

- Sen, Amartya (1997). "Human Rights and Asian Values: What Lee Kuan Yew and Le Peng Don't Understand about Asia." *The New Republic*, 217 (2-3), 33-40.
- Shin, Don Chull (2008). "The Third Wave in East Asia: Comparative and Dynamic Perspectives." *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*, 4 (2), 91-131.
- Taagepera, Rein & Matthew Shugart (1989). *Seats and Votes*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Taagepera, Rein & Mirjam Allik (2006). "Seat Share Distribution of Parties: Models and Empirical Patterns." *Electoral Systems*, 25, 696-713.
- Thompson, Mark R. (2001). "Whatever Happened to 'Asian Values'?" *Journal of Democracy*, 12 (4), 154-165.
- Tsai, Chia-hung (2005). "Policy Making, Local Factions and Candidate Coordination in SNTV: A Case Study in Taiwan." *Party Politics*, 11 (1), 59-77.
- Yu, Ching-Hsin (2005). "The Evolving Party System in Taiwan." *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 40, 105-123.
- Zakaria, Fareed (1994). "Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew". *Foreign Affairs*, 73 (2), 189-194.

## Afghanistan Quagmire and India-Pakistan "Strategic" Rivalry: Is Cooperation Possible?

Amit Ranjan

*Independent Researcher, India*

### Abstract

With the U.S.-led NATO's exit from Afghanistan in 2014, there is all possibility of its re-falling into the clutches of Islamic fundamentalists, and re-surface of civil war among the ethnic groups. Is there a way to control the fall-out? Peace could be a possibility, only when there is co-operation between the two South Asian archrivals- India and Pakistan- on the issues related to Afghanistan.

Keywords: *NATO, post-2014, Afghanistan, Pakhtoon, Taliban, India-Pakistan rivalries, cooperation*

### Introduction

In an enduring war between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Islamic fundamentalist groups, many people have lost their lives, and Afghanistan has turned into a devastated land mass. It has lost whatever basic infrastructure it had. In October, 2001, no one would assume that the Global War on Terror (GWOT) would stretch for more than a decade, but it has. At present, there are nearly 150,000 heavily-armed forces active in Afghanistan, which are 30,000 more than the number of troops deployed by the Soviet Union during the war in the 1980s. (Blackwill 2011, 42-50). Increasing numbers of casualties of defense personnel had forced the United States to call its troops back. In 2012 it was announced that the NATO will make a complete withdrawal by mid-2014. It was hoped that, in almost two years time, some sort of solution would be found, yet-to everybody's dismay-Afghanistan is still marred by violence. In 2013, the U.S. government demurred from its earlier position and decided that even after 2014- NATO troops will maintain nine military posts in Afghanistan.

In this background, a crucial question arises: what will be the political trajectory of Afghanistan after 2014? This question is of less concern to the extra-regional players, but rather unsettles the regional actor(s), who have to face the consequence

of the probable return of the Taliban at the helms of affairs in Afghanistan. Neighboring countries had played a role in the continuation of the civil war and the rise of Islamic radicals in Afghanistan. In the past, almost all of them had lent political and economic support to selected ethnic group(s) in order to achieve some sort of 'strategic' depth against their regional rivals. This decision turned Afghanistan into a Hobbesian state of nature where everyone is against the 'other'. Extra-regional forces just exploited that situation in their strategic interests. At present, though regional actors are worried about the post-2014 challenges, they still have not given up an idea of gaining 'strategic' depth against their rivals. Indiscreetly, all of them are trying to enter into an alliance with ethnic warlords, so that they have strong say vis-à-vis their rivals in any form of post-NATO exit political set-up in Afghanistan.

More than any other neighbors, India and Pakistan have remained important players in Afghanistan. Their bilateral rivalries — as far as the issue of nation-building is concerned — had kept Afghanistan in a state of comatose. Pakistan played a larger role in this, than India. It used the post-Soviet withdrawal Mujahids to achieve two of its, strategic-cum-political goals: to fight a proxy war against Indian security forces, and to wind up the Pakhtoonistan issue. It succeeded in its aims, but at the cost of radicalizing its own society. On the other hand, India had never engaged Pakistan on the Afghanistan issue. Also, it never tried to address the strategic concerns of Pakistan, due to India's political alignment with Afghanistan.

This paper first discusses India-Pakistan relations in the context of Afghanistan and their interferences in the country's internal affairs, since 1947. Next, this paper theoretically builds up a debate in favor of cooperation between India and Pakistan on the Afghanistan issue. In so doing, the paper attempts to answer the following questions: (a) Why is Afghanistan in turmoil? (b) What role did India and Pakistan play in Afghanistan? (c) Can they cooperate to establish peace in post-2014 Afghanistan?

### **Political quagmire in Afghanistan**

By all indicators, Afghanistan fits into the category of failed states. Definition wise, according to TV Paul, a 'failed state' has failed to achieve and sustain security, welfare, and legitimacy. Such a state may have limited control over its territory and it depends heavily on foreign finance and military for its existence. Afghanistan is the closest case of a failed state in South Asia because it survives largely through external support and has limited or no control over vast chunk of its territory (Paul 2011, 3-27). The security environment in 2001 and 2002 was chaotic largely because the Afghan state had ceased to function. There was an anarchic security situation. (Miller 2011, 51-65). Since then, security situation has not markedly improved. At present the state is sovereign, but its writ does not run beyond Kabul.

Historically, due to its geographical location and demography, Afghanistan has remained a 'failed state' for major portion of its political existence. The first mention of the area, currently known as Afghanistan, occurs in the Zoroastrian scriptures recorded during the reign of Cyrus the great (530 B.C.). It is a remarkably old

country founded as a kingdom by the Pashto tribal chiefs exactly two centuries before the birth of its immediate southern neighbor, Pakistan, and the independence of India. Ahmad Shah from the Abdali tribe was selected as the first king of the Afghans in 1747 by the Pashto tribes (Rais 2011, 195-219). During the colonial era, British India and Czarist Russia treated it as a buffer state. Its independence was secured by King Amanullah in 1920, but it remained under the umbrella of British imperialism until they left the subcontinent in 1947 (Marsden 1998).

Nearly two-thirds of Afghanistan's land mass is covered by mountains. Majority of them are from Hindukush range. Other includes: Torkestan Mountains, Sial Kuh range, northern reaching Hesar Mountains, and south-west reaching Malmad and Khakbad mountains. (Meredith 2007, 2-3). These high mountains and deep valleys have played a vital role in the struggle for control of Afghanistan, and have been important to the defense of the country (Ibid). Only 12% of its total land area is arable. Demographically, it is ethnically fractured. It constitutes of 40% Pashtoons, 25% Tajiks, 20% Hazaras and 6% Uzbeks (Hagrety & Hagrety 2007, 113-133). It also has other minor ethnic groups like the Aimaks, the Turks and the Balochs (Meredith 2007, 4). Majority members of these ethnic groups live in Afghanistan's neighboring countries. From there they guard their group's interests in Afghanistan and in the region. The neighboring states have used these dependency linkages with Afghan social groups to play their miniature "great game" in the region (Rais 2011, 195-219).

Afghanistan's geo-strategic location and ethnic composition have kept it in a state of war due to which the idea of a common belonging or a nation failed to get constructed. In Afghanistan, state structures are alien to the multiple ethnic groups and tribes; people's allegiance is directed primarily towards the local community. They have nothing in common except their religion-Islam (Oliver Roy, cited in Marsden 1998, 30). Therefore, the pattern of interaction between the state and society remained, more or less, tribal and feudalistic due to the low capacity of the state to deliver services and the absence of an idea of citizenship. Afghan individuals interact with the state, not as citizens in any modern sense of the word, but as members of primordial social formations such as tribes, ethnic communities, religious sects, and other networks. These traditional institutions maintained their own political space and allowed the state only limited access to its members (Rais 2011, 195-219).

In 1964 – with the promulgation of a constitution by King Zahir Shah – Afghanistan experienced, for the first time in centuries, some degree of modernity towards the establishment of a modern nation state. The political experiment opened up Afghan politics, marking the beginning of relatively free debates in the parliament and criticism by the press. The autonomous structures of the local authorities existed parallel to state institutions and performed state- like functions such as maintaining local order and providing dispute resolution (cited in Rais 2011, 195-219).

That experiment backfired because the nascent institutions failed to manage the political demands raised by the people. The late 1960s witnessed growing dissent, as young people came to the capital from other parts of the country to take advantage of expanded education opportunities, particularly at Kabul University, and found a system that was still highly elitist. As a result, radical movements found fertile ground

amongst Kabul's student population. Some advocated a much faster process of reform and found a vehicle in the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the first communist party, which was formed in 1965, and had backing from the former USSR. Others vociferously opposed the changes that had already taken place and fought for a return to Islamic values (Marsden 1998, 27). This clash of ideas between these two groups was exploited by the ruling groups of Afghanistan and also by the external forces. They found a strong platform to establish themselves in Afghanistan, hence started competition to support one or the other group, depending upon their self-interests. That also marked the beginning of radical Islam in Afghanistan. Groups of radical Muslims and communists often went head-to-head in their competition for the hearts and minds of the tiny, urban Afghan intelligentsia, mainly on the campus of Kabul University. "Young Islamists became actively militant on the university campus from 1968... against the Soviet infiltration of the state apparatus" (Hagrety & Hagrety 2007, 113-133).

The communist party PDPA failed to remain united for a longer period of time. In 1967 it was divided into two major factions, the *Khalaq* (masses) led by Nur Muhammad Taraki and the *Parcham* (banner/flag) led by Babrak Kamal. The *Khalaq* enjoyed string of support within the Afghan military. On the fringe there were few small extremist groups, such as the Maoists and non-religious group called *Sholah-e-Javed* (eternal flame), attracting non-Pashtos, Shi'a Muslims (as opposed to the Sunni majority of about two-thirds of the population), and others discontented with the functioning of the Left-leaning constitutional monarchy of Zahir Shah (Cooley 1998,11). Broadly the competition to capture power was between two groups - *Khalaq* and *Parcham*. In 1973, King Zahir Shah was overthrown in a military coup by his cousin and former Prime Minister: Mohammad Daoud. To fight against Daoud, the two rival factions of PDPA were re-united in 1977. The union was fragile and short-lived, but it helped to stir another military coup. (Ibid, 12). On 27 April 1978, Daoud, with most of his family members, was killed when resisting that military coup orchestrated by the PDPA, with possible Soviet backing (Marsden 1998). The winning faction in this "Saur" or April Revolution, as it was called, was the *Khalaq*, numerically superior to the less radical, and more cautious *Parcham*. From April 1978, the new President, Nur Mohammad Taraki, was a Marxist writer and front man for the much more capable politician Hafizullah Amin. It was suspected by the Soviets that Amin was pro-American and an agent of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Cooley 1998, 12). The Soviet Union took advantage of the PDPA's assumption of power by engaging ever more deeply on the economic, political and military fronts in Afghanistan. In December 1978, an agreement was signed between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, empowering the Kabul government to call on Moscow for direct military assistance if the need would arise. (Marsden 1998, 28).

The presence of a communist government backed by the Soviet Union had given all the reasons for Islamic groups and followers of the western blocks to fight against the regime in Afghanistan. To help its comrades, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on 25 December 1979. Contrary to various speculations, evidence suggests that Moscow's historical fear of encirclement from the south

was a crucial factor behind the Soviet Union's decision to invade Afghanistan. Growing *rapprochement* between Washington D.C. and Beijing had increased this fear multiple times and created an acute sense of paranoia in the Kremlin (Ibid). The Soviet invasion resulted in the death of President Amin. He was replaced by a relatively moderate member of the PDPA, Barbara Karmal.

The U.S. entered Afghanistan to contain the spread of communism. It was helped by its cold war ally-Pakistan, which supplied Mujahidins (holy warriors) to fight against the 'atheists'. It doled out funds to prepare guerilla fighters in Pakistani Madarsas from where they were ordered to show their in-field martial skill in Afghanistan, against the Soviets and PDPA soldiers (Schofield 2011). The CIA gave U.S. \$51 million to the University of Nebraska to produce textbooks that showed the killing of Russians as sufficiently entertaining and morally justified (Ahmed 2009, 150-180).

The war continued for ten long years and ended with the exit of the Soviet forces. Even after that things did not improve. Once again Afghanistan has been beset with serious political problems. Unable to form a government the Mujahidin started fighting among themselves. To fight against the corruption, debauchery and other menaces carried out by the Mujahids, the Taliban was formed by Mohammad Omar (famously known as Mullah Omar) in October, 1994. (Marsden 1998, 43). The Taliban successfully wiped out many Mujahidin warlords and forced many of them to surrender before them. Afterwards it worked quickly on policies that would bring Afghanistan back to an Islamic centered way of life (Ibid, 46). It was both a symbol of Islamic chauvinism that aimed at recapturing political power and reasserting the traditional dominance of their social group. The Taliban have attempted to create *Wahabi* interpretation of Islam, which has become ingrained in Pashto Islamic practices (Rais 2011, 195-219). By the end of 1996, the Taliban had established power all over the country and consolidated their rule in Afghanistan.

The U.S. and other Western countries had no problem with the Taliban. They engaged with the new leadership. The United States, then, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Robin Raphel reportedly explained to a close door UN session in November 1996: "The Taliban control more than two-thirds of the country, they are Afghan, they are indigenous, they have demonstrated staying power... It is not in the interests of Afghanistan or any of us here that Taliban be isolated. In addition, prominent U.S. specialists on Afghanistan such as Zalmay Khalizad emphasized that the Taliban did not practice the anti-US style of fundamentalism practiced in Iran." (Cited in Hussain 2005, 209). This stand of the U.S. shows that Washington gave prominence to its geo-political and economic interests in the region as opposed to its rhetoric of championing democratic governance and human rights globally (Ibid). The Taliban promised to open doors for the construction of giant gas and oil pipelines from Central Asia down through Afghanistan to Pakistan. The main contender for that pipeline was an American Saudi coalition of UNOCAL and Delta oil companies. The Taliban's most important function was to provide security for roads and potentially oil and gas pipelines that would link the states of Central Asia to the international markets through Pakistan rather than through Iran (Richard 1999, 90-103).

The real problem was Al-Qaida (the base) founder Osama bin Laden. He participated in the US led war against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1970s. After years of wandering in the Arabian Peninsula, he developed a hatred for the Saudi monarchs. Seeking to overthrow the Saudi kingdom, he knew quite well that this was impossible while they enjoyed U.S. protection. Thus his primary goal was to force U.S. troops to withdraw from the Saudi kingdom (Achcar 2002, 58). He vowed to make the U.S. exit from the region. He turned against the government of his country, which he had to flee in 1991 after his return from Afghanistan and against its U.S. overlord. Since then he had been engaged in targeting American installations. In 1995, a first attack on U.S. military infrastructure killed five U.S. soldiers and two Indian workers in Riyadh. Prior to it, in 1993, an attempt was made to destroy the World Trade Centre's twin towers in New York. That attack was attributed to bin Laden. Then in 2000 Al-Qaida operatives carried out a suicide attack on the U.S. naval ship USS *Cole* stationed in Yemen (Ibid, 51-52).

In search of shelter, Osama bin Laden entered in 1996 in an alliance with the Taliban and made Afghanistan his operational headquarter. This alliance was in their mutual interest: the Taliban got financial support which bin Laden got permanent safe shelter. Pakistani secret service and the CIA set up a new commando force in 1999 with the mission of capturing or killing bin Laden in Afghanistan. That project was later suspended because of Pervez Musharraf's military coup (Ibid, 53).

The only challenge both Osama and the Taliban faced was from the Ahmad Shah Masood and his *Panjsheri* forces. Hamid Karzai, himself a Pakhtoon, joined this group to weed out the Taliban (Cole 2004). Few days before September 11, 2001, Masood was assassinated by the Taliban. The attack on the World Trade Centre, in New York, on September 11, 2001 was carried out by the Al-Qaeda operatives. It challenged U.S. sovereignty and was a sign of vulnerability to the U.S. civilians. Bin Laden thought that by attacking U.S. civilians in such a criminal devastating way he would succeed in convincing them to force their rulers to disengage. These terrorist actions against civilians made the targeted population stand more firmly behind their rulers' most reactionary brutal policies. On contrary, as a weak power the Vietnamese succeeded in forcing the withdrawal of U.S. troops from their country in 1973 only by combining in contestably legitimate forms of military struggle against the occupying army with a discourse addressed to the U.S. people, appealing to its sense of justice rather than to its fear. The moral superiority of the Vietnamese struggle largely made up for the inferiority of their military means (Achcar 2002, 60).

There is a theory or conspiracy theory that Niaz Naik, former foreign secretary of Pakistan, claimed on British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) that American diplomats had told him in July 2001 that military action against Afghanistan was being prepared for "sometime in October". Then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell was thus simply arguing that there would be no change in plans: Afghanistan first, Iraq next (Ahmad 2004, 212). U.S. aggression started on 7 October 2001. After September 11, 2009 terrorist attack, non-Pashto ethnic warlords were materially supported by the external powers. Northern Alliance (NA) was set up to defeat Taliban and other terrorist groups. (Rais 2011, 195-219).

Under domestic pressure and due to growing number of casualties of the NATO soldiers – the U.S. has decided to withdraw from Afghanistan. Withdrawal does not mean losing its control from the region. To indirectly establish itself in the region, the U.S. is engaged with various forms of adjustments and looking out for favorable solution. Former U.S. ambassador to India, Robert D. Blackwill crafted a plan, called "plan B", suggesting the *de facto* partition of Afghanistan (Blackwill 2011, 42-50). This – as he suggests – will help western forces to bring the area under their control. Partition of Afghanistan is not going to bring peace in the region because even non-Pashtos, Uzbeks and Hazaras' Tajiks do not share cordial relationships.

The second thing on which the stakeholders in Afghanistan are working on is to politically and diplomatically engage the Taliban. Earlier, the U.S. exploited the chances with so called "soft" Taliban which was met with no success. In 2010 with the blessings of U.S. and British intelligence, the Afghan regime engaged in high level peace talks with a senior Taliban leader, Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour. Unfortunately, after handing over tens of thousands of dollars to encourage Mansour's participation, the supposed Taliban leader turned out to be an imposter (Terecy 2013). In 2010, the Taliban hardliners staged a near successful assassination of Agha Jan Motassim — Mullah Omar's son-in-law — who had led secret talks with the U.S. in Bonn and Doha (Swami 2012). But in December 2012, leaders representing Afghanistan's government and opposition met representatives of the Taliban at a French country home outside Paris. Kabul was represented by the Higher Peace Council — a body charged by President Hamid Karzai to engage in negotiations with the Taliban. The body is led by Salahudin Rabbani. The Taliban were represented by Shahabudin Delawar, the Taliban's former ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. He is based in Doha since 2011 when he helped in setting up a political office for the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan - as the Taliban call themselves (Ibid). The Taliban may utilize peace talks to consolidate its position in the south of Afghanistan and build up its strength to destroy the regime.

In this situation, the future of Afghanistan is difficult to perfectly analyze, but one thing is clear: in modern time, the Afghan-Soviet war decided the future of Afghanistan and also of South Asia. It was one modern war in which it is very difficult to determine clearly who won. It was rather one of those wars in which every actor involved lost, sooner or later: the Soviet Union collapsed, the Kabul regime withered away with communism and the Mujhaidin factions fought for years paving the way for the Taliban. The U.S. faced the attacks on September 11, 2009; the Taliban were in turn forced from power and Pakistan continues to face legacies in terrorism and in the Taliban insurgency in the tribal regions (Opcit, Rais 2011, 195-219).

### **India-Pakistan: Strategic Rivalry in Afghanistan.**

Since 1947, India and Pakistan are strategic rivals in Afghanistan. Till the 1970s India had a fair amount of influence in Afghanistan; afterwards, during the U.S.-Pakistan combined operation against the Soviet invasion, Pakistan gradually

established its presence. It is often being maintained that Pakistan indirectly ruled over Afghanistan during the Taliban regime. This is an exaggeration. The Taliban have never been anyone's puppets and their strings are certainly not pulled in Islamabad. Yet their links to Pakistan are all encompassing, forged through nearly two decades of war, devastation and life as refugees (Ahmad 1999).

Geographically, Pakistan has a common frontier of about 1,200 miles called Durand line, known after Sir Mortimer Durand, the foreign Secretary of the British Indian Government. This line begins at the Sarikol range of the Pamir in the north and runs south-west till it reaches the Iranian boundary at a rocky eminence, the Kuh-e Malek Siah, in the inhospitable desert regions beyond the Helmand River (Quddus, 1982). The demarcation of this border and the division of various Pashto tribes on both sides of the border explain to some extent the problems inherited by Afghanistan and after 1945 by Pakistan. Until the creation of Afghanistan, to be an Afghan meant being a Pathan or Pashto (Pakhtun) (Pande 2011, 60). India does not share a common border with Afghanistan.

Since 1947, Pakistan and Afghanistan have battled over the issue of "Pakhtoonistan". It was demanded by the Pashtos from Afghanistan to let Pashtos from Pakistan to join them in the formation of "Pakhtoonistan". Pakistan had denied it, and thus engaged into irredentist and anti-irredentist conflicts between the two countries. The principal argument, as given by Afghans, for creating a "Pakhtoonistan" was ethnological: the Pathans are different from the rest of the Pakistanis and should have a separate homeland. Another basis of claim is historical: that the area in question has been ruled by the Afghan, Ahmad Shah Durrani, and that the British had annexed the territory illegitimately (Quddus 1982). Afghans assert that a legal basis for their claims rests on Article 11 in the 1921 Anglo-Afghan Treaty and a supplementary letter from the British representative to the Afghan Prime Minister attached to the same Treaty. The Article reads as follows: "The Two High Contracting Parties, being mutually satisfied each regarding the goodwill of the other and especially regarding their benevolent intentions towards the tribes residing their benevolent intentions towards the tribes residing close to their respective boundaries, hereby undertake each to inform the other in future of any military operations of major importance which may appear necessary for the maintenance of order among the frontier tribes residing within their spheres..." (Hussain 2005, 65, Quddus 1982).

The first formal international reflection of Afghanistan's conflict with Pakistan appeared in the United Nations (UN), on September 30, 1947, when its delegate was the only one to oppose Pakistan's application for admission to the Organization. The delegate Husain Aziz said: "We cannot recognize the North West Frontier as part of Pakistan so long as the people of the North-West Frontier have not been given an opportunity free from any kind of influence - and I repeat, free from any kind of influence -to determine for themselves whether they wish to be independent or to become a part of Pakistan." (General Assembly Official Records, 92nd plenary Meeting, September 30, 1947, Cited in Pande 2011, 64).

For Pakistan the roots of Pashtoonistan lay in "Hindu" India's attempts to encircle and later divide and break up Pakistan; Afghanistan was only playing into Indian

hands (Ibid 65). This fear has been proved wrong because during the 1965 and 1971 wars with India, the Afghan government never created problems for Pakistan on its western frontier notwithstanding Pakistan-Afghanistan differences. In fact in 1965, King Zahir Shah even asked Pakistan to move all its troops from the border with Afghanistan saying Pakistan had no cause to fear its western border (Ibid, 82).

Similar fears were generated by the Pakistani establishment on the eve of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Pakistan maintained that if Soviet backed communists took full control in Afghanistan, then Pakistan would be sandwiched between two hostile regimes — the Soviet empire to the west and north and India to the east (Ibid). On the contrary, the attack proved to be in favor of Pakistan, which provided it with a strategic advantage inside Afghanistan.

The civil war of the 1970s forced many Afghans to take shelter in Pakistan. Even the leaders who were fighting against the communist government sought safe refuge in Pakistan. When the leaders first arrived in Pakistan they were welcomed by the then president, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He is said to have seen them as potentially strengthening his hand in relation to the highly sensitive issue of Pakhtoonistan, which President Daoud of Afghanistan took an aggressive line. Bhutto permitted the parties to establish offices in Peshawar and also provided them with the wherewithal to organize armed insurrections within Afghanistan, hoping that these would have a destabilizing effect on Daoud's regime (Garare 2003).

The Afghan crisis was used by General Zia ul Haq to legitimize hanging of Zulfikar Bhutto and coup d etat. Both acts made Pakistani Military government a *pariah* in the international community. On December 25, 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, and in one full swoop Pakistan's military establishment went from being a pariah on the world stage to being the U.S.'s most valued and strategic Cold War ally. General Zia ul Haq found himself in a serendipitous position of being able to leverage Pakistan's position as a frontline state in order to dictate terms to the U.S. (Toor 2011, 153).

Pakistan fought the U.S. war at its own terms and conditions. The financial and military aid to Pakistan improved its economic situation and also provided the South Asian country with military hardware to stand against its regional arch-rival-India. General Zia ul Haq turned down Carter's initial offer of \$400 million in aid, dismissing it as "peanuts" and was rewarded with a \$3.2 billion proposal from the Regan administration plus permission to buy F-16 fighter jets that were previously only available to NATO allies and Japan (Cole 2004, 62).

In 1978, when the situation started deteriorating and full-fledged civil war was about to start, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, then minister for external affairs, visited Kabul. He was taken aback at the suggestion of Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin, leader of the *Khalaq* communist Party, that India and Afghanistan should jointly wage a war against Pakistan and divide the country between them (Nayar 2012, 275). This did not happen; the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan. At that time India's initial response to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan reflected domestic political confusion about the transition from the first non-Congress regime to the political re-emergence of Indira Gandhi. Going against the spirit of the Indo-Soviet friendship

treaty of 1971, then Prime Minister Chaudhary Charan Singh strongly opposed the Soviet intervention. India's permanent representative at the United Nations was asked to express New Delhi's official regret over Moscow's intervention and seek its withdrawal from Afghanistan (Muni 2007). But after the fall of the Charan Singh led government, Mrs Gandhi made a comeback; after her assumption of power in the third week of January 1980, India's previous stand was significantly revised. Without being critical of the Soviet Union publicly, she supported the Afghan revolutionary leadership and urged them to appreciate the need for Soviet withdrawal over a period of time. India even abstained during the voting on related UN resolutions that asked for Soviet withdrawal as it was moved by the anti-Soviet front. India was seen as closely identified with the Soviet Union and the pro-Kabul regime (Ibid). Also in that war, India did not play any role except providing shelter to few non-Pashtos. During the peace talks Pakistan had a significant role, while India was kept out of the process. Though, then Afghan President Najibullah had made repetitive visits to India and had kept Indian leaders informed about important developments (Ibid).

After the war the Mujahids became goal-less. Taking benefit out of situation, those well-trained, guerillas were used by Pakistan to fight a low cost proxy war against India. It was unfortunate that even a progressive leader like Benazir Bhutto blessed them and proudly said: "They are my children" (Opcit, Nayar 2012, 277). Hekmatyar's army became the most potent military wing of the Inter Service Intelligence (ISI), backed by the Muslim brotherhood network based in Pakistan which itself operates in Afghanistan and also increasingly in Kashmir (Cole 2004, 210). By the end of 1996 Taliban established itself in power in Kabul. This was greeted with much euphoria in the Sunni Islamic groups in Pakistan. The Pakistani government's then Interior Minister General Naseerullah Babar reportedly justified Pakistan's crucial backing for the militia with the claims that "our boys" (Taliban) were protecting Pakistani "interests" in Afghanistan (Hussain 2005, 208).

During the Taliban regime, India had no contact with the political establishment of Afghanistan. The post-2001 U.S.-led attack provided an opportunity for India to re-gain its influence in Afghanistan. The immediate result of the attack was the upgrading of Indian representation in Afghanistan from a liaison office to a full-fledged Embassy in 2002 (Pant 2012, 105-117). Since then India, has been using soft power strategy, to re-establish its influence in Afghanistan. It actively participated in Bonn Agreement, 2001, and was instrumental in the formation of Tazik-dominated NA government in Afghanistan. It is one of the top six donors in Afghanistan. In May 2011, the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced a fresh commitment of \$500 million for Afghanistan's development in addition to India's existing aid assistance of around \$1.5 billion. Also, the governments in New Delhi and Kabul mutually agreed on a 'strategic partnership' between the two neighbors (Ibid). India is active in the development of human resources in Afghanistan. The Indian government is providing a daily supply of 100 grams of fortified high-protein biscuits to nearly 1.2 million children under a school feeding program. This program was administered through the World Food Program (WFP) and had cost \$460 million (Sachdeva 2012, 150-162). India provides 675 long-term University scholarships annually, sponsored

by the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR), for under-graduates and post-graduate studies in India (Ibid). India is also involved in a wide array of development project there, including the building of the Zaranj-Delaram highway in the south-west near the Iranian border and the promised construction of the new Afghan parliament building (Pande 2011).

These engagements worry Pakistan. As a weak country, which has lost two wars (1965 and 1971), and leaves under constant fear of further mauling down, Pakistan has taken measures to dislodge India from Afghanistan. Tactically, Pakistan's reaction is a natural act by any rival, because encirclement from India will make it vulnerable. In its interests Pakistan's agencies has corroborated with proxies to attack on Indian establishments in Afghanistan. In July 2008 and October 2009, with the help of its acquaintances, Pakistani intelligence agency ISI had engaged in triggering explosions on Indian mission (Pant 2012, 105-117) so to threaten and develop fear among the mission representatives. Those explosions failed to deter India's determination to stay in Afghanistan. Then, Hamid Karzai's spokesman Aimal Faizi revealed that Pakistan "demanded we cut all ties with India, send army officers to Pakistan for training and sign a strategic partnership" (Joshua 2013).

To limit India's involvement in Afghanistan, Pakistan made transit rights to Afghanistan conditional upon the resolution of the Kashmir issue. By not allowing India transit rights to Afghanistan through its territory, Pakistan has sought to leverage Afghanistan's reliance on the Karachi port as its only gateway to the world. But Kabul has pushed back and has used India and Iran to find alternative routes reducing its historic dependence on Pakistan for transit. Although it has failed to achieve its objective in economic realm, it has been successful in limiting India's military involvement in Afghanistan. (Pant 2012, 105-117).

Ahmad Rashid writes that the Pakistani army has always been fearful of the backing of the U.S. invasion in Afghanistan as it had inadvertently helped bring to power the former Northern Alliance, which the military detested because of the support it had received from Pakistan's regional rivals India, Iran and Russia. The Army was also deeply disturbed by the sudden influx of Indians into Kabul. Pakistan also believes that India – through its consulates (at Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kandahar and Jalalabad) in Afghanistan — is financing and training the renewed Baloch leaders now living in exile in Kabul (Rashid 2011, 305-317).

India wants to maintain its strong position in any form in a post-NATO exit political set-up in Afghanistan. It will give an edge against Pakistan. Through its presence in Afghanistan, India can develop further links with West and Central Asian countries. Also, the newly discovered untapped \$ 1 trillion natural resources — iron, gold, cobalt, copper and critical industrial metals like lithium (Risen 2010) — have made Afghanistan an economically important country.

Apart from Pakistan, the reason for India's presence in Afghanistan is China's growing influence in the region which is currently the largest foreign direct investor in Afghanistan. China has invested in the Aynak copper mine in Logar (Fair 2012). Other outside powers and the adjacent neighbors of Afghanistan, too, have their eyes on those natural resources. Pakistan has its own economic interests as well.

Islamabad aspires to develop trade links with the landlocked resource-rich Central Asian nations, in order to give them access to the Arabian Sea port at Gwadar. For that it requires a cooperative Afghanistan (Hasnat 2009).

Thus, India-Pakistan strategic rivalry to gain upper hand in Afghanistan has kept the later disturbed. The strengthening of Islamic radical forces in Afghanistan is a by-product of those strategic rivalries.

### **Regional Initiatives to Establish Peace in Afghanistan.**

In their own ways, neighboring countries of Afghanistan are trying to chalk out solutions to the problem. In 2005, the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA) was started to help Afghanistan. Its first meeting was held in Kabul, followed by a second one in New Delhi in 2006. During the Delhi RECCA besides the host, representatives from China, Iran, Pakistan Turkey, Tajikistan and the United Arab Emirates were present. In March 2012, it had its fifth meeting in Tajikistan's capital Dushanbe. The main objective of RECCA is to help Afghanistan through various ways and means. RECCA conferences focus on border management, strengthening of trade and transit agreements, new power purchase agreements, expanding opportunities for Afghans, energy security and cross-border management. Then there is the Istanbul process started in 2011 in Turkey; the second conference was held in 2012 in Kabul. The third took place on 26 April 2013 in Almaty, Kazakhstan; and the fourth one is proposed to be held in 2014 in China. Its aim is to integrate Afghanistan's economy with the regional economies (Gutman 2013).

Other than these groups Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO or ODKB) are also active in Afghanistan. SCO summits on Afghanistan have been critical of both U.S. goals and strategies and have provided a forum for member states to emphasize the importance of a "regional solution". In November 2005, the organization created the SCO-Afghanistan contact group; one initiative following the 2007 summit in Moscow, explored establishing an SCO-sponsored forum for promoting national reconciliation and dialogue (Cited in Cooley 2012, 84). Due to its own interests, Moscow is unlikely to allow SCO to develop more high-profile role than the CSTO in post-2014 Afghanistan (Ibid, 85).

There are, also, bilateral engagements taking place: Tajikistan's President Emoli Rahman, during his India visit in April 2013, stressed the need for a joint consultative effort before the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan in 2014. Regional Stability was of prime concern for his country ("India, Tajikistan Stress Stakes in Afghan Peace" *The Hindu* 2013). In 2013, India and China during their bilateral dialogues on terrorism focused on Afghanistan. ("India China Could Find Common Ground in Afghanistan" *The Hindu* 2013). Besides bilateral, individually too countries are active in Afghanistan to safeguard their political, strategic, and economic interests after 2014.

As various actors are working out to establish peace in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of NATO forces, an important question arises: which region does Afghanistan belong to? Theoretically, construction and de-construction of a region

is a volatile affair. Regions are intellectual constructs: they wax and wane with changing technological developments, geopolitical events, demographic flows events, scholarly fads and the numerous other dynamics taken together constitute human history (Hagerty 2005, 4). As a member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Afghanistan is, politically, part of South Asia. Once it has been maintained that Afghanistan is a part of South Asia, so regional actors have to play a significant role in establishing peace, another question arises: can the South Asian regional powers -India and Pakistan- cooperate over the issue of Afghanistan? Cooperation between them is important because they have relevant influence on securitization or de-securitization of the region (Buzan & Waever 2003, 44). This does not mean that other neighboring countries have no role to play — they have a certain role and stakes - but not as important as India and Pakistan.

### **Can India and Pakistan cooperate in Afghanistan?**

India wants an in-depth presence in Afghanistan because of two reasons: (a) it will enable New Delhi to gain a strategic upper hand against Pakistan, and (b) due to discovery of huge reserves of natural resources it is in economic interests of India to remain in Afghanistan. For its own strategic interests, Pakistan seeks to limit India's presence in Afghanistan. In this sort of zero-sum game, cooperation between them is difficult, but not impossible.

According to Robert Keohane "cooperation requires that the actions of separate individuals or organizations — which are not in pre-existent harmony — be brought into conformity with one another through a process of negotiation, which is often referred to as "policy coordination". Cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy co-ordination" (Keohane 1984, 51-52).

He further writes that cooperation does not imply an absence of conflict. On the contrary, it is typically mixed with conflict and reflects partially successful efforts to overcome conflict real or potential. Cooperation takes place only in situations in which actors perceive that their policies are actually or potentially in conflict not where they are in harmony. Cooperation should not be viewed as the absence of conflict but rather as a reaction to conflict or potential conflict. Without specter of conflict there is no need to cooperate (Ibid, 52). Applying Keohane's idea, one can make out that India and Pakistan's reaction to the conflicts could lead to cooperation.

Now, 'why' cooperation is needed? Modern nation-states are rational actors. As realists and neo-liberals define, their primary aims are to attain security, maintain self-interest, and acquire power in anarchist world order. To achieve their aims, they can go up to any extent. In past even arch rivals have cooperated when it was needed to serve their purpose. During both World Wars the European arch rivals- France and Britain cooperated against Germany. The capitalist world, which considered the new established Soviet Union as a pariah state since the 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia, cooperated with Moscow to defeat Germany during the Second World War. After the end of the Second World War, all past foes of Europe started a process of

cooperation, which resulted in the creation of the European Union. These examples show that state behavior towards other depends on its interest. Acrimony between modern nation-states is not permanent; it changes with change in mutual strategic interests.

Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan maintain that states are not likely to run major risks for minor gains (Sagan & Waltz 1995, Waltz 2002). The major risk to the security of India and Pakistan stems from the Talibanization of Afghanistan and of the region. With increasing strength of Islamic radicals in Afghanistan, Pakistan has faced damaging consequences. The level of violence in Pakistan has increased and the radical forces have turned into an Frankenstein monster, which is ready to gobble up its former patron. Only two suicide bombings were recorded there in 2002. Yet, the number grew to fifty-nine in 2008 and to eighty-four in 2009, before dropping to twenty-nine in 2010 — the lowest level since 2005 (Cohen 2012). In an interview to American newspaper *Washington Post*, Pakistan's Army chief General Kiyani said "we can't have Talibanization... if we want to remain modern and progressive... Pakistan is better served if the Taliban do not prevail in Afghanistan" (ibid). This statement by the Chief of Pakistani Army, who is leading war against Islamic radicals in his country, shows how the army is growing impatient with the Taliban.

"How" can cooperation take place between the two South Asian arch rivals? According to David Mitterney "cooperation is possible when there is peace, which can be attained only if the intrusion of power politics was checked, have sovereignty sacrificed and efforts made toward material unity in an increasingly interdependent world" (Mitterney 1966). Both India and Pakistan have to give up their antagonistic interests. They cannot move ahead with their contending interests, checking or containing the other. It is not that the two countries cannot cooperate with each other. There are treaties and bilateral arrangements between them, which they follow-in letter and spirit- till today.

Perfect examples of India-Pakistan cooperation amidst all sorts and forms of tension are the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) of 1960 and the 1988 treaty on mutual exchange of information about each other's nuclear installations. Of course, cooperation between them has not been a smooth exercise and tensions keep erupting, intermittently. But given the level of mistrust between them, these things are quite normal and bound to happen. What is important here is that they have managed the conflicts from getting out beyond a certain level. This is true in the case of the IWT. Many voices from both countries have demanded for the scraping of the treaty; many times the two countries had to move to court of arbitration to resolve their water-related conflicts; yet the treaty is intact. One main reason for this is the mediating role played by the World Bank in inking the IWT, and as a guarantor to the treaty. Yet, the actors involved are India and Pakistan. They have made the treaty to run successfully. Likewise in Afghanistan they have to set up mechanisms to de-escalate their bilateral tensions, in favor of greater good.

Mechanisms can be created for their cooperation only after India and Pakistan give up their zero-sum game attitude and instead adopt a *problem solving* approach in Afghanistan. In the words of Roger Fish, a *problem solving* approach is not a

situation in which the two parties sit on opposite sides of the table facing off against one another, but rather where both sits on same side of the table facing the common enemy — the problem (Hoppman 1995). Afghanistan has to be treated as a problem and not a place to advance strategic interests against each other. To do this, India has to take a lead. It has to satisfy Pakistan that its presence will not pose any form of security threat to it. This has to be proved through actions, not by words. Unilateral steps to adjust few, non-core issue- based demands of Pakistan will be a positive move in that direction. India has to follow the spirit of Gujral Doctrine .

Once they work together, India and Pakistan can call on the other SAARC member-states at a later stage to join them for management of peace in the region. More people mean more information available to set the problem and formulate a strategy for solving it. Differences among members are likely to emerge, but it could actually promote more effective problem solving measures. In that situation more diverse information can be available *and helpful* (emphasis mine) for creative solutions (D'Estree 2009). The presence of SAARC members during a later stage of negotiation and also at ground level in Afghanistan will check the political-cum-military tensions between India and Pakistan.

After NATO's exit, there is the possibility of a civil war. The war lords are still active and waiting for exploiting opportunities to establish themselves over the power-structure of Afghanistan. To stop Afghanistan from falling into an anarchical condition, the best option is to have a regional peace-building force, with security personals drawn from all SAARC member-states. Almost every regional organizations have peace-building or peace-making forces, to meet those situations, which have an impact on the entire region, why cannot SAARC? They also play important role during the humanitarian crisis in an individual member state. This arrangement keeps away the external forces. It is not very difficult for the military personals from SAARC countries to work together because they are professionals; and many times in past they have worked together to "keep" peace in the African continent under the banner of the United Nations Peace Keeping Forces (UNPKF). For example they are stationed in Congo as a part of UNPKF.

Second, Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic society with a long history of inter-ethnic and inter-clan wars. To maintain peace, it is important to give all ethnic groups a voice in any kind of power-sharing arrangement. This will help in pacifying the ethnic and clan based tensions.

Depending on the ground level situation and time, other measures, too, can be adopted to establish peace in Afghanistan and in the region.

## Conclusion

The exit is not going to turn into a happy situation for many. Women groups feel that they have won back the hard-fought right to education and work since the Taliban were toppled 12 years ago, but there are fears these freedoms could shrink once NATO-led forces leave Afghanistan by the end of next year (Rahmat 2013). The fear stems from the re-Talibanization of Afghanistan, which is a real and sanguine concern

expressed by common people. At global, regional, and local levels cautious steps must be taken to stop them; it can be possible by establishing democratic political order in Afghanistan and this can take years or even decades. Meanwhile, a transitory phase must be managed by establishing a political set-up with a potential to setup a “positive” direction for the country. India and Pakistan have to take steps to address the post-exit challenges. They cannot linger on with playing strategic game against the other. It is not in anyone’s interest. Soon after the NATO exit, India and Pakistan must hold talks with the representatives of ethnic groups, and, if possible, also with representatives of the Taliban. Unless the grieved groups agree to cooperate among themselves, there will be no peace and stability in Afghanistan. More than them, India and Pakistan (with emphasis) should stop strategic interference in Afghanistan. Unless these things happen, Afghanistan will remain a “battle field” for all sorts of groups and countries.

## Notes

1. The U.S. formed the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) to launch an attack on Afghanistan. The ISAF included soldiers from NATO as well as non-NATO countries. The attack was popularized as Global War on Terror (GWOT). Many countries — directly or indirectly — participated in it. Indirect participation means providing logistical or material supports only. Within short period of its formation, ISAF leadership was taken by the NATO. Since then, it is mainly the USA-led NATO which is engaged in Afghanistan and in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas.
2. Many of the Mujahideen from Afghan theatre shifted their activity to the Indian-administered Kashmir after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. Militant fundamentalist organizations in Pakistan such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad began to recruit and train volunteers for the Kashmir jihad (Cited in Ahmed 2012, pp 150-180 and Hussain 2010, 24). Years before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and American involvement and aid, Pakistani state-including its intelligence and military services-started its quest for a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan by aiding dissident groups. Decades later in the 1990s, the same General Babar would also provide training and aid to the Taliban. In both cases Pakistan was supporting the creation of proxies who would help it achieve its aim of creating problems for the Afghan regime. This was meant to counter the Pashtunistan claim and to nurture the Afghan Islamists as a potential future government of Afghanistan which would be pro-Pakistan (Pande 2012, 72). Relations between Afghan Islamic radicals and Pakistan’s religious groups further helped this cause of Pakistan. “Great Game” is a term used by British novelist Rudyard Kipling, in his book *Kim*, for the competition between Russia and British empire for control over Central Asia. At present this term, aptly, applies on rivalries among the U.S., Russia and China for power and influence in Central Asia.
3. Benedict Anderson, E.J. Hobsbawm et. al. social constructionist s opine that the feeling for a nation exists in imagination. It is a social construct which is being constructed by creating an imagination of feeling for togetherness and oneness. This is being generated by creating common heroes, customs, canons etc. These things failed to develop in Afghanistan. The ethnic tribes adore their own martial history and remember their conflicts with the other group. The common binding among them is entirely missing. That has made this country war-torn for centuries. Any effort to establish peace among the warring groups needs to develop the imagination of belonging to a single political nation (Anderson 1983). According to K. J. Holsti, the modern western states are based on two different foundations of legitimacy: historic-civic and ‘natural’. In the former, the

state moulded the modern territorial nation and in the latter the nation (as defined and even created by elites) helped the state in its creation. Third World States did not meet the ‘civic’ nor natural criteria of state legitimacy at the time of independence. Post-colonial states owe their creation more to the international community than to their own artificial communities (Holsti 1995). The creation of states by the international community or erstwhile colonial powers have made the post-colonial societies a fractured one. Infighting among various groups, and civil war is normal phenomenon. Afghanistan is a typical example of it.

4. “Soft” or “Pragmatic” Taliban is a ghost; not a reality. No one has even a iota of idea about it. But certainly there are people who were previously part of anti-West militia, but now engaged into secret dialogue with the Hamid Karzai-led government or with the representatives of the USA. This development is not new or unique because almost all terrorist or even non-terrorist organizations pass through this phase. Few either rebel or leave the groups due to personal reasons or are even lured by the adversaries to shift their loyalties and sides.
5. The border which touches Afghanistan lies at the Pakistani side of Kashmir.
6. The Bonn Agreement, 2001 (officially the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institution) was the initial series of agreements entered to re-create the state of Afghanistan following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
7. In 1965 and 1971 the war ended with a truce. In both wars Pakistani army had accepted defeat. In 1947 the war ended after mediation by the United Nations. No party accepted defeat therefore there is neither a winner nor a loser. In 1999 India and Pakistan had a military clash in Kargil sector. This was a limited war because actions did not spread to other sectors. Also, this ended after a meeting between Nawaz Sharief, then Prime Minister of Pakistan and Bill Clinton, then the U.S. President.
8. The SCO emerged in 2001 as the successor to the Shanghai Five, a forum that had facilitated negotiations among Russia, the Central Asian states, and China over delimiting disputed Sino-Soviet borders. Its members are: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. CSTO was founded in 2002 comprises Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (joined in 2006).
9. Regions can be broadly divided their by physical characteristics, human impact character and the interaction of humanity and the environment. This is geographical division of a region. Politically, countries by virtue of being - full fledged- member of a regional organization become part of that region.
10. Gujral Doctrine was based on five basic principles (a) with smaller neighbors like Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives and Sri Lanka, India does not ask for reciprocity but gives all that it can in good faith and trust, (b) no South Asian country will be used against the interest of another country of the region, (c) none will interfere in the internal affairs of another, (d) all South Asian countries must respect each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, (e) they will settle all their disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations.
11. SAARC has the dubious distinction of being the least integrated regional organization. There is a popular saying that it takes one step forward, two steps back. The intra-regional trade is very low. Some member states are in dispute over a number of issues. They have never worked together in the past to resolve any regional issue, despite having SAARC conventions and resolutions to do so. But they have to change their attitude and have to come together. This is a tough proposition but sort of accommodations, adjustments and compromises can do so. Even if they do not feel comfortable in co-operation they have to do so in their individual self-interest.

## References

- Achcar, Gilbert (2002). *The Clash of Barbarisms: September 11 and Making of the New World Disorder*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Ahmad, Rashid (1999). "Pakistan and the Taliban." In Maley, William (Ed., ) *Fundamentalism Reborn: Afghanistan and Taliban* (pp. 72-89). London: Hurst and Co.
- Ahmad, Imtiaz (2004). *Iraq, Afghanistan and the Imperialism of our time*. New Delhi: Leftword.
- Ahmed, Ishtiaq (2009). "Spectre of Islamic Fundamentalism." In Rajshree Jetly (Ed., ) *Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics* (pp.150-180). London, New York & New Delhi: Taylor & Francis Group.
- Anderson, Benedict (1983). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Aneja, Atul "Rumblings of Russia's re-entry." *The Hindu*, 2013, 29 March.
- Blackwill, Robert D. (2001). "Plan B in Afghanistan: Why Defacto Partition is the Least Bad Option?" *Foreign Affairs*, January/February, 42-50.
- Buzan, Barry & Ole Waever (2003). *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- Cohen, Stephen (2012) "Introduction." In Stephen P. Cohen & others (Eds., ) *The Future of Pakistan*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Cole, Steve (2004). *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*. New York: Penguin.
- Cooley, John K. (1998). *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism*. London: Sterling and VA Pluto Press.
- Cooley, Alexander (2012) *Great Games, Local Rules :The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- D'Estree, Tamra Pearson (2009). "Problem Solving Approaches." In Jacob Bercovitch & Victor Kremenyuk (Eds., ) *Sage Hand Book of Conflict Resolution* (pp.143-171). New Delhi, London, Singapore & Washington D.C.: Sage Publications.
- Dominic Tcerney (2013). "Fighting While Negotiating in Afghanistan" *Orbis*, 57, 171-186.
- Fair, C. Christine (2012). "Addressing Fundamental Challenges." In Stephen P. Cohen & others (Eds., ) *The Future of Pakistan* (pp. 91-106). New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Hagerty, Devin T. & Herbert. G. Hagerty (2007). "Reconstitution and Reconstruction of Afghanistan." In Devin T. Hagerty (Ed., ) *South Asia in World Politics* (pp. 113-133). Lanham, Boulder, New York Toronto & Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.
- Grare, Fredric (2003). *Pakistan: In the face of the Afghan Conflict 1979-1985; at the turn of cold war*. New Delhi: India Research Press.
- Gul, Rahmat (2013). Afghanistan Blocks Law Protecting Women Retrieved from <http://www.cbca/news/world/story/2013/05/18/afghanistan-women.html> (Accessed on 1 July 2013).
- Hasnat, Syed Farooq (2009). "Pakistan's Strategic Interests: Pakistan and the Fluctuating U.S. Strategy." *Journal of International Affairs*, Fall/Winter, 141-155.
- Holsti, K. J. (1995). *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
- Hoppman P.T. (1995). "Two Paradigms of Negotiations: Bargaining and Problem Solving." *The Annals of American Academy of Politics and Social Science* 542 (pp. 24-47).
- Hussain, Rizwan (2005). *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan*. Burlington: Ashgate.
- Hussian, Zahid (2010). *Frontline Pakistan: The Path to catastrophe and the killing of Benazir Bhutto*. New Delhi. Viva Books.
- "India, Tajikistan Stress Stakes in Afghan Peace." (April 16, 2013). *The Hindu*, 8.
- "India China Could Find Common Ground in Afghanistan." (April 18, 2013). *The Hindu*.
- Jervis, Robert (1999). "Realism, Neo-liberalism and Co-operation: Issues and Debates." *International Security*, 24, 42-63.
- Joshua, Anita (2013) "Pakistan denies asking Afghanistan to snap ties with India." *The Hindu*, 29.
- Keohane, Robert.O. (1984). *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Mackenzie, Richard (1999). "The US and the Taliban." In Maley, William (Ed., ) *Fundamentalism Reborn: Afghanistan and Taliban* (pp.90-103). London: Hurst and Co.
- Marsden, Peter (1998). *The Taliban: War Religion and the New order in Afghanistan; Karachi*. Oxford University Press.
- Meredith L. Runion (2007). *The history of Afghanistan*. Greenwood Press, West port.
- Mitarny, David (1966). *A Working Peace System*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books .
- Muni, S .D (2005). "India's Afghan Policy: Emerging From the Cold." In K. Warikkoo (Ed., ) *Afghanistan: Challenges and Opportunities* (pp. 332-350). New Delhi: Pentagon Press.
- Nayar, Kuldip (2012). *Beyond the Lines: An Autobiography*. New Delhi: Roli Books.
- Paul, D. Miller (2011). "Finish The Job." *Foreign Affairs*, January/February, 51-65.
- Paul, T. V (2011). "State Capacity and South Asia's Perennial Insecurity Problems." In Paul T.V (Ed., ) *South Asia' Weak States: Understanding The Regional Insecurity Predicament* (pp. 3-27). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Pant, V. Harsh (2012). "India's Af-Pak Conundrum: South Asia in Flux." *Orbis*, 56, 105-117.
- Pande Aparna (2011). *Explaining Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Escaping India*. London & New York: Routledge.
- Rashid, Ahmad (2011). "The Afghan Conundrum." In Maleeha Lodhi. *Pakistan: Beyond Crisis State* (pp. 305-317). Delhi: Rupa Publications.
- Rais, Rasul Baksh (2011). "Afghanistan: A Weak State in Path of Power Rivalries." In T.V Paul (Ed., ) *South Asia' Weak States: Understanding The Regional Insecurity Predicament* (pp. 195-219). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Risen, James (2013). "US identifies vast mineral riches in Afghanistan." *New York Times*, June, 13.
- Robert, J. Gutman (2013). "Istanbul Process Conference: Presents Steps for Rebuilding Afghanistan." *Trans Atlantic magazine*, April, 29.
- Sachdeva, Gulshan (2012). "International and Regional Contributions to Afghan Reconstruction." In Arpita Roy Basu, Binoda Kumar Mishra & Alvia Mishra (Eds., ) *International Intervention in Afghanistan: Motives and Approaches* (pp. 150-162). New Delhi: Shipra Publications.
- Sagan, Scott D & Kenneth N. Waltz (1995). *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Schofield, Carey (2011). *Inside the Pakistan Army: A Woman's Experience on the Frontline of the War on Terror*. New Delhi: Pentagon Security Press.
- Taj, Farhat (2012). "Taliban are Pak army proxies and not Pashto nationalists." *The Friday Times*, xxiv, 7.
- Toor, Saadia (2011). *The State of Islam :Culture and Cold War Politics in Pakistan*. London: Pluto Press.
- Quddus, Syed Abdul (1982). *Afghanistan and Pakistan: a Geopolitical Study*. Lahore: Ferozsons Ltd.
- Waltz, Kenneth (2008). *Realism and International Politics*. New York: Routledge.
- [www.embassy.org/afghanistan.org/article/declaration](http://www.embassy.org/afghanistan.org/article/declaration) accessed on 12 July 2013.