965. India subsequently took the initiative in early September 1965 and opened up the Punjab and the Jammu–Sialkot fronts and did manage to achieve both strategic and tactical surprise. Though we managed moderate ingress and advances on both the fronts yet we did not achieve the requisite of offensive success in the plains sectors. However in the hill sectors of J&K we did achieve some resounding success such as capturing some areas across the Line of Control, notably the Haji Pir Pass.

Unfortunately all our gains across the Line of Control and IB both in J&K and Punjab respectively had to be returned as a result of the one-sided Tashkent Agreement. This was a strategic mistake by us and to some extent was repeated again in the 1971 operations where, though we kept our gains in the J&K sector across the Line of Control, we freed the 93,000 Pakistan prisoners of war without ensuring something concrete from the deceitful Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. In 1971 we were far better prepared

8 See the discussion of this figure in the General Editor’s introduction.
Indian Interviewees

and equipped and, guided by the indomitable political leadership of Mrs Indira Gandhi (we need more like her to lead us in India) and the astute and inspiring leadership of the likes of General Sam Manekshaw, India won its greatest military victory in its history. History will always record this glorious chapter in golden letters, attributable to Indira Gandhi and the outstanding professionalism and gallantry of the Indian armed forces. In 1971, India was crystal clear in its approach, aim and overall strategy and well prepared so that we achieved total success. It must be noted after Prime Minister Shastri's premature demise and the assumption of office by Mrs Indira Gandhi, re-equipping, modernizing and expansion of troop numbers were undertaken and these stood us in good stead in the 1971 operations. The signing of the Indo–Russian Defence Treaty in 1971 was also a master-stroke of strategy by Mrs Gandhi.

In operations, the calibre and quality of leadership is a battle-winning factor. There are no good or bad units but performance especially in battle is totally linked to the officers' performance. Frankly, I believe that the only ‘martial class’ in battle is the officer class. If and when they lead, their men will follow them willingly and cheerfully to death. Where and when an officer falters, the troops will follow suit. In the Indian armed forces, we have a hallowed tradition of leading from the front which has been acknowledged many times over in our interactions with Pakistani troops who have many times stated that their officers behave like feudal lords and do not lead from the front like their Indian counterparts. It is thus not amazing that in battle, and now in counter-insurgency operations, the Indian Army has the highest officer to men casualty ratio in the world.

During battle, the Pakistanis are sound professionally but they lack the humane or civilized touch which has been the hallmark of all professional soldiers down the ages. Soldiers, no matter how patriotic, gallant and skilful they are, must behave both in victory and defeat as civilized human beings and observe the Geneva Convention norms and other humane constraints on behaviour. In this aspect the Pakistani Army does not have a record worth emulating. Their treatment of prisoners of war is shameful.

I would also like to mention the fact that I was GOC Ladakh and also Chief of Staff in J&K and have seen the Pakistani Army and terrorists active in J&K. The terrorists observe no normal human behaviour and have no compunction in planting bombs and other explosives in villages and bazaars and causing unnecessary casualties to innocent civilians. In Ladakh during Eid celebrations or the Prophet's birthday, I would never order my troops to open fire or indulge in artillery shelling [across the LoC] but whenever it was Diwali or an Indian holiday, the Pakistanis would invariably lob shells and fire at us.

Have you ever had the opportunity to interact with Pakistani officers?

Whenever they meet socially or in UN missions or in countries where both Indians and Pakistanis are serving together they are friendly and do convey the feeling that we are generally the same people and they often look up towards India! There is a small constituency among the intelligentsia within Pakistan who are rational and peace-loving but those who are ignorant and have never met and interacted with the Indians are being regularly fed totally false propaganda by some in Pakistan, and for some years by the ultra-fundamentalist clergy in Pakistan, to engender a negative view of India.

In your view is India a soft state?

All civilized states have to carry the burden of being soft at times. As far as Pakistan is concerned they do not understand any gentlemanly language. Hence we have to send them firm and consistent signals, which the current Home Minister has done and I totally agree with him.

What are the most significant differences between the Indian Army and the Pakistani Army in your opinion?

The Indian armed forces belong to a great, humane and civilized nation and are thorough professionals like the armies of some other leading countries. Blessed by a vibrant democracy, thanks to our founding fathers
and a robust Constitution, the Indian forces (I am alluding to the armed forces, and not the police, please) follow age-old norms of soldiering which is a very noble profession. We have fought many wars against Pakistan, defeated them each time and yet when we have met them after operations, as professionals we bear no hatred or anything negative towards them. As a matter of fact, they must be amazed at our sense of humanity and compassion towards a vanquished enemy. We have always treated their PoWs with civility. Of course, their conduct towards Indian PoWs has been reprehensible. Most of the 1965 and 1971 PoWs in Pakistan had become mentally insane from the Pakistanis’ frequent mental and physical torture. On the other hand, when my regiment caught a few PoWs in the Shakargarh Sector, they were shaking with fear, but we just smiled at them, gave them tea and sent them back to a PoW camp. Victors must always behave magnanimously. In the Kargil war, the Pakistanis managed to catch a very young Indian, Lieutenant Hanifuddin, and tortured him to death. We on the other hand, gave a decent Muslim funeral to some of their soldiers whom they did not even acknowledge as their own.

How do you view the Cold Start doctrine?

It was originally conceived by the late General Bipin Joshi for the army to take to the field in the minimum time to launch limited offensives which can then graduate to major offensives if required. The element of surprise is a battle-winning factor and today’s formidable and precision firepower makes head-on assaults on well-prepared enemy positions very difficult to achieve. Thus a Cold Start doctrine has its plus points, but is not easy to execute in today’s transparent battlefields. You can go on the Internet for unclassified nuances of this aspect. However, India may have to perfect this doctrine for a speedy and effective response as a retaliatory measure against a major terrorist strike on India.

How do you view the relationship between India and Pakistan in the near future?

The Pakistanis, unfortunately for themselves and the whole region, are in a permanent state of denial and are now on the way to dangerous and unstoppable instability as the very groups they trained and nurtured for terror in India and Afghanistan are hitting back at their masters. Pakistan still refuses to see reason to stem these grave problems jointly with India, Afghanistan and the US. When I refer to the Pakistan establishment, it means the army and the ISI, for the civil hierarchy is virtually redundant and meaningless.

Brigadier Satish Issar

Did the fact that you witnessed Partition make you prejudiced against Pakistan?

No, not in the least. In the pre-Partition days, Punjabi society was cohesive, and cultural commonalities between Muslims and non-Muslims obliterated other differences. I had many Muslim friends and religion was never an issue for any of us. I would like to make the point, which has been made by many scholars earlier, that the Partition of India was not conceived by the Punjabi Muslims, but by Muslims from Bihar, Bengal, UP and western India. In any case, Partition affected all, Muslims and non-Muslims. So there is no question of me holding the Muslim community responsible for Partition. After all, Muslims suffered just as did non-Muslims.

Are there any memories of the 1965 and 1971 wars which are etched in your memory?

In 1965, I was posted in Ladakh and missed the action. But as a keen observer of military affairs I would like to note that the 1965 war was started with the
In your opinion what is the best way to resolve the Kashmir issue?

In my view, the solution lies in recognizing the Line of Control as the interim international border between Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and the rest of Jammu and Kashmir, with greater autonomy to their respective democratically elected governments. China is also sitting in occupation of the illegally ceded portion of Jammu and Kashmir, with a vast border with Ladakh and the Karakorum Pass in the north to Demchok in the south. Economic cooperation in the future can regulate trade and help raise the living standards of the people of the region, which must be regulated under the charter of the UN. The strategic location and its huge natural resources would never allow an independent Jammu and Kashmir, on the pattern of Switzerland, as some learned scholars have suggested. Once the border tension is defused and all the concerned nation states agree to resume trade and the development of this area, peace can return to Jammu and Kashmir.

What are your views on the future of Indo-Pakistan relations in the context of the Afghanistan conflict?

This has become a complex problem. The history before the Partition of the Indian subcontinent was that the Afghans always looked towards India and Indian culture as an outlet for their trade and commerce. The creation of Pakistan denied that free passage to the large Indian markets for their products. Once Pakistan restores that trade passage, it can resolve the Afghanistan–Pakistan–India dispute, which has been hijacked further by religious fanatics as well as by the Soviet misadventure, followed by the US’s current initiative involving NATO forces.

How do you view the Cold Start doctrine?

Basically the Cold Start doctrine is a state of operational preparedness, where each side prepares itself for ‘Zero’ warning; which, in the case of
India, is to be prepared for the worst case. This is a scenario in which China and Pakistan collude with each other to wage a war on India.

Was the Indian response to the 26/11 attack adequate?

This falls into the realm of international relations, the foreign policy of the Government of India and the political will of the Central Government of India. First and foremost, there is the question of how this could happen and the intelligence failure. Then there is the issue of the absence of any coordinated response by the local authorities and officials responsible for the internal security of a strategic city like Mumbai.

What are the prospects for the future relationship between India and Pakistan?

While various predictions are made about the future of the relationship, in order to understand the future it is sometimes imperative to go back into the past. In my opinion there is no doubt whatsoever that the Partition of India was a blunder and the subcontinent is still paying the price for this. At the time of Partition, politicians did not foresee the upheaval which would result from the ‘vivisection’ of India, and unfortunately the people had no voice when the country was being divided. They were silent spectators on the one hand and victims of the unpleasant consequences on the other. While it is easy to state that the division of India was inevitable, one must keep in mind the fact that the different religions and cultures of the subcontinent had lived together harmoniously under 500-odd years of Muslim and British rule. Apart from the common culture, the subcontinent’s geography was also meant to unite it rather than divide it. After all, we should not forget the fact that Indians (this includes citizens from other South Asian countries apart from India) have a great ocean. Partition has given birth to identities which are not historical but manufactured.

While in India there is talk of Mother India (*Bharat Mata*),\(^\text{10}\) which as an identity is mixed up between mythology and history, Pakistan has been witness to the growth of religious fundamentalism and jingoism. Children are brainwashed from day one and taught that India is the enemy. While it may not be possible to redraw borders it is time to make use of our common history and other commonalities in order to ensure a better future for citizens of both countries.

Lieutenant-General J. F. R. Jacob

Did the environment in which you grew up influence you negatively against Pakistan?

I grew up in Calcutta in a cosmopolitan atmosphere where I had many Muslim friends. Later on I had some interactions with Punjabi Muslim officers while serving in the pre-Independence era. There was no reason to develop any anti-Pakistan bias. Later on still I had cordial relations with my opposite number when I was posted at the Samba Sector.

Were there any Pakistani officers with whom you had a chance to interact?

Most of my interactions with Pakistani soldiers were before Partition when we were all part of the same army. While serving in Sumatra, Indonesia, I got a chance to interact with Shaukat Raza, while Brigadier Shammi served with me earlier. He was the commander of the artillery of the Pakistan armoured division. He was killed in the 1965 war by an artillery shell. Tikka Khan as far I can recall was on the gunnery staff course I took at the School of Artillery Deolali in August 1947.

\(^{10}\) The personification of India as a mother goddess.
I used to meet with Brigadier Azmat Hayat [son of Sir Sikander Hayat] many times to sort out numerous incidents and problems on the Jammu–Pakistan border when I was commanding the brigade at Samba in 1965–6. He was a thorough gentleman, and easy to get on with. The junior officers with him were difficult, however. Punjabi Muslims were generally very good soldiers and I got along well with most of them.

Do you have any memories of the 1965 and 1971 wars?

I did not take part in the 1965 war as I was commandant of the artillery school at Deolali. There was no winner. It was a drawn affair, though obviously both sides claimed success. China put pressure on us on the Sikkim border, which was done to help Pakistan. I have many memories of the 1971 war, but some stand out.\(^\text{11}\) First, the Instrument of Surrender was drafted by me. The surrender was negotiated on my draft that I had earlier sent to Delhi and remained unconfirmed by Delhi. There were slight mistakes in the document Aurora brought and which was signed at Dhaka. The Instrument of Surrender papers were signed a second time in Calcutta two weeks later, but I did not change any of the terms. It was my draft and my terms that stood. I was also responsible for getting media coverage of the surrender as this would help [in publicizing it]. I had Surajit Sen – then with the All India Radio – to cover the signing.

If one were to look at the [peace from the] army’s perspective, there was a feeling of immense disappointment. It was felt that after a triumph, what was gained on the battlefield was lost at the negotiating table at Simla. We had 93,000 prisoners.\(^\text{12}\) Yet we achieved little. Bhutto agreed verbally to have the ceasefire line as a border. As I have remarked in my book: ‘A verbal contract is not worth the paper it is written on.’ Bhutto reneged.\(^\text{13}\) 1971 was a truly lost opportunity in my mind.\(^\text{14}\)

Three postwar episodes are etched in my mind and are mentioned in my book. The first one was on 17 December 1971. General J. S. Aurora came up to my room visibly upset. The reason for his disappointment was the fact that in an article published in *The Times of India* Aurora’s name had been omitted from the list of those instrumental in India’s victory.

Secondly, General Manekshaw called me telling me that he had heard rumours that Indian troops were looting Pakistani Army stores. I replied that I had not heard of any such instance. In the end Manekshaw told me...
You have been an advocate of India–Israel cooperation, would you like to mention some of the areas in which you think the two countries can cooperate?

Yes, there is definite scope for cooperation with Israel. It can help with intelligence, modernization of weaponry, upgrading Russian and other equipment, joint projects and in the transfer of technology.

In your opinion have Jews become a soft target for militant groups?

Yes, terrorists from Pakistan definitely have Jewish institutions on their hit list.

What is your view on the likely future relationship between India and Pakistan?

I have not had an opportunity of interacting with Pakistanis in the recent past, but all I can say is that things seem gloomy and the Pakistani Army seems to be adopting a more and more jihadi mentality, which was unheard of earlier. If this continues to persist, I am afraid there is not much hope for peace between the two nuclear states. Pakistan is also not very happy with India’s involvement in Afghanistan, since it views the latter as its sphere of influence. By extending support to the Taliban, it is only carrying on the Great Game. I might also add here that Pakistan is making full use of its geographical location, because NATO requires its logistical support for carrying out operations.

Have you ever had a chance to visit Dhaka after 1971?

I might mention that I led a delegation in March 2008 to Dhaka on their invitation. We were given VIP treatment. A number of freedom fighters and some regular officers attend our functions at Fort William on 16 December each year.

Have you had any interactions with Pakistani officers since your retirement?

None at all.

However, General Jacob has since become a close friend of Israel and has been lauded in the Israeli newspapers. Amnon Barzilai, ‘The Jewish General who beat Pakistan’, Haaretz (6 September 2004): http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/the-jewish-general-who-beat-pakistan-1.1133918.
General A. S. Kalkat

Did the milieu in which you grow up have any negative impact on your thinking?

I was born in pre-Partition Punjab, where culture took precedence over faith. Being Hindu, Muslim and Sikh was not so relevant in pre-Partition Punjab as one’s Punjabi heritage took precedence over all other identities. While Punjab was worst hit by the Partition of the country and the bloody riots which ensued did leave a bad taste in the mouth, in no way did I develop any hatred for either Muslims or Pakistan. In fact I would like to make a mention of the fact that my father rescued many of his Muslim friends. This in spite of the fact that both my parents’ families migrated from West Punjab and faced hardships like millions of others. While my mother’s family migrated from Sialkot, my father’s side came from Montgomery. Post-Partition I continued to learn Urdu, a language which I greatly respect for its profound poetry. Interestingly, soon after Partition my father was able to renew some of his friendships and in fact was invited to a wedding by one of his Muslim friends who was an Inspector-General of police.

What are your memories of the 1965 and 1971 wars?

By the time I joined the Indian Army, the mindset was that of there being only one enemy: Pakistan. The Sino–India war of 1962 brought about a radical shift in India’s military strategy and more attention began to be paid to mountain warfare. There was a complete transformation in the psyche of the Indian Army, with more of an emphasis on mountain warfare. This reorientation resulted in the Indian Army not paying much attention to conventional warfare, which was one of the main reasons why we were not well prepared for the 1965 war.

In 1965, I was posted as Company Commander, 5/8 Gorkha Regiment in the Chhamb sector. One of the major highlights of this war was the offensive in the Sialkot Sector, in retaliation to the attack on Akhnoor which took Pakistan by complete surprise. This was truly a Carthaginian lesson of putting Pakistan on the back foot. India’s decision to open up the theatre of attack into Sialkot (Pakistani Punjab) compelled the Pakistani Army to relocate troops engaged in the operation to defend Punjab. Operation Grand Slam which had been launched with the sole objective of capturing the town of Akhnoor therefore failed miserably as the Pakistani Army was unable to capture it.

If one were to look at the overall military tactics used by Pakistan, it indulged in very heavy artillery shelling and it would not be incorrect to say that Pakistan was in a far superior position as far as artillery was concerned. Their equipment was far superior to Indian arms and ammunition. On a personal note, I might mention that I was wounded and hospitalized. Afterwards, I was posted to another battalion in Kashmir. Interestingly, only a few days after the end of the 1965 war we were actually interacting with our opposite numbers.

In the 1971 war, I was a Battalion Commander, 5/8 GR (Chhamb Sector). The hero of the war, Sam Manekshaw, happened to be from my regiment and this was a matter of immense pride. 1971 in a way was the reverse of 1965, as India first attacked the eastern side while Pakistan retaliated on the western side. In 1965, Pakistan initiated the attack and India went on the offensive attacking Pakistan. While the Indians were better prepared than in 1965 and had much better equipment than then, the Pakistanis fought well and gave us a run for our money. The Chhamb area witnessed a particularly intense battle where the Pakistanis forced the Indians to withdraw from their positions. Three days of heavy fighting also led to the capture of two batteries of 216 Medium Regiment by infiltrating the Pakistani infantry, 191 Brigade. In other parts of Kashmir, the Indians made some small gains along the ceasefire line. The major

16 Hannibal took the Roman empire by surprise by crossing the Alps with elephants, which no one thought was possible. The Carthaginian lesson was the defeat of the Roman legions at the Battle of Cannae in the summer of 216 BC by Hannibal’s superior tactics.
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How do you envisage the future of the India–Pakistan relationship?

The realization has dawned amongst all right-thinking individuals, including the army, that the two countries have to coexist together and that war is not an alternative. One of the fundamental misconceptions about the army, which is reflected in media analysis, is to assume that war is against the people of a country. Nothing could be further from the truth. The fact of the matter is that wars are fought with the regime of a country and not the people. Soldiers are fervently committed to peace as only they know the traumas and hardships resulting from war. On the battlefield they are only doing their duty, but in peacetime they have a crucial role to play in improving relationships between countries. A perfect illustration of this point is the active participation of retired army officers in Track Two initiatives.

I have found in my interactions with Pakistani officers that they are extremely reasonable and while they might have totally divergent views on vexed issues like Kashmir, they are committed to peace and recognize the necessity of a harmonious relationship between the two nuclear states of India and Pakistan. I might also add that a lot of Pakistani officers have begun to realize that a good relationship will be mutually beneficial for both countries. The point I would like to make with regard to the media is that it needs to exercise restraint during periods of tension such as in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks. I have noticed that rather than being a responsible actor during a conflict situation the media increases the hysteria. As an institution it tends to vacillate between two extremes: one day it is pitching for peace while, in the aftermath of an attack, it adopts an extremely hawkish and even untenable approach. In the aftermath of 26/11, for example, the media kept on speaking about giving up some of our basic liberties in order to secure our borders. But the fundamental flaw with this argument is that we may end up losing both of them.

The other thing which I notice is that a lot of time is spent in debating whether India has become a soft state or not. It would not be incorrect to say that ‘soft state’ has become a general cliche and passé unless the speaker clearly defines what he means by the antonym ‘hard state’.

Have you had the opportunity to interact with any Pakistani officers?

I have had the opportunity of meeting Pakistani officers. The first chance I got to interact with a Pakistani officer was in 1967 when I was at the Staff College, Australia. I met a gentleman by the name of Amjad Khan Chowdhury who was a Bengali Khoja Muslim and belonged to the Baloch Regiment. Later on, Chowdhury rose to the rank of major-general in Bangladesh and was number 2 to Ershad, after the creation of Bangladesh. Chowdhury started his own business and for a while was also President of the Bangladesh Chamber of Commerce, where he aggressively pushed for a free trade agreement between India and Bangladesh. I would like to make special mention of the fact that even though it had only been two years since India had fought a war against Pakistan, Chowdhury (then a Pakistani) and I got along extremely well. Later on, as a result of being involved in Track Two initiatives like Neemrana, I have had the opportunity of interacting with Lieutenant-General Durrani (former DG ISI) and Major-General Mahmood Durrani (subsequently NSA). When I met up with them, both had retired and were not holding any position. We had stimulating interactions even though there were differences of opinion on certain issues. I might mention that one of the Track Two summits was in fact held right after Kargil in 1999.

Indian counter-offensive came in the Sialkot–Shakargarh area south and west of Chhamb. In what proved to be the largest tank battle of the war, both sides suffered considerable casualties. The Indian Air Force played a pivotal role in India’s victory. The MIG 21s which were obtained only a few years earlier proved to be handy.

I myself had a very narrow escape while on patrol with some enlisted soldiers (jawan). Suddenly a Pakistani soldier appeared from nowhere and screamed, ‘Hands up!’ One of my men attacked the man with a khukri and killed him. I also remember that one of my nephews, Billu Gill, died in the war. One of the major lessons from 1971 was that India could not follow an unbalanced strategy and henceforth both the air force and the army were extremely important.
Do you think that the Indian government’s response after 26/11 was adequate?

I cannot think of any better options than those exercised consequent to 26/11. After all, a domestic fallout was contained, avoiding any backlash; Pakistan was humbled in the world forums. However, thought-free statements like ‘we will not talk to Pakistan until...’ could have been avoided so that we did not have to backtrack later. Ultimately we have had to resume dialogue with the Pakistani side.

Overall, I would like to reiterate that there is no escape from the fact that both sides need to engage in a creative manner and the ultimate destination has to be peace between the two countries.

Major-General Harwant Krishnan

Did the milieu you grow up in lead to any bias or ill will against Pakistan?

I was born after Partition and I grew up in a cosmopolitan atmosphere, free of any bias or hatred. While Pakistan was looked at as an unfriendly neighbour, China was viewed as the bigger enemy during the period when I was growing up, especially in the aftermath of the Sino-Indian war of 1962.

Do you have any vivid memories from the wars of 1965 and 1971?

I joined the army in 1969 and hence did not get a chance to fight the war of 1965. In the war of 1971, I was a young officer posted in the Poonch Sector. All I can say is that there was a sense of satisfaction and pride in being part of the Indian Army which had fought well and defeated the Pakistani Army. While initially the Indian side was on the defensive, we managed to put the Pakistani side on the back foot. On 3 December 1971, the ceasefire was declared and the war came to an end. India basically followed what is called the policy of ‘offensive defence’.

Have you had any opportunity to interact with Pakistani officers?

I was posted as India’s defence attaché in Germany and got along very well with my Pakistani counterpart. There was no animosity whatsoever. On the contrary, outsiders were surprised when they saw the bonhomie not only between myself and my Pakistani counterpart, but also between our wives, Sudesh and Rubina. I remember that we used to always lapse into Hindi or Urdu, at any given opportunity. While I did not have the chance to interact much with Pakistani officers while I was posted in Kashmir, my colleagues had the opportunity to do so, since there were numerous flag meetings. There were no problems whatsoever between both sides. In fact, they exchanged sweets on numerous occasions with their counterparts.

What memories do you have of your last period of tenure in Kashmir?

During my stint as GOC in Baramulla, the Indian Army played a crucial role in building the bridge between Muzaffarabad and Srinagar. While we had anticipated that the route would take approximately six months to reopen, it ended up taking a mere 38 days. This feat was recognized not only in India, but also internationally. Reconstruction of the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus route included amongst other things the construction of the road, bridge and transit points and a facelift of a 60-mile stretch. This was done through coordination with central ministries and various government departments in Jammu and Kashmir.

Do you think there is any communal angle to the Kashmir issue?

No, not at all. Pakistan has been trying to foment communalism. While its plan was successful in a few areas of the Valley, in other parts of the Valley their strategy has been an absolute failure. The common man is more concerned about day-to-day issues of development and does not have much time for Pakistani propaganda.
In your view is there close coordination between civilian officials and the government on national security issues?

Generally, civilian officials in Kashmir understand the army’s thinking and look forward to army officers’ opinions and assessments since the latter are in intimate contact with the people across the state. A fairly cooperative environment exists between the civilian set-up and the military establishment.

Do you think India should have reacted in a different manner to the Mumbai attack?

Considering that all the planning and control of the attack on Mumbai was from Pakistani soil and no visible actions were being taken by the Pakistan authorities, I feel that the hard line taken by India was necessary.

What in your view is the likely future relationship between the two countries?

The political establishments on each side need to pave the way for peace. The Indian Army is a professional organization and it merely does what it is told to do. My personal experiences clearly illustrate that there is no pathological hatred or ill will between the people of the two countries. This fact is well borne out by my interactions with Pakistani officers.

What do you think is a realistic solution to the Kashmir issue?

The two countries need to sit down and find a realistic solution to the two main problems, Kashmir and terrorism. My experience in Kashmir has clearly demonstrated that apart from a few pockets in the Valley, there is no real anti-India feeling. In fact, during my tenure itself the flag of India was unfurled on the occasion of Republic Day after many years on 26 January 2006 in the heart of Baramulla. There were no untoward incidents. To everyone’s thorough astonishment, the local press reacted very positively to this development. Sections in Kashmir do have their economic grievances, such as a shortage of jobs, which are being addressed by the Government of India to enable Kashmir to join the mainstream of economic development. Yet the earlier animosity against India is a thing of the past. When the Indian Army was distributing relief materials in the aftermath of the October 2005 earthquake, at many places slogans of ‘Indian Army Zindabad’ (Long live the Indian Army!) could be heard. The people constantly demanded that any aid that the government released for the earthquake-affected population should be routed through the Indian Army – so that it reached the right quarters – that’s the kind of confidence the population has in the army – this is the case in villages away from the centres of militant leadership. In this situation, the most realistic solution in my mind is for the two countries to have soft borders and to recognize the Line of Control as the international border. In addition to this, it is important that Pakistan abjures violence and accepts the realities on the ground.

Did the milieu you grew up in create any biases against Pakistan?

While I was born in pre-Partition India, this had no impact whatsoever on my mindset vis-à-vis Pakistan.

What memories of the 1965 and 1971 wars are etched in your mind?

I missed the action in both wars.

General V. P. Malik

Indian Interviewees
What are your memories of the Kargil war of 1999?

When I briefed the commanders-in-chief and other officials on 24 May, it was obvious that the audience was quite surprised with what had happened on the ground in terms of the jihadis’ infiltration. No one had expected that Pakistan would indulge in such a military action when efforts by the two prime ministers were being made to follow up on the Lahore meeting. By the time I finished my briefing, I could sense that the long faces in the audience had become longer. I had conveyed a harsh but unambiguous picture of the ground realities and their political and military implications.

On the commencement of Operation Vijay, diplomatic pressure started building up from Pakistan and the international community for talks between New Delhi and Islamabad. Initially, Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif suggested that air strikes (within our own country) be stopped as a ‘precondition’ for talks. When this suggestion was rejected outright, he offered to send Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz to New Delhi. The Government of India accepted this offer. Until then, we had not been able to recapture any tactically significant area from the intruders in the Kargil Sector. I was worried that any political negotiations or attempts to seek a diplomatic solution at this point of time would result in a militarily disadvantageous solution for us.

We recaptured our first major objective, Tololing, which was the deepest point up to which Pakistani Army had intruded into Dras Sector. Close fighting here, almost bunker to bunker, went on for several days. It was a touch-and-go situation. As Army Chief, I was anxious, but could not afford to convey my anxiety to anyone by asking for too many details; nor could I interfere with the battle that was planned and conducted at the brigade level. The list of casualties kept growing. We lost three officers, four junior commissioned officers and sixteen other ranks; also, 49 personnel were wounded. The enemy losses were put at 27, based on the number of bodies recovered; 60 others were assessed as ‘killed and wounded’. I could say very little till the entire Tololing feature was captured, which happened on 17 June. The events that transpired during the battle made me think of the difficult days ahead, when we had to clear the enemy from other areas.

But after realizing the determination and the fighting spirit of our troops, I was convinced that we could do it.

Due to major budgetary cuts in defence expenditure in the early 1990s, we were short of weapons and equipment in several units. When asked a question about this in one of the press briefings, I had said, ‘We shall fight with whatever we have.’ One day, I accompanied Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to visit wounded soldiers in the military hospital at Srinagar. The Prime Minister asked a seriously wounded Garhwali soldier, ‘How are you feeling? What can I do for you?’ The soldier forgot his pain. He replied, ‘Sir, I will be alright in a few days and then would like to go back to my unit to fight. But I have a request. Please get us lighter weapons and equipment, which we can carry on these mountains more easily.’

I might also mention another interesting episode during Kargil. When General Vij, DGMO during Kargil, met his counterpart from the Pakistani side and showed him the maps that the Pakistani troops had left behind, he said, ‘Ye kaun abmak log hain jo ye sab cheezein chhod ke aa gaye’ (‘What fools have left behind these things!’).

In your view what is the major difference between the Indian Army and Pakistani Army?

First, the Indian Army is totally non-political while I cannot say the same about the Pakistani Army. Kargil itself is a good illustration of how the Pakistani Army dominates the decision-making process of that country. While there is no doubt that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was briefed about Kargil, information emerging from various sources clearly suggests that Sharif was kept in the dark with regard to the overall scale of the operation and possible consequences. Such a scenario is unthinkable in the Indian context. I might add here that of late the Pakistani Army has been making attempts to become part of the democratic set-up, but it remains to be seen whether such a scenario persists, especially with General Kayani being in the good books of the Americans as a result of the Swat operation.

Secondly, the army in Pakistan has an extreme religious influence. After Kargil we got a chance to see Pakistani soldiers’ diaries, and I was
quite surprised to see the religious influence on them. A large number of diaries for instance contained do’s and don’ts from the Qur’an. I would not refrain from saying that the jihadi element has become part and parcel of the Pakistani Army and that the Pakistani strategic culture is jihadi. The Indian Army on the other hand is the epitome of secularism and whenever there have been instances of individuals acting against the state on the altar of religion, due action has been taken against them.

Thirdly, many of the Pakistani Army’s actions are tactically sound but strategically they are nothing short of a blunder. In my opinion even the operation in Swat has only increased alienation and is bound to be counter-productive.

Finally, the Pakistani Army makes use of non-state actors as was evident from the Kabaili invasion of Kashmir in 1948 and Operation Gibraltar in 1965. Kargil in 1999 only reiterated this point further. With such a difference in mindset, I am of the firm opinion that there is no real use in increasing interactions between the armies of the two countries as has been often recommended by individuals from the strategic community, as well as those actively engaged in Track Two diplomacy.

Do you think India should have reacted differently to the Mumbai attacks?

Yes! I think we should have responded much more strongly diplomatically.

How do you view the future of India–Pakistan relations?

If one looks from a long-term perspective there is no escaping the fact that both countries have to look at creating mutual interdependence; the best way of doing this is obviously through increasing economic cooperation and trade between them. Pakistan's army also needs a drastic overhaul. First, the army needs to be less involved in politics and unless there is a genuine shift towards a civilian democracy, the prospects of peace between India and Pakistan are slender. It is important to bear in mind the fact that it is extremely difficult for an Indian political leader to negotiate with the Pakistani set-up as long as it is dominated by the army. We need to be clear about the fact that the mindset of a political leader varies greatly from that of a soldier and negotiations are extremely tough. Thus having a strong political leadership, free from the interference of the army, in Pakistan would do wonders for the relationship in my opinion.
I might add here that while a lot was made of General Musharraf’s overtures towards India, his offers lacked seriousness and I was a bit surprised to see that the former National Security Advisor Mr M. K. Narayanan openly stating that India felt comfortable with Musharraf. After having seen Kargil from close quarters, I did not have any faith in the man in any case. I recollect writing him a letter congratulating him when he took over [as Commander in Chief]. His reply came three months later on in May. By this time, the infiltration in Kargil had already begun.

I might also mention that in 2001, when General Musharraf came for the Agra summit he had extended me an invitation for a tea party he hosted at the Pakistan High Commission. Other guests included the former prime ministers I. K. Gujral and V. P. Singh. The former actually told me that I did the wise thing by not attending the tea, because Musharraf did not seem sincere in his intentions. Musharraf’s book also contains a large number of false statements.

Secondly, the army needs to move away from its present perception of India being enemy number one. Its outlook – of India being enemy number one – makes it problematic for the political establishment in that country to negotiate any sort of settlement with India. Besides being obsessed with India, it overlooks many of its domestic problems.

Thirdly, for a more harmonious relationship between the two nuclear states, it is also imperative that the Pakistani Army stops lending support to non-state actors as it has done in the past.

Fourthly, Pakistan must realize that the relationship between India and Pakistan cannot simply be held hostage to one issue. If it wants dialogue with India it has to give up its intransigence on Kashmir. Unless more flexibility is shown on Kashmir, I am not very hopeful of there being any substantial changes in the relationship between the two countries.

If I were to look at things from a short-term perspective however, I definitely feel that this is the wrong time to talk to Pakistan for a number of reasons. First, at the moment Pakistan’s ties with India are primarily dictated by the Pakistani Army, and only recently the army has quite unambiguously stated that it continues to see India as the primary security threat – not the current happenings across its western border in Afghanistan. Secondly, Pakistan has reneged on its commitment to take action against the perpetrators of 26/11, including the Jamaat-ud-Dawa head, Hafiz Saeed. In addition to this, with the Pune blast having occurred and no signs of reduction of infiltration into Kashmir, by agreeing to talk to Pakistan, India has sent the message that talks are unconditional, i.e. India will talk even if there is no reduction in terrorist activity. This is not the appropriate message to send internationally.

If India has gone ahead for talks as a result of US intervention in the region, it should be wary of this. I do not support mediation by a third party, as this only weakens our stand against Pakistan. During Kargil I remember President Clinton invited Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee to the White House along with Nawaz Sharif, but he refused the invitation saying that he could not accept US mediation when Pakistan had actually invaded Indian territory.

Major-General Ashok K. Mehta

Did the environment in which you grow up influence you adversely against Pakistan?

Even though I was born in what is now Pakistan and come from a family of refugees, Partition did not leave a bitter taste in the mouth or create any anti-Pakistan feeling. Once I joined the Indian Army, however, Pakistan was clearly the immediate enemy while China was viewed as the long-term enemy.

What memories of the 1965 and 1971 wars are etched in your mind?

I had the opportunity of seeing action in both the wars, 1965 and 1971. During the 1965 war, I was posted as a major in the Poonch Sector, while in the 1971 war I was posted as a major on the eastern front. Regarding the
1965 war, I would mince no words in reiterating what many others have said earlier that 1965 was war by stealth and infiltration and this badly backfired on Pakistan. Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar, an infiltration across the Line of Control (LoC) by regular soldiers to instigate an uprising in J&K. This infiltration was met by Indian forces crossing the LoC and capturing the two main launch pads for infiltration at the Haji Pir Pass and Kishanganga. In 1971, I had to shift position from the eastern side to the west within 48 hours. While India emerged victorious in 1971, and it was a matter of immense pride for all of us, I would like to make the point that in both 1965 and 1971, India was extremely humane in dealing with PoWs. There was complete adherence to the rule of law and Geneva Conventions. There was no torture; in fact, Pakistani PoWs were treated extremely well after the defeat of 1971, to the degree that they were even given real feasts (badakhanas), much to the chagrin of many young officers. All the above points have been eminently borne out by Pakistani soldiers. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said about Pakistan’s treatment of PoWs during war.

Have you ever had the opportunity to interact with Pakistani Army officers?

Yes, I have had the opportunity. In 1984, I attended a course at the Royal College of Defence Studies in London, where I got the opportunity to meet and interact with Lieutenant-General Moinuddin Haider who was to become General Musharraf’s Interior Minister. During this course I had the opportunity of interacting with another Pakistani officer, Hakimullah Khan. Later on, as Defence Editor of Sunday, I began to write on issues pertaining to India and Pakistan and actually became connected to two individuals, I. A. Rahman and Hamid Abid Rao. Then, in 1996, a team of Rashtriya Indian Military College alumni came from Pakistan. Here again I interacted with retired Pakistani Army officers who had also served in the Indian Army. In the aftermath of Kargil and the attack on the Indian Parliament, I became active in Track Two diplomacy and in my capacity as head of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung-sponsored India–Pakistan bilateral dialogue I have had the good fortune of interacting with Pakistanis from different walks of life, including retired army officers.

How do you view the future of India–Pakistan relations?

As far as India is concerned, I think it missed a clear opportunity to resolve the Kashmir issue when Musharraf was in office. It remains to be analyzed as to why the Manmohan Singh regime did not clinch the Kashmir issue in 2007. That in my view was India’s best hope to resolve the vexed dispute. If any such opportunity presents itself again, India should take the gamble and do whatever is required to find a solution to the Kashmir issue.

If one looks at Pakistan, ever since 2008, elements in Pakistani civil society are no longer in denial about the fact that certain elements in Pakistan are involved in terrorist activities. Many have openly begun to admit that ‘our own pets are beginning to bite us’. One point which emerged unequivocally at a trilateral conference in Kabul was that India is no longer enemy number one. It is the Taliban who have replaced India as far as the enemy number one tag is concerned. It was interesting to note that there was no talk of ‘Good Taliban’ and ‘Bad Taliban’ as was a common practice in the past. India and the US both need to play a pivotal role in strengthening the hands of liberal elements in Pakistan, especially those actively involved in Track Two diplomacy, who are committed to fighting the malaise of terrorism.

It is important to understand that such a change in mindset is not visible in the establishment, which still views India as the number one enemy. Mushahid Hussein, a former adviser to General Musharraf, recently remarked at a Track Two India–Pakistan conference in Singapore, sponsored by the German Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in November 2009, that the army and ISI both had said tauba (enough) to all underhand tricks. I am of the opinion that there is immense scope for Track Two to influence Track One in changing the prevalent mindset of India being Pakistan’s number one enemy.

In addition to this, India must be ready to speak to Pakistan on Jammu and Kashmir, Siachen and other issues and also ensure that the roots of democracy are strengthened in Pakistan. Trade between the two Kashmirs also must be encouraged. It is important for America, India and Britain to ensure that Pakistan transforms itself into a moderate state. While all the above-mentioned overtures by both India and the West are imperative, I
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How do you view the Cold Start doctrine?

The Cold Start doctrine has been completely exaggerated in Pakistan. It does not have the capability that has been ascribed to it due to several equipment and tactical deficiencies. But it is useful from the Indian point of view as it has got the Pakistanis worried. It’s like making a mountain out of a molehill.

Now that Musharraf is gone and a weak civilian regime is in place in Pakistan, how do you view the prospects of reopening the dialogue on Kashmir?

Civilian governments on their own can do nothing. The army must recognize the cost of hostility and accept that self-inflicted terrorism – and not India – is Pakistan’s enemy number one. India can become a good friend but that will take away the threat that gives the Pakistani Army its primacy in society as the ultimate protector of its core values. Since the fall of General Pervez Musharraf the Pakistani Army under General Kayani has undone all the gains of the Musharraf era. I do not see any reconciliation any time soon; though a reopening of dialogue on Kashmir is likely it will not be result-oriented – unless they pick up the threads of the back-channel Kashmir formula. It is important not to try to reinvent the wheel.

China is a close ally of Pakistan, and India has clear differences with China: do you view the prospect for South Asia as a risk of two rival camps (India–the US vs. China–Pakistan)?

The China–Pakistan rival camp is folklore. An India–US or India–Japan–Vietnam–South Korea alliance is possible but it will not be as overt as the China–Pakistan nexus. Countries in South East Asia fear China and are unlikely to be seen as opposed to it. Similarly the India–US camp can only be covert and informal on specific issues.

Indian Interviewees

Would like to make mention of the fact that post-Mumbai attacks a lot of Indian liberals have begun to lose patience. There is a danger that the animosity against Pakistan will be accentuated in the case of any further attacks emanating from Pakistani soil. In fact, in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks in 2008, some Indians refused to participate in a Track Two event. In the past, attacks have never evoked such a hostile reaction from the Indian side.

Having headed a Track Two initiative, don’t you think that the visa regimes need to be made more flexible to enhance ‘peoples to peoples’ contact which is necessary for improving relations between both countries?

Well, a liberal visa regime is important, but then it is tough to know about the bona fides of certain individuals. So the government has its own constraints and cannot be blamed for its overcautiousness in liberalizing the visa regime.

Do you feel that the army and the political leadership differ in their approach towards national security, especially vis-à-vis Pakistan?

Yes, of course. This was clearly illustrated after the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 when the Army Chief, General Padmanabhan, was extremely keen to take on the Pakistani military. The political leadership, however, is unwilling to risk calling Pakistan’s bluff because of escalation and annoying the Americans.

Are you of the opinion that India has turned into a soft state? Should India have reacted differently after 26/11?

India has always been a soft state. It should have acted differently after Kargil, but again, for the reasons I have mentioned earlier, the political leadership was unwilling to risk it.
There are many other disputes between India and Pakistan, apart from Kashmir. Do you see these as being settled inevitably if a settlement is reached on Kashmir, or are there always likely to be differences between these two powers?

Siachen and Sir Creek are resolvable once the trust deficit is bridged. Siachen is inextricably linked to Pakistan sticking to its commitment, made more than four times, not to allow use of its territory for terrorist attacks against India. In 2000, General Pervez Musharraf told a Rotarians’ gathering in Karachi that, even if the Kashmir dispute is resolved, the India–Pakistan problem will not go away. Kashmir is just the manifestation of the strategic quest by Pakistan for parity with India. Pakistanis believe in the superiority of their nation and religion. Pakistan has to come to terms with itself; discover its identity and personality and not indulge in self-destruction through religious fundamentalism.

Lieutenant-General Satish Nambiar

Before joining the Indian Army, did you have any inbuilt biases against Pakistan?

I have always stated with some conviction that even for people of my generation (I was eleven years old when India and Pakistan became independent), the creation of Pakistan and its status as an independent country were never issues for us. We accepted that fact and in many ways wished them well, except to the extent that they sought to speak for the Muslims of the subcontinent, to which they had absolutely no claim. Generations that have followed us, like my son who is also in the Indian Army, have even less issue with Pakistan as an entity by itself.

Are there any memories of the 1965 and 1971 wars which are etched in your memory?

During the 1965 conflict, I was in the Jammu-Sialkot Sector. One of the most enduring impressions I carried of that war, as also the 1971 conflict, which I invariably stress at various international conferences, symposia and workshops, is the fact that, by and large, the two armed forces refrained from targeting each other’s civilians and civilian population centres. Equally, in so far as the Indian Army is concerned, after the ceasefire, we were meticulous in either clearing minefields that had been laid, or exchanging records of the same where such clearance could not be undertaken prior to pulling out from ‘occupied’ territory.

The most enduring impression I carry of the 1971 conflict is that of our entry into Dhaka on the afternoon of 16 December 1971: a bunch of unwashed and not-too-well-dressed, but determined, guys who had out-fought the opponents and secured their surrender. We drove into Dhaka in vehicles that had been ‘captured’ or ‘commandeered’ in Jamalpur and Tangail, under the baleful glares of armed Pakistani troops, who could do nothing but ‘glare’ at us. As things went, that night we were probably outnumbered five to one by the Pakistanis, if not more. And they were armed just as we were because our higher commanders had allowed them to retain their weapons till we had enough forces to provide for their security against the Bangladeshis who would otherwise have looked for retribution.

The other enduring impression I carry is that of the formal laying down of weapons by the Pakistani troops in Dhaka on 18 December 1971, by which time the Indian Army had enough troops to ensure protection of the prisoners of war against local retribution. The proud Pakistani soldiers who had been brought up in the philosophy that ‘one Pakistani soldier was a match for ten Indian soldiers’ had to come to terms with reality; they were a defeated army. The Indian Army had secured the surrender of over 93,000 Pakistani troops in the Eastern Theatre. This aspect is significant

17 See the General Editor’s Introduction for Brian Cloughley’s revision downwards of these figures, although the number of PoWs remained sizeable.
because it has an impact on the Pakistani psyche even today, particularly that of the Pakistani Army, that has always considered itself as the guardian of the country’s interests. The compulsion to seek revenge for what is perceived as the ignominy of defeat in 1971 is all-pervasive in the Pakistani military establishment and some sections of the political leadership. This has guided their policy in the last four decades and will continue to do so unless the generations that were not physically witness to the ignominy of 1971 are able to put it behind them.

Have you ever had the opportunity to interact with Pakistani Army officers?

I am probably one of the few Indian Army officers to have had considerable personal interaction with Pakistani Army officers. My first interaction started in 1968 when I attended the Australian Army Staff College. My Pakistani colleague on the course was then Major Javed Nasir, who later went on to become the DG ISI and was rabidly anti-India. As colleagues on the course we got on pretty well – much to the surprise of our Australian colleagues who had expected to see us at each other’s throats. We played cricket and hockey for the College, were bridge partners on occasions and, as a bachelor yearning for food with a subcontinental flavour, I often visited his house to partake of roghan josh (or other similar mughlai dishes) and parathas prepared by his charming wife Shabnam. In September 1991, as the then Director-General of Military Operations at army headquarters in Delhi, I led a five-member defence delegation for talks with the Pakistani military in Islamabad.

During a courtesy call on the late General Asif Nawaz Janjua, at the start of our visit, I recall mentioning to him that I was looking forward to meeting Javed Nasir, who was then the Pakistani Army Engineer-in-Chief with the rank of lieutenant-general. To my surprise, General Asif Nawaz enquired whether I was aware that the Javed Nasir of 1991 was not the same person I knew in 1968. This was a reference to the fact that sometime in the 1980s, probably in the Zia-ul-Haq years, Javed Nasir had transformed into a radicalized Islamist as it were. I was of course aware of this transformation from various sources over the years but little expected the Pakistani Chief to refer to it in the manner he did.

In the event, during a dinner hosted for us in the GHQ officers’ mess by the Pakistan Chief of the General Staff, Javed Nasir walked in and greeted me. He had come all the way from Risalpur, where he was located, to meet me. He had a huge flowing beard that reached to his waist and was, unlike the rest of the Pakistani officers who were dressed in lounge suits, clad in a sherwani and pyjamas with a typical fur cap on his head. He embraced me and engaged me in conversation to the exclusion of everyone else for over half an hour and then left. Prior to our departure from Islamabad, I received a couple of personal gifts sent by him, including a shalwar kameez for my wife. As things happened, in early March 1992, I was deputed by the Government of India as the Head of the UN Forces in the former Yugoslavia, and I think sometime that year Javed Nasir was appointed DG ISI by then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

As military adviser at the High Commission of India in London for just under four years from December 1983 until November 1987, I frequently interacted and became on friendly terms with my Pakistani counterparts: in particular, then Brigadier Ayaz Amir, who went on to become a corps commander with the rank of lieutenant-general.

As Director-General of Military Operations in 1991–92, I had occasion to deal with my Pakistani counterpart, initially General Jehangir Karamat and then the late Major-General Jamshed Malik. I was able to establish a cordial working relationship with both of them that enabled us on a number of occasions to lower tensions that had developed on the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. In due course I also met them personally at the official level when they were members of Pakistani delegations, and developed a friendship that we carried into retirement. In fact, Jehangir Karamat and I were later members together of an international project that enabled our wives to meet each other.

18 A photograph forwarded by Brian Cloughley suggests that Nasir’s beard was not as generous as suggested by the interviewee.
Since retirement, I have met and developed a cordial relationship with many former Pakistani diplomats and military officers as a consequence of my association with a number of bilateral and multilateral Track Two processes. This includes personalities like Shahryar Khan, Talat Masood, Assad Durrani and Mahmood Durrani, among many others. I have met General Pervez Musharraf on three occasions (1995, 2003 and 2007) but the interaction was very much formal.

**How do you view the future of India–Pakistan relations?**

As things stand, any significant improvement in relations does not appear to be on the horizon. There is too much distrust, made even worse by the frequent attempts to score brownie points off each other in the regional and global arena. At the core of the problem is Pakistan’s ‘identity crisis’. Pakistan has not apparently yet evolved an identity of its own. Everything it does or seeks to do is set in the prism of being ‘anti-India’. To that extent, issues like Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan’s support for terrorist activities against India are a symptom of the larger malaise of not being able to come to terms with this core problem. And until that is resolved in a manner that gives Pakistan a degree of comfort, there is little or no scope for an improvement in relations. In the meanwhile, one can only work on peripheral issues like people-to-people contacts, cultural exchanges, trade and economy and so on. Even so, it is not outside the realm of possibility that if efforts to increase trade between the two countries meet with some success, leading to improved economic conditions for the people, this may transcend the basic distrust and suspicion and could compel the political and military leadership to strive for stable relations.

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**Lieutenant-General Vijay Oberoi**

**Before joining the Indian Army, did you have any inbuilt biases against Pakistan?**

My family hailed from Jhelum, District Chakwal. At the time of Partition however, my father was posted in Kasur, while we were in Jhelum. My father had many Muslim friends who actually helped him to migrate safely, while the rest of the family too did not face the suffering which many others faced during this traumatic period. Hence I did not have any anti-Muslim or anti-Pakistan feeling, which was widespread amongst those who had gone through the travails of partition. I would like to make one point however that partition inspired me to join the army, as it was the army which controlled the rioting. Interestingly, the Maratha regiment which I was to join later played a stellar role in controlling the riots, and I remember seeing soldiers of this regiment quelling the riots.

**Are there any memories of the 1965 and 1971 wars which are etched in your memory?**

In 1965, I was wounded and lost my leg which later on had to be replaced with an artificial leg. Infiltration into Kashmir started in the first week of August 1965. My battalion, the First Battalion of the famous Maratha Light Infantry, was moved into the area. As we entered the Dachigam forest, infiltrators ambushed us. The first bullet fired hit my right thigh. The action lasted only a few minutes, and there were two casualties – Lieutenant Raut and myself, both wounded.

By the time we reached the hospital at Srinagar, Raut had succumbed to his wounds and the doctor did not have much hope that I would survive either. The doctor’s quick response kept me going however. The lower leg soon developed gangrene. I was shifted to the military hospital at Delhi. Ten days later, my right leg was amputated a little below the knee. Two
In fact, it is my interactions with members of the Pakistani community which actually led to the realization that increasing trade was one of the best ways for building a stable relationship between the two countries. I appeared on a large number of television channels and was part of numerous panel discussions as well. In fact one of the TV channels insisted on interviewing me on one of my later visits to London as well.

**What is your view on the likely future of India–Pakistan relations?**

While there is no doubt whatsoever that both countries need to chalk out a strategy for peaceful coexistence, this does not seem realistic until there are some fundamental changes in the Pakistani system. Firstly, the Pakistani Army has to forego power – until this happens peace between the two countries can only remain a dream as the army's survival is based on its anti-India stance. The roots of this sentiment lie in the crushing defeat which the army faced in 1971. The defeat rankles in the minds of large sections of the Pakistani Army and ever since 1971 the Pakistani Army has assiduously made use of various instruments including attempts to destabilize India. The policy of 'death by a thousand cuts' propounded by General Zia-ul-Haq is still being continued, as was evident from the Mumbai attacks on 26/11, when non-state actors seemed to have received the support of the Pakistani Army. I would like to make it clear however, that while this use of non-state actors may have increased in recent years, it is not a recent phenomenon.

In fact Pakistan has been making use of non-state actors ever since 1947, when it sent in tribal raiders (Kabailis) to Kashmir, and then the 1965 war began with the infiltration of Pakistani commandos and irregulars, who sneaked into J&K in civilian clothes and commenced targeting military and non-military targets. Thus to think that it has resorted to non-state actors only in the aftermath of 1971 is a myth. I would also like to make the point that while this use of non-state actors may have increased in recent years, it is not a recent phenomenon.

Have you ever had the opportunity to interact with Pakistani Army officers?

I have had numerous opportunities to interact with Pakistani Army officers. When I was Director-General of Military Operations, my counterpart on the Pakistani side happened to be General Pervez Musharraf. We used to talk over the telephone frequently and I found him extremely sharp and shrewd. As military attaché in Kuala Lumpur, I interacted on a number of occasions with the Pakistani ambassador and first secretary. In 1988, I went to the US Army War College for a course and got the chance to interact with a Pakistani brigadier, Muhammad Anwar, who was extremely guarded, unlike other Pakistani officers, who in spite of various differences are extremely forthcoming. He later on rose to the rank of major-general and was president of Azad Kashmir from 2001 to 2006. In 2004, I revived contact with him in an unexpected manner. I was being interviewed by a Pakistani TV channel, which had interviewed me during my visit to Pakistan in 2003. Anwar was sitting with my interviewer and was very happy to re-establish links with me after such a long time.

Being involved in research on security and strategic issues, I have also had the opportunity to meet some Pakistani scholars such as Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema. In July 2003, I visited Pakistan as part of a goodwill delegation. This delegation consisted of two members from the Ministry of External Affairs and two former soldiers, one of them being myself. During this visit I had the opportunity to meet General Pervez Musharraf.

The visit gave me an opportunity to interact with the common man and learn more about the perceptions of the ordinary Pakistani vis-à-vis India. Large sections of the Pakistani population are committed to a peaceful and harmonious relationship between the two countries. The desire for a better relationship is more than evident within the Pakistani business community.
There are two possible ways of mitigating the Pakistani Army’s influence within the political system. The first prerequisite for this is a strong and vibrant civil society. There are a large number of individuals in civil society who are steadfastly committed to peace with India, but at the moment for some reason civil society in Pakistan seems to be in disarray. The lawyers’ movement had offered a glimmer of hope as it promised to bring about a reduction in the Pakistani Army’s influence in that country’s politics on the one hand and the foundation of a strong, vibrant, civil society on the other. But this was short-lived, and civil society seems to be in utter disarray.

Secondly, the Pakistani educational curriculum which perpetuates hatred against Indians and non-Muslims needs to be revamped. The Pakistani Army and hardliners exploit the anti-India sentiment, shaped by these textbooks, which is pervasive. Nothing much will change if this indoctrination is not done away with. Thirdly, both countries need to look at creating economic stakes in each other’s countries. The creation of positive vested interests through trade and commerce will strengthen the peace constituency in Pakistan and weaken the anti-India constituency both in the army and outside. A lot of businessmen in Pakistan, including small traders, want the economy to open up and blame their politicians’ narrow thinking for the lack of sufficient trade and commerce between the two countries.

Apart from the reduction of the Pakistani Army’s role in that country’s politics it is pivotal that Pakistan accepts the fact that it is not India’s equal. India has surpassed Pakistan in every sphere, and even by fomenting troubles in various parts of India, Pakistan cannot destabilize a country of 1.3 billion which has immense economic potential, recognized now by even the Western powers.

I am of the firm opinion that until such radical changes take place, even dialogue with Pakistan is fruitless. In fact, I fail to understand why India has resumed talks with Pakistan, while it has not taken concrete action against those elements which are involved in terrorist activities against India.

I would also like to make the point that while no one wants nuclear conflict between the two countries, Pakistan in the recent past has realized that India is a soft state which will never use force, even if necessary. A case in point was the Mumbai attack, which should have been met with a strong response. While surgical strikes would have led to the loss of innocent lives on both sides, they would have sent a clear message that India should not be taken for granted. India, which aspires to be a global power, is itself to blame as it has begun to overestimate the use of ‘soft power’ while ignoring the necessity of ‘hard power’. This is one of the major failures of the political leadership and the bureaucracy, two sections which play a critical role in policy formation. The two sections do not have a comprehensive understanding of many security and defence issues, and by clipping the wings of the Indian Army, they are only weakening the security apparatus. In the present situation it is important for India to focus on security along with economic growth, and in this context the Indian Army needs to be strengthened.

In this context I would like to make the point that the fear of nuclear conflict should not always put India on the back foot and this fear should not mean that India does not retaliate when necessary. A perfect illustration of India’s weakness in dealing with Pakistan is the watering-down of its demands. First, India began by asking Pakistan to stop infiltration into the Kashmir Valley, then it handed over to Pakistan a list of twenty criminals, while recently it has asked Pakistan to take action against a few individuals. Without any action being taken against terrorist elements in Pakistan, India has now agreed to talks. Instead of being on the back foot, Pakistan has actually achieved a significant victory by getting India to the negotiating table in spite of not taking any action against terrorists emanating from its soil. At some stage, India will have to respond to the Pakistani Army with force. Until then, certain elements in Pakistan, especially the army, will continue to use the ‘death by a thousand cuts’ philosophy to destabilize India. In this situation a harmonious India–Pakistan relationship is a mere dream.
Did the Partition of 1947 result in any prejudice against Pakistan or Muslims? How did Muslims and non-Muslims in the Army deal with the tensions?

There are three parts to this question. The first is our attitude towards Pakistan, the second concerns prejudice against Muslims in India and the third regards relations between Muslims and non-Muslims within the army. I will answer the three parts of this question separately, based on my experience and perception.

Pakistan came about as a result of the overwhelming desire amongst the Muslims for a separate homeland for themselves. The crescendo of communal violence and communal bitterness had reached such a high pitch that there was no alternative to Partition. Although Indians accepted the vivisection of the country with much regret, Pakistanis hailed it as a great triumph. Their popular slogan was ‘We have got Pakistan at no cost, we will get Hindustan by force’ (Hans ke lia hai Pakistan, larke lenge Hindustan). India harboured no ill will towards Pakistan and accepted the painful reality of Pakistan. On the other hand, the origin and history of Pakistan has been of relentless hostility towards India. Within weeks of Partition, Pakistan invaded Kashmir. This was only the beginning. Every step taken by Pakistan in the last 63 years has been directed against India whether it has been military invasions, jihadi terrorism or forging alliances with foreign powers. In 1971, Pakistan's genocide in East Pakistan and burdening India with millions of refugees forced Indian intervention in support of the people of what was then East Pakistan. The break-up of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh were all due to Pakistan's own doings. Despite this long ongoing history of bitterness India has shown an exceptionally high level of tolerance and has made considerable efforts to have good relations with Pakistan.

The Muslims of UP and Bihar were in the vanguard of the Pakistan movement. In the wake of Partition, millions migrated to Pakistan where they found themselves discriminated against and to this day they are referred to as Mohajirs (refugees). Many more million Muslims stayed back in India due to the compulsion of circumstances. Initially they felt a sense of guilt about Partition and remained subdued. A few suffered prejudice at the hands of some non-Muslims. The Constitution of India declared that there would be no discrimination against Muslims or any minority.

In the beginning the Muslims had apprehensions. Muslim film actors and actresses adopted Hindu names like Dalip Kumar and Madhu Bala to ensure that there was no bias against them. Soon they realized that there was no need to do so. Muslims started making their mark in all spheres – politics, films, business, sports and so on. Several states with Muslims in a small minority came to have Muslim chief ministers. No non-Muslim has been an achiever or attained eminence in any field in Pakistan. Population statistics speak for themselves. In 1947, West Pakistan had a population of 24 per cent Hindus which has now been reduced to less than 1 per cent, and in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) the reduction has been from 30 per cent to 7 per cent. On the other hand, in India the population of Muslims as per the 1951 census was 10 per cent and this has increased to 17.8 per cent. To build up their vote banks, political parties in India have been following a policy of appeasement of Muslims, who vote as a bloc. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has recently declared that Muslims must have the first call on the resources of the nation.

So far as the army was concerned, it had imbibed the British tradition of being apolitical. All combat units except the Gorkhas and Garhwalis had a mixed composition of half-Muslim and half-non-Muslim. This was part of British policy to maintain the balance between the two communities and guard against an uprising by either. During World War II, I served with the Jat Regiment which had 50 per cent Muslims, and I was posted to a sub-unit of Punjabi Muslims. There was no communal tension between Muslims and non-Muslims in the army and neither showed any leanings.

The interviewee used the verb 'ensured', yet in several areas, there remains a gulf between what the Indian Constitution proclaims and what happens in reality. For example, caste discrimination is outlawed by the Indian Constitution yet remains a significant phenomenon.
kin becoming victims of the communal orgy in Punjab, affected the discipline and impartiality of soldiers of both communities. There were now instances of soldiers taking sides while combating communal violence. However, no clash occurred between soldiers of the two communities. A Punjab Boundary Force of 50,000 troops comprising units earmarked for the two armies was set up in July. It had a British commander with two deputies, one Indian and the other Pakistani. This experiment failed. The force had to be disbanded after a little over one month.

The two dominions had to take responsibility for maintaining order and the evacuation of refugees in their respective territories. A skeleton headquarters of about ten officers, known as Delhi and East Punjab Command, was set up. Lieutenant-General Sir Dudley Russell was the commander and all the officers on his staff were British except me. I then held the rank of major dealing with operations. Initially we were a mobile self-contained headquarters. Mountbatten had given us the Viceroy’s special train from which we functioned, travelling between Delhi and Lahore.

The vast majority of Muslim soldiers of the army went to join the Pakistani Army but a few remained with the Indian Army. All non-Muslim soldiers remained in the Indian Army. The departure of both Muslims and non-Muslims was a sentimental occasion when tears were shed by both. The few Muslims who chose to remain with the Indian Army showed complete loyalty to India. Brigadier Mohammad Usman, the hero of the Battle of Naushera in Kashmir, was a role model. He was later killed in battle at Jhangar and was posthumously awarded the Maha Vir Chakra. Muslims in the armed forces have been serving the country in all the wars fought since Independence. Havildar Abdul Hameed earned the highest award for gallantry, the Param Vir Chakra. They have risen to high rank in the three services, including chief of the air force and army commander.

How were your personal relations with Muslim officers who went to Pakistan?

I had very cordial relations with them. I had worked with them, both in my regiment and on the staff. Until 1947 Indian officers had a special
bond among them and sometimes clashed with junior British officers on matters of food or Indian music on the radio in the officers’ mess. Three officers with whom I had friendly relations rose to high positions in Pakistan. Mohammad Nawaz, Niazi and I served together as captains in Indonesia. Nawaz later joined the civil service and rose to be cabinet secretary in Pakistan. Niazi became a lieutenant-general and surrendered to us at Dhaka in 1971. I served in Army Headquarters at Delhi in the same Directorate with the then Major Yahya Khan while I was a captain. Yahya later became President of Pakistan.

What was your experience of the wars fought since Independence and your comments on them? Was the Simla Agreement of 1972 a blunder?

I was a staff officer dealing with operations in the controlling headquarters given the task of conducting operations in Kashmir. I was the only Indian officer at the headquarters when the first India–Pakistan war started in Kashmir on 27 October 1947. British officers then serving in both Indian and Pakistan armies were forbidden to go to the Kashmir theatre. This placed a heavy responsibility on me. I went along with the first lot of troops flown to Srinagar in October 1947. I was given additional responsibility for organizing the airlift of troops and stores in civilian Dakotas with mostly European pilots from Safdarganj airport at Delhi to the then grass landing ground at Srinagar. Eight hundred sorties were flown in fifteen days, which saved Kashmir from the Pakistani tribal marauders. Referring to this, Mountbatten, the then Governor-General wrote, ‘In my long experience of war I have not come across another such massive airlift carried out at such short notice and so successfully.’

I was closely connected with the planning and conduct of all major battles in that war and sometimes I had to walk up to the forward line, as I did across Zojila during that famous battle when tanks were used at the high altitude of 11,000 feet for the first time in the history of warfare. After the war I went as secretary of the Indian delegation to the conference convened by the UN to delineate the 450-mile-long ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir. This was the first war of Independent India we were fighting, and there was much patriotic fervour among all ranks of the army. This made up for lack of experience among our officer cadre. Due to the sudden departure of British officers, Indian officers were holding ranks and responsibility beyond their experience and length of service.

Certain faulty political decisions denied us the full gains of military success in Kashmir. First, the decision taken on 14 November 1947 not to advance to Muzaffarabad, when the enemy was in full retreat. The army was instead diverted to relieve the besieged State Force garrison, guarding non-Muslim refugees in Poonch. The capture of Muzaffarabad would have reduced the pressure on Poonch. Second, the decision to suspend our summer offensive on 1 June 1948 when we had captured Tithwal and were less than 14 miles from Muzaffarabad: this was in response to the request of the United Nations Commission to both India and Pakistan to suspend offensive operations, while talks were being held. Third, the decision to accept a ceasefire in late December 1948 when, after our successful link-up operation with Poonch, we had an edge and were well poised to liberate Pakistan-occupied territory in that sector and advance up to the Kashmir–Pakistan border.

I was not involved in our war with China in 1962. I was then an instructor at Staff College at Wellington in South India. We paid a heavy price in that war due to our poor political and military leadership. Anyway, the Himalayan débâcle acted as a wake-up call and we improved our military strength. Otherwise the history of the 1965 war might have been different.

During the 1965 war I was commanding a battalion in the east. We concentrated on the border with East Pakistan. Our division was given the task of capturing Dhaka. My battalion was to lead the division’s advance to Jessore in East Pakistan. The war commenced in the west but we were being held back because the government did not want to alienate the people of East Pakistan, as extending the war to that wing of Pakistan might have done. However, in early September, the battle of Khemkaran was in the balance in the west. In case that battle did not go well for us, it was necessary to counter it with success in the east. We received orders to launch our offensive into East Pakistan. We moved to the touch line and were to commence our advance at 4 a.m. We were all set, and there was much
enthusiasm to go for our target, Jessore. Two hours before the scheduled time, we received orders to stand down. The tide had turned in the west in our favour and we were heading for a resounding success at Khemkaran. We felt cheated as we were denied an opportunity to earn laurels in battle. However, in the greater national interest we did well not to go into East Pakistan in 1965 and alienate the people.

Six years later, this stood us in good stead in the liberation war of Bangladesh. The right political decisions were taken in that war. When the enemy sent thousands of infiltrators into Kashmir we retaliated by crossing the ceasefire line and capturing the Haji Pir Pass and Point 13260. When Pakistan launched a major offensive in Chhamb Sector, we retaliated by advancing across the international border to Lahore. The lesson that came out of this is that no war can be won by defensive action alone. We forgot that lesson in the 1990s and after, while fighting the terror war unleashed by Pakistan.

I was on the staff at Army Headquarters connected with manpower planning for the 1971 war. The political and military leadership working in harmony ensured the greatest military victory of Indian arms in thousands of years of our history. Pakistan suffered a crushing defeat. Ninety thousand Pakistani soldiers led by Lieutenant-General A. K. Niazi laid down arms at Dhaka. I was given overall charge of looking after these prisoners. We kept them in several camps at different locations. I had occasion to interact with Niazi, whom I had known from our days in Indonesia in 1945 and some other old acquaintances from the old undivided Indian Army.

I was Governor of Assam and had nothing to do with the Kargil war in 1999. No doubt the Pakistani intrusion had taken us by surprise but this was not the first time this had happened. Having operated at those heights during the 1947–48 war, I was full of admiration and filled with great pride at our young officers leading successful assaults against the enemy on those precipitous heights. The political leadership did well in ensuring the complete diplomatic isolation of Pakistan during the Kargil war. This happened for the first time. Clinton invited the prime ministers of both India and Pakistan to settle the dispute. Nawaz Sharif, then Prime Minister of Pakistan, answered the summons but Vajpayee did not go. He showed his strength in not doing so, in sharp contrast to the policy of subservience to the United States we seem to be following these days.

There is no doubt in my mind that the Simla Agreement of 1972 was a great blunder. Bhutto was under great pressure to get his 93,000 citizens back. We lost a golden opportunity of getting him to agree to convert the ceasefire line into an international border. He misled Indira Gandhi with a verbal assurance that he would do so later. He only agreed to a meaningless change of terminology from ceasefire line to Line of Control. The border in the Siachen Glacier remained undefined. We lost the fruits of our victory at Simla.

Do you think that the Kashmir problem is a communal one? What are your views on Nehru’s Kashmir policy?

Militancy in Kashmir is confined entirely to Muslims. Over 35 percent of the population is non-Muslim and is totally opposed to it. They want to remain an integral part of India. During the communal holocaust of 1947, there was no tension or communal violence between Kashmiri Hindus and Muslims. I remember that in early November 1947, after the situation on the front near the airfield had stabilized, I was sent to Srinagar city to ascertain the requirements of troops to maintain order. The Maharaja had fled to Jammu along with the top officials of the administration. The National Conference volunteers were patrolling the city, maintaining order. I heard the slogan ‘Hamlewar Khaberdar Ham Kashmiri Hindu Muslim Sikh Tayaar’ (‘Beware Invaders, we Kashmiri Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs are prepared’). Mahatma Gandhi had written at that time that he saw a ray of light in Kashmir.

There was a sea change from those days when militancy erupted in the Valley in 1989. Religious fundamentalism had taken deep roots among a large section of the Muslim population in Kashmir. There was the ethnic cleansing of over three lakhs (300,000) Kashmiri Hindus

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21 For the revision down of these figures, see the comments in the General Editor’s introduction.
from the Valley. After the Arab–Israel war of 1973 there were plenty of petro-dollars in fundamentalist countries like Saudi Arabia. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the US provided considerable funds and weapons to Pakistan to raise the precursors of the Taliban and conduct a religious war in Afghanistan against the Soviets. Zia-ul-Haq, known as the Mullah in Khaki, took full advantage of plentiful funds, weapons and US collaboration to win his jihadi war in Afghanistan. At the same time, he crafted his strategy of a thousand cuts to bleed India to death in Kashmir. Several madrassas sprang up in Kashmir with bigoted mullahs from UP and Bihar teaching the fundamentalist philosophy. Maqbool Sherwani was a martyr of 1947 whom the Pakistanis crucified in Baramulla for trying to save the lives of Hindus and Sikhs. In the seventies a new Maqbool sprang up in Kashmir. Maqbool Bhat looted a bank and killed Hindus in the hope of establishing Islamic rule in Kashmir. He was apprehended and sentenced to death by a court of law. He was the new martyr and the new hero of the local people. Jihadi warriors had inflicted a heavy attrition on one of the superpowers, forcing it to retreat from Afghanistan and ultimately leading to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Those warriors, along with a new generation of indoctrinated Kashmiri Muslims, trained and equipped by Pakistan, launched their terrorist jihad in the Valley.

As regards Nehru’s Kashmir policy, I have already mentioned the three occasions when his decisions blocked the way to snatching military victories: stopping the advance to Muzaffarabad in November 1947, suspending the offensive towards Muzaffarabad in June 1948 and the acceptance of a ceasefire in December without fully exploiting our military success. As for political follies, they were his decisions to take the Kashmir issue to the United Nations and pampering Sheikh Abdullah with Article 370. The dismissal and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah became inevitable in 1953 but this had a long-term adverse effect in Kashmir, which we were not able to counter effectively. Bad governance within Kashmir compounded matters. The alienation of the people started growing and even after the restoration of Sheikh Abdullah to power in 1975 the rot continued.
areas and two army public schools at Rajaun and Pahalgam. Free hostel accommodation was provided for their children by both the state government and the army. I had a scheme for 1,000 micro hydro-electric projects to be carried out by the army. It catered for generating 5 to 8 kilowatts of electricity from watermills (gharat) in the mountains. This provided 30 to 40 light points in the villages which had never seen an electric bulb before. By day power was utilized for grinding corn and operating looms. This was a highly popular scheme among the people of the mountains. On completion of the one-thousandth project near Uri, I went to inaugurate it. I flew by helicopter to Baramulla and thence by road on the mountains for 12 miles to the project site. All the villages on the road had the Indian flag fluttering and the villagers had lined up on the road with paper national flags. They were all Gujars and Bakherwals. This had never happened before and was a good index of the success of our scheme.

Religious fundamentalism has made a deep inroad among the Kashmiri Muslims. Militancy has its maximum support from them. I tried to promote Kashmiriyat, the Sufi tradition of amity and brotherhood across the religious divide. I felt that this was the best antidote to religious fundamentalism. It would help us in winning hearts and minds. As chairman of the Amarnath Shrine Board, I would open the Yatra (pilgrimage) by offering prayers at the Holy Cave and fly straight thereafter to the grave of Sheikh Noorudin at Charar-e-Shareef to place a chadar (shawl) there. He is the patron saint of Kashmir. I started a three-day Sufi music festival organized by the Shrine Board to mark the commencement of the Amarnath Yatra. For the first time we secured Pakistani musicians to come to Srinagar for a function. We later expanded it by inviting musicians also from other countries such as Egypt, Syria and Uzbekistan. We got the army to organize batches of 50 to 60 schoolchildren who had never been outside Kashmir to go on Bharat Darshan to Delhi, Agra, Ajmer, Jaipur, Bangalore, Mumbai and so on to see the secular ethos of our country and the progress our country was making. A few batches of senior citizens and imams were also taken on these tours. On return, they would come to Raj Bhavan for an hour’s interaction with me. They were entertained to tea and refreshments and each given a memento. During my tenure, I interacted with some 5,000 of them. They were impressed by our historical buildings, the Juma Masjid at Delhi, the Dargah at Ajmer, the Delhi metro and the big buildings in the metros. We wanted them to return to their villages as ambassadors of national integration.

The army at the request of local clerics renovated a number of ziarats (pilgrimage sites). This was very popular with the locals. A big ziarat at Badgam on the outskirts of Srinagar was renovated at my instance on the request of the local people. The army did an excellent job of it. I was invited to inaugurate the ziarat and I addressed a big public gathering near the site. The people lavished praise on the army and Government of India. This received publicity in the local press. The separatists got upset. The chief cleric of Kashmir issued a fatwa against the army for interfering in religious matters. He maintained that Islam did not permit non-Muslims to work at its religious places. We replied that the army had people of all religions. Funds used for the ziarat were from the Government of India. If the Haj subsidy from the government was acceptable, what was wrong with government funds being used for renovating ziarats at the request of the local cleric and the local people?

On 2 October 2007, on the initiative of Chief Minister Ghulam Nabi Azad, essay competitions for schoolchildren in different grades were organized, on the teachings of Mahatma Gandhi. Many handsome cash prizes were announced. Despite the separatists’ call for a boycott, 50,000 students participated in the competition. This time the chief cleric issued a fatwa against the Chief Minister for subverting Islamic ideology. I started an Institute of Kashmir Studies in Kashmir University to promote the study of Kashmiriyat. This included Kashmiri philosophy, culture, literature, art, history and so on. We held an international seminar on Kashmiriyat to which we invited participants from Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics. The seminar was a big success. I tried to promote the affiliation of Kashmir universities with the universities of Central Asian Republics, including the exchange of students. (Kashmir has a long historical association with the Central Asian Republics.) These are Muslim countries with a secular outlook. They are opposed to terrorism. Developing close relations.
had taken over as Chief Minister. He had a pronounced communal bias. He was opposed to giving facilities to Kashmiri Pandits and to increasing the duration of the Amarnath Yatra or providing temporary prefabricated shelters to pilgrims at the Base Camp. A public-interest litigation (PIL) case was filed in J&K High Court on the duration of the Yatra and the use of prefabricated shelters. A Single Bench of the High Court gave a verdict against the state government. Mufti Mohammad Sayeed had an appeal against that verdict filed before a Division Bench of the High Court. The latter upheld the verdict of the Single Bench.

In 2005, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed was replaced as Chief Minister by Ghulam Nabi Azad from the Congress Party. Azad was very secular and the Shrine Board received full cooperation from him. The mufti’s party, the PDP, was an alliance partner in the government and its ministers created hurdles for the board. In 2005, the Shrine Board had made a request to the state government for the transfer of 100 acres of land, the traditional base camp site for pilgrims climbing up to the Holy Cave. This would enable us to keep the prefabricated shelters in position, instead of having to dismantle them after the Yatra every year, and in the process suffering avoidable losses. We also offered that after the Yatra, the state government could use the shelters for tourists and winter sports. Thereafter for eight months due to heavy snow the area would be unapproachable and uninhabitable. Our proposal remained under consideration by two PDP ministers for three years, and then suddenly towards the end of May, a week before my five-year tenure was to finish, I was pleasantly surprised to learn that the PDP ministers had put up the Baltal land case to the State Cabinet and it was unanimously decided to divert the land to the Shrine Board. This sanction was given at the same time that the highly successful international Kashmiriyat functions were being held in Srinagar. The separatists had been badly rattled and feared that unless they launched a high-profile agitation, they might lose their relevance. They picked on the government decision to divert land to the Shrine Board in order to start an agitation in the Valley.

The name of my successor was announced and I had begun packing to leave. I proceeded for farewell visits to Jammu. On my return to the Valley, I found that a full blast of mischievous and totally false propaganda had with them was in line with our efforts to promote Kashmiriyat. All this had been going on well, though the separatists were not very happy with what we were doing.

We organized a mega international event on Kashmiriyat to which we invited delegations from all the eight South Asian countries. Our aim was to spread the message of Kashmiriyat to all the SAARC countries. I was keen to hold a mega event on Kashmiriyat before I relinquished my appointment on completion of my tenure. We had been working on this project for some time. Smt Pratibha Patil, the President of India, agreed to preside over the function which was held on 25 May 2008. High-powered delegations from all the eight South Asian countries came for the function, such as Chandrika Kumartunga Bandarnaike from Sri Lanka, Dr Gaznafar, a cabinet minister from Afghanistan and Begum Taslima Hashmi, the daughter of the legendary Urdu poet Faiz Ahmed Faiz, from Pakistan and so on. Despite the boycott call given by the separatists, the 2,500-capacity auditorium at Kashmir University was overflowing. The following day, the famous Junoon Band from Pakistan played Sufi pop music at the Dal Lake. The leader of the band announced that he had come to Srinagar to launch a musical jihad for peace. Despite the boycott call given by the separatists, thousands of young people turned up for the concert and were enthralled by the music. The leading English daily of Pakistan, Dawn, wrote in its editorial of 28 May 2008 under the heading ‘Breaking Barriers’ that music knew no boundaries and the people of Kashmir had had the opportunity to express their anger against religious militants.

I was now in the last fortnight of my five-year tenure as governor. I was happy that we had reached such a high-water mark in my efforts to promote Kashmiriyat. The separatists were riled as they were losing their support base. In a deep-rooted controversy, the terrorists, the separatists and some unscrupulous politicians helped by the media ganged up to play the communal card to counter our efforts to promote communal amity.

The Amarnath Shrine Board under the chairmanship of the governor had been constituted by an Act of the state legislature in the last year of the chief ministership of Dr Farooq Abdullah in 2002. I took over as chairman of the board from my predecessor in 2003. The board had not become fully functional when I took over as chairman. By now Mufti Mohammad Sayeed had taken over as Chief Minister. He had a pronounced communal bias. He was opposed to giving facilities to Kashmiri Pandits and to increasing the duration of the Amarnath Yatra or providing temporary prefabricated shelters to pilgrims at the Base Camp. A public-interest litigation (PIL) case was filed in J&K High Court on the duration of the Yatra and the use of prefabricated shelters. A Single Bench of the High Court gave a verdict against the state government. Mufti Mohammad Sayeed had an appeal against that verdict filed before a Division Bench of the High Court. The latter upheld the verdict of the Single Bench.

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The name of my successor was announced and I had begun packing to leave. I proceeded for farewell visits to Jammu. On my return to the Valley, I found that a full blast of mischievous and totally false propaganda had
been unleashed against the Amarnath Shrine Board. The statements issued by the board were either blacked out in the local media or twisted out of context. The Valley press was having a field day. No attempt was made by the government to counter this high-decibel false rhetoric designed to ignite communal passions. The Congress, which was the ruling party, had done nothing to counter this dangerous propaganda politically.

The PDP ministers who were a party to the decision of sanctioning the transfer of the land joined in the agitation against it. Mufti Mohammad Sayeed took a leading part. This appeared to be part of a deep-rooted conspiracy. A virtual communal tornado seemed about to burst. The agitation had not yet become violent. On the day I departed in the morning, the Chief Minister assured me at the airport that he was holding a press conference that afternoon to clarify matters and he was confident that the agitation would subside. His press conference failed to have any impact. The tempo of agitation continued. In fact it became more widespread and increasingly violent with a number of agitators killed as a result of police firing.

The 100-acre plot at Baltal at a height of nearly 9,000 feet is a wasteland with no trees and hardly any grass. The government order diverting the land to the Shrine Board had three stipulations. First, the ownership of the land was to remain with the state government and when no longer required by the board, the land would revert to the government. Second, the board could use the land for no other purpose than putting up temporary prefabricated shelters for pilgrims going to Amarnath. Third, the board would pay Rs 22 million to the Forest Department for the afforestation of 100 acres of forest land for the use of the Baltal plot.

Despite the above facts, which were suppressed by the local press or twisted, an agitation was built up against the Shrine Board on absurd allegations and total untruths. It was alleged that the board was going to construct a Hindu township of Amarnathnagar at Baltal, when it was physically impossible for anyone to do so. This was to be a prelude to settling Hindus in the Valley and changing its demography as Israel has done in Palestine. Two Islamic universities had been set up in the Valley with government assistance but the proposal of the board to set up Shardapeeth University without any government assistance was said to be a Hindu cultural invasion of the Valley. The board proposed a 40 per cent reservation for Kashmiri Pandits to encourage the return of this exiled community to the Valley. To promote a secular ethos, 10 per cent of the places in the university were to be reserved for Kashmiri Muslims. The remaining 50 per cent of the places were to be filled on the basis of merit. As a result of the agitation, the Shardapeeth University proposal had to be given up.

Much was made of the potential damage to the environment resulting from the Amarnath Yatra, when not a single tree was required to be cut, 2,000 modern, pollution-free toilets were being provided and no vehicles were being used, ruling out any carbon emissions. On the other hand, on the same day, on 28 May 2008, when government sanction was given for diverting 100 acres at Baltal to the Shrine Board, the government also sanctioned the transfer of thousands of acres of land for a road under construction across the Pirpanjal. Ten thousand trees were cut to construct this road and a 15-mile-long wildlife sanctuary was moved. On completion of this road, the motor vehicles plying on it would cause considerable carbon emissions. This road was being constructed with money provided by the Government of India to provide a direct road link between the Muslim-majority Rajauri–Poonch region and the Valley. The existing road link between the two regions via Hindu-dominated Jammu region is only marginally longer. The ‘Mughal road’ is part of the plan for a ‘Greater Kashmir’.

Yet another argument used against the Shrine Board was that the local people were being deprived of economic benefits from the Yatra, as the board was providing these to outsiders. This again was totally false. The tentwallahs, managers of the prefabricated shelters, labour for their construction, ponywallahs and pithus (human carriers) and shopkeepers were all locals. The only outsiders employed for the Yatra were the few operators of helicopter companies. The local people of the region, the Gujars and Bakherwals, were very happy with the Yatra. What they earned during the Yatra helped them out throughout the remaining part of the year. It is significant that Gujars and Bakherwals did not join the agitation against the Shrine Board, which remained confined to Kashmiri Muslims, misled by totally false propaganda.

Further, there was nothing extraordinary about the allocation of forest land at Baltal to the Shrine Board. Hundreds of such allocations had been
made over the years to various government departments, to private firms for communication towers, to the Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Board in Jammu and so on. On the day the sanction of land to the Amarnath Shrine Board was given by the State Cabinet, five other such sanctions including one for the Mughal road were given by the State Cabinet. The only allocation against which a massive agitation was started was the one to the Amarnath Shrine Board.

I left Kashmir on the morning of 25 June 2008 on completion of my five-year tenure. The mufti and his party boycotted the functions connected with my departure. The policy of appeasement was tried out. The Baltal land diversion order was cancelled and the state government took over the functions of the Shrine Board. Even this proved insufficient to satisfy the agitators. The mufti’s party withdrew its support and Ghulam Nabi Azad’s government fell on 7 July.

The Valley press continued with its propaganda and communal passions continued to be inflamed. I was being accused of having set the Valley on fire on the eve of my departure. Whereas the state Congress had been supporting me, the Congress at the national level was blaming me for what had happened. The Hindi press at the national level showed a mature understanding of the situation. Unfortunately the English secular press at the national level showed a bias against the Shrine Board in order to establish its secular credentials. It accused me of having sanctioned the Baltal land transfer, when the State Cabinet had unanimously taken the decision in the matter. This decision had come as a surprise to me in the last few days of my tenure in Kashmir. A governor does not have any role in such cases. The disinformation was so complete that Omar Abdullah in an emotional outburst in the Parliament asserted, ‘we will give our lives but never our lands’ (Jaan Denge Par Zameen Nahin Denge).

After the Baltal land transfer had been cancelled and the functions of the Shrine Board taken over by the state government, there was much jubilation in the Valley. Victory processions were begun and the demand for ‘freedom’ (Azadi) stepped up. There was now talk of the government taking over the Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Board, whose management of the Yatra had been a great success story. Seventy-five lakh (750,000) pilgrims a year had begun going to that shrine. This board had put up a residential modern technical university with accommodation for 2,000 students on the campus in five years. Students passing out from technical courses had begun to get hundreds of placements in the corporate sector. The board had invested money in putting up this university, without taking any assistance from the government. President Abdul Kalam had inaugurated this university and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had delivered its first convocation address. Another flagship project of the board was a state-of-the-art 250-bed cancer hospital which was under construction.

There had been much pent-up feeling among the people of Jammu at the political and economic discrimination practised against them. Whereas for every 66,000 voters in the Jammu region there is one MLA, in the Valley for 49,000 voters there is one MLA. The Valley has 46 seats in the State Assembly against 37 seats for the Jammu region. In the allocation of funds for development the Valley has a considerable edge over the Jammu region. And now even in religious matters there was blatant discrimination. On the one hand the Government of India had announced an increase both in the quota for Haj pilgrims and in Haj subsidies, a Haj house had been constructed in Srinagar and another was going up at Narayana in Delhi for which the Chief Minister of Delhi had laid the foundation stone. On the other hand, 100 acres of Baltal land was being denied for the Amarnath pilgrimage, the Amarnath Shrine Board had been taken over by the Government and there was talk of taking over the Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Board.

Resentment against all this burst into a spontaneous mass agitation of unprecedented dimensions in Jammu. The people of Jammu demanded restoration of the Baltal land to the Amarnath Shrine Board and for the board to be allowed to function as before. The agitation in Jammu was a people’s agitation and not organized by a political party. The demand of the agitators was supported both by the local Congress Party and the BJP. There were a few Muslims of Jammu region who were supporting the widespread agitation in Jammu which brought life to a standstill in the entire Jammu region. The agitation in the Valley also continued unabated. It was noticeable that no non-Muslims were supporting the agitation there. Even among the Muslims, the Gujjars, Bakherwals and the Shia Muslims kept away from it. However, the separatists could mobilize hundreds of thousands of people
turnout in Kashmir was an all-time high. It was 62 per cent, appreciably higher than the national average. All the dirty tricks tried out by the mufti were of no avail to him. He and his party were rejected by the voters and his dream of becoming the Chief Minister again was foiled.

Would you like to talk about your experiences in looking after the Pakistani prisoners of war in 1972?

We went all out to comply with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions regarding prisoners of war. In fact we did much more than prescribed by those conventions. We wanted to send the prisoners back as ambassadors of durable peace on the subcontinent. We took various measures to make them as comfortable as possible. The prisoners were dispersed at different locations in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand and Madhya Pradesh. Military barracks were lying vacant as troops were deployed on the border. We accommodated them in those barracks. We gave them the same scale of rations as for our own troops. We kept a record of their weight. We found that almost everyone had put on weight while with us. We arranged for their recreation and sports. Poetry readings (mushaira) and cinema programmes were organized for them. We arranged a cricket match at Roorkee between Pakistani officers and our officers guarding the prisoners’ camps. Muslim civil and military officers holding top positions were invited to visit the camps and address the prisoners. The aim was to showcase our secularism. International Red Cross officials were allowed to visit all the camps and could interview any prisoner without being watched by our soldiers. American journalists visited some of these camps. One of them wrote in the *Los Angeles Times* that never in history have prisoners of war been treated as well as India was treating the Pakistani prisoners of war.24

However, Brian Cloughley records in the new 4th edition of his *History of the Pakistani Army* that “in a cable on 11 April 1972 from the Australian Embassy in Islamabad a diplomat retailed a lengthy conversation with the ICRC representative in Pakistan, Mr Testuz, a worthy and dedicated man who confirmed that a list of about 105,000 names had now been received of prisoners of war in India. There
I would like to mention an incident when I was visiting the prisoner of war camp at Faizabad. It was on the day of Eid and we had organized a banquet (Bara Khana) for the prisoners. I sat on the floor to eat with them. A Baloch subedar was sitting next to me. He told me that he had served in the Pakistani Army for 23 years. He added that their generals were too busy doing politics and had no time for the soldiers. That was the reason why Pakistan lost the war in Bangladesh.

I knew a few of the senior Pakistani officers now prisoners with us. We had served together in the pre-1947 undivided Indian Army. Lieutenant-General A. K. Niazi, the Pakistan commander who surrendered to us at Dhaka, had served in Indonesia. He was then a captain in the Rajput Regiment and I was also a captain, then in the Jat Regiment. We had kept him in a camp at Jabalpur. I met him a few times and we had cordial interactions. He told me that they had lost because they had been stabbed in the back. He added that we should beware as we too would be stabbed in the back one day. I laughed away his warning.

Another officer who was now prisoner with us was Musharraf Hussain. He had been an officer in the Indian Navy. He and I had lived together in the armed forces officers' mess on Zakir Hussain Road in Delhi in 1946. He opted for the civil service and in 1971 was Chief Secretary of East Pakistan. He had also surrendered to us and we kept him in the camp at Bareilly. He was having marital problems. His wife, Laila, had stayed back in Islamabad and had not accompanied him to Dhaka on the plea that the climate there was not congenial. He had written several letters to his wife from the camp at Bareilly. He was not sure whether his letters were being allowed to be sent to his wife. I assured him that all such letters were duly forwarded by us through the International Red Cross. As a special case I would have his letter dispatched to Pakistan through the Egyptian embassy which was looking after Pakistan's interests in India in the absence of diplomatic relations between our two countries. I was informed that the letter could not be delivered to his wife as she had run away with someone to an undisclosed destination in London. I conveyed this to Musharraf, who was much upset at the news.

Incidentally, a few years later, I met Lieutenant-General (Retd.) Habibulla Khan Khattak at the Bihar Regimental Centre in Danapur. He had served in the Bihar Regiment and had commanded 1 Bihar in Burma where I had got to know him. I was a captain at that time. He had come to India with his second wife. Talking to her I discovered that she was the sister of Musharraf Hussain and she cursed Laila who had ruined her brother's life. We live in a small world!

I went to San Remo in Italy as leader of the Indian delegation to a conference convened by the International Red Cross. The conference had been organized at the instance of the United Nations, on the application of human rights to warfare. I was asked to make a presentation on how we were treating the Pakistani prisoners. There was much appreciation of India on this account.

After the Simla Agreement in 1972, we returned the prisoners of war without extracting any agreement to resolve the Kashmir issue. A month after the prisoners went back to Pakistan, I was surprised to receive a letter from Mohammad Nawaz, Cabinet Secretary in Pakistan. He had also been in the Indian Army and we had been staff officers together in 15 Corps Headquarters at Batavia, now Jakarta, in 1946. He wrote that he had received good reports about me from the prisoners who had returned. He decided to write to thank me and also to renew our old association.

What are your views on the future relations between India and Pakistan?

The origins and history of Pakistan have been of relentless hostility towards India. The young generation in Pakistan has been brought up in a 'hate India' environment. They have not forgiven India for the dismemberment of their country in 1971. The desire for revenge continues to remain very strong. Having failed to defeat India in various wars Pakistan launched its strategy of a thousand cuts. From Bhutto's thousand wars to Zia's thousand...
What are your views on the Cold Start doctrine?

I am not aware of what the Cold Start doctrine is but I can make a guess at what it may be. Conventional military wisdom is that you must have your base secure from which you launch an offensive. We ignored this in the Chhamb Sector during the 1971 war. We did not have a secure base from which we launched an offensive in that sector. The Pakistan counter-offensive in that sector unbalanced us. During Operation Parakram, when we moved our forces to the border as part of coercive diplomacy, it took us a long time to do so. Any offensive waiting to be launched for so long till our defensive forces were in position might not have yielded the desired results. An arrangement under which we keep our borders secure, while launching a prompt surgical strike has a lot to commend itself. These issues need not be discussed in public. The army should be left to evolve its strategy without putting it under public scrutiny.

What do you think of our Afghanistan policy?

We have belatedly woken up to the strategic importance of Afghanistan. For more than a quarter of century after Independence, we ignored Afghanistan and the fund of goodwill among Pakhtuns towards India. Khan Abdul Ghafar Khan rightly lamented in 1947 that India had abandoned Pathans to the wolves. In 1947, we should have realized that war with Pakistan was, in the words of Bismarck, in the logic of history. We lacked strategic vision and ignored Afghanistan. Afghanistan to this day does not recognize the Durand Line drawn by the British, dividing the Pakhtuns on both sides of that line. We should have lent support to the Pakhtun cause in our long-term strategic interests. We refrained from doing so. Possibly we were too imbued with the philosophy of non-interference in another country’s affairs as embodied in Panch Sheel. Both in 1965 and in 1971 we had governments friendly to India in Kabul. We did nothing to activate Pakistan’s western border. I recall that in 1974, when I was on an official visit to Afghanistan, a senior Afghan general told me that the Indian and Afghan armies missed an opportunity to work together in 1971. The two
should have shaken hands across the Indus. Our defence planners have to work on a two-front strategy against Pakistan and China but have never done anything to force a two-front strategy on Pakistan.

Today Afghanistan has become a very complex international problem. We seek no military bases or territory in Afghanistan. We have been trying to win Afghan friendship through development work in the country. This policy is commendable and we should continue to pursue it in spite of any difficulties which arise. Between Obama desperately pursuing his exit strategy from Afghanistan and Pakistan calling the shots there, one does not know to what extent we will ultimately succeed in Afghanistan. Be that as it may, we must not give up the effort. It is in India's strategic interest to have a friendly government in Kabul and friendly relations with the Afghan people.

Lastly, what do you think of India's reaction to the Mumbai attack?

26/11 in Mumbai was a repeat of what had happened in 1962. We suffered an avoidable national humiliation on account of poor leadership in our country. In 1962, the Prime Minister confessed in Parliament that he was living in a world divorced from reality. In 2008, the Prime Minister apologized to the nation. In 1962, the Defence Minister was sacked and was never rehabilitated. In 2008, the Home Minister, the Chief Minister, the Deputy Chief Minister were all made to quit but in about a year they were all suitably rehabilitated. The Army Chief and the Corps Commander resigned in 1962 but in 2008 the National Security Adviser and the Director of the Intelligence Bureau were allowed to continue and later provided with other appointments. Both 1962 and 2008 witnessed a failure of political and professional leadership in the country.

In the wake of the Mumbai blasts, our highest decision-making body, the Cabinet, was in disarray. The Foreign Minister stated that all options were open. The Prime Minister corrected him, saying all options other than war were open. One Cabinet Minister insinuated that Hemant Karkare, the chief of Attock airport in Mumbai, was killed by Hindu extremists and not Pakistani terrorists. Three Cabinet Ministers were against the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) being declared an illegal body. One Cabinet Minister wanted a judicial inquiry into the Batla House incident, insinuating that it was a fake encounter. He even wanted government funds to be made available for the defence of the students involved in terrorism in which a police inspector laid down his life and was given the nation's highest gallantry award in peacetime. Belated wisdom dawned on the government when it approved a special law to be enacted for dealing with terrorism. For years, it had been opposing the enactment of any special law, maintaining that normal laws were adequate.

Our professional ineptitude was also exposed by the blasts at Mumbai. Information was available with us about an impending attack on Mumbai from the sea. No attempt was made to suitably analyse this intelligence and disseminate it. The National Security Guard took over 24 hours to reach the site and it took us three days to eliminate ten terrorists. There was little coordination at the site between different agencies of the government.

The induction of Chidambaram as Home Minister has infused life into a somnolent ministry which has remained ineffective for too long. He has initiated a range of measures which will take time to yield results. The capture of a Pakistani terrorist alive was a God-sent opportunity. We have failed to cash in fully on this, relying instead on the US to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for us. Progress in dealing with this case has been much too slow. Apart from the policy of appeasement that has been practised by the government for far too long, a new policy of subservience to the US has emerged, compounding matters.

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PART II
Pakistani Interviewees
Major-General Shafique Ahmed Awan

Major-General Shafique Ahmed Awan was born on 16 September 1934 in a village near Nowshera, Khushab, Punjab. He joined the army as a cadet in 1951 and passed out from Pakistan’s Military Academy, Kakul in 1955. In 1965, he was a captain and in 1971 a lieutenant-colonel.

General Mirza Aslam Beg

General Beg (Baloch Regiment), former Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan was born in Azamgarh, British India, in February 1928. He joined the army in 1950 and was commissioned on 23 August 1952. He was a major in the 1965 war and lieutenant-colonel in the 1971 war, commanding the 53rd Battalion of the Baloch Regiment in the Lahore Sector. From March 1975 to January 1978, as a brigadier he was the chief instructor at the Armed Forces War College at the then National Defence College, Rawalpindi. In 1978, Beg was promoted major-general and posted as the adjutant-general in GHQ. He then served as Chief of the General Staff from 1980 to 1985 and was commander of XI Corps in Peshawar from 1985 to 1987. In March 1987, Beg was promoted to full general and appointed Vice-Chief of Army Staff by the then Army Chief, General Zia-ul-Haq. He became Chief of the Army Staff following the death of Zia in an air crash on 17 August 1988. After his retirement on 16 August 1991, he took up politics, establishing the Awami Qayyadat Party (Peoples’ Leadership Party). He was part of Pakistan’s political arena for almost a decade but his party failed to make progress. He is now chairman of a research organization entitled Foundation for Research on the International Environment, National
Major-General Syed Wajahat Husain

Major-General Syed Wajahat Husain was born and educated at Aligarh, in the United Provinces of British India. His childhood education was at home, by resident tutors. He joined the Muslim University School, matriculating in 1940, and graduated from the Aligarh Muslim University in 1944. With other members of his family joining the armed forces, he followed the example of his first cousins, Khurshid Hyder (who became a major-general) and Masroor Husain (who became an air commodore). Selected for all the three services, he joined the Royal Indian Air Force as a cadet pilot. The war ended just as he started flying and he was demobilized. Still less than nineteen years old, he was selected for the Indian Army’s first post-war Regular Course starting at the Military Academy at Dehradun in 1946. After Partition he opted for the Pakistani Army and his family migrated to Lahore. After a distinguished career, in which his last appointment was as Commandant of the Staff College at Quetta, General Husain retired from the army in 1977 and held several ambassadorial appointments, including in Australia. Since 1986 he has been living in Lahore with his wife and son.
Lieutenant-Colonel Saeed Iqbal

Lieutenant-Colonel Iqbal was born on 31 December 1943 in the small village of Samudari, in the district of Layalpur. His primary education was at Lahore. He was admitted to the military school of Jhelum for further education. He retired from the army in 1989.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tahir Kardar

Lieutenant-Colonel Kardar was born in Lahore on 10 June 1949, joined the army in 1970 and was subsequently commissioned in 1971.

Colonel Khan Sahib Dad Khan

Colonel Khan was born in Miani, a small town in the district of Hoshiarpur in East Punjab on 20 November 1929. He graduated from Sindhi Muslim College, Karachi, in 1948. He joined the Pakistan Military Academy’s third long course in 1949 and was commissioned in February 1951. He saw service in Kashmir during the 1965 war and retired in 1976.

Lieutenant-General Talat Masood

Lieutenant-General Masood, one of Pakistan’s best-known defence analysts and commentators, was born in Hyderabad, Deccan (British India) on 12 October 1932. Following Partition his family emigrated to Pakistan, where he was commissioned in the Corps of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering in 1953. He completed his master’s degree in Strategic Studies in 1957 and attended the National Defence University. Following service in the 1965 and 1971 wars, he was appointed to the Defence Science and Technology Organization in which he was involved in many development projects. Later appointments were in Heavy Industries, Taxila, as Engineer-in-Chief of the army, and as Chairman of the Pakistan Ordnance Factories. His final post was as Secretary for Defence Production, in which he was responsible for a wide variety of production initiatives. He was a Visiting Fellow at the Stimson Centre in Washington in 1997, has contributed widely to analysis of regional defence matters and appears frequently on domestic and international media channels.

Major Arif Hameed Mehr

Major Mehr served in the Pakistani Army for fifteen years. He was born on 25 December 1945 in Dasva, a village ten miles away from Faisalabad (then Lyallpur). He began his education at a religious school attached to a mosque in Jhang. He applied to join the army in 1963 and was accepted the following year. He was commissioned in November 1965 at the age of 25. He left the army in 1980.

Brigadier Shaukat Qadir

Shaukat Qadir began his career as a pilot in the Pakistani Air Force, but transferred to the army and was commissioned in the 6th Battalion, the Frontier Force Regiment, a crack infantry battalion. He participated in the Balochistan counter-insurgency operations in the 1970s and served all over the country. On several occasions, he saw action on the LoC in Kashmir, serving in almost all ranks up to brigadier. During his career he served as staff officer in brigade, division and corps HQs and also pursued a teaching career at the Infantry School, Command and Staff College and the National Defence College (now National Defence University War Wing).
On retirement, he became the founding vice-president of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), and later its president. He now writes as an independent analyst and teaches at Fatima Jinnah University. For some years he has also written a weekly column for the Daily Times which has been published outside Pakistan in a number of journals/dailies.

Rear Admiral Khalid Wasay

Rear Admiral Khalid Wasay was born in Kori Bigha village, Patna Bihar, India, on 14 August 1941. His early education was at the St Joseph Convent and St Francis Xavier High School for Boys, Patna, and his family migrated to East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1954. He joined the navy in 1960 and was commissioned on 10 May 1964. He served as a lieutenant in a minesweeper in the 1965 war, and was instructing at the Naval Academy in Karachi at the time of the 1971 war.

Brigadier Muhammad Yousaf

Brigadier Muhammad Yousaf was born in Bhekri, a village near Chakwal, on 16 July 1948. After studying in a government high school in the area, he passed his matriculation in 1963. In 1967 he completed his BSc from Government College, Chakwal. He joined the army in 1967 and passed out from Pakistan’s military academy in 1969 when he was commissioned. He was promoted as a captain in the artillery in December 1970. He married his first cousin in 1974, who was a member of the Pakistani Army medical corps and now serves as a colonel in it. He resigned from the service in 1997 as Head of Military Intelligence in Punjab.

The Interviews: Pakistan

Major-General Shafique Ahmed Awan

Why did you join the army?

In my view, every patriotic Pakistani wants prosperity for his country. Unfortunately, from the outset an injustice was done to Pakistan at Partition. This sense of inequitable treatment is one of the main reasons for the aggressive Pakistani mindset. We were forced to adopt this approach in order to defend ourselves against India. Riots spread in East and West Punjab and thousands of Muslims were brutally killed. Muslim women were raped by Sikhs and Hindus. Moreover, the British rulers were not even-handed in their treatment of the Muslims of India, and hurt the Muslims the most at the time of Partition. The living proof of the British bias is that the Muslim-majority state of Kashmir was occupied unfairly by the Indians against the will of the people. Almost 90 per cent of the Kashmiri population was Muslim, and wanted to be a part of Pakistan. But the British allowed the [Indian Army] to capture Muslim-majority states such as Kashmir.

India was against Pakistan from the beginning. It does not want to see a strong neighbour, least of all a Muslim-majority state like Pakistan. I never liked the Indian anti-Pakistan approach. That is why I joined the army to look after my country against her enemies. When I received my commission, I was part of the infantry. Army men always want to achieve the safety, security and prosperity of their country and they are bound to defend it at the price of their lives.
Did you grow up in an environment in which hatred for India was widespread?

Yes, I grew up in such an environment. I belong to a military family. In addition to that, the area where I was born and raised was known as the army belt. You could not find a single house where some family member was not in the army. Many of my relatives and cousins were also in the army at the time of my joining. We were also told that we belonged to a martial race and that made us superior fighters.

Are there any memories from the 1965 war which are etched on your mind?

In 1965 I was a captain in army. At that time hatred against India had already grown in the hearts of Pakistani people. That volcano burst open in September 1965, when the Indian Army attacked Pakistan. I was eager to fight the Indian Army. I was deputed to Sialkot, in the Chawinda Sector. I reached there on 10 September 1965 and the very next day I was in the battlefield. I considered myself to be very lucky that I was fighting the enemy of Pakistan in the battlefield. The soldiers under my command fought with great spirit and an iron will. One of my soldiers, Allah Dita, and my batman were martyred. But their martyrdom did not demoralize us as we were fighting for the greatest cause – for our country and for God Almighty. Captain Waheed Kakar (who later became the army chief) was also fighting by my side and was severely wounded.

The Indians were attacking us with superior forces, but we successfully fought off all their attacks. We prevented the Indian Army from cutting Pakistan into two at the Sialkot Sector. Our soldiers and officers gave their blood very bravely to save our homeland. In the battle I personally killed at least seven Indian soldiers. When the Indian forces were on the offensive they were heavily supported by an armoured corps and massive artillery support. This was an eyeball-to-eyeball battle, which was where the Indian Army lost much of its advantage. The Indian Army was forced to retreat with heavy losses. When it had been advancing, I had 70 soldiers under my command fighting bravely. We lost 25 soldiers who were martyred, and 15 were wounded. Later, my company countered another strong attack.

The Pakistani Army fought bravely and the Indians failed to capture Chawinda. The tank battle of Chawinda was the biggest tank battle after World War II. There were about 300 tanks in each army facing each other. Our army fought bravely: we were fewer in numbers but our spirit, valour and passion was greater than theirs. Our training was also superior. In 1962, India had been badly defeated by the Chinese army. Psychologically, their morale was down at that time. In war, the mindset of an army matters a lot. The Pakistan armed forces were psychologically stronger than the Indians. They had a higher purpose in fighting against India: the Indian attack helped raise a great sense of nationalism not only among the people but also in the armed forces. We wanted justice, we felt we were fighting for the right cause. Our biggest asset was our passion in defending our homeland and being ready for its survival.

What was your experience in the 1971 war?

During the 1971 war, I was a lieutenant-colonel and was posted as a commanding officer in Shakargah Sector, Sialkot. We were defending the city of Shakargah. In this sector my battalion fought with great spirit and killed 53 Indian soldiers and wounded many more. In addition to that, 95 Indian soldiers were captured by us as prisoners of war. In that sector, a quarter of our battalion consisted of Bengali soldiers and they fought very bravely against the enemy. However, East Pakistan was lost and this certainly demoralized the army of Pakistan on the Western front.

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1 General Abdul Waheed Kakar was Chief of Army Staff from January 1993 to January 1996.

2 Considerably higher estimates are given below in the interview with Lieutenant-General Hamid Gul. Brian Cloughly comments: 'accounts differ widely as to the number of tanks, but to judge from the number of armoured units deployed on both sides, and given the regimental establishment strength in tanks, it is evident that there was a very slight – perhaps 20 – imbalance in favour of India.'
**What in your view is the reason for these wars?**

I think India's desire to predominate over Muslim-majority Pakistan is the chief reason. Otherwise, why has India occupied Muslim-majority Kashmir since 1948? The broken promise of former Indian Prime Minister Nehru regarding Kashmir's plebiscite is the living proof of India's attitude toward us. Yet the Muslims living in occupied Kashmir still want to join Pakistan. But the Indian Government refuses to make concessions on this issue. India showed her ugly face in 1971 when Mujibur Rahman, the traitor, with the help of the Government of India was able to lead the separation movement of East Pakistan. India was directly involved in the creation of Bangladesh. They never miss any opportunity to hurt Pakistan.

Then in 1972, in the Simla Accord, both Pakistan and India decided to resolve their all outstanding issues by mutual consultation. But all the issues, including Kashmir, are still unresolved. India did not act according to the spirit of the Simla Accord and because of this the region is still longing for peace. In 1984, the Indian Army captured the Siachen Glacier in the disputed area of Kashmir. We want peace and prosperity for Pakistan. We would like to have peaceful and friendly relations with all our neighbours, including India. But on the other hand, India has not accepted Pakistan from the core of her heart. That's why the main issues are still unresolved between the two countries.

Pakistan wants nothing but only justice and fair play. Recently, a leading (former) member of the BJP, Jaswant Singh, rightly confessed in his book *Jinnah: India, Partition, Independence* that the Muslims don't have equal rights in India; they were not considered equal to the Hindu majority. In the writer's words, 'He [Jinnah] had to settle for a moth-eaten Pakistan and (in) that too, he failed to mould it into a working state, let alone a shining example of that implausible theory of Muslims as a separate nation.'

In other words, Pakistan was a failed state even at its birth. Elsewhere, he quotes Nehru: 'If I had to listen to my dear friend Mohammad Ali Jinnah talking the most unmitigated nonsense about his 14 points ... I would consider the desirability of retiring to a South Sea island where there would be some hope of meeting people who were intelligent enough or ignorant enough not to talk of the 14 points.' This is hardly the kind of language one should have used for a distinguished contemporary and the 'sole spokesman' of the Indian Muslims.

This attitude forced the Muslims to create Pakistan. Now even some Indians have accepted that Muslims were forced to have an independent state in order to develop and have the benefit of equal political and economic opportunities. The then Indian Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, consulted the UN for a ceasefire in Kashmir in 1948. Nehru made a commitment that India would give a chance to the people of Kashmir to exercise their right of self-determination. But all the promises and commitments were fake and simply buying time.

If India decides to resolve all the outstanding issues based upon justice and sincerity, then there will be no tension between the two countries and both can live peacefully. Pakistan will want to resume trade with India. But peace needs two sides. If the Indian Government does not change its attitude towards Pakistan then the status quo will remain. Pakistan has to exist and it is here to stay forever. If India is not willing to offer us peace, then, as an independent nation, we have to be ready for war.

India claims to be the largest democracy in the world. But they are not ready to give fundamental rights to the people of occupied Kashmir. What type of democracy is this? Instead of working for the betterment of its people and stability in the region, the Indian Government has been increasing its defence budget on a regular basis. Recently, the amount by which the Indian defence budget has increased is almost equal to Pakistan's total defence budget. The question arises, if India believes in peace and friendly relations, why is she spending so many resources on the armed forces? India has the largest illiterate and poor population on earth. One-

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3 The Siachen Glacier lies to the east of the officially agreed end of the Line of Control in Kashmir and there is doubt as to whether the region should be in the sphere of influence of either country.


5 Ibid., 202.
What do you think is the way forward and how would you perceive the future of the two countries?

If the Kashmir issue is not resolved then I fear that even after another 50 years the relationship between the countries won’t become normal. The population of both countries is deprived of its fundamental rights and improvements in the quality of life. If India is not serious about resolving the issues with Pakistan then peace cannot be our destiny.

General Mirza Aslam Beg

Tell us about your early years and why you joined the army of Pakistan.

I was born into a Muslim family in Azamgarh (in Uttar Pradesh), British India, on 15 February 1928. My early and higher education was at Azamgarh. I graduated in 1948 from the Shibli College. During my school and college times, I was a member of the All India Muslim Students Federation. As a student I actively participated in the Pakistan movement from 1945 to 1947. Unlike Punjab at the time of Partition there were almost no communal riots in Uttar Pradesh. Therefore my family were not forced to migrate because they were Muslims. However, my elder brother, Colonel Afzal Beg, migrated to Pakistan in 1948 and joined the Pakistani Army and I followed him after the completion of my education in 1949. Since I was not good at studying and completed my graduation almost two years later, this made me over the age to join the Pakistani Army. My elder brother ‘reduced’ my age on the papers to meet the requirement for joining the army and finally I joined up in 1950. Interestingly, my other two brothers and my parents left India much later and settled in Pakistan in 1967.
Why did you choose Pakistan?

There were very few communal riots in the area I was living in at the time of Partition. There were tensions among the youth but there was no violence. Since there was no pressure on the Muslims to leave my part of India, my migration to Pakistan was a very difficult decision. Most of my family and friends remained in India after Partition but my passion to serve this newborn state, for which I had struggled as a young student, brought me to Pakistan. At that time I had great love and respect for Pakistan but at the same time I had no hatred for Hindus or India. I decided to go to Pakistan to realize the dream of a new state for the Muslims of the subcontinent. I came to Pakistan in 1949 and joined the Pakistani Army as a great profession to serve the new-born state. I had no intention of crushing India, or killing Hindus as an army man, since I had no hatred or detestation for India.

Do you have any regrets regarding your migration to Pakistan?

Absolutely not! I came by choice. I had a complete and highly fulfilled professional life. I became the head of the Pakistani Army for which I am grateful to Pakistan. I am sure, that as a Muslim, I could never have achieved all this in India. In February 1950, I went to Quetta to obtain training and in 1952 I was commissioned as an army officer of the 6th Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) long course. During almost 41 years of my army service, I was never discriminated against as an immigrant from Uttar Pradesh or for not being a son of the soil. I was always given respect in the army as a Pakistani. My own experience shows that there is no discrimination based upon race, colour or origin in the Pakistani Army, which makes it a great institution.

At the time of joining the army, what was your perception about India?

I had no hard feelings for Hindus or India at that time. India was not a friend in my mind but certainly there was no hatred either. My parents remained residents and citizens of India. In 1956, I visited my home town in India as a captain of the army and enjoyed my stay there. However, after 1948, due to the Kashmir dispute, both the people and the army of Pakistan started taking India as a threat.

Some time after Partition, the people of Pakistan started forgetting the painful memories of migration and bloodshed. I remember that in 1950, when the Indian kabaddi team visited Lahore, they were warmly welcomed everywhere, proving that even the people of Punjab had forgiven the killings and inhumane part of Partition. It was the Kashmir dispute that gave birth to animosity between the two nations. Nehru promised that the right of self-determination would be given to Kashmiris but this was not fulfilled, which caused a negative shift in the Pakistani mindset. The military, in particular, started viewing India as an enemy as a result.

What were your experiences in the 1965 war?

I was posted as a major in East Pakistan while the active war was fought on the western front of Pakistan. I did not directly participate in the 1965 war because at that time India did not have sufficient troops to fight on both the eastern and western borders of Pakistan at the same time. The 1965 war had some negative effects on the people of East Pakistan. There was criticism by the Bengali politicians that the rulers of Pakistan had

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6 Dixit claims that he was the first Mohajir officer to become chief of the army staff: ‘For the first time a Mohajir officer (originally from Azamgarh, UP), General Mirza Aslam Beg, became chief of army staff’ (Dixit, India-Pakistan in War and Peace, 264). However, this is true only in as far as Beg was the first Mohajir to be commissioned after the establishment of Pakistan to become its army chief. General Zia-ul-Haq was the first Mohajir to achieve this position (he was born in Jalandhar and educated at Delhi) but he was commissioned into the British Army of India on 12 May 1943. The author is grateful to Brian Cloughley for this clarification.

7 Kabaddi or Kabadi is a form of recreational combat training.
had brought law and order back to East Pakistan but in order to sustain it, a political solution was needed. In other words, my message was that the problem was a political one, which must be solved in a political way. Unfortunately, the Pakistani rulers failed to find a political solution for the unrest in East Pakistan which led to the later chain of events.

The 1971 conflict was another failure of the Pakistani high command. The majority of the young officers, including me, were asking for a political solution to get to the bottom of the insurgency in East Pakistan. On the other side, the military commander of East Pakistan, General Tiger Niazi, once in a meeting shared with us his plan to attack the Indian cities of Agartala and Calcutta, totally unaware of the political and military realities. The focus of the top Pakistani leadership was completely wrong. I was shocked to see the mindset of the high command because they sought a military solution to a political difficulty. Because of my difference of opinion with them, and pro-negotiation viewpoint, I was sent back to West Pakistan, shortly before the 3 December 1971 war on the western front. It was a sort of punishment for being a ‘rebel’ who had not supported the military action against the uprising. At the time of the war, I was at Defence College, Rawalpindi, West Pakistan. The moment the war started I was given the duty of creating a battalion (lashkar) of 1,200 reservists. I took to the task and was able to create the battalion within the given time, with the help of the people of Lahore. They provided us with food, blankets and basic necessities to take care of 1,200 people. My battalion was posted at Narang Mandi, near the Lahore Sector, during the period of combat and after.

What are your feelings at the time of the surrender of the Pakistani Army?

The Pakistani Army surrendered on 16 December 1971, in East Pakistan. It was obviously a sense of humiliation. Honestly speaking, I felt sorry for the high command of Pakistan. I think it was more a failure of our high command than an Indian success. I was saddened. But, this surrender did not cause anger or hatred against India at a level where I wanted to harm or finish off India or its army. I was sure that what had happened
What is your analysis of the 1971 war?

In my view, the 1971 war was a mistake. The Pakistani Army was not prepared for it. The right equipment, arms and ammunition were not available. It was an ill-planned confrontation, like 1965. In 1965, with all our failings, we were able to save some face, but 1971 was a complete disaster: our incorrect policies forced us to surrender in East Pakistan. I see both 1965 and 1971 as high command failures. Unfortunately, during these wars, our ruling generals were involved in state affairs. Their political role certainly hurt the military leadership’s ability to fight a full-scale war effectively. The Pakistani military high command was more concerned on each occasion with ruling and running the country, resulting in the failure to control the army and prepare it sufficiently for a full-scale war.

Unfortunately, until the late 1980s the Pakistani Army lacked sufficiently well-educated and trained officers fit to lead it in a full-scale war. There were brilliant tacticians who could conduct themselves very well in battles but who didn’t have much of an idea of the strategy of war. There was almost no military education, no training on how to fight on a larger scale. That was why, when I became army chief in 1988, I made it compulsory for all officers to participate in higher education war courses. And Zarb-e-Momin in 1989 was the biggest war exercise in my time, which taught the Pakistani Army how to fight a full-scale war with appropriate emphasis on both offence and defence at the same time. I assure you, because of this present awareness in the Pakistani Army, India has to think much harder before attacking Pakistan. That is also the main reason India did not dare to attack in the so-called ‘stand-off’ against Pakistan in 2002.

How do you define ‘jihad’?

Jihad is not a new thing for Muslims. In the Qur’an, there is a clear order to fight against injustice and the excessive use of power. The Qur’an also asks the Muslims to help those Muslims who are abused and illegitimately ruled by non-Muslim powers. The modern jihad came into existence at the time of the Afghan war when the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan against the will and wishes of the people of the land, in December 1979. From around the world, there were 60,000 volunteer Muslim jihadis who participated against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In addition to them, 40,000 joined from Pakistan. It happened because a Muslim state was occupied by a non-Muslim power against its will; then the jihadis got together to fight against an unlawful occupation.

There is a general perception that the jihadis in the 1980s were created by the ISI with the help of the CIA …

I disagree with this perception. Jihad is not something new to the Islamic world. It has been part of the Muslim belief since the birth of Islam. Jihad was certainly not created by any state or any regular army of the Islamic

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8 This was the largest exercise ever carried out by the Pakistani Army and Air Force. Exercise “Zarb-e-Momin – 1989” provided a rare opportunity for the PAF to participate in a field exercise involving an Army field headquarters consisting of multiple corps. Active involvement of the PAF and the Pakistan Army formations in strategic and tactical planning was very productive in creating a mutual understanding of each other’s capabilities, limitations, and concepts. An important lesson of this exercise was that the requirement of planning and committing air effort in support of Army operations is a task fraught with complications. The planned commitment of air support becomes totally irrelevant to the actual requirements during operations as the battle unfolds. However, the close-support procedures, integration of Army Air Defence assets with the PAF, and tactical reconnaissance with real time information on targets, emerged as the issues that needed to be tackled at the inter-Services level (<http://www.pakdef.info/pids/paf/highmark2.html>).
Soviet retreat which in turn provided the impetus for the jihadis for the liberation of Kashmir against Indian occupation.

Geopolitically, the movement has suffered in the recent past, because of the growing global intolerance of the Kashmiri movement after 9/11. The labelling of the freedom struggle as ‘terrorism’ is a big drawback for the movement. Even the Muslim world is largely silent over the issue.

In spite of all that Pakistan has done to meet Indian demands, it is still under pressure for providing support to the movement. On the other hand India is much better positioned, as there is a strategic pull on India from the US and Russia, which makes India arrogant with regard to dialogue with Pakistan over Kashmir. India today enjoys a strategic advantage over Pakistan. It is in a better position to bargain for a solution for Kashmir from a position of strength. Whatever the compulsions for Pakistan and India, both must realize the seriousness of the Kashmir issue and its expanding dimensions because of its linkage with the ongoing Afghan conflict as well as with Iraq, which after Afghanistan is the new breeding and training ground of the global resistance of the Muslim world. This ‘resistance force’ is fighting for freedom from non-Muslim rulers over the Muslim majority from Chechnya to Palestine, and from Iraq and Afghanistan to Kashmir. The ideological and political contents of the movement thus merge together. There will be no solution to the problem so long as such movements for freedom are labelled as terrorism.

The Kashmiri people have made great sacrifices for their cause, demonstrating their strong will to continue the struggle to its logical end. Kashmir remains the unfinished part of the agenda of partition of the subcontinent. The issue is essentially one of political and human rights, and the UN resolutions contain an abiding commitment to the right of self-determination for the Kashmiris. The freedom movement in Kashmir has gained such a momentum that India, with more than half a million troops, has failed to suppress it.

How do you view the Kashmir dispute between the two countries?

It is not a dispute between India and Pakistan only. The ideological context of the struggle for the liberation of Kashmir needs to be understood. With the advent of Islam in this region, Kashmir became part of the Muslim territories, and for almost 1,000 years was ruled by them.

In 1827, the Sikhs occupied Kashmir and within five years, jihad was declared by the Kashmiris against the non-Muslim ruler. Sikh rule lasted for 30 years, followed by the Dogras for a hundred years and Indian rule has now completed 63 years. The resistance against the non-Muslim rulers started in 1831, within the first five years of rule by the Sikhs. This was the first phase of jihad, which later saw many ups and downs but never abated. 1837, 1931 and 1947 were other occasions when the resistance gained new impetus. In 1947, the Kashmiris succeeded in liberating part of their land from the non-Muslim rulers. In 1990, a new phase of resistance started, in that the jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan led to the world.9 Conversely, the Pakistani Army and the American CIA were pleased to accompany and support them. They were a great support against the Soviet forces. They fought well and gave a hard time to one of the strongest armies of the world in Afghanistan. They may have been supported by the CIA or Pakistan but one thing is for sure, they were not created by them.10 They were fighting because of their belief, as a religious duty.

9 Later in the interview, General Beg comments: ‘Jihad is essentially an obligation for believers to fight against injustice. But there is also another variant of jihad, where a believer is expected to take up arms against a force which is brutalizing the Muslims. If jihad has been declared by the state than it is mandatory for the people to join in, but in the event it is undeclared as is the case of Bosnia, Chechnya or Kashmir, it is only a few individuals, perhaps a few thousands, who will volunteer to help the oppressed.’

What does the future hold for Kashmir?

There is a relationship between the Afghan uprising and Kashmir. The Americans and their NATO allies have lost their nerve and want to exit from Afghanistan, at the earliest opportunity. The Taliban of today were the mujahideen of the 1980s, fighting against the Soviets, who were defeated and forced to withdraw. Thus the American objectives having been served, the mujahideen became irrelevant and were denied their share in the power they had won. They were downgraded by being called ‘extremists and fundamentalists’ and were left to fight amongst themselves. After 9/11, Afghanistan was occupied and the ‘war on terror’ was launched against the Afghans and their rulers, the Taliban. The hard core of the Taliban is the younger generation which was born twenty or twenty-five years back and has grown up under the shadow of war. Their only objective in life is to win their freedom. They have never involved themselves outside Afghanistan. They have no direct relation with Al-Qaeda except the Al-Qaeda Brigade, numbering about 3,000, which has recently joined the ‘Shadow Army’ under Mullah Umar.

The Afghan Taliban are the arbiters of the destiny of the people of Afghanistan and the Americans have wisely developed contacts with them. The Taliban are demanding a ‘time-frame for withdrawal’ as a precondition for negotiations. The occupation forces are facing tough resistance, which is stronger, better organized and better armed than the resistance the Soviets had to face during the 1980s. The resistance now calls itself the ‘Shadow Army’, organized into several divisions, and each division consists of a number of lashkars. The ‘Shadow Army’ comprises: the old mujahideen who fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan; the Afghan Taliban, mostly born under the shadow of war; veterans from Iraq; old and new volunteers from several countries of the world and the 005 Brigade of Al-Qaeda.

Beg uses the expression ‘made to fight amongst themselves’ but it is not clear by whom they were made to fight in his view, since the Americans had lost interest and withdrawn. Most commentators argue that the civil war resulted from inherent factionalism among the mujahideen.
On the other hand, in Pakistan, Pakhtun power has emerged as a reality. There are over 3 million Pakhtuns in Karachi; their power extends to Balochistan, NWFP and to the Hindukush mountains. Their fight for freedom, since 1980, has galvanized them into a formidable force, combining the forces of Pakhtun nationalism, Islamic idealism (jihad) and the universalism of the Islamic resistance against oppression, with its hard core resting along the Durand Line. The Pakhtuns are our strength, as much as they are the strength of Afghanistan. Thus there is a big role for Pakhtun power in our future conflict with India to decide once and for all the issue of Kashmir.

The Islamic resistance grew from the Pakistan–Afghan soil, along the Durand Line. The Pakhtuns provided the hard core of resistance, and jihadis from 70 countries around the world joined them, whose only objective was, and is, freedom: freedom for Afghanistan, freedom for Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon and Kashmir. They do not believe in establishing Islamic rule over other countries. They were not involved in the 9/11 act of terror either, nor in any terrorist act elsewhere. Al-Qaeda has a different identity and targets the ‘oppressors’ outside the zone of conflict. As a result of this conflict, ‘Pakhtun power’ has emerged and extends from Pakistan to the Hindukush mountains.

The unipolar world order now is tri-polar, because the global Islamic resistance has been able to curb the US ambitions of ‘global primacy and pre-eminence’, while Russia and China form the third force. Thus, it is the global Islamic resistance which India might have to face in Kashmir soon after the West leaves Afghanistan.

Is India using Afghanistan against Pakistan?

While Pakistan faces serious internal political crises, conspiracies are being hatched by the occupation forces in Afghanistan seriously undermining Pakistan’s national security. We have enough information to identify this intelligence network inside Afghanistan fairly accurately, to determine the dimensions of this Great Game of the civilized world. The nerve centre is at Jabal-us-Seraj and involves Mossad, MI6 and BND [German intelligence].

It’s a huge set-up with concrete buildings, antennas and all the modern electronic gadgetry one can conceive of. Its outposts are Sarobi and Kandahar against Pakistan. Sarobi is the nerve centre headed by an Indian general officer, who also commands the Border Road Organization (BRO).

In your opinion, what is vital in the India–Pakistan dialogue?

India and Pakistan are not genetically programmed to be the arch-enemies of each other. Peace is the casualty. How to extricate the region from the debilitating impact of mistrust and antipathy requires insight which transcends stereotyping and prejudicial modes of perception.

In order to bring about a behavioural change conducive to cooperation and to developing a collective orientation towards the well-being of the people of both countries, we should discern the ‘realities’ as they exist. It is essential not to label the legitimate struggle for self-determination of the oppressed Kashmiris as terrorism, which often is misperceived and consequently is a great impediment towards peace.

In our region, Kashmir and Afghanistan have assumed special salience on this account. Terrorism, is often referred to as ‘Islamic fundamentalism’, which started with the revolution in Iran, particularly when the Iranians took the Americans as hostages. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, and the combined move of heroic resistance put up by its mujahideen and the Pakistanis who joined them in their struggle was glorified with the sacrosanct name of jihad. For a full decade, it continued as such. The nomenclature suddenly changed, when the Red Army staged a retreat in 1989, and the same mujahideen were now ‘Islamic fundamentalists’ and jihad became ‘Islamic terrorism’. The so-called ‘virus of terrorism’, it is believed, is now being passed on to Kashmir.

Pakistan lost East Pakistan, because we failed to give them their due rights – political, social and economic. The debacle was thus a result of our own folly and a grossly myopic view of history. The lesson that the Indian strategic pundits must bear in mind is that India represents the centre of gravity of the subcontinent. If there is alienation, deprivation or marginalization of any group of people or community or justice is denied to them,
the ‘periphery’ psyche induces them to drift away. Kashmir is undergoing just such a psychological agony. To hold it through coercion or military might will only serve to expedite the process of ‘drift’.

The Kashmiris’ struggle for freedom has not suddenly erupted. This started when the British, totally flouting the norms of humanity and the values of democracy, sold the territory to the Dogras in 1846.\textsuperscript{12} Kashmiri sensibility could not tolerate such an act, and the rebellion against oppression has been a recurrent feature since 1931. The birth of Pakistan in 1947 only accentuated their zeal for freedom, culminating into armed struggle, when all the promises made by the erstwhile leader of India, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, and the explicit resolutions of the United Nations guaranteeing them a right to determine their future were systematically flouted. Indeed it is a semantic perversion to label their heroic armed rebellion against oppression an act of terrorism.

India’s great strength as a nation is undoubtedly the vision of a liberal democratic order based on ‘secular’ values. The Indian and Pakistani visions are not antithetical to each other. They may even occasionally complement each other. Both have a commitment to adhere to liberal democratic values. ‘Secularism’ is not alien to Islam. Respect for all religions is the fundamental obligation for all Muslims. If Pakistan could be friendly to China and Sri Lanka, there is no reason why India and Pakistan could not improve their mutual relations, when there are far more points of convergence than divergence. The historical ‘past’ must be dispensed with, as it is the main determinant of our distorted perceptions.

What are the prospects for peace in South Asia?

India’s emergence as an economic power is foreseeable but the dream cannot be realized unless it cuts down its grandiose military ambitions which run counter to the peace initiative. This requires a degree of objectivity to ensure a plausible use of the emerging opportunities for achieving the economic well-being of the South Asian region. India promotes its own primacy and pre-eminence while Pakistan believes that SAARC’s true potential cannot be realized unless tensions that keep the two countries at loggerheads are resolved, and interrelatedness and harmony is achieved between economics, politics and national security interests. The important consideration, therefore, is to address the Kashmir issue in its correct perspective and not let it drag on, because the regional and global security environments are changing fast. The wars of liberation are being waged in various parts of the world supported by the global resistance force of jihadis – created during the Afghan war of liberation. It is therefore essential that the timeframe for finding a solution of Kashmir issue is laid down precisely and adhered to. It is important because in spite of over half a million Indian troops deployed in Kashmir and a fenced Line of Control, the Kashmir liberation movement continues unabated and will intensify, as soon as the mujahideen, now engaged in Afghanistan and Iraq, are free to shift their attention towards Kashmir. This would greatly intensify violence and instability in the region.

Ultimately, peace can only be achieved through an amicable solution of the Kashmir issue. Once this is accomplished, the economic agenda will automatically gain momentum. As trade and commercial activities expand, the size of the economy will also expand, proportionately reducing the expenditure on defence. At present, the level of defence spending of India is below 3 per cent of GDP while Pakistan’s is at 5.7 per cent.\textsuperscript{13} It is Pakistan which needs to expand its economy, to reduce the ratio of defence spending to an acceptable level of 3 per cent or below without any cut in the defence budget at present. The South Asian countries need to expand their economic base and productivity levels, by widening the scope of cooperation and defeating the biggest enemy, which is poverty.


\textsuperscript{13} Brian Cloughley notes that in neither country is expenditure on their programme of nuclear weapons included in their defence budget.
Does a nuclear Pakistan and a nuclear India mean the inevitability of nuclear war?

The nuclear stand-off between India and Pakistan over the past quarter of a century has reached a point where saner elements in both the countries have started thinking of developing a common strategy for maintaining a South Asian nuclear security regime for peace. The year 1998 was the turning point for Pakistan. Its ambiguity on nuclear policy was put to the test by India, and Pakistan effectively demonstrated its capability. Establishing a level of nuclear deterrence has led to confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan and has modified the climate of confrontation. The proposal for a South Asian nuclear security regime was mooted by the eminent Indian scholar, M. J. Akbar, editor-in-chief of the Asian Age.

The main feature of his proposal was: by working on a joint nuclear strategy, India and Pakistan would be able to safeguard their nuclear status, which has helped establish a stable nuclear deterrence in South Asia. The proposal has its merits but there are some grey areas which need to be viewed with caution. The South Asian nuclear security regime could become a reality if the Kashmir issue is seriously addressed in good time, because the developments taking place in Iraq and Afghanistan are ominous, as these would not only intensify the Kashmir war of liberation, but would have a global impact, as predicted by CIA. Being proactive is a better option than being reactive.

Air Marshal Zafar Ahmad Chaudhry

Why did you join the air force?

During World War II, there was a ban on civilian services in India but the military was very much needed. There were lots of openings for the armed forces at that time. Moreover, uniformed jobs were considered particularly glamorous. This glamour and a safe and secure profession were my two incentives to join the Royal Indian Air Force.

What was the attitude of the armed forces before Partition?

As I said, I did not join the force for some higher cause, such as martyrdom (shahadat); it was simply joining a good profession. I wanted to be a part of the glamour of flying. Frankly speaking, there was no philosophy or sense of nationhood behind my joining the air force. The armed forces were not obsessed by religion or nationalism. Most of the senior military officers were British. While there were Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims, they were fewer compared to the number of British officers. Muslims were even fewer in number as compared to other communities.

I was happy being part of the air force of British India and took it as a privilege to go to England in December 1946 as an air force officer for further training. And I came back in June 1947 and was posted as an instructor at Ambala, Punjab.

Did you ever have the chance of meeting or interacting with the founder of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah?

The Quaid visited Peshawar in 1945 when I was stationed at the air force base there. He was to arrive by an Indian National Airways flight from Delhi, reaching [the base] about midday. The aircraft operating on this route was a fifteen-seat feederliner. There was considerable commotion and heated discussion between the Indian officers over the Quaid’s impending visit. Occasionally, this tended to become acrimonious, revealing the deep-seated prejudice and hatred of some of our colleagues from the majority community.

An animated and boisterous discussion took place on the morning of the Quaid’s arrival, at the end of which a bigoted Bengali Hindu pilot by the name of Dutt said, ‘My guns will be loaded today and I shall shoot down the plane carrying Jinnah.’ This was simply too much, and I replied...
with considerable anger and severity, ‘I shall stay right with you and shoot you down before you touch that plane.’ We took off together and I stuck to Dutt like a leech, but, thank God, his threat proved an idle boast and the Quaid’s plane landed safely. However, this shows the severity and intensity of feelings prevailing on the two sides and, perhaps, lends weight to the view that those really responsible for the partition of India were the bigots of the majority community and not so much the Muslims themselves.

The Quaid arrived to a grand welcome and addressed a public meeting at the Islamia College in the evening. Most Muslim officers attended, more as a homage to the great man than out of any desire to involve themselves in political matters. The main theme of the Quaid’s speech was that he had secured a firm assurance from the British that they would not ‘quit India’ before a political solution had been found which was fully acceptable to the Muslim League. There was deafening applause from a mammoth gathering and we all returned with our confidence renewed in this great man.

The last time I saw the Quaid-i-Azam was on the occasion of his memorable visit to Risalpur in April 1948; this time, he was the Governor-General of Pakistan. He reviewed an air force parade and then visited our mess where a group photograph was taken – a photograph that has since become famous. He then reviewed an army parade which lasted perhaps two hours. Despite his obviously failing health and extreme physical frailty, he stood erect throughout the protracted proceedings, acknowledging the salute of the various formations as they filed past with fervour and reverence. Here was another proof of his indomitable will and courage, though none was needed any longer. Addressing the air force parade he said, ‘A country without a strong air force is at the mercy of an aggressor. Pakistan must build up her air force as quickly as possible. It must be an efficient air force, second to none’ – words that still ring in our ears.

How did the British Army of India behave at the time of Partition?

At the time of the creation of Pakistan and India, I was stationed at Ambala. There was no division into a Hindu or a Muslim army. The majority of army men thought that India and Pakistan would be two neighbours and live peacefully without dispute. At that time, nobody had imagined the eventuality that the British Army of India would be divided into two armies that were to become the separate Pakistani and Indian armies. Moreover, nobody imagined that these two armies would fight a number of wars as arch-rivals.

At that time, in the army, there was no division or hatred between the Muslim and non-Muslim. There was almost no sense of discrimination or division on the basis of religion in the British Army of India at the time of Partition. Interestingly, the Pakistani military (navy, army and air force) in its early days carried forward the same British traditions, likewise the Indian armed forces.

Then how did the communal riots start in which hundreds of thousands of people were butchered?

Soon after Partition, massacres of the civilians from both sides started, which gave birth to extreme inter-communal tension and animosity. In September 1947, there was a visible increase in the rioting. Injustice and insanity, killing and cruelty ruled on both sides of the border and both sides should be blamed; both are guilty of this nonsense. Unfortunately, everyone had gone mad. Instead of sanity and humanity, madness ruled on both sides. However, as a member of the Pakistani Air Force, I took no part in anything like this. From my point of view, this was no answer. In my opinion, religion, fundamentalism, sectarianism were not the forces behind the creation of Pakistan. Pakistan was created for the betterment and security of the Muslims of the subcontinent. As a human being, even today I feel very angry regarding what happened at the time of Partition when both sides killed innocent people.

What was your own experience of communal frenzy at Partition?

I was a flying instructor at Ambala, India, at the time of Partition. It was decided at the highest level that the Indian Air Force personnel who had
decided that I should go to Calcutta and escort my aunt and cousins back to Pakistan. I flew in a small plane to Lahore and then on to Delhi. Although I was familiar with the ground features between Lahore and Delhi, what I saw while over-flying East Punjab was very strange indeed. One is used to seeing wispy ribbons of smoke rising lazily from the cooking fires of peaceful villages and towns, but what I saw now were shafts of dense, black smoke emanating from distinct sections of these habitations and often rising to several thousand feet. This was an eerie sight: the spectacle of wafting angry smoke billowing from scores of familiar towns and villages was almost unreal, shattering the serenity of the flat, tranquil landscape beneath, made up of a multitude of green and brown fields that seemed like tiny chips studded in a grand mosaic fashioned by a master craftsman. This was not the friendly smoke that denotes warmth and hospitality and is an expression of much that is fine, generous and noble in the human spirit. Alas, this was a mirror of the ugly face of humanity, darkened by greed, hatred and barbarity. The sections burning were those of Muslims, many of whom had been hacked to death or forced to flee. Disturbances had also started in Pakistan, and many Hindus and Sikhs had fared no better. It is probable that at least some of these barbarities were perpetrated supposedly to avenge what may have happened on the other side, but this only compounded and magnified the degradation of the human soul, which, if it is true and upright, never espouses bigotry and intolerance, much less commits acts that are the very negation of humanity, no matter what the provocation. It matters little which side started what first and who won the mad race of terror and carnage, for it was the human spirit that was the certain loser – and at this all of us humans, regardless of personal faith or nationality, must feel defeated and ashamed. Mutual accusations and recriminations, or attempts to justify reprisals, can only be an exercise in futility, fanning hatred and reviving injury rather than allowing the soul to cleanse itself and return into the noble mould in which the Maker cast it.

In Delhi, I stayed at the officers’ mess at Palam, waiting to make my way to Calcutta. I saw enough of the effects of violence and barbarism in this jewel of cities to wonder if sanity would ever prevail again. Later, I saw similar scenes in some parts of Pakistan and felt equally appalled and dismayed. It was no longer safe for Muslims to travel by train around Delhi,
so I thought it prudent to avoid this if possible. Luckily, I was offered a lift by the British captain of a transport aircraft going to Allahabad, from where I caught a train for Calcutta. As I was now outside the worst-affected area, I thought it would be reasonably safe to take a train – and, in any case, there was no real alternative.

Although passengers in the compartment talked endlessly of the communal violence in both India and Pakistan and gave harrowing accounts of what they had seen or heard, the journey itself was uneventful and we reached Calcutta's main railway station in the morning. Clutching my small bag, I came out to the taxi stand where passengers had formed a line waiting for their turn. The taxis moved forward slowly in a single line, the next vehicle moving up as the previous one moved away with its load. When my turn came, I noticed that the driver of the vehicle was a Sikh. I felt somewhat reluctant to ride with a Sikh driver in the tense situation that prevailed, and side-stepped to let the person behind me take this vehicle. As the next taxi moved up, I saw that this, too, had a Sikh driver. Now I felt that, perhaps, I was being a coward to refuse riding with a Sikh driver and, therefore, took the taxi.

As we approached the Howrah Bridge, the driver inquired where I wanted to go. Since my brother lived in Park Circus, an exclusively Muslim suburb, I thought it best to avoid telling him this as long as possible. I, therefore, gave him general guidelines to ensure that we headed in the correct direction but did not give him the precise address.

Soon he said, 'Please tell me the area you want to go to.' As there was no way of avoiding this direct question I reluctantly answered, 'Park Circus.' He persisted, 'Where in Park Circus?' I replied, 'Congress Exhibition Road.' He shot back, 'This is a very long road; what number?' I felt for my revolver in the holster under my bush shirt and said, 'The number is 191.' He turned his head to look at me and asked, 'Is that the house where ladies observe purdah?' 'Yes, that is correct. It's my brother's house.' He turned around to look at me again as I prepared myself for the worst, and said, 'Sir, I belong to your village near Pasrur [that is in the Sialkot area of Punjab, now in Pakistan] and my people have lived under the wing of your elders for generations. We are greatly indebted to your family. I had, just by chance, carried some ladies to your brother's house some months ago and discovered that you were the landlords (chaudhries) of our village. I am honoured to have you ride in my taxi; can I be of any other service to you?'

True, I was relieved, but this feeling was totally overshadowed by the sense of guilt and shame I felt in my heart for having imagined this fine human being to belong to the band of those who had degenerated to the level of senseless brigands, perpetrating unspeakable atrocities on innocent people – all because they worshipped God in their own way. We reached the house and the friendly driver insisted on carrying my bag up the stairs to the second floor where my brother lived. He firmly refused the fare when I wanted to pay him, and it took all my powers of persuasion to make him relent and accept my offering. He warmly extended his good wishes and took leave as though he had known me all his life. My flickering faith in humanity was suddenly revived, and the world did not appear to be such a bad place after all.

Indian Airlines was still flying the Calcutta–Delhi route and this enabled me to bring my aunt and my cousins to Delhi on board a scheduled flight. At Delhi airport, we joined other servicemen and their dependants waiting for flights to Pakistan. Many were lodged in aircraft hangars with bare floors and almost no toilet facilities. We were fortunate enough to get a small room in a wing of the officers' mess where we all huddled together. The following day, a Royal Air Force aircraft (from among those assigned for carrying refugees between India and Pakistan) brought us to Rawalpindi, Pakistan. The aircraft had no seats – just its bare floor to sit on. One hundred and fourteen people were herded into the aircraft like cattle, and each person was permitted no more than 20 pounds of baggage. But no one minded this discomfort and privation for it seemed that this 90-minute flight had transported us from the shadow of death to the promised land – one that appeared to offer hope and freedom.

What was the impact of these riots?

The riots provided the foundation for India–Pakistan enmity based on religion. From this time onwards, the dream of two friendly neighbours turned into a nightmare. The riots also led Pakistanis to believe that India
Pakistani Interviewees

Did the British contribute towards the making of the Pakistani Air Force?

As Pakistani officers were mostly of junior ranks and inexperienced at the time of Partition, it became necessary to borrow British officers from the Royal Air Force to fill certain key appointments, including that of the commander-in-chief. Thus, until 1957, the Pakistani Air force was commanded by British officers on loan from the Royal Air Force. By far the most impressive and charismatic of the four British officers who commanded the Pakistani Air Force was Air Vice-Marshal (later Air Marshal Sir Richard) R. L. R. Atcherley, who was in charge from 1949 to 1951. He was one of the best-known personalities of the RAF, and there are many stories about his exuberance and bravado, especially in his younger days. His flair and humour became a by-word, as indeed did his irrepressible drive and total dedication to the service.

He remained a bachelor throughout his life, devoting all his attention and energies to the service he loved so dearly. He always drove himself to the very limit, and also demanded the same single-minded devotion to duty and profession from his subordinates. He was a man not only respected and admired, but also deeply loved by his associates. Lest anyone should imagine that Atcherley was all bluff and bluster let me recount how he

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14 Sir Richard Llewellyn Roger Atcherley (1904–1970) took up the appointment of Air Officer commanding No. 12 Group in the RAF in 1951 after his period of tenure as Chief of the Air Staff of Pakistan.

15 Brian Cloughley notes that Atcherley’s twin brother, David, also an air marshal, was killed in 1952 when the Meteor jet fighter he was piloting disappeared on a flight from Egypt to Cyprus.
How good was the performance of the Pakistani Air Force in the 1965 war?

I was director of air operations at the time of the war. The Pakistani Air Force was young and it was almost 4:1 inferior in terms of equipment and mass compared to the Indian Air Force at that time. Air Marshal Asghar Khan really contributed to make it a modern air force for that time. Anyway, during the war, Air Marshal Noor Khan commanded the PAF. Amusingly, we decided to attack instead of defending against an enemy that was four times our size. We attacked the Indian airfields at Pathankot and Adampur successfully. In addition to that, we also attacked Indian airfields from East Pakistan as well. We attacked Pathankot at the time of sunset. Actually, right after sunset darkness prevails and there was no night vision facility at that time to hunt the enemy by air. When we decided to attack Pathankot from our Peshawar base the top brass did not approve the plan. They were of the opinion that the Indians would not keep their fighter jets close to the Pakistan border at Pathankot airfield but I managed to convince them. In Peshawar, we had five fighters because we could not shift them to other Pakistani bases and from Peshawar we could only hit Pathankot. That was the only use for these five jets. On this argument, we got the approval to attack Pathankot. Frankly, luck was on our side. The Indian fighters were parked at Pathankot and the Indians were not expecting an air attack. That is why their jets became sitting ducks for our fighters and we hurt the Indian Air Force badly in that attack. This successful operation gave a big psychological boost not only to the PAF, but also the entire military. We established a psychological superiority after these successful attacks.

Then the Pakistani Army asked for air cover for the train which was shifting the tanks to the Sialkot Sector. The Indian Army had attacked very heavily in the Sialkot Sector and in order to defend against this attack, tanks were desperately needed there. I decided, being part of the operation team, not to fly over the train because it could help the enemy smell out that there was something special about it. Instead, the Pakistani fighter jets followed the train from a distance. Luckily, the Indians did not attack the train and our assessment turned out right. Had these tanks not reached the right place on time, we could have lost not only the Sialkot Sector but the war too. I think in general we were better trained compared to the Indian forces and, on top of this, luck also favoured us on many occasions. We defended the country against a mightier opponent very well and that was the biggest success of the 1965 war.

How would you compare the Indian and Pakistani air forces in 1965?

One of the reasons for our good performance was that the Pakistani Air Force had just one type of US-made jet fighter, the F-86 Sabre. Having just one type gave us more control and understanding of the jet fighter and its working. We had good expertise in the Sabre at that time. The Pakistani Air Force training was also superior to that of the Indians. And most of our top officers were trained in the US. By contrast, India had the British Hunter and Russian jets. They had more than one type of jet fighter and this reduced their capacity to maintain so many different types of aircraft. We were technically, training-wise and maintenance-wise at home with the Sabre jet. This certainly helped us perform well.

From the Pakistan side, was the 1965 war fought for reasons of religious conviction?

No, it was a war to defend the country. The thinking of the armed forces was based upon their responsibility to defend Pakistan, rather than fighting for a higher moral cause. The country was under attack by a larger enemy and the Pakistan military defended the country and made sacrifices as was their duty in honouring their country and their profession. The Pakistani Army started changing later. In the 1965 war it was all professionalism and a sense of duty in the mindset and not religion or martyrdom.
**Did Pakistan win the 1965 war?**

To claim that we defeated India would be wrong. However, our military performance was not bad and we successfully defended the country. That gave us pride and confidence. But it does not mean India lost the war.

**How would you compare the 1971 war with 1965?**

The Indians learnt from their mistakes in the 1965 war against Pakistan. They tried to improve in all areas. Because of their long period of preparation, training and learning from the past, the Indian Army was superior in many ways to us in the 1971 war. In my opinion, it was our mistake to fight India in 1971. To be honest, India did not attack Pakistan in 1971; rather it was we who attacked India from West Pakistan.

Even before the war, when a high-level Pakistani delegation went to China to seek Chinese help, they were advised by the then Chinese Prime Minister Mr Zhou Enlai [Chou En-lai], one of the all-time greatest and wisest leaders of the world, not to clash with India. They were told that any aggression from the Pakistani side would only serve to help India. The Chinese said that Pakistan must solve the conflict in East Pakistan by political means. On the contrary, if Pakistan tried to use force or war to unravel the East Pakistan crisis, it would only benefit the Indians. China before the war also clarified to the Pakistani top leadership of that time that they wouldn't be able to lend a hand to Pakistan as they had in the 1965 war.

Pakistan fought a poorly planned war, which was lost on the political front even before it started. This war cost us half of Pakistan. I met imprisoned Indian Air Force officers after the war of 1971. There was a noticeable difference between the Indian officers of the 1965 and 1971 wars. The imprisoned officers met me with grace and honour; self-assurance and confidence were apparent on their faces. Those young officers impressed me. I wanted to have officers like them in the Pakistani Air Force as well. At that time, I thought India had improved a lot since 1965.

**What is the issue underlying the wars between India and Pakistan?**

I think both countries are suffering from unreasonable phobias. Both are living with distrust. We Pakistanis always like to blame India for all our wrongs but we are no angels either. We have both suffered from this endless madness. Both India and Pakistan are foolish since they are living in the past. Some Pakistanis think that India wants to erase Pakistan from the globe. But why would India want to add 170 million Pakistanis to their own almost 150 million Muslims? Adding this many more Muslims would make a decisive difference to their politics and planning. More than 300 million Muslims would change the current democratic face of India. Moreover, the destruction of Pakistan would mean that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were at the Indian border. Pakistan is right now a great shock absorber for India! As far as I can see, there is no real reason behind this confrontation but foolishness and self-destruction.

**What do you recommend for a better relationship between the two countries?**

They both have to say goodbye to their past; that is the real solution of this problem. They must live for today. Yesterday is yesterday and it is gone. The Germans and the French used to fight like us but at last they have learnt to live peacefully. There was a time when they continuously wrestled as neighbours but now they have the same currency. Time has changed, and it has changed these countries too. Indians and Pakistanis should come forward to resolve their differences through negotiation and trust.

There should be open trade between India and Pakistan, since this is equally beneficial to both sides. There should be visa-free travel between Pakistan and India. (Terrorists don't obtain visas for travel, so why are both sides punishing the people by imposing restrictions on travel and tourism? This is regrettable.) Kashmir remains a big source of dispute between India and Pakistan, but I wonder how many Kashmiris will want to join Pakistan when the country is bleeding as it is at present. Why would they like to be part of an endless crisis in Pakistan? Unfortunately, India is playing a foolish game. They must grant Kashmiris their right of self-determination.
and India must let them live according to their wishes. India is a big state. It has to show leadership and maturity for the good of the people of the subcontinent as a whole. India and Pakistan should seek greater control over the extremist elements in their societies. The extremists seek to prevent a return to harmony between the countries.

**What future do you expect for the Pakistan–India relationship?**

If there is to be a future between India and Pakistan, it has to be one of friendship. War provides no future for either side!

Lieutenant-General Hamid Gul

**Did you grow up in an environment, where hatred for India was widespread?**

At the time of Partition, I was a young child. I was born and raised in a Muslim society where respect for all religions and people without any discrimination was part of the faith. No doubt, there is general dislike for India in Pakistan. This widespread dislike in our society is not against the Indian people or the fact that India is the largest Hindu state but is in opposition to the erroneous policies of the Indian Government towards Pakistan and the Muslims living there. Everyone can see this widespread abhorrence against the Indian ruling classes in India, as well.

As Muslims or Pakistanis, we don’t despise India or the Indians. We are taught to care for, and respect, every human being. We believe, as Muslims, that all human beings are equal. No one is superior or inferior on the basis of human value. But on the other hand, Hindus believe in the caste system: they do not think that human beings are of one and the same worth. They discriminate among innocent human beings based upon their caste or statement of belief. The so-called high-caste Hindus harbour a deep-down odium against the lower castes of their own religion. ‘Brahmanism’ plays a role like imperialism in India. In India, a Brahman is greater than others and has the right to rule over lower-caste people. We as Pakistanis and Muslims are not ready to allow such an imperialism or sickness to control us. We respect others and we want the same from the other side too. I see the biggest problem among the Indian ruling class as Brahmanism, which is an inhuman mindset. And we will never let this mindset be in charge of any part of us.

In addition to this, we are also equally against the double standards of the Indian government. For example, we believe that the occupation of Kashmir by the state of India is immoral, illegal and inhumane since it is against the will of the people. It is a universal fact that the Kashmiri majority is Muslim and that is why they do not want to be part of India. In Kashmir, India has been abusing basic human rights. India has been denying the fundamental right of self-determination there, by using force. I believe if a chance is given to the people of Kashmir, they will choose to join Muslim Pakistan.

India is also very proud of being a ‘secular’ state. But the people of this region, especially the Muslims of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh had seen the real Indian ‘secular face’ in Ayodhya, where Hindu fundamentalists demolished the Babri Mosque in full view of the Government of India in December 1992. They demolished the mosque to build a Hindu temple there. What type of secularism is this? Now it is even proven by a neutral Indian investigation that the Indian BJP leadership was behind this act of vandalism. This type of double standard continues to upset me; this is my reason for dislike of India.

The rift with India has a solid basis and that is why the Muslims living in the subcontinent – whether in Pakistan, Bangladesh or India – are one nation. And the Indian Hindu mindset and attitude are the major forces behind this oneness among the subcontinental Muslims. [For the Muslims], their faith holds them together even if they are not living within the same borders. They are not divided and cannot be divided because of their unyielding belief in Islam.
**Pakistani Interviewees**

*Are any memories from the wars against India etched in your mind?*

My memories of the war of 1965 are still fresh. The army defended Pakistan very bravely and kicked the Indian Army out of Pakistani areas which they captured in the early days of the war. India attacked Pakistan with arrogance; they were of the opinion that they would bring Pakistan to its knees being mightier and stronger. They wanted to occupy first the sensitive areas and roads to hit the defence of Pakistan badly; they were dreaming of occupying the heart of Pakistan – Lahore – and they were sure in their minds that in a few days they would achieve their military goals. It was true that their army was larger in terms of numbers compared to our army. But the morale of the Pakistani Army was very high. The army defended Pakistan against the Indian Army as part of their faith. We fought the Indians recklessly. The Pakistani Army and the nation fought the war as one unit; the whole nation was against the enemy aggression and wanted to contribute against the attack. Our rival underestimated our abilities and capabilities before the attack. However, after the attack, when the Indian Army faced the Pakistani Army, they understood that the Pakistani Army was no piece of cake. The whole nation stood against the enemy and defended the country with grace and dignity and that is the part of the 1965 war I most cherish.

In 1965, I was a young captain in the army and was posted at Sialkot (Chawinda Sector). In that sector, the biggest tank battle of the subcontinent was fought between Pakistan and India. In Chawinda a total of about 1,200 tanks was involved.\(^{16}\) It is important to note that, during the war, American supplies of weapons to Pakistan were suspended. However, this ban did not affect us adversely or break us. Against all the odds, the brave Pakistani Army fought like a lion on the Sialkot Sector to defend the country. Our troops, units, armour and guns gave the enemy not only a tough time but imposed a very heavy cost in terms of human resources as well as ammunition. We safeguarded Pakistan very courageously and the Indians were forced to retreat.

Our army did its best on the battlefield. The army was successful in that it prevented the Indian Army from achieving its military goals and the occupation of sensitive Pakistani areas in the Sialkot Sector. But unfortunately our high command could not deliver on the political front. When the international powers witnessed the good performance of the Pakistani Army, they pressured our rulers for a ceasefire. The political leadership of Pakistan caved in to these external forces and we lost all that we had gained with our sweat and blood.

In 1971, I was a major on the Multan front. The war started on 3 December 1971 and we were planning to attack from there into India. In East Pakistan our army surrendered on 16 December 1971 which brought an end to the war on the western border of Pakistan, too.

**What is the core issue between the two countries?**

Of course, Kashmir is the bone of contention. The blood of Kashmiris is on the hands of the Indian Army. India is accused of state terrorism in occupied Kashmir for the last 63 years. One side of the Indian face is democracy but the other side is the occupation of Kashmir by violating all restraint. India has no legal, ethical or historical reason to occupy Kashmir. India has been refusing the right of self-determination to the Kashmiris according to the UN resolution since 1948. We have fought three wars for Kashmir. Even during the early days of Pakistan when the country was facing numerous problems, the founder Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah ordered the army to attack Kashmir in order to capture it.

The Quaid declared: ‘Kashmir is an integral part of Pakistan.’ Morally, legally, geographically and economically, Kashmir belongs to Pakistan. If India claims Kashmir as an integral part of its territory, then we have a thousand reasons to prove that Kashmir is an integral part of ours. Our rivers start in Kashmir and we have an agrarian economy. It is our lifeline. Therefore, the Indian occupation of Kashmir cannot bring peace and a closer relationship between the two countries. Our struggle

\(^{16}\) Pakistan had about 600 tanks, of which it lost 44 in the battle of Chawinda. India had 708 tanks and lost about 120 of them in the battle. (But cf. n. 2 above at p. 149.)
Unfortunately, the top rulers in Pakistan have been pawns in the hands of the Western powers. History proves that many major decisions of the Pakistani rulers have been influenced by the West, particularly the Americans through their agents in the shape of the ruling class in Pakistan.¹⁸

¹⁸ This viewpoint of Lieutenant-General Hamid Gul has become particularly controversial since 9/11. Dixit comments that he 'is on public record as saying that Musharraf’s policies are wrong and that they do not serve the long-term interests of Pakistan’ (Dixit, India-Pakistan in War and Peace, 421). In 2001, Arnaud de Borchgrave of UPI interviewed Hamid Gul on who was responsible for 9/11 to which he replied ‘Mossad and its accomplices’. He also argued that the ‘destabilization of Pakistan’ was part of the US plan ‘because it is a Muslim nuclear state’ and that the US sought to ‘isolate Pakistan from China as part of its containment policy’. When asked what turned him against America, Gul replied ‘betrayals and broken promises and what was done to my army career’. The US told President Ishaq Khan that Gul was unacceptable as corps commander, even though as ISI director he had ‘held the whole Mujahideen movement in the palm of my hands. We were all pro-American. But then America left us in the lurch and everything went to pieces, including Afghanistan.’ Gul predicted later in the interview ‘if Pakistan gives the US base rights we will have a national upheaval. And if the US attacks Afghanistan, there will be a call – a fatwa – for a general jihad. All borders will then disappear and it will be a no-holds-barred Islamic uprising against Israel and American imperialism. Pakistan will be engulfed in the firestorm. So I can only hope that cooler heads will prevail in Washington’ (UPI interview with Lieutenant-General Gul, 26 Sept. 2001, reprinted 28 July 2010 at: http://www.veteranstoday.com/2010/07/28/arnaud-de-borchgrave-2001-interview-with-hamid-gul-former-isi-chief/). The WikiLeaks revelations in July 2010 caused a further controversy about Gul’s alleged continuing role ‘as the public face of an underground Pakistani military network that appears to be working to destroy the US effort to create a pro-West Afghanistan’ (Gul calls the reports ‘fiction and nothing else’). One US threat report states that Gul was present at a meeting in Wana, the capital of South Waziristan, in January 2009. ‘There, several older Arab men, presumably from Al Qaeda, and Afghan Taliban commanders discussed with Mr. Gul an attack with suicide bombers in Afghanistan to avenge the death of a leading member of Al Qaeda, Osama al-Kini, in an American drone attack’ (<http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/world/16warlogs.html#report/78313FD0-3219-0B3E-00B6A2578A3> Mark Mazzetti, Jane Perlez, Eric Schmitt and Andrew W. Lehren, ‘ISI and Hamid Gul aid insurgents, reports assert’ (15 July 2010): <http://aacounterterror.wordpress.com/2010/07/25/isi-and-hamid-gul-aid-insurgents-reports-assert/> Also Jeff Stein, ‘The Audacity of Hamid Gul’, Washington Post (26 July 2010): http://blog.

Why has the Pakistan military been unsuccessful in capturing Kashmir?

I strongly believe that the sole purpose of Pakistani Army is to liberate Kashmir from Indian occupation. That is why our army has fought wars when they were ordered to do so. However, we have to recognize that when to start or stop a war is always a political decision taken by the rulers, not by the army itself. In 1948, when our forces were progressing in occupied Kashmir, Pakistani Foreign Minister Sir Zafarullah Khan declared a ceasefire when he was at the UN in New York. In 1965, the Pakistani Army was doing well but it was not given the required force by the top. If the then Finance Minister Shoaib had given the approval for two divisions of armoured forces, the 1965 war might have had a different result. In the 1965 war, we were advancing on the Akhnoor and Sialkot sectors; however, the Pakistani Army was ordered to stop. For some reason, there is always a ceasefire when the Pakistani Army fights for Kashmir and this ceasefire comes from outside the region. The Pakistani Army is meant to fight for Kashmir and they have the spirit, will and passion to fight for Kashmir at any time; the army is willing to pay any price for this mission. So, the Pakistani Army has not failed in terms of attempting to liberate Kashmir. It is a political failure by the rulers of Pakistan.

¹⁷ Muhammad Shoaib (1907–97) was finance minister in 1958–62 and 1962–5, with a six-month gap in 1962 when Abdul Qadir held the post.
When the top leadership does not want to exchange blows then what can the army do? From my perspective, the Pakistan government should not refrain from fighting India over the Kashmir dispute. Kashmir belongs to us and the Pakistani Army has the capability to be successful against the Indian occupation in any type of war.

Do you see Islamic fundamentalism as a problem between the two countries?

Islamic fundamentalism or extremism is all propaganda and the misinformation of the Indian ruling class, especially the Indian media. Indians are cunningly using their powerful media against Pakistan and jihad. On the contrary, Hindu fundamentalism is on the rise every day; but India is in the habit of accusing Pakistan, the ISI and Islamic fundamentalism whenever things go wrong in India. If we look at the record of the Indian accusations against Pakistan, on 13 December 2001 there was an attack on the Indian Lok Sabha and they blamed Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Taiba for it; but it turned out that the perpetrators were in fact Indian Kashmiris. It was a reaction of Indian Kashmiris against Indian abuses and atrocities in Kashmir; this proves that the injustices and power abuses in Kashmir can give Kashmiris cause to carry out something like that. But, India – without any investigation – blamed Pakistan for the attack on the Lok Sabha.

Then in 2007, there was the Samjhota Express case, in which 68 passengers, mostly Pakistanis, were burnt to death in the train. This train was stopped at an obscure railway station in Haryana and the doors were locked. Later the train was set on fire. Again, it was proclaimed that it was Pakistani Lashkar-e-Taiba who were guilty, and they had done it because they wanted to derail the peace process. Yet Lieutenant-Colonel Shrikant Prasad Purohit has been proven to be the culprit instead.19 There are other Indian officers also who are or were his accomplices, and he has a big network. They took explosives (RDX) from the Deolali depot, which is a military depot – so one can say there is a deep penetration by militant Hindus in military and intelligence organizations in India. Nevertheless to please the West, India is permanently blaming Pakistan and Islamic fundamentalism for the problems caused by abusive Indian policies.

What future for Kashmir do you envisage?

The ongoing Afghan war will definitely affect the future of Kashmir too. The West has already smelt defeat there. The inevitable defeat will directly affect America’s ally, India, for sure. I predict today, that after the West’s defeat in Afghanistan, India will leave not only Kashmir but many more places too. And that time is not very far off.

The current American motive is very simple: they want India to come on board with them in their ‘war against terror’, especially when they run

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19 Pakistan Interior Minister Rehman Malik stated in January 2010 that India was not providing details about Lieutenant-Colonel Shrikant Purohit who was allegedly involved in the Samjhota Express bombings in 2007, which killed at least 68 people. ‘India not providing details on Samjhota: Malik’, Dawn (23 Jan. 2010). Purohit had worked in intelligence in J&K and would have been privy to some very sensitive information. ‘The Central government] fears that if Purohit discloses to the court or to the media, after his release on bail, details of covert operations carried out by him for military intelligence then it would internationally face a major embarrassment. Purohit had taken part in several sensitive operations in J&K and the Northeast’ (Pranati Mehra and S. Balakrishnan, ‘Is Purohit the man who knows too much?’, The Times of India, 27 Nov. 2008).
out of troops in Afghanistan. Their NATO allies are pulling out, and they are dragging their feet as they are not prepared to fight there. They want to make it an Indian cause, and they want nearly 150,000 troops in Afghanistan. That is the American motive. There is an Israeli motive also which is similar, that the Americans should not pull out of Afghanistan just because they are short of troops, so they must have more troops there. If the Americans leave without denuclearizing Pakistan, the state of Israel will remain under perpetual danger. So they have an innate fear that Americans will lose heart and pull out of this region as they’re already going out of Iraq. And if they were to go out of Afghanistan, for Israel it will be an unfinished agenda, and Israel will be on the losing end. So, the neo-cons and the Zionists together want to hatch a conspiracy so that Obama gets trapped in a situation in which for the next four years he has to sort out this imbroglio.

But I tell you that whatever the West, America, NATO, Israel and India are planning in Afghanistan, the facts remain the same: they all are unable to control Afghanistan. Their armies are sick and tired of fighting a losing war; the masses in Europe and America are protesting against the occupation and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The West has to run from there; they now have understood the historical fact that Afghanistan cannot be captured or controlled by outsiders. Afghans are not in the habit of living under any foreign rule and they will resist until it ends.

I am almost sure that the US will leave Afghanistan in 2011. The approaching defeat of the West should be very alarming for the Indians. The end of the current Afghan war means the opening of the liberation of Kashmir war as the next target of the jihadis who are presently confronting the Western forces in Afghanistan. The Indian occupation of Kashmir is a time bomb which can blast any time. If India does not solve the problem, she may have to face another Afghanistan in India.22

Can India attack Pakistan in the present situation?

It’s premature to start threatening war against Pakistan because it is a nuclear weapons state. In the case of a conventional war, I can assure you as a soldier that limited war within the nuclear environment is not possible in the subcontinent. And if it comes to an exchange of nuclear weapons, then this becomes a Third World War. China cannot stay out. Russia will not stay out. Russia is already showing its belligerence towards America and Europe. And China of course is a major economic power. It is also a nuclear power, and if this thing happens in their back yard they will have to respond. So this is a very dangerous situation. I think it is playing with fire. The whole thing could get out of hand. India will not and cannot attack a nuclearized Pakistan.

22 Although Lieutenant-General Gul’s statement may appear fanciful, the Indian media reacted forcefully to a suggestion posted on a www.iiss.cn (the website of the Chinese International Institute for Strategic Studies) on 8 April 2009 by an author writing under the pseudonym ‘Zhan Lue’ (Strategy) that Beijing should ‘should work towards the break-up of India into 20–30 independent states with the help of friendly countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan.’ The Assamese, Tamils and Kashmiris should have independent nation states of their own, the author argued. ‘To split India, China can bring into its fold countries like Pakistan, Nepal and Bhutan, support Ulfa in attaining its goal for Assam’s independence, back aspirations of Indian nationalities like Tamils and Nagas, encourage Bangladesh to give a push to the independence of West Bengal and lastly recover the 90,000 sq km territory in southern Tibet.’ The spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry denied that this represented official thinking and the article was subsequently removed from the website. ‘Break India, says China think-tank’, Times of India (12 Aug. 2009): <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Break-India-says-China-think-tank/articleshow/4883573.cms>
According to some reports, there are threats to Pakistan of a limited nuclear war from India. How do you view these?

The Indian nuclear threat to Pakistan is an empty show-off. Deep down, Indians are afraid of Pakistan and they equally know that the price of a small or large nuclear attack by India would be equally harmful to India too. India has to pay an equal price if they want to launch any adventure against Pakistan. Pakistan is not Nepal or Bhutan and the Indians know that very well. They would have to sleep more than a thousand times on this before planning any nuclear aggression against Pakistan. Pakistan has all the abilities, skills and resources to defend herself without any external support. In addition, India’s newly discovered friend, the United States, will never approve of such an adventure either. To recognize this, you only need to examine what President Obama told the Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh, on his visit to the US in November 2009, in this regard.

However, India always tries to bully its neighbours as a psychological tactic of war. For example, at Pune in India, the then Indian Army Chief, General Deepak Kapoor, declared that Pakistan was a failed state. He also threatened Pakistan with a limited war. Actually this shows the frustration of the Indian ruling elite. They know they cannot harm Pakistan militarily and that is why they are using propaganda against it in order to harm it internationally.

General Kapoor appears to be standing on the wrong side of history. The perception of Indian foreign policy which he expressed in Pune is also poor. He tried to commend Indian foreign policy there but he should recognize the failure of Indian foreign policy when the Soviet Union was dismembered. India supported a dying Soviet Union. Kapoor may be a great soldier but his sense of history is appalling. His statement simply reflects
the fact that a general who commands the world’s fourth-biggest standing army is not aware of the strong currents and cross-currents of history. His awareness of the regional balance of power is also faulty.

I also feel his tirade was basically intended to mount a form of psychological pressure on Pakistan. India’s current honeymoon with the United States has perhaps given extra confidence to the Indian Army’s General Staff. Just as in the 1980s, when Indian defence planners followed a faulty policy by not recognizing the likely fate of the former Soviet Union, so today they are again following a faulty policy. They think with the growing US support to New Delhi they will attain the status of the sole regional hegemon. His appreciation of the regional situation is based on incorrect notions. Pakistan has the resilience and potential to meet the challenges of the internal and external threats it faces. I am sorry to say General Kapoor’s dream that Pakistan will disappear from the map is based on an inaccurate evaluation. It is a historic phenomenon that global imperialism is on the decline. Indian Brahmanism cannot become a new regional imperialism. The other regional powers will not allow this.

The US forces have not been able to achieve the objectives which were set by the Bush Administration in Afghanistan and now President Obama is about to offer an exit time-frame for US forces from Afghanistan. It’s an open secret that the Americans have started talking to the Afghan Taliban. The Obama Administration wants to evolve a strategy for a face-saving exit from Afghanistan. This is what Robert Gates has recently stated. When I say that in the 1980s the Indian military leadership could not understand the situation in Afghanistan its present estimation too is incorrect. India remained in the lap of Soviet Union when it was being dismembered. Now they are repeating this in the lap of the US.

28 It is not clear that General Kapoor considered this a realistic possibility.

29 This was uncertain at the time that Lieutenant-General Gul was interviewed. However, now see Dexter Filkins, ‘Taliban’s Elite, Aided by NATO, Join talks for Afghan Peace’, New York Times (10 Oct. 2010).

Who is behind the present wave of terrorism in Pakistan, and how can terrorism be defeated?

Pakistan is facing numerous challenges at present, but the most important challenge is internal, as our own people have been targeting the army and law enforcement agencies. These are our own people, but our enemies are using them against the country. However, the US drone attacks are the main factor which leads to suicide missions within Pakistan. If the government wants to control these suicide missions, then first it must ask the US to stop the drone attacks. In addition to this we must realize that military operations are not an effective way to fight terrorists. Instead the process of dialogue should be initiated with them.

Major-General Syed Wajahat Husain

Would you please describe the political atmosphere in the Aligarh Muslim University where you studied?

In the early 1940s, Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s political philosophy of Pakistan motivated the majority of the students of Aligarh Muslim University, which he described as the ‘Arsenal of Muslim India’. The Aligarh Movement’s core aim was the solidarity of Indian Muslims crystallized around the concept of an independent Muslim State, to release us from the suffocating British rule and the prospect of Hindu predominance. Jinnah spurred on the Pakistan movement at this ‘Citadel of the Muslim Renaissance’,30 as it has been called, by regular visits and addresses to the students. On this highly motivated and responsive platform, Jinnah, who was the country’s best constitutional lawyer, articulated his political doctrine with great legal
much repeated phrases of ‘Islamic ideology’ and ‘Pakistan: no God but Allah’ (Ka Matlab La Ilah Ilah) were not heard at that time in popular quarters. They are later expressions used in Pakistan.

Tell us how you came to join the Indian Military Academy at Dehradun.

In 1945, the C-in-C India, Field Marshal Auchinleck, formed a high-power commission to determine the composition of the postwar Indian Army and the training of Indian officers in view of their expected Independence, the experience of World War II and future requirements anticipating a shortage of 12,000 officers after Indianization and demobilization. The Emergency Commissioned Officers Training Schools [OTS] were closed, and the reconstituted Indian Military Academy had reverted to its pre-war role of training regular officers, modelled on the US West Point and British Sandhurst academies. The most experienced and high-calibre officers, mostly British from the brigadier commandant downwards, were posted to start the Academy. Major Attiq-ur-Rehman MC FF Rifles and Major Zorawar Singh MC Central India Horse were the only Indians. Some company commanders joined later and a few captain platoon commanders, notably Tikka Khan and S. G. Mehdi.

I was selected to be a junior under officer and company senior under officer until I passed out in December 1946. The second-term platoon commander was Tikka Khan, who was highly regarded in the Indian Army for his excellent war record. The legendary British Guards RSM with his team of tough British sergeants under the outstanding adjutant from the Rifle Brigade, Major A. J. Wilson MC OBE (later Lieutenant-General Sir James Wilson) were the custodians of an exacting and hard training. The surrounding Shivalak hills provided an excellent tough weapons and tactical training ground.

During the last term we could sniff freedom and the hazy prospect of Pakistan at some point in the future, but soon the communal disturbances started with the ‘Great Calcutta Killings’ followed by the reaction in Rawalpindi. However, the army’s strong esprit de corps tradition and strict discipline ensured that the cadets and staff from different religions...
'You will learn more with the Boundary Force than sitting on your ass in the Armour School.' How right he was!

Serving with the Boundary Force was a unique experience. Apart from its professional value, it gave me an insight into the dimensions of the forthcoming acute problems of the new country. The military trains had to be guarded, whilst Peter Hussey was bringing the Road Party destined for Lahore. This all became quite an operation. Normally taking three days, the trains took seven days, with constant threats of attacks and nerve-wracking delays, no food, living on hard rations, no passenger compartments, sleeping under the tanks, facing the blazing sun and rain. As we crawled into the suburbs of Amritsar I was horrified to see thousands of Muslim refugees lying on both sides of the railway lines. On the main platform I witnessed the slaughter of Muslim families. The same sight was repeated coming into the Lahore Cantonment Station, with miles of refugees on both sides of the track. From the Mianmir bridge I was awestruck by watching the red glow of the old city burning. At Lahore, after the horrendous journey, I was ordered to turn about and proceed to Jullunder, as East Punjab was out of control. At Jullunder, unloading the tanks on the main platform, I went straight into action in the city to quell the heavily armed Sikh bands (jathas) attacking and burning Muslim neighbourhoods (mohallas) and adjoining villages.

From that day onwards the squadron was continuously engaged in operations in East Punjab, fighting the Sikhs and Hindus who were systematically attacking the Muslim-majority belt of villages in the Doaba and Muslim localities in the towns. Our mission was first to prevent these attacks, defend the areas, evacuate the Muslims to safer places, establish refugee camps and finally escort them to Pakistan and bring back Hindus and Sikhs safely from Pakistan to India. Sikh and Hindu jathas armed to the teeth were joined with thousands of armed and trained state forces deserting from the East Punjab States (Patiala and Kapurthala and so on) making the job of the Punjab Boundary Force very difficult. We had to

You were one of the few Muslim officers to have served with the Punjab Boundary Force. Could you share your experiences with us?

On 14 August 1947 my British colonel, driving me to the Pakistan Day celebrations at Ahmadnagar Club, told me he had appointed me second-in-command of the squadron under Major Peter Hussey proceeding to join the Punjab Boundary Force – basically a mixed Jat and Dogra force – as urgent reinforcements for the hard-pressed 50,000-strong force, mainly under British officers specially raised to maintain law and order along the new border between India and Pakistan. On my reminding the colonel that I had been detailed for the Young Officers Course he snapped back,

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34 On this subject, Robin Jeffrey, 'The Punjab Boundary Force and the Problem of Order, August 1947', Modern Asian Studies 8/4 (1974), 491–510. Ibid., 498–9, where Jeffrey notes that the force stood at 23,000 and ‘never approached the figure of 40,000 which most writers have assigned to it.’ Ibid., 500: ‘the Force was approximately 40 percent caste Hindu, 35 percent Muslim, 20 percent Gurkha and non-caste Hindu and 5–10 percent Sikh’. It operated over 13 civil districts covering 37,500 square miles, an area somewhat larger than Ireland. To the population, the troop ratio was 1:630 people.

35 Doaba is the region of Indian Punjab surrounded by the rivers Beas and Sutlej. The name ‘Doaba’ literally means ‘land of two rivers’.
How did you move from the Indian Army to the Pakistani Army?

In the last week of October 1947 events in India–Pakistan relations moved very fast. The invasion by the tribesmen of NWFP into Kashmir spurred these events. The operations of the Punjab Boundary Force were nearing completion and it was going to be disbanded. The 4th Indian Division’s first Indian commander, General Chimayo, relieved the British general who was returning to England and similarly my commanding officer, Colonel Bill Ridley. The day after the incursion into Kashmir, I was summoned to HQ to ascertain my future options. I told them very clearly I had opted for the Pakistani Army and would soon be leaving. They tried to dissuade me and insisted that I should stay in the Indian Army, having done well at the Indian Military Academy and in the Boundary Force, and given the fact that my family was in India. However, I refused to budge from my original decision, all the more so having seen the carnage of the Muslims in East Punjab. Consequently I was told to leave for Pakistan as the Central Indian Horse was leaving for Kashmir. Colonel Bill Ridley arrived from Ahmednagar and drove me to Peshawar. We stopped for lunch in Rawalpindi at Flashman’s Hotel. There I was surprised to run into our Indian Military Academy adjutant, Major Wilson, having lunch with Colonel Shahid Hamid, former secretary to Field Marshal Auchinleck, and Colonel Ingle, Commandant designate of the Pakistan Military Academy. To my surprise, Wilson informed me that I had been posted as captain instructor at the Indian Military Academy at Dehradun. I told him I was on my way to Peshawar to join my regiment. When he asked me about my family, I told him that I had not been in touch with my parents for the last four months. He then suggested that, since I had been posted as an instructor at the Indian Military Academy, he could arrange for me to have transport and escort from Dehradun to enabling me to collect my family from Aligarh and return to Lahore. I was grateful, and agreed to accompany him to Delhi and Dehradun. My CO, 19th Lancers Peshawar, was informed. So I left with Major Wilson, Colonel Ingle and another officer and flew in a Dakota DC3 to Delhi and stayed for the night at the commander-in-chief’s house. Early next morning I left for Dehradun. Jim Wilson arranged a movement order for me. On temporary duty from Dehradun to Lahore with an escort of a British sergeant, a couple of Gurkha soldiers and two vehicles, I was to collect Brigadier Tariq Mir’s family from Dehradun, proceed to Aligarh, collect my family and leave for Lahore. The vehicles and the guards had to be returned.

When I reached Aligarh my parents were very pleased to see me. My father was also having problems as the house had been searched several times by the local authorities since he was accused of supporting local Muslim...
activists. He quickly made up his mind. He left everything behind. My mother packed some boxes and early next morning I left with my parents, my two younger brothers and my younger sister. We reached Lahore via Delhi where I left my parents with my elder brother, who had arrived earlier, and the escorts with the vehicles were returned to Dehradun. Leaving my family in Lahore, I proceeded to Peshawar and joined my regiment, the 19th Lancers. A month later I was moved to the Guides Cavalry as the GHQ carried out adjustments in the corps and the Guides were short of officers.

You were ADC to the first Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani Army, General Gracey, during 1948–9. Please tell us about the early days of the Pakistani Army.

The C-in-C on seeing me said: ‘Lieutenant Husain, you have done well at the Academy. Your good work with the Boundary Force has been conveyed by Bill Rees also. I have selected you as my ADC but I will ask you some questions.’ His first question took me aback. ‘Do you intend to be a professional officer or are you interested in politics and would like to open the doors of the prime minister’s and governor-general’s cars?’ I immediately replied that having joined the army as a regular officer I intended to stay a professional officer and was not interested in politics. He said: ‘Good, in that case stay with me and you will learn something.’

Gracey took over as C-in-C of the Pakistani Army in February 1948. On joining Gracey’s staff I found life extremely busy, with the general mostly occupied with the Kashmir operations and the raising and organization of the Pakistani Army. These two were gigantic tasks, requiring the starting up of various training institutions. Regular meetings were going on with India regarding the division of our assets and their movement to Pakistan, since we were still a new-born baby with our umbilical cord attached to India. Existing communications with India were still open, all the telephone lines and railway lines and despite the disturbances the roads were all open and functioning through open borders. Refugees were pouring in from every direction, filling up the pavements in Lahore and Karachi and all available open spaces. Many problems regarding the movement of army units, their families from across the border, the induction of troops and collection of stores from India were faced. Both the civil and military leaderships at GHQ India and GHQ Pakistan were in constant touch with each other.

The first task of General Gracey was to reorientate and relocate the Pakistani Army, the locations and establishment of its training institutions and the regimental centres. We had received only one major training institution from the Indian Army, the Command and Staff College at Quetta; all the other training institutions went to India. Gracey gave orders to start the first staff course within three months. He selected the location of the Pakistan Military Academy at Abbottabad, and it was started soon after. The army was reoriented from north to south. Most of the British Indian Army, in view of the German and Russian threats and the fighting with the tribesmen, had been located in NWFP. As no such problems from the north were now expected – though Afghanistan was hostile – Operation Curzon could be effected with the bulk of the army withdrawn from the forward areas, replaced by Scouts, and the divisions with their HQs relocated. The biggest problem was to start the training of the army on a uniform footing, for which training pamphlets were required. In spite of all his efforts, Gracey could not get our share of training pamphlets from the Indian Army. So he started writing his own training pamphlets to give the army a basis on which training could begin. This was a Herculean task – writing the Pakistani Army battle instructions in his personal longhand, working late into the night and into the early morning. He produced them within a few weeks and issued them to the army units.

The next major issue was the movement of our troops, units and officers from across the border and their placement in the Pakistani Army. Equally important were the requirements of our defence stores – ammunition and so on – and finance, since we had no funds because India had not released them. For this purpose regular meetings were held under the Partition Defence Committee, with Field Marshal Auchinleck and Lord Mountbatten alternately in Delhi and Karachi. In spite of sympathy from Auchinleck and loud promises from Mountbatten, progress was minimal. Hurdles and excuses were created against the transfer of the badly needed
and saw Mountbatten being painted in full regalia, unconcerned about the lunch, which further annoyed Gracey. After lunch Mountbatten turned round to Gracey and said, ‘Douglas, as you know I will be leaving shortly and would like to visit Karachi to say goodbye to all of you.’ Gracey immediately retorted, ‘Dick don’t bother to come to Pakistan. If you do I will make sure my air force chases you out of the sky.’ That was the last meeting with Mountbatten.

Can you tell us about General Gracey’s policy and control of operations in Kashmir in 1947–8?

A special cell for control and conduct of military operations had been established in Rawalpindi, looked after by the then DMO Brigadier Sher Khan MC. General Gracey kept in close touch with Brigadier Sher Khan who briefed him every morning at GHQ. The general after returning from GHQ used to change into civilian clothes, get into his private car and drive himself to Sher Khan’s office to monitor the Kashmir operations. The field operations were under Major-General Tottenham DSO, MC, GOC 7th Division, who kept in close touch with General Gracey. Soon after the tribesmen invaded Kashmir it became imperative to have some control over them to defend Azad Kashmir effectively.

What is your view of the Kashmir operation of 1948?

It must be mentioned that from the very beginning the Quaid-i-Azam was very upset over the way we got embroiled in Kashmir. Being a constitutional lawyer who achieved Pakistan through legal and fair means, he was very upset by the ugly confrontational turn. He directed Gracey and Liaquat ‘Ali Khan to end the fighting in Kashmir without any loss of face or loss of territory. Unfortunately, soon after the establishment of Pakistan, without any resources or money and the pressing problems of establishing Pakistan to attend to, we got involved in Kashmir, which was a heavy drain on our already bankrupt state. The Kashmir operation was initiated, without the
first lesson we have learnt is that if we take any action in Kashmir, India will cross the international boundary.

The fact was that both the high command and GHQ were taken by surprise by India’s unexpected two-pronged offensive; this unnerved Field Marshal Ayub Khan, who made no contribution thereafter, with the result that the army lost its balance. With no contingency plans and no resources, GHQ merely reacted. Armoured formations were unnecessarily moved hundreds of miles, wasting precious track mileage, exhausting the crews before they joined crucial battles. There was an absence of proper planning at GHQ and effective direction. The formation headquarters fought their own battles as best they could. Command 1 Corps, ably assisted by generals Attiq and Yaqub, playing an important role and quickly gained grip of the Sialkot and Lahore sectors after initial setbacks and confusion. In short, where commanders were mentally robust and aggressively resolute with determination, as in the Armored Division and the desert areas, results were satisfactory. The weaker ones, as happens, courted near-disaster.

What was your own experience of the 1965 war?

Preparations for war started early. On 5 May my regiment was moved by train from Nowshera to our concentration area in Gujranwala. By August we were in a high state of operational preparedness. In mid-August with the signing of the Rann of Kutch Agreement, the war clouds receded. I was posted as director of the Command and Staff College at Quetta. I protested to General Abrar, who replied that as war was no longer expected postings had started. Yet on 6 September 1965 war was declared and the college was closed. Next day all the students went to their war postings. I left the college on 9 September. On the morning of 11 September, I received an urgent call from GHQ to report immediately to the field area to take over command of the 11th Cavalry, whose commanding officer had been wounded. I got to the regiment late at night. It was located in the Pasrur Eidgah graveyard. I asked about the enemy and was told that they were ‘all around us’! At
4 o’clock in the morning, as if on cue, the enemy started activities. That is how the first day of my command finished.

On 15 September, the enemy renewed efforts and several attacks were made against Chawinda the following morning. During the night we intercepted the enemy’s messages for reinforcements, particularly for tanks, so we anticipated an attack the following morning. The first attack came at first light from the north in front of us, a repeat performance of the previous day. Good fighting by the 24th Brigade, 25th Cavalry and heavy artillery supported by the Guides Cavalry blunted the enemy attack. The second attack was around 0800 hours, when the enemy made a desperate effort to create a wedge between Jassoran and our front and Chawinda on my right with a strong tank and infantry force, emphasizing that every enemy attack was a combined tank and infantry effort. After some sharp fighting the attack was repulsed. Shortly afterwards, fresh and more determined tank and infantry attempts were launched against Chawinda; these too were repulsed by last light. Simultaneously, Badiana was subjected to constant heavy shelling and severe tank attacks, developing thrusts to the main Pasrur road and on to the Badiana crossroads. Both the armoured regiments, the Guides and the 22nd Cavalry, were locked in grim battles throughout the day. I was personally on the air passing information about enemy moves, manoeuvring the regiments to block the enemy penetrations. The strongest attack came at about 1700 hours, a double thrust from Rakha Baba Bhra Shah in front for Badiana crossroads to envelop Chawinda and Pasrur. 14 FF Company took the brunt, gallantly supported by the Guides, and the attack was thwarted, but by now we were reduced to two weak squadrons covering a wide area. So I gave 14 FF the mission of plugging the gaps with their meagre resources. My only reserve, 1 Company 14 FF, was used later at night to hold the Rakha and clear them. In the morning we lost nearly half our men in the process, while the other company was used to clear the village of Fatehpur in front. We reached the railway line with losses under withering tank fire from the railway station reinforced by enemy reserves. In spite of all the weight the enemy put into these repeated attacks they failed to make any major headway. With no let-up, fighting continued until late in the evening. At about 5 p.m., we intercepted a message from the enemy divisional commander, impressing upon his commanders the importance of pressing their attacks saying, ‘the Prime Minister wants Badiana and Chawinda captured tonight so that the victory could be presented in parliament tomorrow morning.’

15 September was a day of tough fighting, both at Badiana and Chawinda. We had taken some casualties but had inflicted heavy losses on the attackers. From the wireless intercept, we learnt that the enemy had also lost their infantry brigadier at Badaina. Throughout these operations our artillery – I was keeping the artillery commander with me all the times – gave excellent support. Our interception of enemy radio messages, plus the use of army aviation, enabled us to be forewarned about the enemy thrusts. The Pakistani Air Force successfully fended off enemy air attacks. All these combined efforts frustrated the enemy attacks. The total tank casualty in the Badiana–Chawinda Sector on that day was five tanks, while we had knocked out fourteen enemy tanks.

At the end of the day’s battle, the commander of the Guides Cavalry sought permission to pull back a couple of thousand yards for much-needed replenishment and maintenance and to collect straggler tanks to make up his low tank strength; the time was now approaching after delivering the knockout blows to go on the offensive. From the GoC’s caravan, I checked with Janjua again on the progress of replenishment, told him to finish quickly and get back to his position. Returning to my HQ at about two in the morning I checked that all my units were in position, ready to take on the enemy. The enemy action started exactly at 4 o’clock in the morning.

Thursday 16 September was the day of the fiercest tank battle of the war, all units of the division except Zafarwal being fully engaged. The enemy launched three major coordinated attacks on Badiana and Chawinda simultaneously. The first attack came at 0730 and lasted until 1030 hours, the second from 1230 to 1430 hours and the third from 1630 until well after dark.

The main attack on the 22nd Cavalry group at Badiana was by another armoured regiment with infantry and artillery attempting to break through the Guides Cavally and to envelop Chawinda through 3 FF and 25th Cavalry positions, supported with a frontal assault by infantry brigade plus intense artillery shelling, to mask Badiana and cut Chawinda from the west and rear with concentrated moves of two armoured regiments. It was
a brilliant manoeuvre shattered by the rock-like determination of our tank commanders, each one of them taking part with grit and determination. The steadfastness of our men in the trenches and some accurate shooting by our gunners with all our tanks shooting very well and fighting gallantly threw back wave upon wave of enemy tanks: they used a column formation of tanks to break through on a narrow front. I personally requested the PAF Joint Ops HQ that my cousin Commodore Masroor Husain – who was killed in the war – should conduct the joint operations for maximum air support. This request was promptly granted. The air operation succeeded in damaging the enemy’s echelons, gun areas and HWs in the rear. The enemy did gain some ground after repeated attacks but only at a prohibitive cost. Desperate to outflank Chawinda, he tried to go for our guns at Pasrur. Considering the enemy’s cautious tactics the bulk of our guns had been boldly deployed centrally well forward, one of the major battle-winning factors. The guns successfully engaged the enemy armour, assisted by the tankbusters of 22nd Cavalry I had deployed earlier on. For the crucial battle I was personally directing the complete corps artillery fire of all the available guns on the enemy thrust.

Thus 16 September saw some of the toughest and grimmest fighting of the entire operations. This was the day the Indians desperately tried every possible means to force their way through, but all their efforts were thwarted by our gallant defence. Casualties on both sides were heavy: total tank casualties at the Badiana–Chawinda Sector stood at fifteen tanks lost by us, but we had knocked out 29 enemy tanks, including those hit by the Pakistani Air Force.

That night, on reporting to General Abrar and discussing the day’s battle with him, it was apparent that the enemy had suffered heavy casualties and all his efforts had failed. The situation was restored, although at a very heavy cost of suffering casualties as well as some loss of territory. However, the main defensive line of Badiana–Chawinda was held intact. Having received reinforcements from the 1st Armoured Division and an infantry brigade, we felt confident to take countermeasures to regain the lost territory.

Next morning there was not much activity; the enemy was licking his wounds having suffered very heavy losses. His two best tank regiments, the 17th Poona Horse and 4th Hodson’s Horse, were very badly mauled, with both the commanding officers killed, the former by 25th Cavalry in front of 24th Brigade and the latter by my Task Force. (I returned Colonel Bakhshi’s body personally to his widow after the ceasefire.)

Later, from 17 September onwards, operations were mounted to clear the area ahead of us to regain lost territory. I handed over to Brigadier Riaz ul-Karim of the HQ 4th Armoured Brigade on 17 September and was directed to get back to 11th Cavalry to reorganize and refit the regiment quickly. 11th Cavalry was back in the front line at Chawinda on 24 September after the ceasefire.

Certain aspects of the war relating to wireless communications were particularly interesting. With heavy fighting going on around us, there were extensive communications, with both sides intercepting messages. We thus had the opportunity to pass over certain important orders, which we knew were being intercepted. We changed to a language the enemy would not understand to keep messages secret; I instructed Khursheed to speak in Pushto when relaying important messages. It worked. The enemy was baffled but he also changed to Gurkhali, which we could not understand!

From the start the enemy had used electronic warfare effectively, deploying radio teams to carry out the jamming of our communications, interception, passing fake messages and also passing misleading orders to our units. They were able to do this because they had captured certain documents after the first battle of Phillaura. Until we had a Task Force HQ there were too many wireless stations on the command net, creating confusion. This was only corrected once the Task Force HQ was established. And since we knew each other’s voices there was no need for call signs and all messages were passed very quickly after recognizing the units. By these countermeasures we took effective steps to continue giving orders on wireless without even a minute’s breakdown in our command communications. At no stage was my Command Net unavailable and orders were passed speedily to all concerned.

Towards the later stages of the fighting we were paying the enemy back in their own coin, passing misleading orders to them, giving exaggerated numbers of enemy casualties and a false picture of their low morale
and the failure of their efforts. All this had some effect and I believe these countermeasures were successful.

I cannot overemphasize the importance of excellent communications, the lifeblood of armoured operations and the question of the commanders manning their command wireless nets and not the staff officers or the operators. It was a pleasure to hear Brigadier Effendi, excellent in commanding Command Nets: his roaring crisp orders was a great morale booster. In my Task Force I never used staff officers or operators and was on the net from 4 in the morning until late at night during all operations. I felt very proud, when I was later on complimented by the Corps Commander and even by General Yahya Khan at 7th Division, who said, ‘We could hear your voice all the time in the 7th Division area.’ Later the commander of GHQ Signal Regiment mentioned that they had recorded entire battles because of the excellent voice communications of the Task Force and the Armoured Division HQ.

In spite of some wireless deficiencies on our side, the communications of 6th Armoured Division throughout were excellent, the main reason why we maintained good command and control and achieved success in battle. This was the basic reason for the failure of the operations in the Chhamb Sector, where there was a four- to six-hour breakdown in communications between the HQ of General Akhtar Malik, his units and the Army Chief, which resulted in a loss of precious time and the opportunity to capture Aknoor in Kashmir.

How would you compare the Pakistani Armoured Corps with the Indian Armoured Corps based on the results of the 1965 war?

We must remember that the Indian Armoured Corps is much older, more experienced and a larger force with excellent training facilities. Equally their ‘Fakhr-e-Hind’, the 1st Armoured Division, raised 60 years ago is well tried, experienced in many campaigns and is an excellent armoured formation by any standard. Still there is not much difference between the two forces. In spite of all the advantages the Indian 1st Armoured Division had in mounting Operation Nepal – a corps plus with two reinforced infantry divisions and a reinforced armoured division – it was still unable to carry out what was expected of it, and failed to achieve the main objective.

Undoubtedly, after crossing the ceasefire line without a declaration of war and achieving the element of surprise and meeting no opposition, they hit Phillaura without much difficulty. However, even in this first battle against a weak force of an armoured regiment and a motor battalion they managed to gain an easy victory but still suffered losses. After a very slow advance from Phillaura to Chawinda, only 3 to 5 miles, having struck this blow on the 6th Armoured Division and having reorganized and regrouped, they failed to make any appreciable headway, suffering very heavy casualties. They kept on trying and despite all their efforts failed to capture the Chawinda–Badiana ‘defence box’, missing their next objectives. Their infantry strong points undoubtedly were very strong. Their attacks were well planned, well coordinated and resolutely carried out with great determination, and all units fought well, especially the 17th Poona Horse and 4th Hodson’s Horse. It must be noted that all their units were well-tried-out, battle-hardened regiments. Their strong points were good infantry–tank cooperation and their system of replenishment, making up the crew and tanks at the end of the day with fresh reinforcements. Conversely, we were at a great disadvantage, not having a proper system of replenishment and reinforcement as our units had to start next day, exhausted, without reinforcements and with depleted tank strengths of our regiments day after day. In spite of this, and our regiments fighting with fewer tanks, we did extremely well not allowing the enemy to move forward on the Badiana–Chawinda defence line.

Where were you in 1971 war?

At the time of the war, I was serving as a brigadier at the war college, Quetta. The college was declared closed with the start of war. I was given a special assignment by military high command to leave for Iran and Turkey immediately as a special envoy of the President of Pakistan, General Yahya Khan. There were two major purposes of the trip: one was the buying of arms and ammunition for the Pakistani Army and I was set up with a
You visited the Indian Military Academy at Dehradun in 1996 to attend your course's Golden Jubilee. What were your impressions?

The cadets and instructors of the IMA First Regular Course 1946 in Pakistan were invited by the commandant of the Indian Military Academy to attend the Golden Jubilee Reunion of IMA Dehradun in December 1996. I myself and Brigadier Ejaz of artillery were the only ones to attend. We were collected under special arrangements at the Wagah border by our course mate General Bajwa and driven to Chandigarh.

From there we were driven to Dehradun with our wives. It was an exciting feeling visiting the old Academy after half a century to meet old colleagues and instructors. IMA had grown considerably in the last 50 years and had a staff of about 450 officers. It was commanded by a senior lieutenant-general, a Sikh officer from the Sindh Horse. Interestingly it had only two Muslim officers on the staff, one a major and the other a captain. The academy now has ten companies of the battalion. This Golden Jubilee coincided with the passing out of the hundredth course, comprising 350 cadets and the technical course of about 150. We were there for three days – very hospitable, extremely courteous. My old colleagues, most of them retired generals, stressed the dire necessity of restoring normal friendly relations between India and Pakistan. Politics in both countries was blamed for the deterioration of the mutual relations. However, whenever we touched on Kashmir or other issues, they all towed the government line! The standard of the passing-out parade was not very high; my colleagues held the same opinion. Nor were the cadets impressive: rather thin and small but well educated. I was impressed by the junior officers (captains and above), who appeared confident, well-spoken and well-turned-out. The army has kept up the old traditions; it did not go for changing badges, ties and so on, and the armoured corps especially held to the old traditions. In short, it was an interesting and useful experience. My final observation was ‘Thank God I opted for Pakistan,’ and I was happy to return home.

Is jihad part of the Pakistani Army’s mindset?

The Pakistani Army is a professional and proud army which is there to defend its country. Extremism and the concept of jihad were never part of the Pakistani Army. The main focus of the army was professionalism only. ‘Faith, Unity and Discipline,’ the Quaid-i-Azam’s motto, was the slogan of the Pakistani Army. The change came over the army in 1977, when General Zia-ul-Haq took over power from Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s democratic government. General Zia was the first to introduce the concept of jihad and shahadat to the army. He tried to bring religion into the mindset of a nationalistic army. I think Zia-ul-Haq wanted to Islamize Pakistan and its army and that is why he changed the motto of ‘Faith, Discipline and Unity’ to ‘Faith, Piety and Struggle in the way of God’ or jihad (Iman, Taqwa Jihad Fi Sabil-illah) which was not the maxim of the Pakistani Army in the earlier period.36

36 On General Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization policies, see Appendix VI.
What is your analysis of the rift between India and Pakistan?

War has not served any purpose or resolved the rift between the two countries. Pakistan has suffered more than India in the three declared wars. In 1948 also, we incorrectly led the tribal people to fight for the liberation of Kashmir. After the 1965 war, on the so-called preparations, we have been spending huge resources on the military. Likewise, we helped the mujahideen in Kashmir from 1979, unwisely. The people who were supported once by us are those who are causing terrorism in Pakistan today. The present wave of terrorism in Pakistan definitely has connections with the so-called mujahideen who fought in occupied Kashmir with our help.

In my judgement, the 1965 war was our greatest blunder. Pakistan was doing very well in terms of economic progress and industrial development. But this war turned the progress into permanent military confrontation. Constant confrontation with India has been not to the advantage of Pakistan. Pakistan is on the decline because of this military quarrel with India. From 1947 to 1958, when Pakistan was under democratic rule with no military role in government, the country experienced peace and prosperity. This was the best decade of Pakistan's history. The main reason behind this peace and progress was there was no military rift with any neighbour of Pakistan. The first budget of the first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, was in surplus. Law and order was maintained that year. And that made the majority of people content.

What solutions do you recommend for peace in region?

Unfortunately the core issue between Pakistan and India is Kashmir. It has not been solved since Partition. Prime Minister Nehru promised a plebiscite in occupied Kashmir according to the UN resolutions. But India has not carried out its prime minister’s promise nor has it obeyed the UN resolutions.

A political solution is needed, particularly because of the financial stress on Pakistan, which cannot afford war. Pakistan also needs a friendly relationship with India in order to control terrorism within the country. On the other side, India has to show maturity and increase its tolerance level too. A stable and terrorism-free Pakistan is just as much in the interest of India as it is in ours. Therefore India should help Pakistan to resolve the disputes by peaceful means.

What should be the solution of the Kashmir problem from a Pakistani perspective?

When India refused to talk to resolve the Kashmir issue, General Ayub Khan out of desperation fought the 1965 war in order to try to win Kashmir back. It was a serious mistake that he made. The 1971 war was also an extension of the 1965 war. We did not gain Kashmir in these wars, but half of Pakistan was lost in 1971. War is no solution to the problem.

Presently, I don't think that Kashmir is the number one problem of Pakistan; nor is it the most important issue between the two countries. This time our focus should be terrorism. The elimination of terrorism is the biggest challenge facing Pakistan. Pakistan must also pay equal attention to overcoming its ongoing economic crisis; otherwise, we will not be able to establish law and order.

The Indian military is now far ahead of Pakistan. India is presently the fourth-largest military power on earth and it is on the way to becoming the third. We should accept this as a fact and direct all our attention towards the prosperity and development of our country. It’s simply common sense: when Pakistan is facing boundless problems domestically, why would Kashmiris want to be part of Pakistan? Kashmir is part of the historical baggage of Partition and must be resolved through diplomatic efforts. There is no other way forward.
Lieutenant-Colonel Saeed Iqbal

Why did you join the Pakistani Army?

At first I did not have any great wish to join the army. The main reason for this was that my father had served in the army as an engineer and had been posted to many different places. So my father did not have a stable family life because of these constant transfers from one place to another. As a young man, I did not like this army lifestyle. I wanted to live a stable and more predictable life.

I intended to become a businessman and this led me to graduate in business and commerce from Hailey College, Lahore. While I was still studying there, the 1965 war broke out with India. This war changed the whole mindset of the nation. War was glorified by every one, especially by the mass media. One of my classmates, Najam Burki, wanted to quit education and join the army. He also asked me to apply for the army to test my calibre. So, we both went to get the application forms from a temporary recruitment centre which was functioning in Lahore Cantonment. My friend Najam was not doing well in his studies and wanted to join the army as an escape from education. At the recruitment centre, my friend asked me to apply at the same time. I applied to test my abilities only. Due to the 1965 war, the selection process was not the normal one. It was intended to recruit officers in the shortest possible time. After ten days of tests and exams, both of us were selected.

In November 1965, I joined up. There were two reasons for taking this appointment. I was no more than an ordinary student so I also took the opening as an escape from studying. Moreover, the whole country was in a sense of euphoria over the war. The general understanding was that the Pakistani Army was much smaller than the Indian Army but had defended the country successfully, which gave us for the first time a sense of equality with India. I was commissioned in 1966. General Khalid Mahmood, General Aziz and General Hamid Javed were my badge mates.
Do you believe that a Muslim soldier is not afraid of death?

I have experienced some of the 1965 war and the whole of the 1971 war with India. I have seen death with my own eyes. I do not believe that soldiers of the Pakistani Army have no fear of death. Life is precious to everyone, and to fear death is both normal and human. Whoever denies this fear of death is a liar.

In my experience, bravery is relative, and cowardly people who have a fear of death can sometimes fight bravely without panic. For Muslims, it is easier to control this fear of death because your belief in dying for the Almighty (shahadat) helps you. Therefore, it is much easier for the Muslim Pakistani Army to overcome the terror of death, as compared to the Indians. This obsession with shahadat can also make us reckless.

What was your experience in the 1965 war?

I joined the army after the war of 1965. But after my six months in a short training course, I was posted as a lieutenant near the Lahore border. The war was over at the end of September 1965 but both armies remained at the border for more than a year. I participated in many skirmishes with the enemy even after the ceasefire was declared between the two armies. As a young officer I was part of the troop which captured the jeep of the Indian General Parshad as he was retreating. I had the honour and pride as a young army officer to drive this jeep in Lahore’s famous Anarkali Bazaar. As soon as people came to know that the jeep was captured from Indian soldiers during the war, they rushed towards us, kissed our hands; and we were treated as princes. We were given generous gifts by the people in the bazaar and the women donated their jewellery for the war against India.

37 Noor Jehan was the adopted stage name for Allah Waisai (1926–2000), a legendary singer and actress whose career spanned seven decades and who was given the honorific title of Queen of Melody (Malika-e-Tarannum).

38 The battle for Lahore or the Ravi–Sutlej Corridor led to various drastic changes in the Indian high command and a rethinking of unit deployment. Niranjan Parshad, the GOC 15th Indian Division, was dismissed: http://www.orbat.com/site/history/historical/pakistan/aminkhemkaran.html
Where were you during the 1971 war?

In 1971 I was an infantry major. A few months before the war my unit was posted at Sulemanki, near the River Sutlej. It was a very sensitive post. If the enemy had captured that area, they could have cut the Grand Trunk Road in the middle of Pakistan.

Along the border, before the war, we used to interact with the Indian troops on a regular basis. On the Indian side, the third battalion of the Assam Regiment was facing us under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Sushi Pal. Interestingly, at that time, during any interaction, we used to salute each other as part of the joint army tradition. We used to salute Indian officers who were senior in rank to us. Likewise, the Indian officers saluted senior-ranked Pakistanis. It was a common tradition followed by both armies. A few days before the war, Lieutenant-Colonel Pal sent us a message asking if any of us had received training at the military college at Jhelum. Since I was a former student of the college, I introduced myself to him. He was really glad to meet me. He treated me as a junior officer but with full respect. We shared the names of those teachers who had taught us both. This cultural commonality created a warm human relationship between the Indian commanding officer and a young Pakistani officer such as myself. Lieutenant-Colonel Pal used to send us some of the Indian magazines which we could not find in Pakistan. He used to show extra respect towards me as a fellow alumnus of the military college at Jhelum. There was another link between us and the Indian unit: the then Army Chief, General Ayub Khan, had served in it.

In the first week of December 1971, the war began on the West Pakistan border. General Amir Hamza was the commander of Sulemanki and had been there in the 1965 war. In the Sulemanki Sector, Amaco was the last station on the Pakistani side before the railway track proceeded to Delhi on the Indian side. For defence purposes, the Pakistani Army cut the track before the war broke out.

In the 1965 war, the Pakistani Army had attacked at the same area and they had captured some Indian territory. Because of this, the Indian Army had paid a great deal of attention to the defence of the area. They had built a canal as an extra defence line. In view of the Indian defensive lines, our commanding officer, Colonel Jamal Ditta, assigned Major Shabir Sharif to capture the village of Gur-Makra, which he completed successfully. As a commanding officer, Sharif led his troops from the front and attacked the Indian troops ferociously, even though they were in their bunkers. He captured some of the enemy territory and determined to advance further at the cost of his life. His bravery was admired even by the Indians and he was awarded the Nishan-e-Haider posthumously.

I was a part of the 18th Baloch Regiment. Days passed but I received no orders to attack. How I could justify being a Rajput, I asked myself, if I am not to fight in wartime? I wanted to attack India for the pride of my unit. I requested my commanding officer to permit me to lead an attack. On my request, I was given the task of capturing Khanwala village.

The Punjabi winter was extremely cold. We attacked the target before dawn. We knew the enemy would not expect an attack that early. When we got within a few yards of the Indian troops, one of them heard us and called out, ‘Who is there?’ in Punjabi. I replied in the same tone and language, ‘It’s us.’ This gave us a vital moment to improve our position for firing, though they opened fire first. We lost four men immediately. I was standing in the middle of my 50-man company. It was cold and dark. I could not see anything but killing and death. For a moment, the fear of death hit me. I thought I might die at any moment. But, I managed to convince myself that I was prepared to die for a higher cause. My whole family would be blessed by my shahadat. This way of thinking helped me to bounce back, and then I gained renewed energy and courage to fight the enemy and lead my men without any fear. We replied to the Indian attack with all our force. Since it was dark, the Indians could not judge our numbers and positions correctly. They thought that the attack was too heavy for them and they decided to retreat from their posts. Finally we took over the area.

We left Kairiyana bridge and entered Khanwala (India). The local people had already run away from the village. We captured Khanwala and my

39 Rajputs consider themselves descendants of the ruling warrior group of the Hindu social order (Kshatriya varna). Under the Raj, the British recruited Rajputs, as a presumed martial race, into their armies.
opponent, Major Kuldeep Singh, had retreated to the rear. We stayed in the Khanewala area for two months after the war. During the war of 1971, Sulemanki and Hussainiwala were the only two sectors where the Pakistani Army advanced and captured some Indian territory. We had only three companies in the sector and we all went on the offensive. This aggressive policy led the Indian Army to think that we were in much greater numbers than we actually were. In fact, if the Indians had attacked us, there were no reserves on our side. An Indian attack could have hurt us severely.

What have India and Pakistan achieved from these wars?

Frankly speaking, these wars have not served any positive purpose for either country. The 1965 war gave birth to a strong anti-Indian sentiment in Pakistan which was not there before the war. Moreover, the effects of this war are still there in the Pakistani mindset, in the government’s foreign policy, in regional politics and international relations, even today. That war, along with the Kashmir dispute, created the anti-India Pakistani foreign policy. On the other hand, India has not achieved much from these wars either. Its army is still there in occupied Kashmir and echoes of Indian Army abuses and the violation of the Kashmiri people’s rights are heard all over the world. Indian leadership, and the claim to be the world’s biggest democracy, have been questioned because of Kashmir both within and outside India.

However, Pakistan may possibly have gained some psychological advantage as a result of these wars, since they brought about a stronger sense of nationalism within the country. In the 1965 war, we were all one as a nation against India’s aggressive attitude. We proved that we could and would fight against the enemy of Pakistan. The war of 1965 also inspired jihad passion and Muslim brotherhood. This war helped us to understand what it means to be a Muslim and to fight for the higher causes of defending our country and our religion.

Can India and Pakistan achieve peaceful relations?

Kashmir remains one of the big issues between the two countries. It can be solved in only one of two ways: either we forget about Kashmir and the rights of the Kashmiris, or the right of self-determination has to be given to them. It seems we are not willing to give up on Kashmir. Therefore, India and Pakistan are vulnerable to the threat of war. I think that the two countries should find a solution which is mutually acceptable and also to the Kashmiris.

I think the Muslim-majority areas of Kashmir should be allocated to Pakistan and the Hindu-majority areas should remain with India. This could be a ‘win-win’ for all.40 If this issue could be resolved, terrorism could be expelled from the region. Solving the Kashmir issue is in the interests of both Pakistan and India. First, the Indian and Pakistan governments should resolve the main issues by means of peaceful negotiations and then there should be a ‘no war’ pact between the two countries. Otherwise, the leadership in both countries will be accountable to future generations and to the judgement of history for permitting conflict to continue and not providing an opportunity for friendship, peace and progress to develop.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tahir Kardar

Would you explain the background to the activities of the India–Pakistan Soldiers Initiative for Peace (IPSI) of which you are a member?

People-to-people contact and Track Two diplomacy came into vogue during mid-1990s as an important effort by peace activists in India and Pakistan to break the deadlock in relations between the two estranged neighbours.

40 Except that India has always ruled out ‘territorial concessions’, as it sees them, as a course of action on Kashmir.
Foremost amongst those peace activists was the untiring Dr Nirmala Deshpande, Member of the Rajya Sabha, and an eminent Gandhian.\(^41\) When she was asked by Colonel Virendra Sahai Verma, who had retired after 34 years of active military service which saw him through two wars with Pakistan, to explore the possibility of bringing together like-minded retired military officers in Pakistan, she readily agreed to the suggestion. She was equally widely respected in Pakistan and India for her enduring commitment to non-violence. During several visits to Pakistan, she discussed the subject and returned with positive responses. Thus a unique non-governmental organization came into being in the form of the India–Pakistan Soldiers Initiative for Peace, with a chapter in New Delhi (India) and Lahore (Pakistan) and with Nirmala Deshpande as the joint chairperson. The respective chapters are headed by former chiefs of services and there are at present about 200 members in India and Pakistan.

The landmark event was in January 2000, when a delegation from Pakistan led by Lieutenant-General Nasir Akhtar, Brigadier Rao Abid Hamid and two other generals came to India, immediately in the aftermath of the Kargil war. IPSI organized several meetings with them at Calcutta and New Delhi. The exchanges were sometimes sharp. There were clear differences in the views expressed, but overall the atmosphere remained calm. The prominent separatist faction of Kashmir, known as the Hurriyat Conference, also joined in at one of the meetings. This was the first time that all the sides of the dispute of Kashmir came together. Again, strong opposing views were expressed but even so there was complete cordiality due to the influence of Nirmala Deshpande.

A twenty-member delegation of IPSI India led by Nirmala Deshpande, Admiral Ramdas, formerly chief of the Indian Navy, and Mrs Lalita Ramdas visited Lahore, Islamabad and Abottabad from 22 February 2001 to 1 March 2001. During the visit a number of seminars and meetings were organized.

\(^41\) Nirmala Deshpande (1929–2008) was a noted Indian social activist who devoted her adult life to the promotion of communal harmony and service to women, tribal people and the dispossessed in India as well as to the improvement of relations between India and Pakistan: http://www.nirmaladeshpande.org/HTML/about.html.
regions of Kashmir and listened to the stories of suffering from Kashmiris sandwiched between the fire of the security forces and the militants. We addressed several public meetings and allowed people to speak their mind freely. We moved without armed escort in places whose names appear every day in newspapers because they are places where shootings by militants and security forces occur. We took no side in the conflict. We only spoke for peace and communal harmony. We listened more than we spoke. It was amazing to see the common people in tears pleading for an end to violence. We were grieved to learn that in a border village in Baramulla District more than 25 per cent of its population is maimed due to landmines and regular artillery shelling. More than one third of married women in this village are widows as a result of the violent insurgency over the last fifteen years in the Valley. Schools in the border villages are closed for months for fear of shelling. There is a similar situation on the other side of the border. In the border areas, there is no employment. Young people of Kashmir also do not get jobs outside the state because they are regarded with suspicion. With these experiences we returned determined to work harder for peace.

After many delays and hiccups, finally a Pakistani delegation of 25 distinguished retired officers and their spouses, led by former Chief of the Air Staff Air Marshal Zafar A. Chaudhry arrived for a nine days’ visit on 2 December 2005. The programme consisted of meetings with the top political leadership, members of parliament, a meeting with the Hurriyat Conference leaders of Kashmir, press conferences, seminars at Delhi University, defence institutions, NGOs, and social programmes in the officers’ messes of the three services. The warm responses after their return confirm that IPSI has taken deep roots amongst the retired services fraternity of Pakistan.

Our chief motto is that when soldiers who once fought fierce battles opposite each other realize the need for peace, it cannot be far away. Relations between the two countries are now on an upswing. A number of confidence-building measures have been taken by both governments. The larger people-to-people contacts are removing many apprehensions about each other. Though the core problems of Kashmir and increasing defence expenditure on both sides remain, the road ahead appears to be heading for peace in the subcontinent. In this big effort, IPSI has a small but significant role.

The last visit to India of IPSI delegates from Pakistan was in 2008. A delegation from the IPSI Pakistan chapter, comprising ten officers and eight family members led by Lieutenant-General Muhammad Nasir Akhtar visited India from 10 to 17 May 2008 at the invitation of the late Nirmala Deshpande. The IPSI convention was held at Mumbai from 10 to 12 May 2008, followed by a visit to Delhi to attend a memorial service for the late chairperson on 14 May 2008 and a seminar at the United Service Institution of India. The visit coincided with the tenth anniversary of IPSI. Major-General Tej Krishen Kaul was the host and convener at Mumbai.

The delegation on its arrival was warmly received by the president of the IPSI India chapter, Lieutenant-General Moti Dar and other members. The activities for the tenth anniversary of IPSI commenced the same afternoon with a visit to Saffee Hospital followed by a symbolic peace march from Girgaum Chowpatty to Mani Bhawan, the private residence of Mahatma Gandhi, which was now been converted into a museum under a national heritage initiative. Approximately 250 people participated in this peace march, which was led by the Sheriff of Mumbai, M. S. Sonali. The event was well organized and allowed an opportunity for the public to mix freely and understand the purpose of this gathering.

During the IPSI convention, the main programme in the form of seminars, talks and interaction was spread over two days in four half-sessions covering specific topics for discussion. Speakers for each topic had been earmarked and were from the military, the political establishment and intellectuals who were specialists in their fields. This was followed by a questions and answers session which was conducted in an uncensored environment with no restrictions but in a friendly atmosphere.

Major-General Tej Kaul remained master of ceremonies for this convention. He was of the view that countries located within the same geographical mass like Europe were making their borders more porous to facilitate the free movement of the people. This could be applied to our two countries so as to help those people living on either side of the border who had left behind their homes in 1947. He referred to peace, normalization and brotherhood *(bhai chaara)* as envisaged by Dr Manmohan Singh. He
summed up, alluding to the mission of the late Nirmala Deshpande, that
the purpose was to foster an atmosphere of trust and good neighbourly
relations under the aegis of the veterans of the armed forces from both
countries.

The leader on the Pakistani side, Lieutenant-General Nasir Akhtar,
covered the initiatives so far taken by the leaders of Pakistan to create
conditions for improving relations between the two countries. He stressed
General Musharraf’s honesty of purpose in seeking to reach to some sort
of understanding at the Agra summit, in which people-to-people contact
would be a central focus. Such activities might bring about confidence
amongst ordinary people so that thereafter the political initiative could be
taken up by political figures. On the Pakistani side both Mr Nawaz Sharif
and Mr Asif Zardari are amenable to pragmatic options for improving
relations between our countries.

The Indian speakers all emphasized the need to make a start in the
areas of trade, commerce, free movement and social interchange, leaving the
intractable issue of Kashmir issue to take its time and course. The majority
advocated making the border irrelevant, arguing for more people-to-people
contact and more openness in the visa regime. The Pakistani speakers
opposed the concept of ‘irrelevant borders’ but agreed on closer people-to-people contacts and relatively open visa policies, especially with regard
to religious tourism. They considered that there needed to be at least the
acceptance by India of Kashmir as an important issue before there could be
real progress in trade, commerce and the social sector. Concluding the
discussion, Colonel Tahir Kardar stated that ‘we, Pakistan and India, both
should prefer peace over war. We should be finding the ways to increase
cooperation, tourism, trade and interaction between the two of us ... [Greater] people-to-people contacts [might] lead to people solving the
existing problems themselves.’

Colonel Khan Sahib Dad Khan

You were young when Partition was announced. What were your feelings at
the time?

I was almost eighteen years old when Pakistan came into being. While in
India, we heard the news of creation of Pakistan on the radio. I was born
and raised in East Punjab. My family was one of the big property owners
and agriculturists of the area. We were noticed and respected among not
only the Muslims but the Hindus and Sikhs too. Before Partition we never
doubted that we were part of the soil or thought that somehow we were
outsiders to the area. It never dawned on us that one day India would
be divided and that this would force us to leave our place to live abroad.
Although, in the middle of 1947, communal riots were happening in some
parts of India and Punjab too, we were still unaware of this bloodshed. Our
area was quite peaceful at the time of Partition and no one at first thought
of leaving home in order to protect ourselves. My family and I thought
that the two countries had been separated peacefully. Interestingly at that
time, we did not have any hatred against India. In my family, there was no
anger against Hindus or Sikhs for any reason.

Although we were from East Punjab, my father used to work as super-
intendent of police in the Baroda State police. That is why we migrated
to Pakistan by sea. Our experience in coming to Pakistan was normal and
uneventful. We did not see any atrocities while leaving India and coming
to Pakistan. My family and I did not get to know that thousands of people
had lost their lives during the migration until we met our relatives and the
Muslims from our village. My first cousin, her mother-in-law, husband and
four kids were killed during their migration to Pakistan. Their painful story
was the first I knew about the insanity of the migration.
Did the killing of blood relations make you bitter?

We did not have any bad feelings for India at the time of Partition. We came to Pakistan but thought that we would go back home to East Punjab one day. However, unfortunately, the awful news started breaking soon after Partition. Every day Muslims were looted, butchered and attacked by armed Hindus and Sikhs in East Punjab. This does not mean that Muslims from this side did not do similar things: our side was not innocent either. Killing and nonsense prevailed on both sides at that time for reasons which are not altogether clear. Insanity took over on both sides of the border.

Since I had not personally witnessed the bloodletting there was no thought of revenge in my mind. Moreover, I was not alone in this kind of thinking or feeling. Over all, there was no wish for revenge against India or the Indian Army in the early period of Partition. I had assumed that the two countries were on good terms. Nevertheless, as the news of the massacres spread, even the educated and liberal Muslims started thinking negatively about India.

Why did you join the army of Pakistan?

I did not join the Pakistani Army to take revenge on India or on the Hindus and Sikhs. I joined the army as a profession. Though my mother tried to discourage me, at the time the army was considered a respectable profession and that was in my mind too. I certainly wanted to serve my country; as a military officer, I wanted to defend Pakistan, but fighting India was not the reason for joining the Pakistani Army. Honestly, I never wanted to be martyred or to become a good Muslim who wants to go to heaven after jihad.

In your view, what is the core issue between the two countries which has led them to war?

Kashmir was the core issue and it still is. Until the 1965 war, the Indian and Pakistan armies were not considered hostile as they are today. From 1947 to 1965, as an army person, we never regarded the Indian Army as an inevitable enemy. However, the Indian occupation of the Kashmir Valley did not allow the friendly spirit to continue for long. Kashmir became a point of rift between Pakistan and India soon after the creation of Pakistan. From the outset, Pakistan firmly believed that the 80 per cent Muslim population of Kashmir must be part of Pakistan. Moreover, India had captured Kashmir against the will and desire of the people of Kashmir. Kashmiris are punished and abused by the Indians because they are Muslims and they want to join Pakistan instead of continuing to live under Indian rule. This has become a permanent source of revulsion for many Pakistanis against India. In addition, the September 1965 war fuelled the anti-India, pro-Kashmiri feeling and thinking very quickly in Pakistan. It is sad to see that since 1948 the Indian leadership has not tried to come up with a resolution of this fundamental issue between the two neighbouring states.

You fought in the 1965 war. Would you like to recount your experiences?

I was posted in Azad Kashmir in 1965. However, my battalion – called the Third Baloch – fought the 1965 war at Wāghā border near Lahore. Initially, my battalion removed all the mines [in front of our defensive positions] in July 1965. This showed signs of peace from our side, on the international border.

However, in August, war started at the disputed Kashmir border. I was asked to move to Kashmir during the war, and we captured different places. In fact, war was not declared at the time and the Pakistani Army was advancing as civilians (before the declaration of war, that is on 6 September 1965, the Pakistani Army was fighting in Kashmir not in army uniforms but in civilian clothes). By 29 August, we had captured many areas of occupied Kashmir but GHQ ordered us to leave the occupied areas and come back to barracks. Interestingly, later in the August, we were ordered again to attack the positions which had been captured by us earlier. On 30 August, we attacked again but were less successful, as India had taken advantage of our absence. This time the Indian Army was prepared for us and they had taken measures to confront us better. The second attack cost us a lot;
we suffered about seven casualties, including a captain named Jalil Khan. Actually, we were speedily and successfully achieving our targets under the supervision of General Akhtar Malik, but, all of a sudden, our top command replaced him with General Yahya Khan on 3–4 September. The change of commander during the campaign hurt us badly. I regard it as a crime that was committed by GHQ. One of the reasons for this non-professional move might have been to curtail the rising fame of General Akhtar Malik as a successful military commander. His success in Kashmir could have hurt the so-called popularity of the military ruler, Field Marshal Ayub Khan. I felt strongly that Akhtar Malik was replaced to protect Ayub Khan's position. Anyway, the change of command at this critical juncture damaged us, and all our efforts and early military successes were in vain.

Who won the 1965 war?

This is not easy to answer. Though the Pakistani Army was considerably outnumbered, it fought better than the Indians and successfully defended the country against India. Given its numerical disadvantage, I think it was a win for the Pakistani Army and Pakistan. The Pakistani Army showed its superiority in many areas against the Indians. The concept of 'martyrdom' played a decisive role, too. The Pakistani Army had greater passion to fight not for the country only but also for its religious honour. This was one of the vital forces motivating soldiers which helped them to fight heroically.

What went wrong in 1971?

I did not participate in the war although I was in the army. I was posted in West Pakistan and was taking care of the training of recruits within the country. I think we lost the shine of 1965 as an army in the 1971 war. India had learnt lessons from the 1965 war and had greatly improved their army. They had paid a lot of attention to training and modern warfare. They paid very close attention to their previous weaknesses and our strengths. For our part, we had simply glorified the 1965 war and failed to learn any lessons from it. We did not rectify our weaknesses in terms of military training, strategy or planning. We focused more on the grandeur of the army and we shut our eyes to the danger. India was improving day by day while we rapidly lost our professionalism. Because of the political crisis and lack of leadership, the army was demoralized in 1971. The Bengalis turned against us. Above all, the Indians demonstrated their military superiority over us at that time.

You left the army in 1974. You have been living as a civilian for more than three decades. What do you suggest to both the countries in order that they might live as peaceful neighbours?

Muslim-majority Pakistan must acquire strength to protect itself. Extremists like the RSS in India – and even Indira Gandhi – could not forget 400 years of Muslim rule over them and sought, or are still seeking, to avenge it. Kashmir is still the bone of contention between the two countries, and it is hard to resolve the issue by war now that both countries have nuclear weapons. India wants peace on its terms – that is, 'Forget Kashmir and we are brothers.' Being both Muslims and Pakistanis, we cannot be dominated by Indians.

In order to live peacefully in a friendly subcontinent, India has to show its sincerity and willingness for an independent Muslim Pakistan. The history of 63 years of Pakistan's independence suggests to me that India deep down does not want to see it progress and prosper. India wants to predominate over Pakistan. However, the people, the army and the country will never accept India as the regional hegemon unless it acts fairly. I think that India has to act as a fair and just neighbour by taking the correct action. India must come up with a Kashmir solution to prove that India has accepted Pakistan as a neighbouring state on the basis of equality. Pakistanis will reject Indian hegemony whether or not they have to fight a war without end. The hidden desire of the extremist Hindus to dominate over Muslims

42 He used the term 'local bully'.
is the first and biggest cause of tension and disputes between the two countries. Three wars have not resolved any of the problems but India must know we will not give up without a settlement. I am in my eighties. Even if I had to fight for my country right now, I would do it. I would prefer to die fighting India than rather than live under Indian rule.

Lieutenant-General Talat Masood

What are the after-effects of 9/11 on the region?

Pakistan’s relations with India suffered as a result of the 9/11 events in the US. Whereas Pakistan became a frontline state and non-NATO ally, it was India that truly acquired the status of a strategic partner of the US with the nuclear deal and cooperation in defence, technology and space. New Delhi has taken advantage of Pakistan’s predicament after 9/11, stepped up its pressure and orchestrated a campaign that Kashmiri jihadi elements should be treated as terrorists. It also suited Western countries not to differentiate between terrorism and a genuine freedom struggle. The nexus between Kashmiri militants and Al-Qaeda and the Taliban is a source of serious concern to the international community and a solution to the problem of Kashmir remains frozen.

Initially Pakistan benefited from economic assistance offered by the US, other Western powers and multilateral agencies. But in these years the cost of war has been staggering in terms of loss of life, disabling injuries, the displacement of millions of people and the extensive destruction of private and public property. Rough estimates indicate that the true cost is anywhere between 35 to 40 billion dollars, while Pakistan has received from Washington about 11 billion dollars, which includes reimbursements for services rendered. In the process, the economy has been a serious casualty as foreign and local investment dropped because of security considerations. And clearly Pakistan has partially lost its sovereignty as its political and economic affairs are being micro-managed by the US. Politically, 9/11 has contributed to the polarization of our society and made it more violent and intolerant.

What is the impact of the Mumbai attacks on the India–Pakistan relationship?

Relations between India and Pakistan received a serious setback after the tragic terrorist attack on Mumbai and have remained practically frozen ever since. Clearly, the incident had a traumatic effect on the Indian public and the Indian government reacted by suspending the composite dialogue and a ‘cold war’ environment has prevailed ever since. The Indian government has taken a strong position that unless Pakistan punishes the perpetrators of the crime and in particular takes action against Hafiz Saeed, the chief of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, they will not resume dialogue. Islamabad takes the line that it is fully cooperating and is determined to bring to justice the real perpetrators of the crime. Seven terrorists have been arrested.

Furthermore, on the basis of our own investigations, cases have been registered against twenty others who are currently absconding but efforts are being made to track them down. As regards Hafiz Saeed, Islamabad is working on the leads provided but so far the evidence collected is insufficient to take the case to court. To display its good faith the government took serious notice of Hafiz Saeed’s speech of 16 September 2009 in which he was inciting people to wage jihad and soliciting charity for the cause, by arresting him under the Anti-Terrorism Act. On the order of the court he was subsequently released on bail, but is being kept under surveillance.

New Delhi’s prime focus on Hafiz Saeed is deliberate and has a strong political motive. They want to use it for symbolic purposes and to keep Pakistan on the defensive. It is not that the Indian leadership does not realize Pakistan’s predicament in dealing with Hafiz Saeed. First, there is a history of LeT that at one time enjoyed the support of the military and intelligence services for the role that it was playing as a resistance movement in Jammu and Kashmir. It is only as a consequence of 9/11 that the policies changed at the official level but there is still a strong sentiment in favour of the Kashmiri jihadis in Azad Kashmir and Punjab. The PPP government is
handling the problem politically as well as it can through law enforcement mechanisms but it has its own limitations.

Domestic politics is dictating New Delhi to take this tough stand against Pakistan. Congress does not want to convey an impression of being weak and ‘compliant’. The media have played an important role in shaping this policy towards Pakistan. In the past it was mostly the politicians who competed in acting tough and belligerent towards each other. Now it is the media that have gone hyper-nationalist in India with nearly a hundred channels, including the regional ones, competing to outdo each other in drumming up paranoia against the nuclear neighbour.

How can terrorism be reduced in the region?

The resolution of the Kashmir issue will help stamp out terrorism in the region and this is the best opportunity for Pakistan to work out a political settlement of the issue. India and Pakistan should continue talking on bilateral issues. The resolution of the Kashmir issue would reduce the incentive for terrorist networks to continue using violence and would allow for increased Pakistani cooperation against the Taliban. However, our optimistic assessment before was wrong. The Mumbai attacks illustrated the fragility of India–Pakistan relations. Now I am afraid that the rapprochement efforts of the last few years are likely to fall entirely apart given that even before the attacks on Mumbai, the dialogue between the two countries had deteriorated.

In Pakistan, the transition from dictatorship to democracy meant a great distraction from the peace process. And India was too much preoccupied with its international agenda. It did not seem to be much concerned with regional problems. That was a great mistake on the Indian side. However, the biggest drawback in the composite dialogue was the lack of success in the territorial disputes around Kashmir, Siachen and Sir Creek. If these problems had been handled successfully, this would have transformed our relations. Another setback was the abandonment of plans for a gas pipeline from Iran to India through Pakistan, due to pressure from the United States. Both countries need the energy, and the pipeline would also have increased the mutual dependence between India and Pakistan.

There is reason why many Pakistanis including myself are extremely unhappy with the Indian accusations that the Pakistan government or government agencies played a role in the attacks on Mumbai. The Indian announcement that all options were open – including military action – to deal with Pakistan, and Indian attempts to isolate Pakistan have been a poor strategy. Pakistan is facing its greatest challenge with radicalism. The country needs the support of the region and of the international community. If you try to isolate Pakistan, you play into the hands of the militants; India must know that.

What benefit can India expect from a no-dialogue policy?

The long-term economic interests of India were not well served by the state of tension and uncertainty that surrounded the relationship after the Mumbai incident. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh also alluded to the fact that India has to maintain a consistent 8 to 9 percent GDP growth to overcome poverty, and, for that, peace between neighbours is a prerequisite. By not agreeing to commence serious negotiations, New Delhi risked running into a dead end.

The situation in Afghanistan is also being adversely affected by the India–Pakistan rivalry, creating instability in the region and accentuating the threat to US and NATO forces. New Delhi may derive pleasure by being adamant but this serves no strategic objective apart from strengthening the hands of the militants.

What can Pakistan do under the present circumstances?

Pakistan too must show its genuine sincerity by making measurable progress in pursuing the cases against the perpetrators of the Mumbai crime. The best course for Pakistan is to demonstrate clearly to the world that it is determined to dismantle and disarm the jihadi entities in its own national
interest. The blowback from these organizations on Pakistan society is already severe and it is unacceptable in the twenty-first century in a totally transformed global environment to allow such entities to coexist with the state. This decision has to come from within Pakistan’s power structure and not as an act of compliance with either the controversial ‘Enhanced Partnership Act’ of 2009 with the US or as a result of Indian pressure.

Can India and Pakistan usefully talk?

With Pakistan engaged in a death dance with the home-grown Taliban, its relations with India acquire greater strategic and political significance. It has to focus on the internal threat and adjust its national priorities accordingly. Do our security managers see the internal danger or are they still fixated on India as the real enemy? Similarly, is India prepared to take a long-term view of its relations with Pakistan? India cannot remain isolated from the rising tide of militancy that is sweeping the region.

Relations between India and Pakistan fell to their lowest ebb after Mumbai. The reaction of India to suspend the composite dialogue reflected the old mood, and there were inherent dangers in maintaining the stalemate. India and Pakistan are nuclear states. They cannot go to war as it would be suicidal. So the sooner they lift this self-imposed restriction the better it will be for resolving the major issues and facing the common challenge of terrorism.

Our establishment, under external and internal pressures, has been adjusting to the new realities and bringing about a shift in its policies, but it needs to do more. From 2004 onwards it has withdrawn its support of militant organizations and especially after the Mumbai incident it has taken action to close the jihadi camps and we are in a state of transition. India’s diplomatic, media and political offensive against Pakistan after the Mumbai incident also has made it difficult for our leadership to convince its people that New Delhi has benign motives. India’s initial anguish and reaction was understandable but its subsequent policy of pushing Pakistan to the wall made little sense. Nonetheless, the militants succeeded in their mission of driving a wedge between the two nuclear neighbours and holding the peace process hostage.

There are genuine reasons for Pakistan’s security concerns that need to be allayed. India may use the potential threat of China to justify its fast-growing military power but the hard reality is that more than 70 per cent of its forces are facing Pakistan. The doctrine of Cold Start, the concept of using highly mobile integrated forces as strike elements, is Pakistan-specific. Moreover, Islamabad has genuine reasons to complain of India’s meddling in Balochistan. It is well known that Baloch nationalists find sympathy and support from India and many are living there, or in Afghanistan, under its patronage. India’s expanding influence in Afghanistan is equally unsettling for us.

The revival of formal dialogue process covering all outstanding issues including Kashmir, coupled with expanded political contacts and increased economic interaction, however, can gradually bring the two countries closer and help make the region more stable.

What is your view on the US–India nuclear deal?

As of now, India and Pakistan are not interested in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and are engaged in building up their stocks of fissile material and warheads. India will also be taking full advantage of the US–India nuclear deal to step up production of fissile material. That could well lead to an arms race between India, China and Pakistan. The introduction of ballistic missile defence in India, with the assistance of the US and Israel, could be another potentially destabilizing factor in the regional context.
What is your message to the Indian political classes and society as a whole?

Engage Pakistan in multiple areas of activity, change your mindset and transform the relationship to a cooperative one. It is to be hoped that the phase of dominating the region by regional powers has passed. For the ‘new India’ that is on a sharp upward economic curve, the stability of the region should be the goal rather than its dominance over it. A cooperative relationship with India can vastly contribute to Pakistan’s political stability and economic progress. It will allow Pakistan to focus fully on internal issues of governance and divert resources towards social uplift and productive avenues.

What is the key to peace between the two countries?

Relations between India and Pakistan can only improve in a sustainable way if a solution to the Kashmir problem is found. It all depends on the political will: if you want it, you can do it. The process has to be started; it can lead to a solution. But is the will there? Currently, I cannot see it. But in the next three to five years the thinking on both sides is likely to change – the people and the leaders will realize enough is enough and let us take bold decisions and normalize relations and then keep moving forward.

Major Arif Hameed Mehr

What was your experience in the 1965 war?

I was a young and inexperienced cadet so I was not allowed to play any role in the war, like other cadets under training. But after the martyrdom of our senior cadet, Shaheed Abid Majid, in March 1965, we kept on building pressure on our commanders to let us participate in the war. But only
What about the war of 1971?

In 1965, I was promoted captain and sent to East Pakistan. I remained there until 1971 and fought the war as a major of the Pakistani Army. But I came back to West Pakistan before the surrender of the Pakistani Army at the end of the war. Eid was on 30 November and 1 December, while war began on 2 December 1971. Our two aircraft were shot down on Eid, which made it obvious that the war was about to start. I was one of the pioneers who used the ack-ack anti-aircraft weapon imported from China (the enemy did not know that we had it).44

Initially, General Yahya Khan did not encourage the idea of using ack-ack and claimed that during World War II Britain had only one ack-ack gun which had not proved a success.45 But we insisted on using it and it showed great results during the war. We shot down many Indian aircraft with ack-ack and it also supported the Pakistani Air Force. In the 1971 war, there was the same euphoria as in 1965 war, but circumstances were different. In East Pakistan, we were not only fighting against the Indian Army but also facing hostility from our own countrymen who were sup-

44 Anne Gilks and Gerald Segal, China and the Arms Trade (Beckenham: Croom Helm, 1985), 208.
45 Yahya Khan’s remark is erroneous. The 3.7-inch ack-ack gun was the generally used anti-aircraft gun. It was used in the Battle of Britain and at Dover and then taken to France in 1944 once air superiority had been gained. It was used in a new role firing air bursts over enemy positions (http://www.patricktaylor.com/108).
What role did India play in the secession of East Pakistan in 1971?

Historically speaking, the mindset of East Pakistan was different from West Pakistan. East Pakistan was landlocked by India and India was the biggest buyer of its jute production. Jute was a significant product in international trade at the time. This made East Pakistan financially dependent on India from the beginning. On the top of this, in East Pakistan, compared to West Pakistan, there was a larger Hindu population from the time of Partition.

Right after the creation of Pakistan, India sought to exploit the situation in East Pakistan in its favour. The Indians knew there were a thousand miles between the West and East wings of Pakistan which was a great impediment to the unity of Pakistan, as India was in the middle. Since Partition, in East Pakistan, the majority of the teachers at the public schools and colleges were Hindus who poisoned the minds of Bengalis against a united [federal] Pakistan, following the lines of India’s propaganda.

The idea of Bangladesh was created not in East Pakistan, but at Agartala, India. For years, the Indian Army and intelligence agencies had been supporting the Awami League top leadership to work against Pakistan. The fighting faction of the Awami League – the Mukti Bahini – started the armed struggle against the Pakistani Army after the 1965 war. Pakistan’s inability to fix the political crisis with the Awami League cost the Pakistani Army very heavily and affected the morale and mood of the army. We did not lose the war as a result of India’s army alone; rather, our own failures and mistakes led us to defeat.

What do you recommend to improve the relationship?

Certainly, war is not the answer. I honestly think that an open people-to-people interaction can bring a ground-breaking change to the 63-year-old India–Pakistan clash. The two countries have a lot to offer each other in terms of trade, tourism and joint ventures. India and Pakistan are between them almost a sixth of the world’s population. They have more than 600 miles of border between them. They are naturally and historically trading partners. Two-way trade can be a ‘win-win’ for both countries. There are unlimited opportunities in the areas of textiles, food, agriculture, the energy sector, natural resources, information technology and so on.

Tourism is another area for both to explore. The potential in terms of tourist attractions is unlimited for the people of Pakistan and India. Pakistan has seven peaks out of the world’s top ten which could become a great attraction to many Indians. Lahore and its culture fascinate almost every Indian. Likewise, why would not a Pakistani like to visit the Taj Mahal, Agra and the Red Fort of Delhi? Moreover, religious tourism can bring in billions of dollars in foreign exchange between the two countries. The Punjab in Pakistan is very important for the Sikhs’ religion. To visit Nankana Sahib, which is the birthplace of the founder of Sikh religion, Guru Nanak, is a sort of holy duty for Sikhs. In addition to that, places like Katas Raj in Pakistan have great religious significance for the almost one billion Hindus of India. For a majority of Pakistanis, the mausoleums
of great saints like Nizam-u-Din Auliya at Delhi and Khawaja Chisti of Ajmer Sharif have great importance. India and Pakistan can compete on productivity, trade and the quality of goods. This sort of competition would be a ‘win-win’ for both countries.

What is your view on the visa policy?

It is time to change. We have to be mature neighbours and we should trust each other. Both Pakistan and India should allow their people to travel freely between the two countries. Restricting people from visiting each other only serves to create hate and increase mistrust. We should stop blaming each other. If a terrorist activity occurs in Pakistan, we blindly accuse RAW; on the other hand, India is in the habit of blaming Pakistan and the ISI for whatever disaster happens there. We have to negotiate and understand each other before talking such nonsense. We have to go further than the blame game. The exchange of students can be beneficial as it helps the youth of both sides to understand the cultural, social and traditional values of both countries. It will also stop them selling hate in the future and help them to understand each other on the basis of merit. The future demands interaction and communication for the development of a common culture of peace.

Brigadier Shaukat Qadir

Would you like to outline briefly your military career?

I started my military career as a pilot in the PAF, where I saw the 1965 war. Then I joined the army, opting for the 6th Frontier Force regiment (infantry). I saw action in erstwhile East Pakistan, where I volunteered to go for two months. My stay kept getting extended on the request of HQ, but I was fortunate to return in late October 1971. I saw action in Sulemanki and the desert sector. Later I participated in the Balochistan counter-insurgency operations in the 1970s and served all over the country and, on numerous occasions, saw action on the Line of Control in Kashmir, serving in almost all ranks up to brigadier. During my career I served as staff officer in brigade, division and corps HQs and also pursued a teaching career at the Infantry School, Command and Staff College and the National Defence College (now the National Defence University War Wing).

Do you have any reflections on the wisdom or otherwise of the 1965 and 1971 wars?

Both wars were acts of stupidity. You can find my views on the 1965 war and Kargil on my website. India has carried out an assessment of 1999 in The Kargil Report, but Pakistan has neither attempted to produce a similar document, nor is likely to do so. My verdict was published in 2002 in the journal of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Whitehall, though it has been challenged by some in Pakistan.46 The Kargil war was fought over an area extending from Dras to Kargil and Batalik, an area spanning about 60 miles in length. Craggy peaks abound in the region, ranging in height from 13,000 feet to 18,000 feet, with the floor of the valleys at around 7,000 feet. Each crest line is followed by another, with ravines in between and, even along the crest line of one continuous feature, there are frequent

46 A fuller statement of his views may be found at http://shaukatqadir.info/articles.html. Shireen M. Mazari, The Kargil Conflict, 1999: Separating Fact from Fiction (Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies, 2001), questions Shaukat Qadir’s interpretation, but (in A. G. Noorani’s phrase) ‘she allow(s) patriotic fervour to override the claims of objectivity.’ Mazari blames the Centre for Contemporary Conflict’s Kargil Project for misperceptions of Pakistan’s policy. ‘Further misperceptions were created about Kargil when an unofficial, conjectural version of Pakistan’s Kargil position was published by a retired Army official, who at the time had his own axe to grind with the military government in Pakistan.’ This is a reference to Brigadier Shukat Qadir’s article ‘An Analysis of Kargil’ in RUSI Journal (April 2002). He was a participant in the Monterey Conference.
depressions, which could range from a few hundred feet in depth, to a few thousand. The nature of the terrain made infantry attacks, unless backed by surprise, an unbelievably costly venture and almost certainly doomed to failure. The extremely harsh and inhospitable nature of the terrain was the reason for the Indian troops taking a 'calculated risk,’ leaving it unoccupied during winters, and returning at the advent of spring.

While preparations for executing the Kargil plan began in November/December 1998, the subject was casually broached with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif sometime in December [1998], presenting the same argument that the freedom struggle in Kashmir needed a fillip, which could be provided by an incursion into these territories, left unoccupied by the Indians during winter. It would also repay them for their incursion into Siachen. In fact, it would hurt them more. Nawaz Sharif, being the kind of person he is, accepted the statement at face value. Nor did the military leadership, as it is supposed to, present a complete analysis of the scale of the operation or its possible outcome, with a political aim, and how the military operation would achieve the political aim.

Personally, I do not think that the operation was intended to reach the scale that it finally did. In all likelihood, it grew in scale as the troops crept forward to find more unoccupied heights, and finally were overlooking the valley. In the process, they had ended up occupying an area of about 500 square miles over a front of 60 miles and depth ranging between 4 to 9 miles. They were occupying 132 posts of various sizes. Whereas the total number occupying these posts never exceeded 1,000 of all ranks, four times this number provided the logistical back-up to undertake the operation.

While the political aim spelt out was, ‘to seek a just and permanent solution to the Kashmir issue in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir,’ the military aim leading up to the political aim was ‘to create a military threat that could be viewed as capable of leading to a military solution, so as to force India to the negotiating table from a position of weakness.’ The operational plan visualized the Indians amassing troops at the LoC to deal with the threat at Kargil, resulting in a vacuum in their rear areas. While it is useless to speculate on whether it could in fact have succeeded, theoretically the plan was faultless, the initial execution, tactically brilliant. The only flaw was that it had not catered for the ‘environment.’ Quite clearly, it was an aberration in the environment, and the international reaction soon left little doubt of that.

Nawaz Sharif, who had been gloating over the drubbing that the Indians were getting, began to feel uncomfortable. In all fairness to him, the military leadership had failed to apprise him of the politico-diplomatic fallout and he, being the kind of person he was, had made no effort to analyse this aspect. The international pressure was becoming unbearable and, when the posts at Dras fell, without appreciating the military causes of it, he began looking for an escape route, but he was very worried about the reaction of the military leadership and apprehended that a withdrawal might result in his untimely deposition. He, therefore, dispatched his brother, Shahbaz Sharif, to Washington, where, after a series of meetings, he managed to get the American establishment to issue a warning that a military coup in Pakistan would be unacceptable to them. Not only did this serve to warn the military leadership of Nawaz's fears, it also shed some light on the possible course he might pursue later. The Indian leadership had been offering Nawaz an ‘out,’ by saying that the Pakistani Army had undertaken the operation without political sanction.

Had Nawaz picked up this offer in time, he might have survived, even though it would have made him look foolish, but he lacked the political acumen. By the time he did pick it up, after his deposition, he found few believers. Meantime, in the last briefing in late June, the Chief of Army Staff47 told Nawaz that, while there were no military apprehensions of India's succeeding in ousting Pakistanis from the posts they were holding, if the government so desired, the army would pull back. After some frantic telephone calls conveying his desperate straits to President Clinton, Nawaz went to Washington, met Clinton on 4 July, and with guarantees of his support, returned to announce the withdrawal of the 'freedom fighters' occupying Kargil.

Pakistan’s first error of judgement was to undertake the operation at a juncture when the entire international community was bound to

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47 That is, Musharraf.
Do you consider that by pursuing a military career it was inevitable that you would find yourself immersed into an anti-India strategic culture?

Yes, to a certain extent. However, I realized the futility of wars midway through my career and, although I continued to fight when the occasion arose, I advocated peace during my teaching career and have been an advocate of peace with all neighbours, including India.

Would you care to reflect on the long periods of military rule in Pakistan (longer than the periods of civilian rule, to date)? In India, this is perceived as one of the reasons there is a ‘problem’ with Pakistan. Do you agree (it leaves out long-standing issues such as Kashmir)?

I have always been a democrat and opposed to military takeovers. No, I do not think that military rule is entirely responsible for the anti-India rhetoric or the Kashmir policy. Even Musharraf sought to make peace with India. However, the military is responsible for converting a genuine movement for an independent Kashmir, which had the support of all Kashmiris, across the religious divide, into a jihad – the greatest damage that we could do and did.

In 1989, when the independence movement in Kashmir started up again, it was led by Kashmiri Muslims but with the support of Kashmiri Sikhs and even Hindus. The movement was led by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, the JKLF, which had a chapter on either side of the LoC. As their name implies, the JKLF wanted a united and liberated Independent Kashmir for the Kashmiris. This was Benazir Bhutto’s first tenure as prime minister: she was, ostensibly, opposed to supporting the Kashmiri freedom struggle. I am not sure whether in private she agreed with the army chief, General Mirza Aslam Beg. Certainly Beg was fully committed to supporting the Kashmiri movement.

I am not sure why or who took the decision to deny the support publicly, but that was the decision. Why I find this puzzling is that, if I remember rightly, the UN charter makes it incumbent ‘on all member states
How damaging was the Kargil war to Pakistan’s international reputation, bearing in mind that Nawaz Sharif and Vajpayee had recently met at Lahore?

Kargil was a watershed event from which we are still suffering. By 1998, the Kashmiri struggle had begun to flag a little. This was the stated reason for undertaking Kargil. By this stage, the JKLF had also gone into the background. The pro-Pakistan parties had forced all parties into a common forum, the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC). The APHC was also beginning to lose its steam and rumours of back-channel negotiations with Indian authorities were rife.

Kargil took everybody by surprise. Indian Kashmiris were ecstatic; at last the Pakistani Army had intervened in their support and would help them get their independence. The ‘abject surrender and withdrawal’ as they referred to it, was the final betrayal. Their bitterness was as strong as their previous ecstasy! ‘They are using us like pawns, for their own ends’ – this was the accusation against both India and Pakistan. ‘Pakistan can afford to let us bleed, the blood is ours’ and so on.

The Agra summit of 15 and 16 July 2001 has been seen by many as a lost opportunity for improving India–Pakistan relations. Would you care to comment on that?

In my view, the Agra summit was too great a media success for Musharraf. India had to ensure it failed. And yes, it was another missed opportunity.

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49 Chapter 1, Article 1, part 2 states that purpose of the UN Charter is: ‘To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.’ Justified by the language of self-determination, between 1946 and 1960 the peoples of 37 new nations freed themselves from colonial status in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. However, India considers itself a postcolonial power and that any right of self-determination is outlawed under the Indian Constitution which disallows secession.

50 Continuing Indian resentment against Musharraf’s role in launching the Kargil war seems to have been behind the decision to deny him a visa to visit India in December 2010. ‘Musharraf vows never to visit India again’ AFP (3 Dec. 2010): <http://www.dawn.com/2010/12/03/musharraf-vows-never-to-visit-india-again-report.html>
We now come to the aftermath of the events of 9/11 in the United States, which led to a rapid about-turn in Pakistan’s policy, particularly with regard to Afghanistan. With the benefit of hindsight, do you think that the Pakistani public should have been told exactly what the US President wanted from Pakistan?

I am guilty of having said these exact words to Musharraf in February 2000: ‘The world can live with your Kashmir policy, but it cannot live with your Afghan (pro-Taliban) policy.’ Since he finally changed his policy under US coercion, yes, the people should have been taken into confidence and Musharraf should have laid down terms for Pakistan’s support, including the ‘Red Lines’ that the US would NOT be allowed to cross. However, he lacked the guts. Despite his apparent ‘gung ho’ attitude, he was far from courageous.

President Musharraf made a significant number of changes in the army command following the change in policy over Afghanistan and Pakistan’s commitment to the United States in the ‘war on terror’. Was this coincidence, in that it was a normal promotions and appointments list? Or did he have a problem with the attitude of some officers?

The promotions and appointments were normal. However, quite obviously, Musharraf loyalists were given preferred appointments.

Following the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 and the mobilization of the Indian Army along the borders of Pakistan, President Musharraf gave a speech on 12 January 2002 in which he denounced Islamist militancy and vowed that Pakistan’s territory would not be used by extremist groups for attacks on another state. Was this a real change of policy? If so, was it implemented?

No, this was not a change in policy, nor was it ever implemented either in letter or spirit.51

Would you care to comment on the so-called ‘A. Q. Khan Network’ and Pakistan’s measures in dealing with it?

In my view, A. Q. Khan’s acquisition of material and information was approved at the highest level, at least within the army. Our proliferation to North Korea was on a quid pro quo basis and also approved by the army chief and the political government; as also was our attempted proliferation to Saudi Arabia, which was nipped in the bud. However, our proliferation to Iran was purely mercenary. A. Q. Khan certainly got paid well for it and he was in a position to do this entirely on his own. But it would not surprise me if the army chief was in on it and also benefited.

A young Pakistani researcher, Rizwana Abbasi, has argued that since the Khan revelations Pakistan has put its house in order and states that there is now a ‘new taboo’ in Pakistan against proliferation, which sets an example to the rest of the world. The argument is an endorsement of the Musharraf policies after 2001. Do you think that Pakistan’s achievements in counter-proliferation have not received sufficient international attention?

Indeed a fairly strict non-proliferation policy is now in vogue; though I would not refer to it as exemplary. Yes, because of our past reputation, we remain suspect and our efforts unappreciated.

51 The Brigadier’s comments were echoed by the late Richard Holbrooke, the US roving envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan: ‘Had he fulfilled his promises to President Bush to restore democracy, close down the extreme madrassas and do the right thing in the tribal areas, we wouldn’t be in the situation we are today. He didn’t keep his word.’ Holbrooke commented to a gathering of US diplomats and security experts. ‘Let us not be nostalgic for military rule ...’, he stated. ‘Holbrooke dismisses chances of Musharraf comeback’, Reuters (18 Nov. 2010): http://www.dawn.com/2010/11/18/248533.html.
Turning now to the war in Afghanistan and its relationship to the insurgency in the tribal areas: would there have been such a problem in FATA – and Swat and elsewhere – if the US had not invaded Afghanistan in 2001? Can you comment on the campaign there and operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa? And, incidentally, do you agree with the renaming of NWFP?

The answer to the first part of your question is no; we might never have had this problem if the US had not decided to stay on in Afghanistan. An article on my website, ‘Understanding the insurgency in FATA’ provides a detailed response. The unrest in the Hazara (the non-Pakhtun portion of Khyber–Pakhtunkhwa) could become increasingly difficult to handle. Personally, I have been in favour of increasing the number of provinces in Pakistan; however, that is another matter. It is a physical impossibility for the Pakistan military to maintain a credible deterrent force on its eastern borders, fight the Taliban, maintain a sufficient presence in the recaptured areas to prevent a return of the Taliban and, simultaneously, assume politico-administrative control of these recaptured areas. What is more, the mere fact that the political leadership has not assumed its rightful duties in these areas is tantamount to a voluntary ceding of political authority to the army. This is something that the army does not want.

In a recent interview former President Musharraf has pointed to the significance of resolving the Kashmir dispute – ‘not because Pakistan wants it’, he said, but because ‘it’s necessary for the region, for the world to fight terrorism and extremism.’ He also said that before he left office he and the Indian Prime Minister, Dr Singh, were ‘proceeding reasonably fast [on resolving the Kashmir dispute]. We had worked [out] the parameters and were drafting an agreement. It’s a pity that we could not reach the conclusion.’ Do you consider that this opportunity for a settlement having been lost it will now be very difficult to reach the same outcome at a later date?

Musharraf, like all his ilk, is too boastful; amongst the few sensible things he did was the tacit acceptance of the LoC as a de facto border. After 9/11, Musharraf was under pressure from the US and began to reduce Pakistan’s support to the militants in Kashmir. He also wanted to improve relations with India, or at least to be seen as trying to do so, and stated, ‘in the event of India reducing its forces in Kashmir and its repression of Kashmiris, Pakistan would be prepared to overlook the UN Resolutions and let things be; or words to that effect: a tacit acceptance of the LoC as the international boundary – and a clear message to the Kashmiris. As of 2006, support was reduced to a trickle; mostly from unofficial sources, while the government looked the other way. But post-Kargil, Indian Kashmiris had become increasingly disillusioned with Pakistan. They began to look for maximum autonomy within a union with India as the only viable option.

The JKLF retained its dream of a united, independent Kashmir and, therefore, once again the JKLF began its ascent and peaked during the long march through the length of Indian Kashmir in 2009, led by Yasin Malik, its president. Once again congregations were addressed by Hindus and Sikhs, seeking independence. But even he realized that this was an unattainable dream.

Finally, in June 2010 there arose the clarion call for ‘freedom’ (azadi) by the youth. These were children who had been brought up witnessing rape, pillage and murder. They violently oppose assistance from Pakistan and refuse to accept anything less than freedom. They no longer carry weapons; only stones that come from Indian Kashmir. Once again, they are not only Muslims. Since they are united, they will not accept anything less, and will not permit Pakistan to corrupt the purity of their movement. Who knows: they might succeed where their elders failed. Perhaps now the international community will be forced to sit up and take notice.

In my view, post-Kargil, Pakistan has become increasingly irrelevant to the Kashmir dispute. All that Pakistan should be concerned with is the distribution of water of the rivers that flow from Kashmir. The current phenomenon in Indian Kashmir is a Kashmiri Intifada, if you will; one which if Pakistan attempts to assist it will also be stoned by the Kashmiris. Indian Kashmir will also continue to fester like Palestine until some day India decides to settle the issue. There is no longer a possibility of Pakistan being involved in resolving this dispute.
Were there any viable alternative policies to those pursued by the Musharraf government and its successors between 2001 and now?

Pakistan has lacked a sensible and comprehensive foreign policy for decades. Yes, we have become too dependent on the US. Our most viable alternative was to improve relations with our neighbours, including India. Our oft-quoted ‘strategic location’ is strategic only if commerce flows through it in all directions. The local daily *Express Tribune* carried a piece by me on this subject recently.  

Several of the Indian former senior officers who have been interviewed for this book have argued that the power of the military in Pakistan is part of the problem, not part of the solution. Why do some such as former President Musharraf feel differently, and argue that the power of the military in the state should actually be strengthened?

I would agree that, more often than not, the political clout of Pakistan’s military has been a problem. However, today we have a military leadership that wanted to stay totally apolitical, but has been forced into the arena. The problem is two-sided: Pakistan’s politicians refuse take over authority and keep ceding their authority to GHQ. As you know nature abhors a vacuum. Today’s political vacuum in Pakistan is being filled by the army and the judiciary. Kayani was already in effective control of ‘domestic affairs’ and now seems firmly in control of foreign relations with the US, the West, India and Afghanistan. He persists in taking a back seat but without a shadow of doubt, he is the most powerful man in Pakistan. In a country where the political leadership persists in proving itself inept and corrupt, this might be for the best in the immediate and short-term future. In many ways his extension to 2013 was for the best. General Kayani has indeed become indispensable and there does not seem to be a replacement for him available to fill the enormous shoes he wears. However, this situation cannot but continue to weaken civilian institutions in the long run. More importantly, it can result in a desire for self-perpetuation under the very real conviction of his own indispensability – as happened to many of his predecessors. Admittedly, Kayani is an individual of far stronger character than any of the examples one can think of, but then, absolute power can become a powerfully addictive aphrodisiac.

Recently, ex-President Musharraf noted the size of the Indian military forces deployed specifically against Pakistan, and accused India of using its consulates at Jalalabad and Kandahar for stirring up trouble in Pakistan. How dangerous is the potential for a proxy war between India and Pakistan in Afghanistan? How optimistic are you that India–Pakistan relations can be improved in the long-term interests of both countries, and the region as a whole – particularly the stability of Afghanistan?

My article on FATA also addresses the Indian involvement in Afghanistan. That India is stoking unrest in Balochistan and, to a lesser degree in FATA, exposure of a US diplomatic cable quoting the head of the French Interagency on Afghanistan-Pakistan, Jasmine Zerinini]: http://www.dawn.com/2010/12/01/kayani-staying-behind-the-scene-french-official-2.html. In an unusual move, short-circuiting the usual diplomatic channels, General Kayani handed President Obama a thirteen-page policy paper. ‘I cannot say that the paper is going to be become President Obama’s favourite reading material, but for the first time he has a direct understanding of where the Pakistan military is coming from on issues that are vital for the US and for global security,’ said a Western diplomat. ‘… This is the first time we have a written account of the Pakistani establishment’s core concerns ….’ Syed Talat Hussain, ‘Policy paper catches Obama’s attention’, *Dawn* (2 Dec. 2010): http://www.dawn.com/2010/12/02/policy-paper-catches-obamas-attention.html. In an unusual move, short-circuiting the usual diplomatic channels, General Kayani handed President Obama a thirteen-page policy paper. ‘I cannot say that the paper is going to be become President Obama’s favourite reading material, but for the first time he has a direct understanding of where the Pakistan military is coming from on issues that are vital for the US and for global security,’ said a Western diplomat. ‘… This is the first time we have a written account of the Pakistani establishment’s core concerns ….’ Syed Talat Hussain, ‘Policy paper catches Obama’s attention’, *Dawn* (2 Dec. 2010): http://www.dawn.com/2010/12/02/policy-paper-catches-obamas-attention.html. In an unusual move, short-circuiting the usual diplomatic channels, General Kayani handed President Obama a thirteen-page policy paper. ‘I cannot say that the paper is going to be become President Obama’s favourite reading material, but for the first time he has a direct understanding of where the Pakistan military is coming from on issues that are vital for the US and for global security,’ said a Western diplomat. ‘… This is the first time we have a written account of the Pakistani establishment’s core concerns ….’ Syed Talat Hussain, ‘Policy paper catches Obama’s attention’, *Dawn* (2 Dec. 2010): http://www.dawn.com/2010/12/02/policy-paper-catches-obamas-attention.html. In an unusual move, short-circuiting the usual diplomatic channels, General Kayani handed President Obama a thirteen-page policy paper. ‘I cannot say that the paper is going to be become President Obama’s favourite reading material, but for the first time he has a direct understanding of where the Pakistan military is coming from on issues that are vital for the US and for global security,’ said a Western diplomat. ‘… This is the first time we have a written account of the Pakistani establishment’s core concerns ….’ Syed Talat Hussain, ‘Policy paper catches Obama’s attention’, *Dawn* (2 Dec. 2010): http://www.dawn.com/2010/12/02/policy-paper-catches-obamas-attention.html.
is now virtually an accepted fact (not that Pakistan is not doing the same in India). My personal take is that when the US leaves Afghanistan, which it will sooner or later, so will India, at least from the Pakhtun-dominated areas. Pakhtuns have a deep-rooted mistrust of Hindus and, therefore, India. I am in an infinitesimally small minority which is not too worried about Indians in Afghanistan – in the long run, though it is doing us considerable damage now.

The second part of this question regards future stability in Afghanistan: this is likely to remain elusive for many years to come. The US departure is likely to result in chaos, but after a few years the pendulum will return to its normal oscillation. Bosnia is the best example. The Taliban will return but not for long and will probably govern better than they did from 1996 onwards.

How do you view the future prospects of Pakistan and the hopes for its peaceful economic development and the cessation of terrorism?

Bleakly for the moment. When the US leaves the region, things could improve dramatically, depending on the political leadership. I wrote a piece on this for a Brookings project.55

Do you consider that the Kargil war permanently damaged Pakistan’s image in the eyes of Kashmiris who now seek freedom (azadi) rather than merger with Pakistan?

Very much so. During Kargil the Kashmiris were ecstatic but the tame surrender – which is laid solely at Nawaz Sharif’s door, erroneously and unjustly – was the final betrayal. The Kashmiri leadership still talks about a solution ‘acceptable to Pakistan’, more as a bargaining chip with India than a real demand. Those who have taken up the current cry of Azadi are the children who witnessed the terrorism by Indian state forces in the 1990s. They also witnessed terrorism by the foreign ‘freedom fighters’, including Pakistanis; these instances were fewer, but they also occurred. They don’t want us or the Indians.

Pakistan traditionally has been let down by the United States. Do you consider that the US is likely to prove any more reliable as an ally after 2010, bearing in mind the closeness of the India-US relationship?

The US will dump us like a used tissue the moment it is finished in Afghanistan. It needs India as a market, and to counterbalance the China threat as it perceives it. We are a liability. What is more, the US will need a scapegoat on whom to pin its inevitable defeat in Afghanistan: one guess as to who qualifies? We are in bed with a praying mantis; though some Americans might take umbrage and dispute as to who is doing what to whom!

Is the relationship between Pakistan and China a balance to the alliance with the United States or is it – particularly if the US deserts Pakistan as it did in the past – potentially the most important alliance?

China, in my view, is the future centre of the world; our children will probably live to see this happen. It is also Pakistan’s hope for the future. If the proposed rail link from Urumqi in China to Havelian in Pakistan, and on to Gwadar, is built, the flow of commerce from Central Asia and Xinkiang alone will suffice to bolster our economy. It will also make us more equal partners with China in what has been so far an unequal relationship.

documents/93284> ‘Boucher asked Karzai if he could assure Pakistan that the Bugtis were not supporting armed struggle and that India was not involved. Karzai said “yes”, though he doubted Pakistan would accept his assurances. Pakistan would continue to think India is involved. There is a lot of misinformation out there, Karzai commented … (Note: Halfway through the discussion of Bugti, Karzai signalled that the issue was too sensitive and asked that notetaking be suspended. End Note).’

Admiral Khalid Wasay

Tell us about your childhood and whether you migrated from India during Partition.

My forefathers came from Bihar, India, and I was born in Patna, Bihar, too. My father, Ghulam Abdul Wasay, was a lawyer by profession. I received my early education up to class 5 from missionary schools, the St Joseph Convent and St Francis Xavier High School for Boys, Patna. We were two brothers and one sister. My elder brother is also a retired Pakistani military officer – Brigadier Saraj Wasay. My father was known to be pro-Muslim and pro-Pakistan at the time of the British leaving India. He was sympathetic to Muslims in their cases in the law courts, helping to save them from legal punishments as a result of the riots. During Partition, riots spread to Patna as in some other parts of India, and hundreds of Muslims and Hindus were killed. My father received threats against his life from Hindu fundamentalists in his area. He was forced to migrate to East Pakistan in 1947. In the absence of our father, we could not make our way in India either; finally, some years after my father’s departure, the rest of our family, including myself, also migrated to East Pakistan, in 1954.

Did you grow up in an environment, where hatred for India was widespread?

I grew up in East Pakistan. There, in the years after Independence, the majority in general were against India. The people used to think of India as not a well-wisher towards Pakistan. However, this attitude or way of thinking started to change when the people of East Pakistan were told by the Bengali politicians that West Pakistan was not acting fairly towards them and that East Pakistan was being abused by the rulers of West Pakistan. This made a difference in the thinking of the common people and after that they started regarding West Pakistan, not India, with suspicion.

The people of East Pakistan began to feel closer to the Indians than to the West Pakistanis. The love and passion for the West Pakistanis was lost soon after the creation of Pakistan. Because of the erroneous policies of the rulers of Pakistan, we could not give a feeling of oneness to the people of East Pakistan. The Bengalis in general viewed the West Pakistanis as their colonial masters. However, the Urdu-speaking community – those who migrated to East Pakistan from India at the time of Partition – in East Pakistan always supported West Pakistan. This also affected me as well. I was not a Bengali but an immigrant in East Pakistan. I was not happy to see these differences between East and West Pakistan arise. My passion and love for Pakistan was stronger than loyalty to East or West. On top of that, my feelings regarding India were not friendly since I had witnessed the Hindu mindset against Muslims at the time of Partition.

What was the impact of the surrounding environment on you especially during the wars?

At the time of the 1965 war, the whole nation was one against India. The army and the common people were one, and no one was in favour of the Indian attitude regarding their occupation of Kashmir. Before and during the war, people showed their solidarity with the armed forces and gave them all kinds of support. This had a very powerful effect on the military of Pakistan as well. They felt honoured as soldiers fighting against the Indians. In short, there was complete harmony among all sections of society. The urge to fight India was dominant among the forces and the common people. And this affected the morale of the armed forces, which was very positive.

During the 1965 war, I was a lieutenant serving on a minesweeper, a ship named Mehmood. At this time, the Pakistani Navy was well equipped compared to the enemy. In some respects, the Pakistani Navy training and war tactics were superior to the Indian Navy. In the 1965 war, Pakistan proved its strength and domination; that is why, most of the time during the war the Indian Navy did not come out from their harbours. To feel safe and secure, they stayed in port. The Pakistani Navy was in the commanding
position because it had scores of modern vessels and more advanced weaponry. The Indian Navy had an aircraft carrier and command of the air but lacked submarines. Yet with all its strength, the Indian Navy did not set sail or attack the Pakistani Navy. The Indian Navy simply could not attack Pakistan because of the Ghazi submarine. They knew that the Ghazi would damage them. They could not defend themselves against Pakistan's top-notch submarine.

During the war, the Pakistan mass media were giving all the tributes to the Pakistani Army and Air Force most of the time in the coverage; these two forces were in the mainstream of the war, unlike the Pakistani Navy. So the Pakistani naval Chief, Admiral A. R. Khan, decided to go on the offensive in order to force the enemy to come out of their harbours. To bring the Indian Navy out into open seas, the Pakistani Navy air-attacked a port complex with a heavy bombardment. Even this heavy attack failed to bring the Indian naval forces out of their harbours. In short, the Pakistani Navy performed very well in the war. It successfully defended the waters of Pakistan against an enemy six times its size.

There was a strong reaction in India to this substandard performance. The chief of the Indian Navy was summoned before the Indian Parliament, the Lok Sabha, and cut a very sorry figure there. After the undesirable results of the 1965 war, the Indian Government took the needs of the navy very seriously. It decided to invest very heavily in the navy to improve its capabilities and power with modern technology. India modernized its navy in a short period of time; it improved the capability of the navy within just a few years by purchasing missile boats from the Soviet Union. Pakistan also tried to buy these missile boats from the Soviet Union but was unsuccessful.

The 1971 war was not a good experience for the Pakistani Navy. The Indians had been preparing the war since 1965; they had done everything they could to establish a modern and effective naval force. On the other hand, Pakistan had not paid serious attention to its navy after the 1965 war. In addition to this failure in preparations, there were also many loopholes in Pakistan's naval intelligence system during the 1971 war. Therefore the navy could not play its role as effectively as it had done in 1965. The Indian Navy attacked with missile boats which were really harmful. The Khyber was hit by these missile attacks and some of the other Pakistani ships were badly damaged. One of our submarines named Hangor attacked an Indian ship near Bombay (Mumbai) in 1971. However, the biggest loss to Pakistan was the Ghazi; she was sent to East Pakistan in 1971 but was destroyed when entering Indian waters. This really hurt the Pakistani Navy on the East Pakistan front during the war. On that front, the Pakistani Air Force, Army and Navy were less numerous, which handed the advantage to the Indian armed forces.

The motto of Field Marshal Ayub Khan, which was that 'the defence of East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan', was proved entirely incorrect in the 1971 war. The East Pakistani people were given an inferiority complex by such views and ways of governing. The head of the Pakistani Government, President General Yahya Khan, was mainly responsible for the fall of East Pakistan. It was one of the most humiliating military defeats in Muslim history. Yahya Khan's political failure led to the military defeat. It was his responsibility to invite the most popular Bengali leader, Mujibur Rahman, who had swept the 1970 elections in East Pakistan, to form a government. But he refused to allow him to do so. This refusal to respect the people's voice and vote cost us a disastrous military defeat and the loss of half of the country. General Yahya did not transfer the power to Mujibur as was his right. This turned the tables against Pakistan and the Pakistan armed forces.

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56 Brian Cloughley suggests more accurately that after the Pakistani Navy attacked a radar station at the Indian coastal town of Dwarka, about 300 miles south of Karachi, the Indian Navy mounted patrols of the region, but there were no engagements.

57 Brian Cloughley comments that the submarine PNS Ghazi was sunk by depth charges from the Indian destroyer INS Rajput in the Bay of Bengal. The Pakistani submarine PNS Hangor torpedoed the destroyer INS Kukri in the Arabian Sea, sinking it with the loss of 194 all ranks.

58 The Hamoodur Rehman Commission Report subsequently revealed that the GHQ of the Pakistan Army had done nothing to underpin its own strategic thinking with preparedness.
Mujibur Rahman was a very good communicator and agitator. He knew the hearts and minds of the Bengali people. When he realized that he would not be given the genuine right to rule, he took the road of separation from Pakistan. In my opinion, not transferring power to the democratic forces was the root cause of the fall of Dhaka. But Mujibur was no good as an administrator. If he had been given the opportunity to form the government at the time, it would have collapsed within six months because of his own mistakes. But Pakistan’s rulers did not manage his weaknesses intelligently. This unjust war cost Pakistan dearly. This made the majority turn against West Pakistan and the Pakistani armed forces as their enemies. It also provided the opportunity for India first to interfere and later to send its army to East Pakistan. The Indians used their opening very cleverly and also incited hatred against Pakistan and the Pakistani Army in East Pakistan. However, I must say that it was not only India’s help and support which created Bangladesh; it was our rulers’ mistakes and policies. We did not stand by democracy there. The voice of the Bengali people was not heard by the Pakistani rulers. That is why, even without Indian assistance, East Pakistan would have been separated from West Pakistan.

Are there any memories from the war which are etched on your memory?

On 3 December 1971, the commissioning parade was held in the Naval Academy at Monora Island, in Karachi. There were a large number of military officials and civilian guests who sat to witness the passing-out parade in which their relatives were to receive commissions in the Pakistani Navy. As the parade was ready to start, three Indian fighter planes strafed the parade ground; planes were firing bullets all over the place. After some time, a few civilians ran to take shelter in a nearby building, but the entire parade stood still. There was no fear. I was a lieutenant in the Naval Academy and was highly impressed to see the calm of the common people in the face of an Indian air attack.

Have you had any chance to interact with soldiers from the other side?

I did not interact with the Indian soldiers during my service. However, I went to India twice as a retired Pakistani Navy officer in 2004 and 2008. My trip to India provided me an opportunity to interact with many former Indian military officials. I met some retired senior officers of the Indian Army and Navy there. I think the retired military persons from both sides tend to think alike. The majority of retired military officials on the Indian side are all out for peace with us. They, ‘like us’, believe that war does not solve problems; on the contrary, it creates new problems. The wars between India and Pakistan have had hurt the economy of both sides, too.

What is the core issue between the two countries?

The core issue is Kashmir. Pakistan has invested 63 years in Kashmir. Pakistan’s rivers come from there. Pakistan drinks Kashmiri water. Historically, culturally, religiously and geographically Kashmir is naturally close to Pakistan. It is difficult to visualize Kashmir without Pakistan. That is why, for us, it is next to impossible to stop thinking about Kashmir. What about the rivers which are in Kashmir? Pakistan needs water to live, to drink and to cultivate. No water means no life, and that is why Kashmir is the lifeline for Pakistan. But Kashmir is not that valuable for India. They may like to occupy Kashmir in order to massage their ego or to demonstrate that they are a powerful South Asian power. Moreover, while the Kashmir issue may be a real or big issue between the two armies and the two governments, it may not be between the people of the two countries. That is why, I think, in order to have a stable and strong friendly relationship between these two atomic neighbours, the solution of the Kashmir problem is a must.

The aim must be to unlock the 63 years of madness between the two countries, two nations and two armies. However, I am afraid that India will not accept any political solution for Kashmir. They think of themselves as powerful, and that is why the majority of Indians do not want any concession to Pakistan on the dispute over Kashmir. They want Pakistan to quit Kashmir. Although they are ready for a dialogue with Pakistan on
Kashmir, deep down they don’t mean anything by this. They have been using ‘dialogue’ as a delaying tactic and wasting the time of Pakistan for the last 63 years.

The proof of my argument is obvious. The Indians have not even accepted the Musharraf formula on Kashmir. In the formula, General Musharraf was willing to give up Indian-occupied Kashmir. He was ready to accept the status quo on Kashmir for peace between the two countries. But the Indians did not give General Musharraf any concessions to solve the dispute over Kashmir. I think the Indian attitude on Kashmir is a barrier to peace in the region. I would like to add that, if India will not resolve the issue or come up with the will to resolve it according to the UN resolutions, the South Asian region is unlikely to experience harmony. In short, the road to tranquility goes via Kashmir, and it is India which is in the driving seat. So India has to choose between the path of peace or conflict.

How do you feel about the wars fought between the two countries?

I feel the wars between Pakistan and India were unnecessary and could have been avoided. The problem with Pakistan is that it is a weak democracy. Power in Pakistan has been long been dominated by the army. The army has been playing an important role even in the domestic politics of the country as well as dominating its foreign policies. In the rest of the civilized world, the military is under the complete and effective control of the civilian government. The reverse is true in Pakistan. Had the military been under civilian control in Pakistan, the political and other problems between Pakistan and India might have been solved through dialogue rather than by guns. And time has proved that guns have failed to bring peace or solve the disputes between Pakistan and India.

Do you think that India is trying to destabilize Pakistan?

In my view, the Indians are trying to destabilize Pakistan. Indian hands are involved in terrorist activities in Pakistan. The Indians are also interfering in Balochistan. The Indians keep an eye on the Pakistani nuclear assets. The Americans are also supporting India in terms of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. The Pakistan Government should fully open its eyes on this issue. Unfortunately, Pakistan is currently lacking effective political leadership. Even Nawaz Sharif is not a leader who has the calibre to help his country in the present unattractive circumstances. Only a stronger and braver leadership will be able to overcome such problems and conspiracies of the enemy.

What is your message, for India’s political class, and Indian society as a whole?

If India is to play a big role it has to act big. If India is just into tit for tat, then we will get nowhere. India must realize that peace is not just in the interest of Pakistan. South Asia needs peace to develop and pay attention to the problems of one-sixth of the world’s population that lives in this area. Even India cannot progress if Pakistan remains unstable and lives under the shadows of terrorism. Fundamentalism and terrorism have no borders. A weak and internally unstable Pakistan will remain dangerous for India. India must understand this with its heart and soul.

Indian should drop its arrogance towards Pakistan; this attitude will not take India far along the road to prosperity. India needs stable and healthily progressing neighbours. It should realize that solving the outstanding disputes with Pakistan is in her interest. India should come forward with an open heart and mind. What is needed is the will to solve the problems in order to make the region a home of peace and prosperity.

59 It is unclear what the interviewee means here. If he means that specific Pakistan nuclear secrets are divulged by the US to India, there is no evidence of this. If, alternatively, he is alluding to the proposed US–Pakistan partnership, which asserts civilian over military control of nuclear ‘assets’, then this could be viewed as being in India’s interests. See W. Pal Sidhu, ‘India could gain from US–Pakistan nuke deal’ (8 Apr. 2010): http://www.livemint.com/2010/04/08231806/India-could-gain-from-USPakis.html?id=1
The Indian mindset must think about the general good and a ‘win win’ outcome for the whole region. India’s political class needs to come up with a solution to resolve the Kashmir problem with Pakistan in the larger interest of South Asia. It will entail some sacrifices by the Indians. I am convinced that it would be worth doing. The Indian masses should also pressurize their government for a solution in Kashmir. In the meantime they should step up people-centred cooperative ventures in various fields.

What do you think is the way forward and how would you perceive the future of the two countries?

It is difficult to guess what will be the position in forty or fifty years. It depends on many factors, particularly whether India will predominate in Afghanistan after the American retreat, and the solution of the Kashmir problem can make the difference, too. As for Pakistan, no change is possible in the political field unless we get rid of feudalism. If we do not kill off feudalism, we will be led by third-rate leaders and ex-crooks as at present. However, in order to finish off terrorism, Pakistan must abandon the militants once and for all, regardless of the Kashmir issue.

Brigadier Muhammad Yousaf

Why did you join the army of Pakistan?

The great performance of the Pakistani armed forces against the Indian Army during the 1965 war led me to join the army. It gave a new meaning to the people and the army of Pakistan. From the Pakistani side, it was a war fought together by the armed forces and the nation to shield the homeland. The army safeguarded the country according to the nation’s expectations. The 1965 war glorified the record of the armed forces of Pakistan and enhanced its standing among the youth of the time. As a teenager, I was both impressed and stimulated by the 1965 war experience. The Pakistani Army not only watched over country against India but its performance increased the national self-confidence and our people’s pride in being Pakistanis. I was determined to join the army in order to protect my country and fight the Indians for the nation and the superiority of Islam.

What was your experience in the 1971 war?

As a young artillery captain, I was posted at the Baidyian Sector near Lahore. I was stationed there from November 1971 to August 1972. I was part of the war and battles after war too. General Lodhi was our brigade commander, and during the war we successfully advanced into India up to 5 miles from Baidyian from the Pakistani side of the border. We conquered the Indian villages of Chinabedijan and Kharla House. This was a big success.

From the beginning of my career, I knew that India did not want to see a prosperous and developed Muslim Pakistan; the enemy of Pakistan has never wished to see us progressing in peace. From the creation of Pakistan until the present, India has been afraid of Pakistan as a strong and independent Muslim state.

During the war, I was highly motivated at the border. I was using my guns to hurt the enemy to the utmost. While we were advancing towards our targets on the Indian side of the border a shell fired by the enemy exploded just a few yards away from me and took the life of a captain in our army. I saw death at close quarters. On this and other occasions I smelt death near by me but nothing could scare me. I knew that our war was a jihad against evil. And I am duty-bound to fight for my belief and country.

How do you define jihad?

It is duty of every Muslim. It is a part of the great religion of Islam. In short, jihad is fighting for a superior cause to please Allah, our creator. Jihad is fighting selflessly against evil; it is also sacrificing life for justice and truth. I am convinced that we as Muslims cannot win a war if jihad enthusiasm
Muhammad Siddiq-ur-Rehman, a Bengali. Late at night around 1 to 2 a.m., he used to bring milk for me. It showed that deep down Bangladesh did not have any hatred against the Pakistani Army but, at that time, the course of the Pakistani leadership and the inability to resolve the political crisis, forced them to turn against Pakistan. Bangladesh was our political failure, not an Indian success. We lost to India because of not holding firm to the faith and jihad.

Is inculcating the concept of jihad part of the training of the Pakistani Army?

Yes. Jihad is part of the Pakistani armed forces since they are serving an Islamic state. Pakistan is based on the ‘two nations’ theory. Obviously, Muslims and Hindus are two nations with different customs, cultures and ways of thinking. Pakistan came into being as an Islamic state for the Muslims of the subcontinent, and the Pakistani Army also believes in the two nations theory. Our beliefs and ways of life are different. The Pakistani Army also reflects that mindset. It can never accept India as a superior country. The Pakistani Army will never give up against India. If not superior, we are at least equal to them. We will always fight India if it looks down upon us as inferiors. As Muslims, it is our duty to defend ourselves and be prepared for war at any time. During our training at one of the most prestigious military academies of Pakistan, we were taught a Qur’anic verse (Qur’an 8:60): ‘Keep your horses ready to strike terror into the hearts of the enemies of Allah and yours.’

Is difference in religion the cause of the conflict between the two nations?

By the grace of God, we are Muslims. Islam is a religion of peace; it teaches us the lessons of tolerance and peace. It would be wrong to say that religion is the bone of contention between India and Pakistan. It is obvious that the core issue is Kashmir. For the last 63 years, India has refused the fundamental right of self-determination of the Kashmiri Muslims. India has
been ruling them by force against their wishes. According to one estimate, there are 700,000 Indian troops stationed in occupied Kashmir. What is the Indian Army doing in Kashmir? India has no respect for the basic rights of the people of Kashmir nor for the UN resolution of 1949, which asked India to conduct a plebiscite to ascertain the Kashmiris’ willingness to join India or Pakistan. The then Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, promised a plebiscite for the Kashmir people and stated: ‘India does not believe in a forced marriage.’ But, to resolve the issue, India has not done anything yet.

The key to peace is in India’s hands. They are not on the side of justice and self-determination. On the contrary, Pakistan has been trying to solve the issue in order to have stability and peace in the region. During the war between India and China in 1962, Pakistan was pushed by China to attack Kashmir to capture it. But Pakistan assured the Americans and the British through President General Ayub Khan that Pakistan would not attack India. Pakistan gave a written assurance during the India–China war that it would not harass India. After the end of the war in 1963, India’s foreign minister visited Pakistan to negotiate on the Kashmir issue, but it was purely a deceptive move by India. Time has proved that India never wanted to get to the bottom of the core issue to have peace between the two nations. In fact, the Indian occupation of Kashmir shows they are against Pakistan and the Muslims of the area.

India’s aspiration to dominate Pakistan is the biggest problem. We must thank Allah that during the Afghan war, Pakistan wisely established its atomic programme. And had there been no atom bomb in Pakistan, India would have attacked us long, long ago.

What is and should the future relationship between the two countries?

One Muslim is equal to twenty Hindus. Our history has proven that we are superior to them. To predominate over Pakistan or the Muslims would be daydreaming by the Indians. Of course, we have been facing some problems within our country but they are due to a lack of leadership and the lack of a true Islamic character. As a country and nation, we are stronger than India. Our willingness to undergo martyrdom makes us superior, and no army on earth can defeat us if we are ready to accept shahadat.

I would also like to add that the Pakistani Army will never give up against its principles. The Pakistani Army will fight always against every Indian plan conceived to oppose Pakistan; we will never give up against them. As I said before, Islam believes in peace and harmony. We do not believe in fighting without reason. The latest regional situation is showing that India and Israel are working against Pakistan. Why does India have eight consulates in Afghanistan near the borders of Pakistan? Pakistan has hosted 3.5 million Afghan refugees for decades, but India is exploiting the Uzbek-dominated Northern Alliance government in Afghanistan,62 which is hostile to Pakistan. India is involved in the recent terrorist activities in Pakistan.

The solution of the problem is very simple. India and Pakistan have to make up their minds to resolve the problems left by the British in 1947 on the basis of justice and not by force. Force can never resolve things. India must respect the fundamental rights of the Kashmiri people. The Kashmir issue can be solved by peaceful negotiations. Peace is equally beneficial for both countries. The two nations have many common problems and difficulties, such as poverty, unemployment and illiteracy. The peaceful settlement of the disputes between the two countries is in everyone’s interest. Now, the ball is in India’s court. India has to stand by justice and the right of self-determination of the people of Kashmir. Otherwise, peace for the subcontinent will be just a daydream.

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62 Rather, the Tajik- and Uzbek-dominated government of President Karzai in Afghanistan. The Tajiks are more numerous than the Uzbeks, but the largest group, the Pakhtuns, are largely unrepresented.
Conclusion

[I]n so far as the peaceful management of disputes and progress towards the termination of the rivalry are concerned, the lessons learned by both sides have been largely dysfunctional. Experiential learning that has occurred during the course of the rivalry most often has reinforced behaviour that has encouraged the recurrence of crises and wars.¹

The United States routinely produces National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on most countries in the world. But it also needs NIEs that try to replicate India’s NIE of Pakistan and vice versa. Although states often realize that they need to see the world through their adversary’s eyes, it remains hard for them to grasp that others live in very different perceptual worlds.²

In strategic thinking about the relationship between India and Pakistan, one of the biggest worries has always been that both countries do not know where the other’s red lines lie when it comes to the use of nuclear weapons. Even more worrying, they think they do. That thinking probably applies too to the United States and Pakistan – that they don’t know where each other’s red lines lie – either in terms of Washington’s ability to absorb another attack, or in Pakistan’s ability to withstand the US reaction. You


would have to hope that they know they don’t know, and that the ‘retribution plan’, if it still exists, never has to be put into practice.5

The fascinating series of interviews with ex-military figures published in this book reflect some of the deep-seated differences and entrenched prejudices that bedevil relations between India and Pakistan and which at times have threatened to engulf the rest of the Indian subcontinent. There are some voices on both sides which are inclined to see an optimistic outcome as not only desirable but inevitable, given the fact that both India and Pakistan are nuclear weapons states and that full-scale war – as opposed to a border skirmish – is now unthinkable between the two powers because of the dangers of mutually assured destruction. Some voices in India argue, foolishly, that India – unlike Pakistan – could survive a nuclear attack because it is a so much larger country.

The reality is that because there are such large Indian population centres within the range of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons the damage would still be unacceptably high. In June 2002, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld provided the Indian and Pakistan leadership with detailed US estimates of the likely consequence of a nuclear war, which would result in between 9 and 12 million deaths. According to the reports from Rumsfeld’s assistants, neither the Indian nor the Pakistan leadership displayed much interest in these calculations. The competition in risk-taking in crisis situations means that leaders often downplay the fear of nuclear catastrophe, making it hard for later analysts to judge their level of concern.4

The peace optimists / nuclear pessimists on either side are in a minority among the interviewees. For the greater part, the Indian ex-military consider that the problem is Pakistan. Pakistan cannot be trusted; it pursues a covert proxy war while denying that it does so; if the Pakistan military is not overtly jihadist in ideology, it is prepared to develop deep ties with Islamist militants who are deployed at will in Afghanistan and Kashmir. No concessions should be made either to ‘terrorism’ or to the ‘terrorist state’ which encourages militancy on this scale.6 Indian-occupied Kashmir is an integral part of India and any further Pakistani transgressions across the Line of Control in the manner of Kargil in 1999 should be repulsed and Pakistan ‘taught a lesson’. Only once the ‘lesson’ is properly learnt can normal relations with Pakistan resume, but there can be no settlement of Kashmir which involves a transfer of territory or population. For many in India before the Mumbai attacks of 2008, the Kargil conflict was ‘India’s Pearl Harbor’. As Prime Minister Vajpayee expressed it, at Lahore in February 1999, ‘we shook hands like friends … [but then] we were stabbed in the back’.6 The failure of the Pakistan authorities to arrest and imprison those responsible for the Mumbai attacks of 2008 – 11/26 is India’s 9/11 or its ‘real’ Pearl Harbor – has served only to prolong and deepen the suspicion that for the foreseeable future there is nothing to be gained by negotiations with Pakistan.

For their part, the views of the Pakistan ex-military, by and large, are the mirror image of the majority Indian viewpoint. Here the story is Kashmir, Kashmir, Kashmir. If India had not shown such malevolence towards Pakistan from the time of Partition, then normal relations would have been possible. But the unjust, undemocratic and ultimately self-defeating Indian occupation of Jammu and Kashmir since 1948 without holding

5 ‘Why hasn’t Pakistan been declared a terrorist state?’ President Obama was asked by a female student on his visit to India in November 2010. ‘It may be surprising, but I am absolutely convinced that the country which has the biggest stake in Pakistan’s success is India,’ he replied. ‘We will work with the Pakistan government to eradicate extremism which is a cancer that can engulf the country. We think that the Pakistan government understands the potential threat that exists within the borders,’ Mr Obama said. Jawed Naqvi, ‘Be a good neighbour, Obama tells India’, Dawn (8 Nov. 2010): <http://public.dawn.com/2010/11/08/be-a-good-neighbour-obama-tells-india-2.html>


4 Jervis, ‘Kargil, Deterrence and international relations theory’, 390 n. 27.
the plebiscite that was demanded by the United Nations and conceded on several occasions publicly by Nehru has poisoned the relationship. Only if the Kashmir dispute can be ‘settled’ and the right of self-determination granted to the Kashmiri people7 – exactly how is left unsaid for the most part – will the establishment of a new order in South Asia be possible.

Pakistan’s problem is that its capacity to determine the outcome of the Kashmir dispute has weakened over time, and India as the more powerful rival has no interest in offering concessions. Worse still, the Kargil ‘misadventure’ (as India calls it), played into India’s hands in opening up the possibility of a mutually beneficial relationship with the United States – the US–India civil nuclear partnership of 2005 – and in securing the joint US–Pakistan statement of 5 July 1999 on the ‘sanctity’ of the Line of Control in Kashmir which had to be ‘respected’ by both parties in accordance with their 1972 Simla Accord.8

A minority of those interviewed disavowed this polarized viewpoint and argued the necessity of more frequent and more numerous ‘people-to-people’ contacts, Track Two diplomacy and other initiatives seeking to bring forward a consensus at a much earlier date than seemed realistic to the majority. Yet no one interviewed seemed to consider that the normalization of India–Pakistan relations and a genuine settlement for Kashmir were likely to be easy to achieve without outside mediation, which India – holding firm to its strict interpretation of the Simla treaty of 19729 – has always rejected in favour of bilateral discussions between the two states. One or two interviewees correctly noted that India and Pakistan had come close to an agreement in 2007, though it was by no means clear then – or even now – that the agreement could have been ‘sold’ to Indian, Pakistani and Kashmiri public opinion (Appendix I).

Nor was there a consensus on how urgent the need for a settlement is. Most of the ex-military who were interviewed seem to be of the opinion that a degree of nuclear deterrence has been achieved in South Asia, that this is a permanent state of affairs – in the sense that denuclearization is not likely to take place in the foreseeable future, if ever – and that it tends to prevent the outbreak of conventional war rather than to encourage it. Commentators from outside the Indian subcontinent are divided on the sustainability and reliability of the nuclear deterrence that has been achieved. Is it robust enough to prevent the accidental triggering of a nuclear war? The fact that it has not yet happened does not prove that in a combination of largely unforeseen circumstances it might not yet happen.10

There is strong evidence that in recent years Pakistan has been expanding its nuclear arsenal faster than any other country in the world, from about 60 weapons in 2006 to about 110 in 2011, a development which threatens a new arms race in the subcontinent.11

An extraordinary meeting held at New Delhi over three days in January 2010, with representatives from both India and Pakistan, produced a final

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9 However, the Simla Accord does not specifically exclude third-party mediation. It states only that ‘the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them’. Mediation is excluded, therefore, because India does not agree to it and there is not mutual agreement between the parties.


Conclusion

as a step towards building confidence and goodwill. There should be a strengthening of democratic institutions – it is not clear whether this is intended to apply to both India- and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, but it is important to apply the principle in both areas – and an independent tribunal should be established to ensure the application of Article 370 for Indian-administered Kashmir. Kashmiris should be allowed to live and work in Pakistan if they so wish. The interests of the minorities in Jammu and Kashmir should be protected and the opinions and aspirations of people in all the areas of Kashmir should be considered when solutions to the conflict are being worked out.

The national and ethnic question is regarded as ‘important and extremely sensitive ... in South Asia’, and the Road Map towards Peace argues that attempts should made in both India and Pakistan to ‘find solutions to conflicts around these questions, involving all parties in the dispute’. There needs to be a better understanding of the issues and the building of a new consensus through the interaction of academics and members of civil society. Above all, a public ‘space for national and other minorities’ needs to be created ‘in all parts of India and Pakistan’.

So, to the question ‘what sort of Kashmir do we want?’, we have a much broader answer in the sense of ‘this is the sort of South Asia that we want’. It should be a region which seriously seeks to reverse the competitive arms race, which could become a nuclear-free zone, which addresses xenophobic and jingoistic antagonistic national identities and which seeks instead to build a future based on trust for all the people. Whether the statement on terrorism is sufficiently robust to ensure that violent minority groups are no longer in a position to hold to ransom the whole process of regularizing relations is a matter of opinion.  


13 ‘a. Joint management of water resources. b. Revisit the Indus Waters Treaty in the light of new factors like climate change and its implications based on the principles of equitable sharing rather than division of waters. c. Ways need to be explored to optimize use and distribution of waters and energy for benefit of the people of both countries.’ It will be contested by India because Clause 11 of the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 appears to rule out discussion of water issues in other forums for negotiations between India and Pakistan apart from the meetings of the Indus Waters Treaty Commissioners.

14 However, in March 2011 the Commission on Centre–State relations recommended against the review of the continuation of the AFSPA in Jammu and Kashmir because of continuing infiltration across the LoC: Syed Junaid Hashmi, ‘No Review of AFSPA in J&K’, Countercurrents.org (14 Mar. 2011): http://www.countercurrents.org/hashmi140311.htm

15 ‘a. Terrorism. Both countries should work together to counter terrorism and fundamentalism which are common challenges. b. Set up joint mechanisms, and share intelligence and related information within the framework of the 1987 SAARC convention on combating terrorism.’
India had its ‘Arundhati Roy moment’ on 24 October 2010 when the famous author declared that Kashmir ‘has never been an integral part of India’. It is a historical fact, she added. By describing the pro-freedom leaders in the valley as separatists, India in a sense has already acknowledged that secession has taken place. ‘Arundhati Roy spoke to Kashmiris and felt their heartbeat before expressing her opinion’, one commentator writes. ‘By attacking her one is only trying to silence the truth. Isn’t it better to face the truth and seek a solution than live in a myth and pay heavily in terms of human lives and mounting costs?’

J. N. Dixit noted that Pakistan has a ‘geo-economic concern’ that the headwaters of practically all the waters flowing into Pakistan are in Jammu and Kashmir. ‘The Pakistani worry, therefore,’ Dixit recognized, ‘is that if Jammu and Kashmir remains under the control of India, Pakistan can be held hostage by India cutting off the water supply.’ The fact of the matter, Dixit contended, ‘is that despite there having been four wars with Pakistan, India never thought of taking such action.’ Here the former Indian national security adviser was incorrectly informed, for on 1 April 1948 India did cut off part of the water supply to Pakistan and it was not...


Dixit, India-Pakistan in War and Peace, 317.
resumed until 4 May that year.\textsuperscript{22} The fear of an interruption in the water supply is deeply rooted in the Pakistan psyche. Ayub Khan describes a meeting with Prime Minister Feroz Khan Noon and three former prime ministers on 1 June 1958 at which ‘they asked me what we should do about Kashmir and [the] stoppage of canal waters by India.’\textsuperscript{23} Brigadier – later General and President – Pervez Musharraf noted in his 1990 thesis at the Royal College of Defence Studies, London, that ‘once the Kashmir issue is resolved the water dispute will automatically cease to exist because the headwaters of all the rivers lie in Kashmir.’\textsuperscript{24} 

Brigadier Musharraf’s 1990 thesis is of considerable interest to scholars of the subject of the India–Pakistan conflict, not least because he argued that the ‘peace dividend’ for the socio-economic advancement of the poor, unhealthy and uneducated of the two countries was long overdue and that the arms race – including the nuclear arms race – should be averted. As was demonstrated in the introduction, few positive trends are discernible in the twenty years since this argument was made in favour of détente in South Asia, while the arms race has been confirmed. Musharraf stressed the positive opportunities for cooperation presented by SAARC, the regional body for South Asia, but argued that its potential was vitiated by India’s emphasis on bilateral negotiations. India, he argued, ‘insists on “bilateralism” in resolving disputes where [it] can obviously pressurise any of the other regional states into submission to its dictates. SAARC allows unification of the voices of the six other member countries and therefore goes against Indian interests.’

J. N. Dixit contended that much of the anxiety in Pakistan was ‘rooted in misconceptions about potential Indian hegemonism.’\textsuperscript{25} He argued that for a number of Pakistan’s ‘strategic thinkers of various hues’ the Indian republic was too vast and that tensions would be inevitable in the subcontinent until it was broken up into a number of smaller states which would ‘create a geo-strategic equilibrium in South Asia from the point of view of India’s smaller neighbours.’ Dixit justified an uncompromising stance on Jammu and Kashmir on the grounds that there were ‘long-term and critical implications for the unity, stability and territorial integrity of India.’ The union risked dissolution as a result of the pressure of fissiparous ethnic, linguistic and regional forces.\textsuperscript{26} In a quotation cited by Musharraf in his 1990 thesis, the doyen of India’s strategic affairs community, Dr K.  

\textsuperscript{22} This affected the water supply to the Central Bari Doab Canal System, the Dipalpur Canal System and the Bahawalpur Doab Canal System. At the time of Partition, there had been a ‘standstill agreement’ between the two Punjabs – East and West – for maintaining the pre-Partition allocation of water for the Upper Bari Doab Canal (UBDC) and the Dipalpur canal serving Pakistan. It was valid until 31 March 1948. Since Pakistan had failed to renegotiate or renew the agreement, East Punjab stopped the supply of water to these canals on 1 April 1948, with the result that the water supply to Lahore was cut off. On 4 May 1948, a new agreement was signed in which Pakistan agreed to pay for water it received through these two canals. The Tribune online (4 Jan. 2009): http://www.tribuneindia.com/2009/20090105/main7.htm.


\textsuperscript{24} Pervez Musharraf, ‘The Arms Race in the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent Conflicts with the Pressing Requirements of Socio-Economic Development. What are its Causes and Implications? Is there a Remedy?’ (Royal College of Defence Studies, UK, 1990). The assumption of this remark was presumably that the Kashmir issue would be settled in Pakistan’s interests.

\textsuperscript{25} Dixit, \textit{India-Pakistan in War and Peace}, 399.

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 362, 390. Ibid., 309: ‘India cannot allow any part of its territory and any of its peoples to be alienated from the Indian republic on the basis of religious affiliation. Such an eventuality would destroy the basic terms of reference on which independent India came into existence, the terms of reference of a pluralistic, multi-religious, multi-lingual, national territorial identity.’ Ibid., 312: India ‘had to persuade various governments about the legitimacy of [its] stand and inform them about the dangers of ethno-religious fragmentation that would affect the nations of South Asia if Kashmir were allowed to secede.’ Ibid., 314–5: ‘At the most fundamental level, the issue of Jammu and Kashmir is no longer a legal or territorial dispute for both India and Pakistan. The issue is now a question of the ideological basis of their respective national identities. For Pakistan, acquiring Kashmir will be a revived confirmation of the two-nation[s] theory. For India, alienation of any portion of Jammu and Kashmir because of its being a Muslim majority-area will be a denial of the secular, pluralist terms of reference of India’s national identity.’
Subrahmanyam, stated in 1988: ‘We need to exercise the nuclear option absolutely. If we don’t, India will not be a united country in 15 years.’

Commenting on the impending visit of President Obama to India in November 2010, Dr Subrahmanyam stated that the twin challenges were from jihadism and from ‘Chinese one-party authoritarianism which denies pluralism’. The ‘only way of effectively countering China’s authoritarianism’, Subrahmanyam asserted, ‘is to expose the Chinese population to democracy in a more and more intensified manner.’ He argued that in military terms, the US can still maintain its lead for some time to come. But the US can be number one only if it has its lead technologically and organizationally. And this cannot be done unless the US has a partner, which is equal in population with China, is democratic, pluralistic, shares the same values as the US, and with which the US already has a population to population relationship. Indians contribute to American growth and American technology and American organisational skills. And therefore, Obama does not have much of an option but to make India its leading partner.

Most of the things that have happened to the United States, Subrahmanyam mused, ‘are a kind of nemesis’. They allied with Pakistan to create jihadism …. And … jihadism has blown up on them …. The Pakistanis got the derivative of nuclear weapons, which was terrorism. And they are using the derivative terrorism not only against US but against the US, UK and Europe …. Deterrent power gets them the shield. And therefore, they are able to use terrorism as an instrument of state policy …. They’re playing with a venomous snake. And there is no doubt about it that one of these days, the snake is going to bite them. And the Pakistanis are going to pay a high price, when the various jihadi organizations are going to turn on the Pakistani state and the Pakistani army. One of them has [done so] already – the Pakistani Taliban. But it is only a question of time when others also do [so].

President Obama himself has called Pakistan ‘a state afflicted with a cancer’. Here lies the standard Indian accusation against Pakistan since 9/11. As J. N. Dixit observed: ‘India asserts that [it is] cross-border terrorism and not Jammu and Kashmir which is the central issue. India is disappointed that the US has not designated [the] Government of Pakistan as

He is called ‘India’s leading strategic analyst’ in Arvind Gupta (ed.), India in a Changing Global Nuclear Order (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2009), 8. In his introduction to this book, Subrahmanyam states: ‘the US assured Pakistan that there would be no intervention in Pakistan’s nuclear programme in 1982; the US Administration looking away from Chinese proliferation to Pakistan; and the US intelligence permitting Dr. A. Q. Khan’s proliferation to Iran and North Korea – all fall into a pattern of US permissiveness to Pakistan’s nuclear weapon acquisition’ (ibid. 16). There has been no proven proliferation by Khan’s network to Iran.

28 ‘Obama does not have much of an option but to make India its leading partner.’ Interview of Dr. K. Subrahmanyam with Shekhar Gupta (Nov. 2010): http://www.defenceforum.in/forum/showthread.php?t=15670&page=1. ‘US President Barack Obama has reportedly told President Asif Ali Zardari through his National Security Adviser, retired Marine General James L. Jones, and CIA Director Leon Panetta [on 19 May 2010] that the cancer of terrorism is in Pakistan and emanating from that country’ (29 Sept. 2010): http://sify.com/news/cancer-of-terrorism-is-in-pakistan-obama-tells-zardari-through-his-nsa-news-international-kj3mRqihhij.html. Bob Woodward, Obama: “We need to make clear to people that the cancer is in Pakistan,” Washington Post (29 Sept. 2010): http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-yn/content/article/2010/09/28/AR2010092805092.html. According to Woodward, Obama had declared during an Oval Office meeting on 25 Nov. 2009 that ‘We need to make clear to people that the cancer is in Pakistan.’ The reason to create a secure, self-governing Afghanistan, he said, was ‘so the cancer doesn’t spread there.’ According to Woodward, the Obama administration had a ‘retribution’ plan, one of the most sensitive and secretive of all military contingencies. The plan called for bombing about 150 identified terrorist camps in a brutal, punishing attack inside Pakistan. What would be the consequences of such an attack? One commentator suggests that bombing 150 sites in Pakistan would face colossal retribution towards the US. Here are some possible scenarios. 1) Pakistan would immediately terminate the NATO supply routes, choking the war in Afghanistan. 2) All overflights of US planes and drones would be stopped. 3) The US would be evicted from the air bases on Pakistani territory. 4) The civilian government that resists a forceful response to the US would not be able to stand. 5) Without a reasonably secure supply route, the US would then have to end the war in Afghanistan. 6) Pakistan would possibly end cooperation in the ‘war on terror’. 7) In the worst-case scenario, the US bases in the vicinity could be targeted. http://rupecnews.com/2010/09/27/pakistan-strategic-response-to-us-retribution-plan-to-bomb-150-sites-in-pakistan/.
The conclusion is that the United States will only do so in the case of a direct attack on its homeland emanating from a terrorist entity operating from within Pakistan. Short of this, the cooperation of Pakistan is too useful to the United States for substantive geo-strategic and operational reasons. Prior to his visit to India, President Obama stressed that the United States had had taken every opportunity to make it clear to Pakistan that ‘confronting violent extremism of all sorts is in its own interests and in the interest of regional stability.’ The opening remarks on his visit to India were delivered symbolically in front of the Taj Mahal Hotel, Mumbai, the location of the murderous attacks on 26/11. And in his speech at the Indian Parliament he recalled the attack there in December 2001, noting that ‘we will continue to insist to Pakistan’s leaders that terrorist safe-havens within their borders are unacceptable, and that the terrorists behind the Mumbai attacks be brought to justice. We must also recognize that all of us have an interest in both an Afghanistan and a Pakistan that is stable, prosperous and democratic – and none more so than India.’

In an interview conducted on 5 November 2010, the former ambassador of Nepal to the United Nations and the UK, Murari Raj Sharma, provided the viewpoint of a distinguished public servant of one of South Asia’s smaller states. ‘We can’t forget the Kashmir issue,’ he accepted. ‘Kashmir is the key issue between the two countries … Kashmir involves religion, geography, culture, historical evidence on both sides, and involves the United Kingdom [in origin].’ In Ambassador Sharma’s view, however, the Kashmir conflict should not be allowed to stand in the way of more positive relations between India and Pakistan. He recalls that Chairman Mao told the Americans that the Taiwan issue could be resolved in 100 years if you are prepared to work with us. ‘This kind of confidence is non-existent in Islamabad.’ Anticipating President Obama’s comments on gradualism in India, he stated: ‘they could put the Kashmir issue on the back burner for ten or twenty years … they have not been able to resolve their own internal contradictions…’ ‘As long as Pakistan is not at peace with itself’, the ambassador argues, there can be no positive change (see

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29 Dixit, India-Pakistan in War and Peace, 422.

30 Ibid., 423.


32 Remarks of President Barack Obama – As Prepared for Delivery. Address to a Joint Session of the Indian Parliament. New Delhi, India, Monday, 8 Nov. 2010.


34 Mao told Nixon: ‘We can do without them [Taiwanese] for the time being, and let it come after 100 years … Why such great haste? … This issue [Taiwan] is not an important one.’ Recorded by Henry Kissinger in his White House Years, 1062. Winston Lord confirms the conversation. ‘Actually, in the Mao–Nixon meeting, which of course I was in, Mao did say, about Taiwan, “We can wait a hundred years on this.” So they understood that they had to make concessions. What we basically did in the Shanghai Communiqué and what we did for years was to kick the Taiwan issue down the road, so we could get on with the anti-Soviet hegemony issues and all the other issues, and both sides preserving their position on Taiwan – yes, some historical formulations, which were important to the Chinese, but basically there was a tacit agreement that this thing was too sensitive to resolve, and we had larger fish to fry at that point. And this was part of Mao’s courage, on his side, to put this aside.’ http://www.cfr.org/publication/7980/history_declassified.html.

35 ‘My hope is that over time, trust develops between the two countries, that dialogue begins, perhaps on less controversial issues, building up to more controversial issues … India and Pakistan can prosper and live side by side, this will not happen tomorrow but needs to be the ultimate goal. The US can be a partner but cannot impose this process. India and Pakistan [must] have their own understanding.’ Naqvi, ‘Pakistan should fulfil pledges on Mumbai attacks: Obama’, Dawn (4 Nov. 2010). However, Ayub Khan noted the duplicity in the Indian position. ‘This has been the constant pattern of Indian policy: “Let things become normal and we will deal with the problem”; and “now that things are normal why raise the problem[?]”’ (Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, 145). Ibid.; ‘Their thesis “let goodwill grow” means “let’s have it our way.”

36 Elsewhere in the interview, the ambassador commented: ‘Islamabad’s writ does not run over part of Pakistan … it’s a cauldron of problems. That’s one of the reasons why Islamabad wants to keep this rivalry with India alive. They have not been able to resolve their problems...’
the wayside while India continues to make rapid economic progress, the difference between the rates of GDP expended on the armed forces in the two countries being the most significant factor pointing to the need for a change in attitude. Pakistan's demographic timebomb – the Washington-based Pew Research Center predicts it will be the country with the single largest Muslim population by 2030 – will result in mass pauperization unless the rates of expenditure on the armed forces in Pakistan are cut significantly.

Brigadier Pervez Musharraf’s thesis, written in London in 1990 on the subject of India–Pakistan relations, failed to anticipate the rapidity and extent of Indian economic growth in the following twenty years. Not that anyone could have anticipated the economic battering Pakistan has received from the war on terror since 2001, the Kashmir earthquake of 2005 and the extensive flooding of 2010. The financial transfers from the United States for support in the war on terror have helped – almost $14 billion between 2002 and 2011, according to Alan Kronstadt’s estimates – but

38 As President Obama stated in India, ‘if Pakistan is unstable, that’s bad for India. If Pakistan is stable and prosperous, that’s good because India is on the move.’ Naqvi, ‘Pakistan should fulfil pledges on Mumbai attacks: Obama’, Dawn (4 Nov. 2010).

39 The graph for percentage of GDP spent on defence for Pakistan to 2008 (when 3.27 per cent was recorded by the World Bank) is in a downward curve, but excludes costs for nuclear weapons: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/pakistan/military-expenditure-percent-of-gdp-wb-data.html. India’s percentage of GDP for 2008 (2.45 per cent according to the World Bank) is lower, but the graph shows fluctuations below 3.6 per cent since 1988 and again excludes costs for nuclear weapons. The economy has posted an average growth rate of more than 7 per cent in the decade since 1997, however: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/india/military-expenditure-percent-of-gdp-wb-data.html.


Ambassador Sharma contends that ‘we haven’t had a political leader in Pakistan who has had the guts to think out of the box and implement his thinking ... As long as Kashmir remains on the front burner, [the issues between] India and Pakistan [are] not going to be resolved ...’ At some future moment, ‘some Pakistani leader will realize this is not the best course ... let the Kashmir issue rest for twenty years before it is settled.’ The danger with this approach is that events in Indian-administered Kashmir will not allow it to happen: for three successive summers in 2008, 2009 and 2010 there have been mass protests against paramilitary control and in favour of Kashmir autonomy. If serious concessions are not made to this viewpoint, the risk is a renewal of the violence at pre-2008 levels. In addition, a terrorist strike in India by a Pakistan-based Kashmir secessionist group, akin to the Mumbai attack of 2008, might precipitate war between India and Pakistan. The criticism of the previous Pakistani leadership also fails to give full weight to President Musharraf’s commitment to a settlement of the Kashmir dispute, which came close to a resolution of the problem in 2007 (Appendix I). A more persuasive argument is not to seek to delay a Kashmir settlement, but to argue for a complete revision of the hostile relationship between Pakistan and India. For as one of our interviewees, Major-General Ashok Mehta, argues, even if the Kashmir dispute could be resolved there are plenty of other grounds for disagreement and conflict between the two states.

Ambassador Sharma firmly believes that if Pakistan does not revise its hostile approach towards India then it, not India, will suffer: ‘Pakistan is going to suffer a lack of progress, a lack of development. They are going to have to pay much more on defence. Other things are going to suffer as a result, education and health and so on.’ The risk is that Pakistan may fall by
have certainly not outweighed these economic setbacks. It is scarcely any surprise that many Pakistanis still do not regard the war on terror as their war, or view the US–Pakistan alliance as being of benefit to Pakistan. As Salma M. Siddiqui has argued, this war, ‘perhaps more than any before, is fought over perceptions and with increasingly low morale.’ The US must realize that if it is to withdraw from Afghanistan, not only must it ensure containment of the Taliban, but also avoid having Afghanistan turn into a proxy battlefield between the two South Asian giants.

Within twenty years South Asia is going to be more vibrant than Southeast Asia, Ambassador Murari Raj Sharma predicts. ‘South Asia will have to be prosperous first and peaceful second …. It’s not the traditional sequence. It’s the other way round.’ The Pakistan ambassador to China has said much the same thing: ‘South Asia would fare much better if it learned from the positive experiences of the European Union (EU) and ASEAN. The EU especially is a shining example of hostile nations burying the hatchet and start[ing] an era of cooperation and integration.’ The question to be resolved, therefore, is whether or not a new era of improved economic cooperation can be embarked upon, from which all the states of South Asia may benefit; or whether the dead hand of the past is to maintain its ideological hold on the next generation of political leaders who – unlike most of the ex-military figures interviewed in this book – will have been born after Partition.

As this book was going to press, the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India, or TAPI, natural gas pipeline deal was signed on 11 December 2010, after fifteen years of negotiations. It is a classic example of a ‘win-win’ for all the signatories to the accord. Pakistan and India both need new natural gas supplies as an additional energy resource. The economy of Afghanistan would benefit from the transit route fees, while Turkmenistan is anxious to cash in on its huge natural gas reserves. The two problems that may hold up the project are security and development finance. Without security for the project, the necessary finance – estimated at $7.6 billion – will not be forthcoming. However, the long route for the pipeline (some 1,680 to 1,735 kilometres depending on the precise route chosen), arcs through Kandahar province in Afghanistan, the heart of the Taliban insurgency against the Karzai government and the foreign forces supporting it. Writing for the Asia Times, M. K. Bhadrakumar commented: ‘The project is ostensibly about the transportation of the huge Caspian energy reserves to the world market, but it is also about the stabilization of Afghanistan, fostering of Pakistan–India amity, bonding of Central Asia and South Asia and the overall consolidation of US political, military and economic influence in the strategic high plateau that overlooks Russia, Iran and China.’

Susan Elliot, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State on South and Central Asian Affairs, noted that the TAPI route could become a new corridor of stability: ‘The pipeline’s route may serve as a stabilizing corridor, linking neighbours together in economic growth within twenty years South Asia is going to be more vibrant than Southeast Asia, Ambassador Murari Raj Sharma predicts. ‘South Asia will have to be prosperous first and peaceful second …. It’s not the traditional sequence. It’s the other way round.’ The Pakistan ambassador to China has said much the same thing: ‘South Asia would fare much better if it learned from the positive experiences of the European Union (EU) and ASEAN. The EU especially is a shining example of hostile nations burying the hatchet and start[ing] an era of cooperation and integration.’ The question to be resolved, therefore, is whether or not a new era of improved economic cooperation can be embarked upon, from which all the states of South Asia may benefit; or whether the dead hand of the past is to maintain its ideological hold on the next generation of political leaders who – unlike most of the ex-military figures interviewed in this book – will have been born after Partition.

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Susan Elliot, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State on South and Central Asian Affairs, noted that the TAPI route could become a new corridor of stability: ‘The pipeline’s route may serve as a stabilizing corridor, linking neighbours together in economic growth


42 Siddiqui adds that the backlash in Pakistan to Obama’s visit to India cannot be ignored: ‘Not only has it aroused a sense of neglect among Pakistanis, but more significantly, it has clearly indicated the disposable nature of the US–Pakistan alliance in the face of India’s economic lure’ (Salma M. Siddiqui, ‘Pakistan weary of US alliance’ (18 Nov. 2010)): http://www.isn.efd.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/ISN-Insights/Detail?lng=en&id=124098&contextid1=124098&contextid2=124096&tabid=124096124098.

43 ‘Security and prosperity in South Asia are correlated. Security means that there are no conflicts and wars, and terrorism and extremism are not driving the political discourse. And prosperity in South Asia would mean an end to strife, conflict, deprivation and poverty.’ Masood Khan, ‘Security and Prosperity in South Asia,’ Global Times (18 June 2009): http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/top-photo/2009-06/437953.html.

44 However, as far as Pakistan is concerned, it is illusory to believe that the post-Partition generations are necessarily more moderate or liberal than the founding generation of the state. See Appendix VI.
and prosperity. The road ahead is long for this project but the benefits could be tremendous and are certainly worthy of the diligence demonstrated by those four countries so far.45 It is in economic projects of this kind, from which Pakistan and India would derive equal benefits, that a future more stable and more peaceful relationship may lie.46

India and Pakistan: Real Growth Rates of GDP compared

(GDP growth on an annual basis adjusted for inflation and expressed as per cent.)

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<th>Date</th>
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45 M. K. Bhadrakumar, ‘Pipeline project a new Silk Road’, *Asia Times* (16 Dec. 2010): http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/L1F6Df01.html. Also Bruce Pannier, ‘Tapi Pipeline Signed, Sealed – not yet Delivered‘, ISN Network (16 Dec. 2010). The Asian Development Bank has pledged to help finance TAPI but the bulk of the financing of the project will be left to private investors. The TAPI pipeline could be operational as early as 2013–14. During 2008–9, Pakistan’s demand for natural gas began outstripping its production by a shortfall of 203 mmcfd (million cubic feet per day). Pakistan’s share from TAPI is pegged at 1,325 mmcfd (the same as India’s).


Conclusion

For India: http://www.indexmundi.com/india/gdp_real_growth_rate.html.

For Pakistan: http://www.indexmundi.com/pakistan/gdp_real_growth_rate.html.

From 1998 until 2009, Pakistan’s average annual GDP growth (unadjusted for inflation) was 4.92 per cent, reaching an historic high of 9.00 per cent in December 2005 and a record low of 2.00 per cent in December 2001: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/Economics/GDP-Growth.aspx?Symbol=PKR.

From 2004 until 2010, India’s average quarterly GDP growth (unadjusted for inflation) was 8.37 percent reaching a historic high of 10.10 percent in September 2006 and a record low of 5.50 percent in December 2004: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/Economics/GDP-Growth.aspx?Symbol=INR.
An opportunity was missed in July 2007, the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the independent states of India and Pakistan: this was the opportunity to settle the Kashmir dispute. As Farhan Bokhari and Jo Johnson argued in the Financial Times on 29 May that year, ‘there would have been no better way for India and Pakistan to celebrate’ this anniversary than to have struck a deal on Kashmir, ‘the issue that has done most over the decades to bedevil bilateral relations’.¹ But though the deal – referred to by some as a ‘paradigm shift’ in relations between the two powers – was in preparation through ‘back channel’ talks started in Bangkok, Dubai and London, and completed in Havana, the political weakness of Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan (who was embroiled in a dispute with the country’s chief justice, which was to undermine his hold on power) and Manmohan Singh in India (who had forthcoming general elections to face) meant that there was a fatal slowing down of momentum, and the opportunity for a Kashmir settlement – perhaps the best opportunity in the 60 years of dispute between the two countries – was let slip.

¹ Farhan Bokhari and Jo Johnson, ‘Political wrangles dim the prospect of a deal with India’, Financial Times (29 May 2007). The report quoted the view of one of our interviewees, Major-General Ashok Mehta, who argued that the weakness of the timing lay in the fact that the Manmohan Singh government appeared to have run out of steam: ‘The government in India has completed its three years and doesn’t have much to show.’ In reality, the rapid unravelling of Musharraf’s power base proved to be the decisive factor.
The proposed agreement – though it existed only in the form of an unsigned ‘non-paper’ that could serve as a deniable but detailed basis for a deal negotiated by the two principal envoys, Tariq Aziz (Pakistan) and Satinder Lambah (India) – contained five elements: no change in the territorial layout of Kashmir, currently divided into Pakistani- and Indian-administered areas; the creation of a ‘soft border’ across the Line of Control (LoC); greater autonomy and self-governance within both Indian- and Pakistani-controlled parts of the state; a cross-LoC consultative mechanism; and, finally, the demilitarization of Kashmir at a pace determined by the decline in cross-border terrorism.

Both in principle and practice, the proposed deal was open to the objection that there was no formal consultation with the Kashmiri people, who were thus not actively involved in what they would regard as their act of self-determination. This point was raised by Baroness Emma Nicholson, the European Parliament’s rapporteur for Kashmir, who stated in a letter to the Financial Times that the proposed deal ‘completely overlooks the people of Kashmir in the search for a durable solution. Notwithstanding the need for demilitarization on both sides of the Line of Control, as parliamentarians our principal concern is for greater democracy, human rights, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms in all parts of Kashmir.’ However, Musharraf had made several approaches to Kashmiri politicians of different persuasions. Almost all the prominent Kashmiri leaders except hardliner Syed Ali Shah Geelani and the military resistance groups were thought to be in agreement with the accord that was due to be signed during a visit by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Islamabad scheduled for February or March 2007 but which in the end never took place. It is important in any future negotiations that the failure to include representatives of all sections of Kashmiri opinion formally in the discussions at some point before the final signature of an agreement is addressed. This was a critical weakness in the 2007 plan, which would have laid the proposals open to objection for this reason alone, whatever substantive merits the plan might have possessed.

Three other issues are worth clarification on the stalled 2007 peace process before the implications for the future are considered. The first concerns the role of the Pakistani military. Contrary to received opinion,
the commanders in 2007 were consulted and in agreement: as an enthusiastic supporter of the deal, Musharraf succeeded in winning converts among Pakistan’s sceptical military leadership. And this also involved his successor: as the then Director-General of the ISI, General Kayani, now Chief of Army Staff until 2013, was one of the four closest Pakistani negotiators. The Pakistani military, drawn into a debate about the definition of Pakistan’s national security, accepted the view that diplomacy was the only way forward to achieve a settlement. ‘Pakistan has become a nuclear power. War was no longer an option for either side,’ said Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, who attended a 2007 meeting in Rawalpindi called by Musharraf to review the progress in the negotiations with his senior generals and two foreign ministry officials. No ‘sane person’ could even contemplate a military solution, given the nuclearization of the region, Kasuri has repeated to the Indian media. The Pakistani military were always ‘kept in the loop’ on diplomatic initiatives, he contended. The Pakistan Defence Forum website includes a note on the negotiations to the effect that ‘the military is completely on board at top levels – with a paradigm shift, to see India as an opportunity, to change domestic attitudes.’

A second important point concerns the role of international facilitators. Steve Coll’s account of the negotiations, published in February 2009, makes it clear that the US and British governments were aware of the talks and offered low-key support. Coll comments: ‘Ultimately, any peace settlement would have to attract support in both countries’ parliaments; if it were seen as a product of American or British meddling, its prospects would be dim.’ International facilitation may be needed once again in the future, but it has to be in the background in a supportive role or else the initiative may be prejudiced.

The third point, and a serious weakness of the 2007 initiative, was that, in the words of an unnamed Pakistani official quoted by Steve Coll, ‘the public mood is out of sync.’ Although, as has been seen, there had been a leak to the public abroad via the pages of the Financial Times, there was insufficient preparation of public opinion either in India or Pakistan for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute on the terms that were politically feasible in 2007. One reason for this was the fear of exploitation of each government’s diplomatic stance by the opposition parties. In India, L. K. Advani, the leader of the opposition BJP, cautioned Pakistan against a ‘quick fix’ on Kashmir with the Congress-led government. ‘I have been influenced by [the] observation that the chances of Indo–Pakistan relations improving are maximum if the BJP comes to power,’ Advani told Pakistan Foreign Minister Kasuri. ‘We demonstrated this during the six years of the NDA rule from 1998 to 2004. In fact, I shared this with President Musharraf when he came to New Delhi in 2005 after the UPA government assumed office.’ Advani emphasized that, from the point of view of the Indian people, ‘the two most important issues affecting Indo–Pakistan relations are cross-border terrorism and Jammu and Kashmir. Our people will not accept any compromise on terrorism or any surrender on Jammu and Kashmir.’

Advani’s successor, Arun Jaitley, was still trying to obtain clarification of the Indian government’s position in January 2011. If what Kasuri claimed was true, or even partially true, he contended it was an abandonment of

7 The others were Musharraf himself, Foreign Secretary Riaz Mohammed Khan and Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri. The Indian side was represented by the then External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, then Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon, who is now the National Security Adviser (NSA), the PM’s special envoy to Pakistan, Satinder Lambah, and the then NSA, M. K. Narayanan.


the unanimous resolution of the Indian Parliament in 1994 that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India.12

Within Pakistan itself, there seems to have been relatively little overt opposition to the proposed settlement until an article appeared in Dawn on 1 June from a former ambassador, Javid Husain. ‘[W]e should get ready in the near future for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute on Indian terms’, he announced. ‘The irony is that General Musharraf and those around him will try to sell it to the nation as a historic achievement. This sell-out, of course, would be a tragedy of historic proportions.’ And the author concluded by questioning whether Musharraf had the mandate of the people to reach a final settlement with India on the Kashmir dispute.

It would be better for him and the nation if in the negotiations with India he would limit himself to steps which would ameliorate the living conditions of the Kashmiri people on both sides of the LoC (e.g. autonomy, demilitarization, respect for the human rights of the Kashmiri people and easy movement across the LoC) while leaving the task of negotiating a final settlement with India at an opportune time to a democratically-elected government in Pakistan.13

Subsequently, the merits or otherwise of the proposed settlement have been confused with the issue of the legitimacy of Musharraf’s rule and other mistakes made in his last year in office. There are doubts as to whether the deal could have been marketed to Pakistan public opinion, which has not been gradually awakened to the reality that outright victory for Pakistan’s case in a protracted diplomatic negotiation is highly unlikely. Musharraf, it has been argued, would not have been able ‘to sell [his proposals] in the parliament of Pakistan, the public of Pakistan, the armed forces of Pakistan, and even to those well-meaning people who want normalization and a peaceful relationship between India and Pakistan.’14

So when is an ‘amicable agreement’ – former Pakistani Foreign Minister Kasuri’s words – on Jammu and Kashmir not an agreement at all? When it is in an unsigned and undated ‘non-paper’. The difficulty about the procedure adopted in 2006–7 is that in changed circumstances it is easy for the governments of both countries to deny what has been agreed in principle. This lays the process of negotiation open in the future to the risk of having to start again as a tabula rasa – as if nothing had taken place and an in-principle agreement had not been reached.15 Advocate Ahmer Bilal Soofi argues correctly that prior legal exploration of the appropriate mechanisms for negotiations, and the timeline of negotiations, might prevent this outcome (see Appendix V). But, as one of our interviewees in this book, Major-General Ashok Mehta, argues, it is also important not to reinvent the wheel. Kashmir negotiations cannot start again without reference to what had previously been the point of virtual agreement. The only logical way to proceed is to build the previous process into the new peace process but in addition to address any procedural or consultative shortcomings. Yes, as Kasuri argues, politicians need to ‘expend their political capital and stick

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15 Raja Asghar, ‘Old Kashmir policy stands revived: FM’, Dawn (5 May 2010). Musharraf was said to have been ‘wavering’ for seven to eight years, with reliance placed mainly on ‘bala bala (stealthy) back-channel diplomacy’ without taking parliament into his confidence. ‘We are trying to recover from the damage done to Pakistan’s case then …’ In an interview given in Pakistan, the veteran Indian Muslim commentator, A. G. Noorani, was much more complimentary towards Musharraf: ‘Musharraf deserves tribute for the constructive role he played in (trying to solve) the Kashmir dispute. He brought Kashmir to the outskirts of a solution. A few loose ends remained.’ On the criticism that Musharraf had abandoned the UNSC resolutions, Noorani commented: ‘they had been (already) abandoned in all but name.’ Qasim A. Moini, ‘Musharraf brought Kashmir close to a solution’, Dawn (15 Oct. 2008).
their neck on the line\textsuperscript{16} to revive the talks. But the atmosphere of secrecy that is necessarily involved should not prevent the inclusion of specialist lawyers to deal with procedural issues and consultative mechanisms within defined timelines so that the Kashmiri people can be made a party to their own settlement, as well as the national political audiences of Pakistan and India. The task is a difficult, but not an impossible one. It should not be delayed because the prospect of further acts of terrorism bedevilling the future course of India–Pakistan relations are too great to be risked.

Nevertheless there are grounds for a cautious optimism about the future of Kashmir. Much still needs to be done to educate public opinion in both Pakistan and India. Much also needs to be done to seek a coalescence of the myriad of opinions and identities in Kashmir around a potential settlement inclusive of all. Religious and political pluralism have to feature in any future settlement for Kashmiris. The ‘Kashmir optimists’ are those who, while aware of the potential for nuclear war in a confrontation between India and Pakistan, nevertheless believe that the parties to a dispute are able to reach a consensual arrangement for the mutual benefit of all in the region, without one side demanding victory for its sectional viewpoint and with only a small rump denouncing the outcome as a betrayal. The ‘Kashmir pessimists’, those so-called ‘realists’ who believe in the inevitability of conflict between India and Pakistan because of competing national identities, must be shown that there is a better way forward for South Asia, one which will unlock the immense economic and social potential of the region for a constructive future.\textsuperscript{17}

Finally, as Moonis Ahmar suggests, there are other processes which need to be undertaken to build a viable constituency for peace. He calls these the processes 1) of dialogue; 2) of constructive cooperation; 3) of constructive settlement; 4) of protecting minority rights in Indian- and Pakistani-controlled J&K; 5) of regional autonomy in Indian- and


http://www.hindu.com/2011/04/03/stories/201104035479500.htm
Appendix II
Washington Declaration, 31 July–1 August 2008

The two-day 9th International Kashmir Peace Conference, organized by
the Kashmiri American Council, Kashmir Center, Washington DC, and
co-hosted by the Association of Humanitarian Lawyers:¹

1. Resolves that the people of Jammu and Kashmir are central to the India–
Pakistan peace process and representative dialogue and affirms that a
sustainable and just solution of the Kashmir dispute can be achieved
only through democratically established procedures for ascertaining
the will of the people of the state (as existing on 14/15 August 1947).

2. Resolves that, in the context of the Prime Minister of India, Dr
Manmohan Singh’s, pledge for zero tolerance of human rights abuses,
an independent and credible investigative commission should be set up
to probe human rights abuses including the issue of mass graves recently
discovered in the state.

3. Resolves that the pace of India–Pakistan dialogue, particularly in rela-
tion to Jammu and Kashmir, should be accelerated and given a realistic
time frame. The dialogue should be inclusive and Kashmiris should be
an integral part of this process.

¹ The members of the drafting committee included: 1) Justice Rajinder Sachar, former
Chief Justice of Delhi High Court; 2) Ms Farzana Raja, Member, Pakistan National
Assembly; 3) Mr Ved Bhasin, Chairman, Kashmir Times Group, Jammu; 4) Mr
Jatinder Bakshi, President, J&K Forum for Peace and Reconciliation, Jammu; 5) Ms
Victoria Schofield, author, writer, England; 6) Dr Ghulam N. Mir, President, World
Kashmir Freedom Movement; 7) Professor Nazir A. Shawl, Executive Director,
Justice Foundation/Kashmir Center, London; and 8) Dr Ghulam Nabi Fai, Executive
Director, Kashmiri American Council/Kashmir Center, Host. ‘The Declaration was
adopted unanimously.’
Appendix III
Road Map towards Peace, 10–12 January 2010

Declaration: India Pakistan Conference – A Road Map towards Peace, India International Centre, New Delhi, 10–12 January 2010

1) Peace Dialogue
a. Resumption of dialogue and the composite peace process. Once resumed, dialogue should be uninterrupted and uninterruptible, whatever the twists and turns in the relations between the two countries may be.
b. Consider a suitable location near the border where the talks will be held at regular intervals.
c. The contents and outcomes of the talks should be as transparent as possible, so that there is accountability to the people of both countries.
d. There should be coordination amongst the various ministries of the government of India involved and concerned with India–Pakistan relations and policy.
e. There must be no militarist/chauvinist statements from political or military leadership of the two countries.
f. Confidence Building Measures: Items long awaiting solution like Siachin, Sir Creek, Wullar Barrage need to be settled immediately.
g. Demilitarize the border between India and Pakistan.

2) Terrorism
a. Both countries should work together to counter terrorism and fundamentalism which are common challenges.
b. Set up joint mechanisms, and share intelligence and related information within the framework of the 1987 SAARC convention on combating terrorism.

Source: hindtoday.com/Blogs/ViewBlogsV2.aspx?HTAdvId=2098&HTAdvPlaceCode=USA
3) Economic Cooperation
   a. Free flow of goods and commodities, encouragement of joint business initiatives.
   b. India must unilaterally open the borders to further facilitate border trade.
   c. Build cooperation on the existing women-led initiatives.
   d. India must take initiative to build the trade between the two countries and with the rest of South Asia.
   e. Ease customs and tariff procedures, and issuing of business visas.
   g. Try to formulate a joint economic partnership agreement between India and Pakistan.
   h. Set up more branches of more Indian and Pakistani banks and financial institutions in each others’ territories.
   i. Collaborative approaches on issues relating to WTO and international trade.

4) Kashmir
   a. Since this is a core issue there must a genuine and urgent effort to find solutions.
   b. Firstly both India and Pakistan must jointly agree to de-militarize Jammu & Kashmir. The Indian government should repeal the Armed Forces Special Powers Act.
   c. Withdrawal of troops and punishment of those guilty of crimes against people.
   d. Strengthening of democratic institutions and establishing an independent tribunal to ensure Article 370 for Kashmir. Reinstate Article 370 in its original form as a step towards building confidence and goodwill.
   e. Allow Kashmiris to live and work in Pakistan if they wish.
   f. Protect the interests of minorities in J&K. Take the opinions and aspirations of people in all areas in J&K when working out solutions.

5) Media, Information and Culture
   a. There has to be a self-censorship: stop hate speech, war mongering in the media.
   b. The flow of information, software, know-how, knowledge should be opened up.
   c. Import of books, periodicals, newspapers should be permitted without impediment.
   d. Meeting of senior editors should be held, in effort to lead media away from jingoism.
   e. Media houses should be allowed to station journalists in each others’ capitals without difficulty.
   f. Cultural exchange must be freely allowed and encouraged between the two countries.
   g. Education: Revision of curricula in both countries to encourage friendship, not hate.

6) Visa Regime
   a. Visa-free South Asia: The possibility of a visa-free regime has been often discussed but not operationalized. Stringent scrutiny can be done without undue restrictiveness.
   b. Opening of consulates in all the major cities of both the countries.
   c. Special facilities for senior citizens and children below 12 years.
   d. Free exchange of scholars, students and technical experts.

7) Nuclear Disarmament
   Roll back the nuclear program in both countries to establish a nuclear-free South Asia and cooperate jointly towards global disarmament.

8) National and Ethnic Question
   a. Since this is an important and extremely sensitive question in South Asia, attempts to be made in both countries to find solutions to conflicts around these questions, involving all parties in the dispute.
   b. Facilitate the coming together of academia and civil society to build a better understanding and possible consensus on this issue.
   c. Create space for national and other minorities in all parts of India and Pakistan.
9) Water Resources
   a. Joint management of water resources.
   b. Revisit the Indus Water Treaty in the light of new factors like climate change and its implications based on the principles of equitable sharing rather than division of waters.
   c. Ways need to be explored to optimize use and distribution of waters and energy for benefit of the people of both countries.

10) Military and Defence
   a. Reduce military spending by at least 10 per cent per year, and divert the savings to the social and development sector.
   b. In order to reduce tensions, it is important that military commanders of both countries meet and interact, as part of the peace dialogue.
   c. Joint patrol of borders.
   d. Change the beating retreat ceremony at the Wagah border to reflect peace, not conflict.

11) Climate Change
   a. Start common initiatives to adapt to the common challenges of climate change.
   b. Cooperation in international negotiations and at SAARC.
   c. Joint approaches towards transfer of technology on renewable energy, adaptation and mitigation. India should assist Pakistan to develop a low-carbon strategy and facilitate the transfer of regenerative technologies to Pakistan; strengthen regional cooperation based on the SAARC charter and its conventions.
   d. Conduct joint research on ecological and climate-related issues.

12) Siachen Glacier must become a Zone of Peace
   It should be cleared of the army presence altogether. This is important both for reasons of environment and also for the sake of the soldiers.

13) SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation)
   Work together to strengthen regional cooperation based on the SAARC charter and its conventions.

14) Human Rights
   a. Release of all fisherfolk currently detained in Indian and Pakistani jails. Stop arresting fisherfolk who stray into the other country’s territorial waters.
   b. Release of all political prisoners who have served their term. Review of cases to see that innocents who have strayed over the land border are released.
   c. See that the lives and properties of human rights defenders are protected. Punish those guilty of torture, rape, plunder in the name of security, counter-terror, war.

15) Joint India–Pakistan Committees must be set up on:
   a. Kashmir
   b. Hate speech
   c. Human rights
   d. Distribution of water resources
   e. Prisoners
   f. Military expenditure
   g. CBMs

Source: <http://www.sacw.net/article1322.html>
Appendix IV
Memorandum on Present Realities, Transitions and Resolution in Kashmir, 4 November 2010

We, the undersigned, write today in the aftermath of yet another summer of state repression and violence in Indian-administered Kashmir, followed by a peace process initiated by the Indian State without the consent or active participation of the Kashmiri people, and on the occasion of United States President Barak Obama’s visit to India.

We write concerned that the Indian State has implemented a deceptive ‘peace’ plan without recognizing the dispute, formulated ‘resolution’ without reckoning loss, and designated ‘post-conflict’ status without halting military rule in Kashmir.

1 This was a report of the International People’s Tribunal on Human Rights and Justice in Kashmir (IPTK). The report was endorsed by 1) Dr Angana Chatterji, Co-convenor, International People’s Tribunal on Human Rights and Justice in Indian-administered Kashmir and Professor, Department of Anthropology, California Institute of Integral Studies; 2) the Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society; 3) the Kashmir High Court Bar Association; 4) Advocate Mihir Desai, legal counsel, International People’s Tribunal on Human Rights and Justice in Indian-administered Kashmir and advocate, Mumbai High Court and Supreme Court of India; 5) the Chamber of Commerce and Industries – Kashmir; 6) the Jammu Kashmir Trade Union Council; 7) the Kashmir Minorities Front; 8) the Majlis-e-Mashawarat, Shopian; 9) the Kashmir University Students Union; 10) the Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons; 11) Koshish; 12) the People’s Rights Movement; 13) the Jammu and Kashmir Hussainee Trust; 14) VIVA Kashmir; 15) Dr Sheikh Showkat Hussain, scholar; 16) Dr Syeda Afshana, scholar; 17) Dr Altaf Hussain, author; 18) Dr Abdul Ahad, historian; 19) Parvaiz Bukhari, journalist; 20) Dr Mirza Ashraf Beg, columnist and social activist; 21) Dr Mubarak Ahmed, social activist; 22) Abdul Majeed Zargar, columnist; 23) Zareef Ahmed Zareef, poet and social activist; and 24) Zahid G. Muhammad, columnist. ‘Other names [were] withheld for fear of reprisal.’
We note that the recent protests in Kashmir ... are indicative of civilian sentiments and responses to the sustained confinement of civil society by Indian military and paramilitary forces since 1989, the attendant cycles of violence, and the suppression of local demands for the right to self-determination since 1947. The Government of India recently called for 'creative solutions' to resolve the 'Kashmir problem'. If we map the events inside Indian-administered Kashmir, the approach of the Indian State has been, and continues to be, neo-imperialistic and aggressively militaristic.

We note that while India deems Indian-administered Kashmir to be an 'internal matter', refusing transparency, international scrutiny, and adherence to humanitarian laws of conflict and war, civil society in Kashmir remains 'under the authority of the hostile army', whose reach and power 'has been established and can be exercised' (Hague Convention, Laws and Customs of War on Land [Hague IV] Article 42, 1907).

We urge that, in order to ensure interim conditions that are facilitative of non-violent conflict resolution, and enable ethical civil society participation, the Government of India, the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, and the military, paramilitary, and police be held accountable to a minimum agenda in Kashmir inclusive of the following. We urge that the international leadership and global civil society ask that the Government of India undertake the following measures:

1. Immediate halt to, and moratorium on, the use of extrajudicial killings, torture, kidnapping, enforced disappearance, and gendered violence by the Indian military, paramilitary, and police in Kashmir.
2. Agreement to non-interference in the exercise of civil liberties of Kashmiris, including the right to civil disobedience, and freedom of speech, movement, travel, assembly, and religion.
3. Proactive demilitarization and the immediate revocation of authoritarian laws.
4. Release of political prisoners.
5. Transparent identification and dismantling of detention and torture centres, including in army camps.

We ask the United States act responsibly in seeking access to India's markets and in attempting to reposition its role in Afghanistan. We ask that President Obama bring up the ‘K’ word, as Kashmir has been pejoratively labelled, in his discussions with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India. We ask that in seeking stronger relations with India, the United States not compromise the rights of Kashmiri peoples or regional peace and security concerns in South Asia which act as deterrents to resolutions of past partitions and current conflicts, and which prevent the integration of South Asia into responsible global economic units.

We urge that the international community, including civil society and governments of the European Union, Organization of the Islamic Conference, China, and others support Kashmir's demands of the United Nations (and respect the history of United Nations resolutions on Kashmir).

We ask that the international community bring their judicial counsel to persuading the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan to initiate meaningful exchanges, engagements, and reconciliations between Kashmiri peoples across borders as a precondition to conflict resolution.

We ask that the Government of India end hostilities on Kashmiri peoples, and formally recognize the right of Kashmiris to determine their future. In an attempt to convince the global community of its ability to practise power responsibly, the Indian State must practise accountability and atonement with respect to Kashmir. The negligence, indifference, and callousness that has delayed the resolution of the Kashmir dispute continues to have serious repercussions on the everyday lives of Kashmiris, as it defers hope and prosperity, as well as Kashmiri entitlements to rights, liberties, and freedoms that are universally recognized as inalienable.

We ask that the Government of India respect civil society and civil disobedience processes in Kashmir undertaken by diverse Kashmiri groups and peoples in preparation to moving forward.

We ask that the Government of India recognize that prior to a resolution, certain minimum preconditions must be enforced to enable transitional and transformative processes of justice, with relevant international oversight. This would lead to defining and implementing mechanisms for accountability, reckoning and reparation, and resolution.
Today the options available to the parties are either to proceed in the direction of a dialogue or insist on the implementation of the UNSC resolutions. If there is little headway or a lack of meaningful progress in dialogue then Pakistan will have to consider its options for going back to insistence on implementing the UNSC resolutions. Although it continues to remain the principled and a well-showcased position of Pakistan that Kashmir should be resolved in accordance with the UNSC resolutions, the fact remains that the policy-makers in Pakistan are not averse to the process of dialogue and negotiations on Kashmir. That is why Pakistan has not taken overt steps for implementation of the UNSC resolutions. The steps that Pakistan can take to supersede the application of the Simla Agreement as a governing text for the resolution of the Kashmir issue include invoking Article 103 of the UN Charter, which states that in the event of a conflict between a bilateral treaty and a UN obligation, the obligations under the Charter prevail. The Indian position, that the Simla Agreement will be the governing law/text for resolution of Kashmir, can be questioned, as Article 103 is categorical both in its nature and language.

The dialogue on the other hand has not commenced, so there can be no confidence in the ultimate resolution of the issue. Of course, the unfortunate ‘spanner in the works’ of the Mumbai attacks brought the dialogue process to a halt. The fact remains that even if the dialogue process stands revived it has little chance of achieving success unless there is third-party involvement.
Planning the Dialogue

The dialogue process will bring India and Pakistan to the table to discuss various political options over Kashmir. Some of those options are:

1. An independent Kashmir
2. Semi-independence or partial independence
3. Joint control of certain portions
4. Making the LoC a permanent border
5. A permanent border with slight changes in the LoC
6. The Musharraf formula
7. Other options

The author has no wish to comment on the preferability of any of the above, since this is a political issue and in the domain of the politicians. However, from a legal point of view, all these options when discussed at the negotiating table pose similar legal questions which must be answered with clarity – without which political progress on the dialogue will not be possible.

Some of these questions are:

1. Which portion of the territory of Kashmir shall be the subject matter of resolution/negotiations? Only the Valley? The entire area of Indian-administered/-occupied Kashmir? Should this include AJ&K or not? Should Gilgit–Baltistan and other areas be included or not?
2. The parties will have to make a determination of a legal or a historic yardstick that is acceptable to both sides. For example, one yardstick could be the actual situation of the state of AJ&K in 1947. An alternative yardstick might be only those areas in which there is ongoing unrest today. Yet another yardstick might be the areas in which the plebiscite was originally conceived to be conducted as the territories on which negotiations will proceed. The determination of this yardstick is a major issue in its own right.
Planning the Dialogue

1. A pre-dialogue preparation be carried out by experts from both sides. This could be done informally or formally. Both foreign secretaries could announce a committee of legal and technical experts comprising Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris. This committee would have the mandate to carry out a legal due diligence against all options so that when the parties sit for negotiations they have before them an itinerary of legal steps against each political option. Both India and Pakistan can declare that the views and work of the committee are not binding on either of the parties and its work will not have an official recognition. India and Pakistan may choose even to prohibit the committee from making public its work for the time being.

2. Timelines for a dialogue should be spelt out by a bilateral legal instrument between India and Pakistan. As of now, there is no legal obligation on the states to sit down at the negotiating table by a given date. As a result, the commencement of the dialogue is a political or a diplomatic choice and not a legal compulsion. The legal framework would also determine the various levels of dialogue between the parties and how gradually these levels would be raised. It would spell out working sessions on various issues. These working sessions could utilize the work done by the committee of experts.

3. The timelines may then result in a formal and final dialogue wherein both parties arrive at a consensus on the options listed above. The outcome of this political consensus needs to be converted into a bilateral treaty which conclusively disposes of the issue. If the outcome of the dialogue is a treaty that further extends the time for negotiations then this would be a recipe for further complications and ought to be avoided. The treaty instrument must in one move conclude the issue and give a period of a few weeks to the parties to make suitable changes to their respective constitutional instruments.

4. In fact, it would be extremely interesting if the above order were to be reversed. Why not develop a legal instrument draft for the final disposition of Kashmir and let that be one of the initial tasks for the experts’ committee?

Plan for the Dialogue

It is in the above context that I propose the following as a plan for the dialogue:

1. In any kind of political settlement, indicated above, what will be the changes required in the Indian Constitution? What changes will be required in the Constitution of Pakistan and in the AJ&K Constitution? Will those changes be acceptable to the people in India, Pakistan and AJ&K?

2. Will the Indian government negotiating a political settlement on a given day have a majority and the public sentiment in the Lok Sabha to bring about the necessary changes in its own Constitution?

3. The eventual fate of the 2 March 1963 agreement between Pakistan and China will require determination, since it contains a contingency provision for renegotiation once the issue of Kashmir is resolved with India.

4. China has been exercising effective control over the Trans-Karakoram Tract. Does this make China a party to these negotiations as it will have a legal interest in the outcome? Will China then be sitting at the table as well as India and Pakistan? Will India be prepared to allow China a role in negotiations to the extent of a renegotiation of the 1963 treaty?

5. What will be the role of Kashmiris in this process? So far their role is informal and it is time that their role and their participation in the future dialogue process is formalized.

The above are only a few complexities that one sees clearly and the fear is that these legal and technical complexities can easily derail the political dialogue or stall it. This has happened at least twice in the past, in the cases of Sir Creek and Siachen, when a similar political consensus was achieved for withdrawal but later the technical and legal experts undermined the broad political understanding to resolve the matter.
Appendix VI
Pakistan: Islam’s Predicament with Modernity and the Issue of Self-Identity

‘Pakistan has to come to terms with itself, discover its identity and personality and not indulge in self-destruction through religious fundamentalism.’ Major-General Mehta’s words in his interview in this book are prescient and reflect the views of many scholars, commentators and friends of Pakistan. ‘Allah does not change people, unless they change themselves’ (Qur’an 13:11). Bassam Tibi cites this verse from the Holy Qur’an on several occasions in a wide-ranging and thought-provoking book1 which attempts to convince Muslims that they need to avoid self-victimization and placing the blame for their current problems on the non-Muslim ‘other’ (that is, the West) and instead view themselves and their cultures more self-critically.

Bassam Tibi recalls that at school in Damascus at the age of ten (c. 1954) he asked his teacher: ‘why are the conditions we live under not in line with verse 3:110 in the Qu’ran? (‘You are the best community (umma) that has ever been raised up for mankind.’) The Europeans and Americans were more advanced than his own community. Why was this so, ‘if Allah says we are superior to all non-Muslim parts of mankind?’ To this, his teacher replied without hesitation: ‘we are in crisis (mihna) and Allah is examining us.’ The answer was ‘neither satisfactory nor convincing’ to the author, and

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the search for a more comprehensive explanation has been the underlying quest of his life.

His analysis returns to the era of greatness in Islamic civilization, and the phenomenon described by the Egyptian philosopher Mourad Wahba as ‘the paradoxon of Averroës’ (Mufarqat Ibn Rushd): the paradox that Ibn Rushd’s works – published under the Latinize name Averroës – had a great impact on Europe during the course of the Renaissance, yet in the same period his books were burned by the Salafist orthodoxy. Tibi quotes approvingly the viewpoint of the recently deceased Moroccan professor of philosophy, Mohammed al-Jabri, who addressed the ‘struggle for reason and rationality’ in Islamic history and argued that ‘the survival of our philosophical tradition … can only be Averroist … the Averroist spirit is adaptable to our era, because it agrees with it on more than one point: rationalism, realism, axiomatic method and critical approach.’ Ultimately, Tibi sees this heritage as of critical importance, because it points to a ‘virtual separation of religion and politics.’ In contrast, the Islamist position of linking the two is akin to a ‘new variety of jihad fought against rationality.’

The fight against Western knowledge is an essential part of the jihad against unbelief (kufr). The Islamist strategy is to combine the ‘Islamization of knowledge’ with the ‘shari’atization of law’ in a fundamentalist project to de-Westernize the Islamic world, and indeed the world at large.

Bassam Tibi questions both aspects of the Islamist strategy. Knowledge cannot be shared by others if it is exclusively based on a particular religion – unless, that is, people convert to that religion, which would be a denial of the religious diversity which is accepted in the Qur’an (‘we created you in peoples and tribes to get to know one another’: Qur’an 49:13; ‘Unto you your religion, and unto me my religion’: Qur’an 109:6). Advances in knowledge result from cross-cultural and inter-religious fertilization, as in the period of greatness of Islamic civilization. This, Tibi asserts is the essence of the intellectual heritage of the whole of humanity. What Tibi calls the ‘Islamic dream of semi-modernity’ – the rejection of rational knowledge while adopting modernity’s techno-scientific accomplishments – is dismissed as an unrealistic splitting of modernity into two unrelated components. How is it possible, he asks, ‘to reduce modernization to an instrumental adoption of material items, while furiously rejecting the rational, human-centred view of the world upon which modern accomplishments are based?’

Similarly, the idea that the shari’a is absolute is dismissed by Tibi, since ‘it stands in antithesis to the idea of the project of modernity, according to which all knowledge is revisable?’ ‘The core issue today’, he argues, ‘is no longer the earlier, anti-colonial defensive-cultural ideology (jihad as a response to the imperialism of the West), but rather the offensive claim of a remaking of the world in accordance with divine precepts based on Islamic law.’ The term shari’a appears only once in the Holy Qur’an (45:18) with the meaning of morality, not of law, ‘to enjoin the good and forbid the evil.’ It was not until the work of the legal scribe or jurist (faqih) Ibn Taimiyyah that shari’a came to be associated with state administration (shari’a law politics or al-siyyasa al-shar’iyya). Tibi regards this as an ‘addition’ undertaken by Ibn Taimiyyah which ‘explains his appeal and the great influence of his work on contemporary “radical Islam”’.

There is, however, no common understanding among Muslims of precisely what is meant by the notion of shari’a. The Islamists’ ‘politicization of shari’a (civil law) and its advancement to the status of a constitutional law (dustur) results in a totalitarian state,’ Tibi asserts. It ‘legitimates

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4 Tibi, *Islam’s Predicament with Modernity*, 100.

5 Ibid., 75.

6 Ibid., 315.

7 Ibid., 85.

8 Ibid., 98.

9 Ibid., 107. Although as Michael Cook shows in his *Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), commentary on this passage could in itself lead to innovation in this area.

10 Tibi, *Islam’s Predicament with Modernity*, 100, 106.

11 Ibid., 104.
totalitarian rule in the name of religion'. In his view, ‘there can be no democratic, shari’a-based rule of law’, while ‘shari’a and democracy are incompatible’. Here Tibi quotes Mawdudi’s view that the ‘dreadful system of democracy’ – Mawdudi’s term – is ‘in contradiction’ with Islam. ‘When Islam comes to power’, Mawdudi wrote in Islam and Modern Civilization, ‘there is no place for this system.’ Among basic human rights is freedom of faith. The shari’a law exacerbates problems and, instead of engaging in reforming, it puts obstacles in the way of provision of this right. ‘One must have cultural sensitivity when dealing with the issue in order not to offend Muslims,’ Tibi argues, ‘but at the same time unequivocally counter any totalitarianism in the name of politicized religion. It is not an offence to religious sensitivities to counter the religionization of politics.’

Bassam Tibi contends that ‘there is a lack of religious pluralism in Islam, which claims superiority for itself’ and reduces non-Muslim monotheists to an inferior status of dhimmitude. The notions of the ‘house of war’ or the ‘house of unbelievers’ (dar al-harb, or dar-al kuffar) – under which the non-Muslim ‘other’ is an enemy to be subdued by jihad – are ‘offensive and aggressive and they should be abandoned by Muslims altogether’. The apostasy (riddah) doctrine ‘clearly indicates [a] lack of freedom of faith in Islam, because it forbids conversion, under penalty’, the penal code of hudud. Shari’a allows ‘great room for arbitrary law making in the guise of an interpretation of God’s revelation.’ Moreover, whereas ‘a secular legal rule can be altered by any parliament in a legislative act … sacral law cannot be changed.’

In view of the legal-cultural diversity of humanity, Tibi contends that ‘Muslim jurists need an “Islamic Reformation”.’ ‘There is no innovative rethinking of scriptural Islam along the lines of religious reformation. An insistence on scriptural arguments leads, in an unproductive repetition of Islamic precepts, to an essentialization of Islam.’ Islamic modernists such as Afghani may have admired Luther’s Reformation, but they failed to emulate the spirit of the Reformation. ‘This is the reason why no secularization emerged. Above all, there was no rethinking of the religious dogma.’ An ideological secularization (e.g. Kemalism) that lacks the necessary cultural foundation is ‘doomed to fail’ in Tibi’s view. The evidence for this statement is the successful rise of political Islam in Turkey, parallel to the combined decline of secularism and Kemalism. ‘Turkey has been ‘an easy prey to the Islamism of the AKP … The Islamists were able to Islamize from below while the Kemalists were secularizing from above, and the Kemalists have lost.’ The AKP, Tibi asserts, ‘pursues policies that are not in line with religious pluralism’. Yet ‘a pluralist, democratic civil Islam that can accommodate pluralism is the urgently needed alternative to political Islam.’ The acceptance of pluralism is ‘essential, both for world peace and inner peace within Islamic civilization itself.’ Sectarian strife and violence, as illustrated by Iraq and Pakistan, result from ‘the lack of an acceptance of pluralism even within Islam.’ ‘Despite all the bleak perspectives, an Islamic reformation continues to be the future prospect.’

12 Ibid., 107.
13 Ibid., 102.
14 Ibid., 97.
15 Ibid., 216.
16 Ibid., 103.
17 Ibid., 109.
18 Ibid., 104.
19 Ibid., 236.
20 Ibid., 105, 110.
21 Ibid., 112.
22 Ibid., 189.
23 Ibid., 199.
24 Ibid., 201.
25 Ibid., 203.
26 Ibid., 190.
27 Ibid., 217.
28 Ibid., 231.
29 Ibid., 227.
30 Ibid., 210.
31 Ibid., 206.
Iqbal: the Poet Philosopher of Pakistan

The case of Pakistan illustrates many of Bassam Tibi’s central themes. First, it does so in terms of its founding ideology, which arises essentially from the ideas and writings of Allama Sir Mohammed Iqbal (1877–1938). ‘With the reawakening of Islam’, Iqbal considered it ‘necessary to examine, in an independent spirit, what Europe has taught and how far the conclusions reached by her can help us in the revision, and if necessary, reconstruction of theological thought in Islam’. Ijtihad (independent reasoning or legal interpretation) was a central concept for Iqbal. He stressed the reinterpretation of foundational legal principles deduced from the Qur’an and was prepared to argue for the non-implementation or at least for deferring the implementation of Quranic laws under certain specified circumstances. Ta’bid, that is, equality, solidarity and freedom, were the fundamental legal principles for Iqbal. Likewise he argued against the use of the ahadith (the literature which consists of the narrations of the life of the Prophet and the things approved by him, sometimes including narrations about the Companions of the Prophet and Successors to the Companions as well) as a source of law. For the purposes of legislation, Iqbal considered that the ahadith literature should be disregarded.

Perhaps the most serious outcome of what has been called ‘the closing of the door [or gate] of Ijtihad’ in the early modern period and after was that it restricted Islamic intellectual space and gave the ulama (or, in Pakistan, ulema) the sole right and privilege to dominate and control discussion and debate within the Muslim intellectual world. The ulama were elevated to the status of the defenders and disseminators of the ‘true’ and ‘authentic’ version of Islam. Islam and Muslims, it has been said, ‘have been burdened by the demands of this discourse of authenticity ever since. For centuries, Muslims have had to deal with the legacy left behind by the conservative ulama of the past.’ Dr Ayesha Jalal comments that ‘with the exception of [Maulana Abul Kalam] Azad, the most ardent believers in the ummah vahidah or one nation theory patented by Congress were ulama who could not imagine an independent India without shari’a rule.’

For Iqbal, in contrast to the conservative ulama, the aim was to restore the original universalism and dynamism of Islam, which could not be achieved by adopting the terms ‘reformation’ or ‘modernization’. (Unlike Bassam Tibi, Iqbal considered ‘a Luther in the world of Islam … an impossibility.’)

34 www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/
35 ‘Regarding the ahadith Iqbal stands for an outright non-consideration of it in legal matters …’: http://www.allamaiqbal.com/publications/journals/review/apr99/9.htm
37 Iqbal commented: ‘The closing of the door of Ijtihad is a pure fiction suggestion by the crystallization of legal thought in Islam, and partly by that intellectual laziness which in periods of spiritual decay turns great thinkers into idols for the masses.’
39 Without citing Iqbal’s name, Weiss (1978) endorses this quest: ‘...it is by virtue of the theory that Islamic law is Islamic. Obviously, the theory must eventually be related to actual practice, and for this a renewed ijtihad, resembling in its vigour and zeal the ijtihad of the earliest centuries of Islam, clearly must be undertaken.’ Weiss, ‘Interpretation in Islamic Law’, 212. However, it must be noted that Iqbal’s
when they happen to be members of the legislature; ‘in this way alone we can stir into activity the dormant spirit of life in our legal system and give it an evolutionary outlook.’ Otherwise their role is merely recommendatory, that is, they are supposed to help and guide free discussions on questions relating to law. In other words, if a conflict emerges regarding a future enactment of legislation, then it must be the will of the legislative assembly which prevails over the reasoning of the ulama.  

In Islam as a Political and Moral Ideal, Iqbal argued that ‘democracy has been the great mission of England in modern times … It is one aspect of our own political ideal that is being worked out in it. It is … th[e] spirit of the British Empire that makes it the greatest Muhammadan Empire in the world.’ Iqbal maintained that the principle of consensus (ijma), ‘interpreted as the consensus of the entire community of Muslims, not merely the ulama,’ amounted to an Islamic form of democracy. Iqbal also vigorously rejected any oppressive aspect of Muslim majoritarianism. Iqbal declared that

a community which is inspired by feelings of ill will towards other communities is low and ignoble. I entertain the highest respect for the customs, laws, religious and social institutions of other communities. Nay, it is my duty, according to the teachings of the Qur’an, even to defend their places of worship, if need be. Yet I love the communal group which is the source of my life and behaviour and which has formed me into what I am by giving me its religion, its literature, its thought, its culture and thereby recreating its whole past as a living operative factor in my present consciousness.

The concept of Muslim nationhood is thus inspired by the profound love of one’s own community, i.e, the Muslim community, and immense respect for all other communities.

We have the witness of one of our interviewees, Major-General Syed Wajahat Husain, on Jinnah’s speeches in the 1940s.

Condemning religious bigotry and obscurantism, Jinnah continuously emphasized a liberal, tolerant and outward-looking progressive ‘Pakistan’ – before it became a state – advising us to guard against religious fanaticism which was the negation of Islamic values. ... Abhorring sectarianism, corruption, nepotism and favouritism, which were rampant in the Nizam’s Hyderabad, he consistently cautioned against these ‘malignant Muslim diseases’ during all his Aligarh speeches. How right he was in his pronouncements! Today these very afflictions, with growing impunity, are threatening to tear further apart our mutilated country. His well-thought-out guidelines of ‘Faith, Unity and Discipline’ were the correct panacea for Muslims’ perennial problems, which alas! we have not followed and which has led to damage to the national fabric in every area of public life.

It has not always been recognized that the principle of ‘secularism’ on the Indian model – that is, religious pluralism – was accepted by Jinnah in the Muslim-majority state he founded. Jinnah’s inaugural speech to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly in particular has been suppressed on a number of occasions. The most recent censorship occurred during Pakistan’s second martial law regime under General Zia-ul-Haq which was committed to the preservation of the Pakistan ideology and ‘Islamic character’ of the state. Newspaper articles on the occasion of the anniversary of Jinnah’s birth in 1981 omitted the key words from his 11 August 1947 Presidential Address to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. *Now ... you will find in the course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state.* Despite the massacres and migrations which accompanied India’s Partition, Jinnah remained committed to the ideal of equality of treatment for religious minorities. As his broadcast to the people of the United States made in February 1948 clearly underlines, this attitude was rooted in Jinnah’s understanding of Islam:

Islam and its idealism have taught us democracy. It has taught equality of men, justice and fair play to everybody. We are the inheritors of these glorious traditions and are fully alive to our responsibilities and obligations as framers of the future constitution of Pakistan. In any case Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic State – to be ruled by priests with a divine mission. We have many non-Muslims – Hindus, Christians, and Parsis – but they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other citizens and will play their rightful part in the affairs of Pakistan.47

Prime Minister Liaquat ‘Ali Khan stated in November 1948 that the new state’s problem was ‘to keep the Islamic ideals before us and at the same time to adopt and absorb all that is valuable in modern life’.48 Education, especially for women, was seen as essential for Pakistan’s progress.49 So too was Jinnah’s formulation of ‘not only justice but generosity’ for the religious minorities.50 Legislation in the new Islamic democracy might be guided by the *shari’a*, but ‘we are not bound to accept the interpretation which vested interests may give to the laws of the *shari’at* simply to secure their own selfish ends ...’.51 ‘It is obvious that people who consider that Islam, as a religion, bars progress, do not understand the real spirit of Islam. It can be asserted without any fear of contradiction that no religion gives the same importance to knowledge and education as is given by Islam.’52

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49 Ibid., 192.
50 Ibid., 194.
51 Ibid., 267.
52 Ibid., 268.
The people of Pakistan have now taken up the formidable problem of creating a society based on the Islamic principles of social justice, equality and brotherhood of man. Some people think that it is an impossible task. They say, you cannot have a really progressive State based on Islamic principles. These people fail completely to understand the basic principles of Islam and the real spirit behind it which at one time made it sweep the whole world ....

Moving the Objectives Resolution on 7 March 1949, Liaquat Ali Khan stated that Pakistan was in the process of setting up [a polity] which may prove to be a laboratory to the world that Islam is not only a progressive force in the world but it also provides remedies for many of the ills from which humanity has been suffering.

Undermining the Conception of Pakistan of Iqbal and Jinnah: ‘Shari’atization’ and the Spread of Jihadism since the Regime of Zia-ul-Haq

Although the religious parties in Pakistan have historically paid lip service to the views of Iqbal and Jinnah, they presume to provide a ‘correct interpretation’ of their views. This amounts to undermining or overturning the foundational principles of the state of Pakistan. Their idea of a Muslim-majority state has been distorted by political Islam into something quite different – an Islamic state defined on their terms. Mawdudi’s Jamaat Islami, which had already led the campaigns against the Ahmadiyya community in 1953 and 1974, gradually came to champion the revivalist cause of the shari’ah and linked its cause with the various groups of ulama.

Partly as a result, the period of Zia-ul-Haq’s administration (1977–89) saw a rapid programme of Islamization, the culmination of a battle for the reconstruction of the shari’ah led by the ulama, in which the interests of Zia’s regime in gaining increased legitimacy, and the ulama and the Jamaat Islami in reinforcing their position in society, proved mutually reinforcing. Whereas Iqbal had advocated licensing the ulama and considered that Ataturk’s exclusion of their role from the religious life of the people ‘would have delighted the heart of an Ibn Taimiyah or a Shah Waliullah’, Zia launched a massive programme for the Islamization of education, in which Khurshid Ahmad, deputy amir of the Jamaat Islami, compiled the prescribed texts. The Jamaat’s ideas about the Islamic state and shari’ah thus gained currency among the young graduates of this period.

Thousands of new madrassas, the majority highly conservative and exclusivist from the Deobandi or Wahhabi traditions, were established and patronized by Zia-ul-Haq: their numbers rose from 137 in 1947 and 210 in 1950 to 1,896 in 1982. Between 1988 and 2002, the numbers rose exponentially with the apparent abandonment by the state of the cause of secular education: there were 2,801 madrassas in 1988 but 9,880 by 2002. However, although the madrassas were bastions of a traditionalist, anti-modern education, as well as hostile to faiths other than Islam, they were not necessarily training grounds for Islamic militants. Yoginder Sikand emphasizes that not all, or even most, Pakistani Islamic militants were madrassa students – many of them, as in the case of the Jamaati-i-Islami activists, were educated in regular schools or even in colleges and universities. The vast majority of the Muslim activists who

57 Ibid., 247, 253.
Islam’s Predicament with Modernity

Much of this might be dismissed as political posturing and demogagucry to coincide with the ‘million march’ organized by the MMA against the federal government in 2005, were it not for the fact that it has to be viewed against a series of theoretical positions advanced by the vice-president (Naib Amir) of the Jamaati-i-Islami, Professor Khurshid Ahmad, an MMA senator who was also Rector of the Markfield Institute for Higher Education in Leicestershire, UK. These took the form of Urdu editorials in Tarjuman Ul Quran, but subsequently, after some delay, they appeared in English under the Isharat section of the Jamaati-i-Islami website. The most overtly confrontational was an editorial which appeared in July 2004, entitled “‘Enlightened Moderation’ or the new US ‘Religious Order’”.

In this, Khurshid Ahmad denied the relevance of ‘enlightened moderation’ to the situation of Pakistan:

‘Enlightened Moderation’ has definitely no relevance to our own needs. It is related neither to our socio-cultural moorings. It is instead a pointer to the change being contemplated for removing Islam and the Muslim society and culture from their own basis to synchronize them with Western demands ...

[President Musharraf] equates the upsurge for Islamic renaissance with terrorism and is apprehensive of a possible clash between the Islamic civilization and the global forces of oppression and tyranny. He is, therefore, advocating ‘enlightened moderation’ and ‘liberalism’ as the panacea for all ills of the world. He is at pains to impress that there is no contradiction between Islam and ‘Modernism–Secularism’ and [that] the two can walk hand in hand. It is for the first time that he is now openly supporting Secularism. The cat of ‘Enlightenment’ has thus come out of the bag. It does not remain a secret any more which way he is leading the country and to what end in view ...

This ‘new Islam’ aims at suspending the shari’a in practice and paving the way for Westernization through the separation of the state and religion and modernization. Islam may thus be retained in name while a secular order [is] actually promoted so as to win the US and Western approval for an ‘enlightened’ and ‘moderate’ religion that may be to them free from the elements of fundamentalism and extremism. Rather, in such an Islam they could see and reflect their civilizational values and traditions and also bear the stamp of authenticity ...

Zia-ul-Haq also promulgated a series of ordinances enforcing the Islamic penal laws (hudud), which had hitherto never been implemented. In 1985, a law prescribed the death sentence for the offence of blasphemy against the Prophet and the Qur’an. The Jamaat Islami, along with other religious groups in other Muslim countries, launched a jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The reconstruction of shari’a, the implementation of the hudud laws, the expansion of the madrassas and the new jihadi culture they nurtured were all part of a closing down of the openness of the modern Islamic democracy that Iqbal and Jinnah had propounded, which seemed to have become an unfulfilled promise.

The extent to which the public debate in Pakistan has become trapped into a traditionalist versus secularist dichotomy may be ascertained from some of the debates in recent years. In a statement on 22 March 2005, Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) President Qazi Hussain Ahmad (also President [Naib Amir] of the Jamaati-i-Islami) called upon people at large to start a movement against the government, calling President Musharraf’s policy of so-called ‘enlightened moderation’ a threat to the identity of Pakistan and Islamic values. He claimed that the rulers had become a tool in the hands of the US government, at whose dictates the educational curriculum had been changed, the Hudud Ordinance was being amended and the religious status column in the passport was being abolished. He argued that efforts were being made to undermine Islamic values and promote Hindu culture and vulgarity [sic] in the country. He made it clear that no move against religious values or the Islamic identity of the country would be tolerated. Government policies were termed contrary both to Islamic principles and the interest of the nation.

60 Ibid., 160–7.
For Khurshid Ahmad, it is the forces of ‘liberalism,’ ‘modernism’ and ‘secularism’ which have done the greatest damage within the Muslim world. His list of ‘failed’ leaders is impressive in its eclecticism:

In the Muslim World ... the secular and liberal leaderships have been responsible for its abject failure. Kamal Ataturk and Reza Shah of Iran were the symbols of this ‘Modernism’. Gamal Abdel Nasser, Hafiz Al Assad, Habib Bourgiba, Hourri Boumediene, Saddam Hussain and Muammar Qadhafi have been the models of liberal and secular leaderships and all of them contributed in varying degrees to the debasement and disgrace of the Muslim World. The same is the case with Pakistan and its liberal and secular leaderships from Field Marshal Ayub Khan to General Pervez Musharraf.

The ‘real aim’ of Musharraf, he contended, was to undermine Islam itself:

Musharraf believes that secularism is not opposed to Islam, whereas it is contrary to the Islam’s philosophy of life and negates the very raison d’être of Pakistan. In case his statement is due to ignorance about the concept of secularism and its implications, it is an ignorance that cannot be ‘a bliss’. But if it is part of a deliberate manoeuvre, then the General should remember that whoever amongst his predecessors from Iskandar Mirza to Ayub Khan has ventured to toe this pro-West approach has eventually had to lick his own wounds. The Muslim Ummah will never accept the secular approach to life. The real objective of the ‘New US Religious Order’ is to introduce in the Muslim World a system based on the division between the spiritual and the temporal and the religion and politics. This ‘New Religious Order’ seeks to promote an ascetic view of Islam, that restricts religion to homes and mosques, while the entire affairs of life are run according to the precepts and ideologies suited to the West. It is an order that aims at holding the shari’a in abeyance and jihad abrogated. Such a development would however, mean an open declaration of war against Allah ... and his Last Messenger ....

Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization of laws was undertaken in haste and promulgated without debate or scrutiny. At the time, the ordinances were criticized by lawyers, women’s groups and human rights organizations.63 Events following the killing of Salman Taseer, the prominent governor of Punjab Province in 2011, have demonstrated just how far Islamization has penetrated Pakistan’s society and how difficult it is for a prominent politician to criticize the operation of the blasphemy law or oppose the religious parties.64 Many of the young lawyers who demonstrated against Taseer and in favour of his assassin were educated in the madrassas established in Zia’s era which have provided Pakistan with a dysfunctional educational system.65 At the time this book went to press, no prominent politician in Pakistan was prepared openly to campaign for a repeal of the blasphemy laws,66 in spite of vehement criticism from abroad67 and the evident contradiction between this legislation and the intentions of the founding fathers of the state. Worse still, on 2 March 2011, the (Roman Catholic) minister for minorities, Clement Shahbaz Bhatti, a committed proponent of Jinnah’s founding vision for Pakistan, who sought to ‘make this world beautiful by delivering a message of peace, togetherness, unity and tolerance’ was also assassinated.68 Human Rights Watch called Mr Bhatti’s assassination a set-

63 Masud, ‘Communicative action and the social construction of shar’ia in Pakistan’, 173.


65 Carlotta Gall, ‘Lawyers’ support for Taseer’s assassin worries Pak’, New York Times (11 Jan. 2011). Gall notes, however, that Rao Abdur Raheem, and six of his colleagues in the Movement to Protect the Dignity of the Prophet, were all university graduates and that only one had had a religious training in a madrassa. Carlotta Gall, ‘Pakistan faces a divide of age on Muslim law’, New York Times (10 Jan. 2011). ‘In their deep religious conviction, and in their energy and commitment to the cause of the blasphemy laws, they are miles apart from the older generation of lawyers and law enforcement officials above them.’


back for the struggle for tolerance, pluralism and respect for human rights in the country. The murder was condemned by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Western political leaders such as Barack Obama and David Cameron, Pope Benedict XVI and the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, representing the Anglican communion.

Conclusion

Pakistan provides the case of a liberal guiding vision of the founding fathers – Iqbal, Jinnah and Liaquat ‘Ali, who sought to establish a progressive state based on Islamic principles – which was undermined almost from the outset by the religious ultra-conservatives. Can the ‘behavioural lag’ between what Muslims think and what they actually do be overcome? Islamists refer to the norms of the *shari'a*, Bassam Tibi contends, but ‘they do something else, namely, invent tradition.’ ‘Can a legal philosophy emerge in Islam’, he asks, ‘that allows human reasoning on law to counter the shari’atization that is currently pursued by Islamism to the detriment of Islam?’69 This is just one of the debates that needs to be pursued in the reform of the currently dysfunctional Pakistani state. Until this reform debate takes place, it is unlikely that Pakistan will be able to end what India refers to as Pakistan’s ‘compulsive hostility’ towards it,70 because it is precisely against the background of this confrontation that the religious parties are most successful in projecting their agenda.71

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Postscript


United Nations, General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Sixteenth session. Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development. Freedom of religion or belief. 18 March 2011 (draft circulated); 24 March 2011 (draft accepted).

The Human Rights Council

Recalling General Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 November 1981, in which the General Assembly proclaimed the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief,

Recalling also article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant human rights provisions,

Recalling further Human Rights Council resolution 14/11 of 18 June 2010 and other resolutions on the elimination of all forms of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief adopted by the General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights,

Reaffirming that all human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated,

Stressing that everyone, including persons belonging to religious minorities, should be able to live safely and to exercise freely their freedom of religion or belief,

Recalling the primary duty of States to protect everyone within their territory, including persons belonging to religious minorities, and to safeguard their rights, including their right to exercise freely their religion or belief,

Noting with regret that no part of the world is exempt from religious intolerance, discrimination and violence,
Expressing solidarity with States and individuals combating violence against members of religious minorities, and paying tribute to the commitment of states to prevent these acts,

Underlining that schools may offer unique possibilities for constructive dialogue among all parts of society, and that human rights education in particular can contribute to the elimination of negative stereotypes that often adversely affect members of religious minorities,

1. Stresses that everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion or belief, which includes the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of one's choice, and the freedom, either alone or in community with others, and in public or private, to manifest one's religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance, including the right to change one's religion or belief;

2. Emphasizes that freedom of religion or belief and freedom of expression are interdependent, interrelated and mutually reinforcing, and stresses the role that these rights can play in the fight against all forms of intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief;

3. Expresses deep concern at the emerging obstacles to the enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion or belief, as well as at the increasing number of instances of religious intolerance, discrimination and violence, inter alia:
   (a) Recent acts of violence directed against individuals and or persons belonging to religious minorities in various parts of the world;
   (b) The rise of religious extremism in various parts of the world that affects the rights of individuals and persons belonging to religious minorities;
   (c) Attacks on religious places, sites and shrines, as well as vandalism of cemeteries, in violation of international law, in particular human rights law and humanitarian law;

4. Condemns all forms of violence, intolerance and discrimination based on or in the name of religion or belief, as well as violations of the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, as well as any advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, whether it involves the use of print, audio-visual or electronic media or any other means;

5. Also condemns recent violence and acts of terrorism targeting persons belonging to religious minorities across the world;

6. Emphasizes that States have an obligation to protect persons belonging to religious minorities and should exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and punish acts of violence against them, regardless of the perpetrator, and that failure to do so may constitute a human rights violation;

7. Urges States to step up their efforts to protect and promote freedom of thought, conscience and religion or belief, and to this end:
   (a) To ensure that their constitutional and legislative systems provide adequate and effective guarantees of freedom of thought, conscience and religion or belief to all without distinction by, inter alia, the provision of access to justice and effective remedies in cases where the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion or belief, or the right to freely practise one's religion, including the right to change one's religion or belief, is violated;
   (b) To ensure that no one within their jurisdiction is deprived of the right to life, liberty or security of person because of religion or belief and that no one is subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or arbitrary arrest or detention on that account, and to bring to justice all perpetrators of violations of these rights;
   (c) To end violations of the human rights of women and to devote particular attention to abolishing practices and legislation that discriminates against women, including in the exercise of their right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion or belief;
   (d) To ensure that no one is discriminated against on the basis of his or her religion or belief in their access to, inter alia, education, medical care, employment, humanitarian assistance or social benefits, and to ensure that everyone has the right and the opportunity to have access, on general terms of equality, to public services in their country, without any discrimination on the basis of religion or belief;
   (e) To review, whenever relevant, existing registration practices in order to ensure that such practices do not limit the right of all persons to manifest their religion or belief, either alone or in community with others and in public or private;
   (f) To ensure that no official documents are withheld from the individual on the grounds of religion or belief and that everyone has the right to refrain from disclosing information concerning their religious affiliation in such documents against their will;
   (g) To ensure, in particular, the right of all persons to worship, assemble or teach in connection with a religion or belief and their right to establish and maintain places for these purposes, and the right of all persons to seek, receive and impart information and ideas in these areas;
   (h) To ensure that, in accordance with appropriate national legislation and in conformity with international human rights law, the freedom of all persons and members of groups to establish and maintain religious, charitable or humanitarian institutions is fully respected and protected;
   (i) To ensure that all public officials and civil servants, including members of law enforcement bodies, and personnel of detention facilities, the military and
13. Decides to remain seized of this question under the same agenda item and to con-
tinue consideration of measures to implement the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief.

http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/sdpage_e.aspx?b=10&se=113&t=4
The UN ref is A/HRC/16/L.14
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### Timeline of the India–Pakistan Conflict

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<td>14–15 August 1947</td>
<td>Establishment of the independent state of Pakistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 August 1947</td>
<td>Establishment of the independent state of India.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 October 1947</td>
<td>&quot;Lashkar&quot; of 5,000 tribal raiders from FATA (Pakistan) enters Jammu and Kashmir via Muzaffarabad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 October 1947</td>
<td>Tribal raiders capture Baramulla located 35 miles from Srinagar. Maharaja Hari Singh flees to Jammu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 October 1947</td>
<td>Indian troops begin to arrive at Srinagar. Instrument of Accession signed by the Maharaja of Kashmir in effect empowers Indian troops to intervene in the Kashmir war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 October 1947</td>
<td>Uprising of Gilgit Scouts in Gilgit. Their British commander, Major Brown, raises the Pakistan flag three days later.</td>
</tr>
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<td>1 January 1948</td>
<td>India lodges complaint against Pakistan with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 April 1948</td>
<td>Resolution of the UNSC on Kashmir.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 June 1949</td>
<td>Under the auspices of UNCIP, a ceasefire line agreement is signed by India and Pakistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 October 1949</td>
<td>Article 370 is inserted into the Indian Constitution providing special rights to Kashmir not given to other states in India.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 April 1950</td>
<td>Signature of Liaquat–Nehru pact at New Delhi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 April 1950</td>
<td>Appointment by UNSC of Sir Owen Dixon as UN representative on Kashmir.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 January 1951</td>
<td>Statement on Kashmir by President of UNSC.</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 October 1951</td>
<td>Assassination of Liaquat 'Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 March 1953</td>
<td>UNSC representative Frank Graham reports on the failure of his mission to resolve the Kashmir dispute.</td>
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<td>20 August 1953</td>
<td>Pakistan and India agree to the appointment of a plebiscite administrator for Kashmir by the end of April 1954.</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 January 1957</td>
<td>New arrangements for the incorporation of Jammu and Kashmir (J&amp;K) into India come into force.</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 &amp; 30 March 1957</td>
<td>Elections to the J&amp;K state assembly held.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 September 1959</td>
<td>Ayub Khan–Nehru talks at Delhi mention a settlement of the Kashmir dispute.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 September 1960</td>
<td>Signature of the Indus Water Treaty by Ayub Khan and Nehru, brokered by the World Bank. (The Treaty remains in force in spite of subsequent armed conflicts between India and Pakistan.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 October 1962</td>
<td>Chinese offensive launched across India's borders.</td>
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<tr>
<td>21 November 1962</td>
<td>China announces a unilateral ceasefire.</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 December 1962</td>
<td>Six rounds of secret talks on Kashmir held between India and Pakistan at insistence of US and UK, ending 16 May 1965 without agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 March 1963</td>
<td>Sino–Pakistan border and territorial agreement signed. Denounced by India.</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 May 1964</td>
<td>Death of Nehru without having redeemed his pledge to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir.</td>
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<td>16 October 1964</td>
<td>First Chinese nuclear test (codenamed 596).</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 August 1965</td>
<td>Five-week war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir begins with the infiltration of Pakistan troops without uniforms across the LoC.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 January 1966</td>
<td>Signature of the Tashkent Agreement by Ayub Khan of Pakistan and Prime Minister Shastri of India. Shashtri dies after signing the agreement.</td>
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<td>19 February 1968</td>
<td>Award made by the Rann of Kutch Tribunal. Sir Creek not subject to the award and remains a source of dispute between India and Pakistan.</td>
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<td>1 July 1968</td>
<td>Signature of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by the UK, US and USSR and several other states, but not India and Pakistan.</td>
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<td>3 December 1971</td>
<td>Pakistan declares war on India. India recognizes Bangladesh as an independent state on 6 Dec.</td>
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<td>14 December 1971</td>
<td>Third veto by USSR at UNSC on US resolution for a ceasefire and troop withdrawal from East Pakistan.</td>
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<td>16 December 1971</td>
<td>Pakistani Army surrenders at Dhaka, marking the defeat of Pakistan by India in the Bangladesh war. Capture of 74,000 Pakistani PoWs by India (not 91,000 as claimed at the time). In addition 16,370 Pakistani civilians taken prisoner. Former East Pakistan becomes the de facto sovereign state of Bangladesh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 December 1971</td>
<td>UNSC Resolution on a ceasefire in the war.</td>
</tr>
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<td>20 January 1972</td>
<td>Secret meeting of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto with 263 of Pakistan's top scientists: the decision to plan for a nuclear weapon within three years is taken.</td>
</tr>
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<td>2 July 1972</td>
<td>Simla Accord between Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The agreement is ratified by the Pakistan National Assembly on 15 July and by the Indian Parliament on 10 August.</td>
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<td>11 December 1972</td>
<td>Agreement on the delineation of the LoC between Pakistan and India.</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 February 1974</td>
<td>Pakistan recognizes Bangladesh, which is admitted to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 May 1974</td>
<td>Supposedly 'peaceful' Indian nuclear test (PNE) at Pokhran ('Smiling Buddha').</td>
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<td>19 May 1974</td>
<td>Zulfikar Ali Bhutto demands a 'nuclear umbrella' for Pakistan to protect it from nuclear blackmail by India.</td>
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<td>11 September 1974</td>
<td>National Assembly of Pakistan declares the Ahmadiyya sect to be non-Muslim</td>
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<td>25–26 June 1975</td>
<td>Indira Gandhi imposes Emergency, which lasts for 21 months.</td>
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<td>15 August 1975</td>
<td>Assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, President of Bangladesh.</td>
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<td>24 July 1976</td>
<td>Formal resumption of diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan, suspended in 1971.</td>
</tr>
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<td>5 July 1977</td>
<td>Coup d'état by Zia-ul-Haq in Pakistan, who declares martial law and appoints himself chief martial law administrator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 March 1978</td>
<td>Zulfikar Ali Bhutto sentenced to death by unanimous decision of the Lahore High Court; executed 4 April 1979.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 September 1978</td>
<td>Zia-ul-Haq sworn in as President of Pakistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1979</td>
<td>Islamization measures announced by President Zia. (In Dec. 1986 an international commission of jurists mission to Pakistan calls for the repeal of certain of the measures as inequitable.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Under Zia, a constitutional amendment redefines who is and who is not a Muslim."

1 November 1982
Meeting between Zia and Indira Gandhi in New Delhi leads to the establishment of SAARC.

5–6 June 1984
Assault by the Indian Army on the Golden Temple in Amritsar (Operation Bluestar). The leader of the Sikh militants, S. J. Bhindranwale, is found among the dead.

30 September 1987
Military clashes in the Siachen Glacier area: India seizes 579 square miles of territory to which Pakistan lays claim.

17 August 1988
President Zia is killed in a plane crash. Ghulam Ishaq Khan becomes acting president and General Mirza Aslam Beg chief of army staff.

2 December 1988
Benazir Bhutto sworn in as prime minister of Pakistan.

13 March 1990
Benazir Bhutto refers to the situation in Kashmir as a jihad. On 1 April she recalls her father’s determination to fight over Kashmir if necessary for 1,000 years.

15 May 1990
International Conference on Kashmir’s ‘freedom movement’ organized by Jamaat-i-Islami in Lahore.

24 May 1990
Benazir Bhutto denounces the idea of an independent Kashmir as carrying dangerous consequences for India and Pakistan.

6 August 1990
Dismissal of Benazir’s government by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan.

10 November 1990
Nawaz Sharif sworn in as prime minister of Pakistan.

27 January 1991
Agreement between India and Pakistan on prohibition of attacks on each other’s nuclear installations and facilities comes into effect.

22 May 1991
Assassination of Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi.

1 January 1992
India and Pakistan exchange lists of nuclear installations and facilities in accordance with the agreement of 27 Jan. 1991.

24 December 1992
Pakistan National Assembly adopts a resolution condemning the demolition of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya (India) and demanding its reconstruction at the original site.

18 April 1993
President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismisses Nawaz Sharif’s government and dissolves National Assembly.

27 May 1993
Restoration of Nawaz Sharif as prime minister following a decision of the Supreme Court the previous day.

19 October 1993
Benazir Bhutto becomes prime minister for the second time following general elections in Pakistan.

9 April 1995
India declares readiness for dialogue with Pakistan on Kashmir. On 17 May India rules out third-party mediation.

22 June 1997
Pakistan and India agree on a mechanism for sustained dialogue, identifying eight issues, including J&K, as the agenda.

17 October 1997
Nawaz Sharif returns as prime minister of Pakistan after winning elections.

19 March 1998
Atal Bihari Vajpayee as prime minister leads a BJP-led coalition government in India which remains in power until 19 May 2004.

3 May 1998
Three nuclear devices exploded by India. Two more exploded on 13 May.

28 May 1998
Pakistan responds by exploding five nuclear devices.

16–18 October 1998
Beginning of the so-called ‘composite dialogue’ process between India and Pakistan.

21 February 1999
Summit meeting between Nawaz Sharif and Vajpayee ends with the Lahore Declaration.

2 May 1999
So-called Kargil war begins with the first encounter of Indian troops with Pakistan troops who had crossed the LoC. Conflict ends on 4 July with Nawaz Sharif’s agreement for an unconditional withdrawal.

11 September 2001
Terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and on the Pentagon (‘9/11’) lead to heavy US pressure on Pakistan to change its foreign policy, particularly with regard to Afghanistan.
<table>
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<th>Event Description</th>
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<td>13 December 2001</td>
<td>Terrorist attack by members of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) on the Indian Lok Sabha, leading to twelve deaths.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 December 2001</td>
<td>India mobilizes its army and responds to the terrorist attack of 13 Dec. by ordering Operation Victory (Parakram), the mobilization of Indian armed forces on the border with Pakistan. War in Jan. 2002 is averted by international mediation. The mobilization is eventually ended on 10 June and de-escalation is gradually implemented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 January 2002</td>
<td>Landmark televised broadcast by President Musharraf, announcing the banning of several militant organizations and the stark choice for Pakistan between 'enlightened moderation' and obscurantist sectarianism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 March 2002</td>
<td>President Musharraf calls for a resumption of talks between India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 April 2003</td>
<td>On a visit to Indian-administered Kashmir, Prime Minister Vajpayee offers dialogue with Pakistan on the issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 August 2003</td>
<td>President Musharraf orders a ceasefire along the LoC between Pakistan- and Indian-administered Kashmir. The ceasefire comes into effect on 27 November.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 January 2004</td>
<td>President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee hold direct talks at Islamabad on the sidelines of the SAARC meeting; ‘resumption of the composite dialogue will lead to peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 April 2004</td>
<td>President Musharraf tells a meeting at Lahore that there can be no question of Pakistan’s accepting the LoC as the solution to the Kashmir issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 May 2004</td>
<td>Prime Minister Manmohan Singh assumes office following his Congress-led UPA victory in the Indian general elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 August 2004</td>
<td>Prime Minister Singh states that India wants a purposive bilateral dialogue with Pakistan to resolve all outstanding issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 September 2004</td>
<td>First meeting between Prime Minister Singh and President Musharraf in New York. They agree on the need for confidence-building measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 October 2004</td>
<td>President Musharraf proposes a five-point plan for the settlement of the Kashmir issue, including that Pakistan will no longer insist on a plebiscite in Kashmir.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 April 2005</td>
<td>India’s Cabinet agrees to seven CBMs for Kashmir.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 April 2005</td>
<td>India and Pakistan agree to four CBMs. Further CBMs are agreed in August after talks in New Delhi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 September 2005</td>
<td>Second meeting between Prime Minister Singh and President Musharraf at the UN's World Summit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 May 2006</td>
<td>Breakdown of the tenth round of talks between India and Pakistan on withdrawing troops from the Siachen Glacier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 July 2006</td>
<td>President Musharraf condemns the bomb attacks in Mumbai as ‘despicable’ and offers help to the Indian investigation of the perpetrators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 March 2007</td>
<td>President Musharraf suspends Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, Chief Justice of Pakistan’s Supreme Court, for unspecified misuse of authority, leading to prolonged conflict with the judiciary and the eventual reinstatement of Chaudhry on 20 July. Chaudhry is dismissed again in Nov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 December 2007</td>
<td>Pakistan’s state of emergency imposed by Musharraf on 3 Nov. is lifted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 December 2007</td>
<td>Benazir Bhutto, leader of the PPP, is assassinated at an election rally in Rawalpindi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 February 2008</td>
<td>General election held in Pakistan. The PPP and PML(N) initially form a new coalition government with Youssuf Raza Gillani as prime minister (24 March). The PML(N) ministers resign on 13 May.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 August 2008</td>
<td>The PPP and PML(N) agree to impeach President Musharraf if he refuses to resign.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 August 2008</td>
<td>Resignation of Musharraf, who goes into exile at residences in London and Dubai.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 September 2008</td>
<td>Asif Ali Zardari, co-leader of the PPP and widower of Benazir Bhutto, becomes President of Pakistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 November 2008</td>
<td>More than ten coordinated attacks on Mumbai (‘26/11’ – India’s 9/11) by LeT terrorists, whose planning seems to originate in Pakistan: 164 people killed and 308 wounded. India suspends the ‘composite dialogue’ process with Pakistan and threatens retaliation against alleged training camps unless the suspected masterminds are brought to justice. (In Nov 2009, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh states that Pakistan has still not done enough to bring the perpetrators of the attacks to justice.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 March 2009</td>
<td>Prime Minister Gillani restores Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry as Chief Justice of Pakistan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9 January 2011  Prime Minister Gillani argues that India should restore the ‘composite dialogue’ process. Relations between the two states should not be made hostage to ‘one terror incident’, he claims.

9 February 2011  Foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan, meeting at Thimpu, agree that the ‘composite dialogue’ process should restart shortly.

30 March 2011  Resumption of the ‘composite dialogue’ process following the meeting of the Pakistani and Indian prime ministers at the Punjab Cricket Association Stadium at Mohali during the semi-final of the cricket world cup between Pakistan and India (won by India). The opposition BJP criticizes the attitude taken by the Indian government in resuming the dialogue with Pakistan and whether it flowed from its assessment of national interests or from international pressure.

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