Water Disputes between Punjab and Sindh:
A Challenge to Pakistan

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Water disputes between Punjab and Sindh provinces in Pakistan pose a challenge to its existing federal–state relationship. Sindh alleges that Punjab, due to its domination over state’s machinery, diverts the water resources at the cost of others. This dispute is not a new rather it exists since the irrigation system was developed in this region. The colonial rulers constructed canals to promote loyalty and secure their interests. The loyalists and soldiers were provided with land to produce cash crops in canal colonies. The partition of India in 1947 also partitioned the existing irrigation system. Since 1947 many futile attempts have been made to manage the water disputes between Punjab and Sindh. The reasons for it are not only the physical availability of the water resources but many more.

Keywords: Mughal Period, Irrigation System, Indus Water Treaty, Eighteenth Amendment Act, WAPDA, Indus Apportionment Act 1991

Inter-provincial water disputes between Punjab and Sindh in Pakistan exists, since irrigation system developed in both regions. Both the provinces have agriculture-based economy, which is mainly dependent on the waters from river Indus. During colonial years, the British rulers used the hydrological structures to implement their policy of “divide and rule”. Water from one region was diverted to the other to suppress the rise of nationalism during the struggle for independence against the British rule. After Pakistan was formed, as a result of partition of India in 1947, Punjab is being alleged for diverting water resources for its use at the cost of Sindh. The increasing burden on available resources is cited as a reason for this, but the power asymmetry between Punjab and Sindh too is an important factor for water disputes. In this paper, an attempt is being made to address following questions: Why water disputes between Punjab and Sindh still exist? Why the policies adopted by the federal government have failed to manage inter-provincial water disputes in Pakistan? What could be a probable solution to address water disputes between Punjab and Sindh? Excluding the introduction and conclusion, this paper is divided into three parts. In the first part, the physical and political reasons for the disputes are discussed. The history of development of irrigation system is the focus of the second part. The water disputes between Punjab and Sindh are then discussed in the third, and last, part.

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Why Water Disputes?

Water disputes among the provinces are a challenge to the federal government. They cannot be easily managed, and it is very difficult for states to take a side; yet the federal governments, across the world, are alleged for being bias toward one or the other units. In matured democracy, this biasness is based on the consideration of number of political representatives a province elects to the upper or lower house of a country or the weightage of the votes from the units. In non-democratic system, the reason for biasness is the support the leader draws from a unit, and the degree of authority people from an administrative unit has over the institutional machineries of the state. As Pakistan, over the decades, has witnessed both forms of governance, the administrative units have experienced favour or ignorance due to both circumstances.

Primarily, Pakistan’s economy is based on agricultural activities, which contributes about 24 percent in its gross domestic product (GDP); about 48 percent of overall labour force is employed in this sector and; 70 percent of Pakistani exports depend on agricultural products (Ahmedani 2014). This has been possible because it has the largest contiguous irrigation system in the world, which provides the backbone to its agriculture-based economy (Ali 2009). This entire agriculture activity depends on two major river systems: rivers flowing into Arabian Sea and Endorheic river basin. The former comprises: Indus river basin, Lyari river, Hingol, Hub rivers, and later includes: Mashkal, Siastan basin, Indus plain, etc. Among all, it is river Indus which along with its tributaries forms Indus River System (IRS), and is considered to be the “hydrological lifeline” of Pakistan. As river Indus flows across Pakistan, all provinces and federal administrative units want to use maximum quantity of its water for agriculture, industries, and domestic consumption. This leads to competition, tensions, and disputes among the provinces.

Inter-state and also intra-state disputes over shared rivers are very complex, where many reasons are tenuously intertwined. In Pakistan, main reasons for the inter-provincial water disputes are as follows.

Water stress: The term water stress was developed by Mallin Falkenmark, who also developed Water Stress Index (WSI) (Falkenmark 1990). According to WSI, Pakistan is already water stressed country and by 2020 it will fall in a category of countries with acute water shortage. The per capita availability of water in Pakistan was 5,210 m³ in 1951, which reduced to 1,100 m³ in 2006 (http://www.wapda.gov.pk). In 2010, it was 1,038 m³ and is being projected to be around 877 m³ by 2020 (Xinhua 2010, also see PIDLAT 2011). Some global warming projections have estimated a decrease in the water availability in the IRS to a staggering 40 percent by the middle of present century, which if it were to happen would threaten the very survival of a population already swollen beyond sustainability (Ali 2009).

Phenomenon of climate change: The dispute over water is not only due to water stress, but also because of release of more than the required water, and occurring
of non-required floods. The upper riparian states do so to maintain their own water interests. However, this regulation and release and withdrawal of water cause droughts and floods in lower riparian state. This damages the standing crops and also brings disaster to human lives. Change in weather pattern is causing non-seasonal precipitation and increase or decrease in monsoon rains. A few times the increase in spell of rainfall raises the water level, which positively helps in managing water distribution disputes, though only for a season. In 2014, due to increased spell of rainfall it was possible for Indus Rivers System Authority (IRSA) to supply additional water to Punjab and Sindh (Ahmedani 2014). This avoided clashes between them that season.

**Punjabisation of Pakistan:** Scholars such as Yunus Samad, Ian Talbot et al. use the term “Punjabisation of Pakistan” (Samad 2007) to discuss the domination of Punjab province over the Pakistani state machinery. Punjab has attained this status because of the key role it plays in Pakistan’s history. It is home to Pakistan Army which has wielded power directly for two and half decades and indirectly for longer still (Talbot 2002). Politically, it is such a powerful province that any head of the state in Pakistan cannot even think of surviving without its support. During her first (1988–1990) ministry, Benazir Bhutto found to her cost that a national administration in Islamabad could be undermined by a hostile provincial government in Lahore (ibid). Any challenge to Punjab’s authority in Pakistan by the others is punitive. The Sindhi Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was hanged by the Punjabi military rulers on April 4, 1979, but for the same level of “conspiracy” and allegations, in 1999 then Prime Minister Nawaz Sahrif, a Punjabi, was deported to other country, by a Mohajir (migrant) Chief of Army Staff. Later on he returned from his exile in 2008 and become the Prime Minister of Pakistan in 2013. Economically, the province constitutes around 56 percent of population of Pakistan. The massive irrigation projects introduced by the British in the late 1880s ensured the West Punjab would be the bread basket of Pakistan, just as it had been of British India. With the help of Green Revolution technology, introduced in the 1960s, in 1976–1977 Punjab was producing 76 percent of country’s output of major crops and 67 percent of the food grains output (ibid). Even today Punjab is bread basket of Pakistan and also industrially developed than other provinces. The Punjabisation of Pakistan leads to cropping up of a sense of marginalization among people from other provinces. In past and present, many secessionist movements have grown up in Pakistan, due to this phenomenon.

**Democratisation deficit:** For the first time in the history of Pakistan, there was a peaceful and democratic transfer of power in 2013. This is an achievement for Pakistan, but still it is under the shadow of its Army which has suddenly amassed power due to its role in global war against terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Because of its being a praetorian state, there is a deficit of democratic decentralization in Pakistan, which leads to feud among the provinces on the issue of water sharing. The civil society has failed to engage itself into a serious debate over it; as a result, politicians exploit parochial and regional sentiments over the water issues (Habib 2005). Owing to non-democratisation of politics and social
inequality in Pakistan, all of the state’s resources are effectively placed at disposal of the landed elite. If the poor want to save themselves or access these resources, they could only do so through feudal in their district. The system in Pakistan, at the best times, is based on political patronage (Shah 2011).

Development of Irrigation System

Both Punjab and Sindh have a good network of river system, which had been exploited by the rulers to encourage agriculture in the region and increase their revenues out of such activity. Mainly, during the Mughal period (1526–1857), the canals were built in both provinces for irrigation of agricultural land. During this period in Punjab proper, a small system of canals was brought into existence in the Upper Bari Doab. The best known of these was the “Shahnahr”, excavated in the reign of Shahjahan. It took off from the Ravi at Rajpur (or Shahpur) close to the hills and carried water up to Lahor (Lahore)—a distance of about 37 kurohs, or 84 miles (Habib 2014, 37). In Sindh, in 1628–1629, a local zamindar (landlord), Mir Abra, cut a canal from the Indus into the waterless country of Northern Sindh, enabling kharif crops to be raised in an area of 100,000 jaribs (bighas), besides the rabi crops. Then the long Begar Wah in Upper Sindh, its very name signifying a canal excavated with forced labour (begar), and the Nulakhi in Naushahro Division, are supposed to have been dug before the beginning of the sixteenth century (ibid 38).

The real development in irrigation system in both provinces began during the imperial rule. After the British annexation of two important “irrigation provinces”—Sindh in 1842 and Punjab in 1849—hundreds of inundation canals which had served the valleys of the Indus and its tributaries for millennia came now under the management of the Public Works Department (Whitcombe 1983). In Punjab, plans were first completed for irrigation of East Punjab, and later in the valley of the Sutlej and the Indus itself. Projects were constructed (and in part renovated from pre-British works) for a total capital cost of barely Rs 200,000 in the districts of Multan and Montgomery, respectively, between 1886 and 1888. Within 10 years of these first experiments, the pace of canal colonization was greatly accelerated by the construction of the Lower Chenab Canal at a capital cost of Rs 900,000, and the development of colonial settlement in its command area (already, by 1899–1900, close on 1 million acres) over the years 1892–1905 (ibid). The transformation of 6 million acres of desert into one of the richest agricultural regions in Asia was seen as stupendous engineering feat that was seen as colonial government biggest achievement (Talbot 2007). The farmers were encouraged to grow “cash crops” instead of food grains (Surinder 2004,365-387) which was a reason for intermittent famines and starvation deaths in India, including in water-rich areas.

The building of canals was also related to the political imperatives of state building in the Indus Basin region. For the British, as much as for earlier Indus Basin states, the link between canal building, agricultural settlement, and political control was central to the construction of state power (Gilmartin 1994). Sir Charles Aitchison maintained: “It is of greatest importance to secure for these tracts manly peasantry
capable of self-support and of loyal and law-abiding disposition” (Talbot 2007). Many retired Sikh soldiers who helped the British rulers to suppress the 1857 rebellion and win many wars outside India were settled in those canal colonies. Besides them, caste, community, or individuals, who were thought to be loyal to British rule were preferred settlers in canal colonies. In 1914, Michel O. Dwyer (Butcher of Amritsar) developed the scheme for grant of land in colonies to the “landed gentry”. The holders were to provide natural leadership to the settlers. Seven and half percent of Lower Bari Doab colony were reserved in this way. The main beneficaries of it were large land holders such as Noons and Tiwanas, who were loyalist military contractors to the Raj (ibid). This led to emergence of feudals in Punjab, who were dependent upon waters from Indus to enrich and support their lavish lifestyles (ibid).

Disputes over Shared River System

The dilemma of the irrigation system developed in Punjab and Sindh was that both are fed by a single river system, therefore the disputes over water had to occur. For the first time in 1901, the issue of water dispute between Punjab and Sindh came to the force, when the Indian Irrigation Commission prohibited Punjab from taking even a drop of water from Indus without the approval of Sindh (Memon 2002). This was mainly because of rising nationalism in Punjab which had its impact in canal colonies also. Then in 1919, the then government of British India released the Sir Arthur Cotton Committee report, wherein it prohibited Punjab from undertaking any projects until Sukkur barrage was completed and water needs of Sindh were determinedly filed (ibid). In 1925, Lord Reading, then British Viceroy of India, rejected Punjab’s request for Thal canal from Indus considering the undue deprivation of Sindh’s lower riparian rights. In 1937, however, the Anderson Commission allowed Punjab to withdraw 775 cusecs of water on experimental basis from Indus for Thal canal (ibid). This happened even with the absence of Thal canal in the terms of the commission and clearly constituted a direct violation of the viceroy’s orders of 1925. In 1939, Sindh lodged a formal complaint with the government, under the Government of India Act of 1935. Consequently, in 1941, the Rao Commission recommended construction of two new barrages in Sindh on Indus, and ordered Punjab to pay 20 million Rupees of the construction cost of these barrages to ameliorate Sindh’s losses due to the actions of Punjab (ibid). Following the provisions of the Rao commission, a committee comprising of the chief engineers of Punjab and Sindh came out with an agreement in 1945, known as “Sindh–Punjab Agreement” to resolve disputes between them (ibid).

The partition of the irrigation system in 1947 affected Punjab more than the Sindh because the former’s hydrological headworks were divided between two sovereign countries. Though Sir Cyril Radcliffe, while demarcating boundary between India and Pakistan tried to not disturb the irrigation system, determinants made him to do so at some places (Chester 2009). After losing its own water to India, Punjab targeted Indus to siphon off its waters in violation of the existing agreements
between Sindh and Punjab. Punjab constructed a link canal called “Bambanwala–Ravi–Bedian (BRBD) link canal” without the consent and approval of Sindh in a clear violation of Sindh–Punjab Agreement of 1945 (Memon 2002).

Soon after partition, water disputes between two Punjabs also developed. To resolve it, the chief engineers of East Punjab (India) and West Punjab (Pakistan) signed a Standstill Agreement on December 20, 1947 providing, *inter alia*, that until the end of the current *rabi* crop, on March 31, 1948, the status quo would be maintained with regard to water allocation in the Indus Basin irrigation system. After the given date, the authorities in East Punjab refused the renewal of the agreement upon expiration and on April 1, 1948, halted the supply of water to several canals in Pakistani territory (Salman & Uprety, 2002). In this situation one option Pakistan had was to go for war and many advocated for it but the government avoided it. Finally both sides ready for dialogue. Following extensive discussions in an Inter-Dominion conference held in New Delhi on May 3-4 1948, a new agreement was signed (commonly called the Delhi Agreement) on May 4 1948. Under the terms of that Agreement, East and West Punjab recognized the necessity to resolve the issues in the spirit of goodwill and friendship. Without prejudice to its own rights, the government of East Punjab granted to West Punjab the assurance that it would not suddenly withhold the supply of water without providing sufficient time for West Punjab to develop alternate sources. This arrangement was continued until the Indus Water Treaty (IWT), mediated by the World Bank, was signed in 1960 between India and Pakistan (ibid). According to IWT, India has been allocated 20 percent of water from the IRS while Pakistan receives 80 percent. Pakistan got rights over rivers Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab plus Kabul barring some limited uses for India in Jammu and Kashmir. India got the entire waters from three smaller rivers (Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej), and some minor irrigation uses for Pakistan from four nullahs that join the river Ravi. India was also permitted to develop additional irrigation of 1.34 million acres in Jammu and Kashmir. Further India is allowed 3.60 million acre foot (MAF) of storage (0.4 MAF on Indus, 1.5 MAF on the Jhelum, and 1.7 MAF on the Chenab) (Verghese 2006). Sindhis complaints that Dr. Saleh Qureshi, a Sindhi, was initially made a member of the negotiating team but was promptly removed, when the One Unit system was imposed in Pakistan in 1955, before the serious negotiations began. They believe was to give water leverage to Punjab province in the treaty. Moreover, according to the provisions of the IWT, Pakistan got funds from various donor countries including India and the World Bank to construct barrages, canals, etc., to utilize its share of water (Memon 2002).

To resolve the internal water disputes, in 1968, under the chairmanship of Akhtar Hussain, the Water Allocations and Rates Committee was constituted by the Governor of (then) West Pakistan. Its objective was: to review barrage water allocations, reservoir release patterns and drawdown levels, and use of ground water in relation to surface water deliveries. The committee submitted its report in July 1970, but no attention was paid on this report (Mansur 2002; PILDAT 2011). Again in 1970, Justice Fazl-e-Akbar committee was constituted to recommend apportionment of water of river Indus and its tributaries. This committee submitted its report in 1971. During the same period, ad hoc distribution from Chasma barrage and later Tarbela...
reservoir storage among the provinces was ordered (ibid). No substantive decision was taken on the Fazl-e-Akbar committee recommendations and water continued to be distributed on ad hoc orders by the government of Pakistan. In 1977, the government of Pakistan established another commission comprising the chief justices of the High Courts of the Province, headed by the Chief Justice of Pakistan to examine the issue of water apportionment (ibid). Then, there was Justice Halim Commission set up to look into the matter (Feyyaz 2011). All these commissions and committees failed to find a permanent solution to address the water disputes between Punjab and Sindh.

After series of discussions and debates, in 1991 Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif led government forced the signing of the Indus Water Accord to resolve all Indus water-sharing-related disputes. This accord was signed on March 16, 1991 at Karachi, in a meeting of the chief ministers of Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then North West Frontier Province). It was ratified by the Council of Common Interests (CCIs) on March 21, 1991 (PILDAT 2011). Under this accord, the IRSA, with headquarters at Lahore, was established to monitor the distribution pattern among the provinces. According to the accord, the three online reservoirs at Tarbela, Mangla, and Chashma and inter-river link canals are the key structural facilities for Indus Basin water management. The allocation of reservoir water shared by provinces was centralized, using “suggested operation criteria” established on a 10-day basis (Qutub and Parajuli 2004). According to the formula to distribute water from IRS, total water available in the system was estimated to be 114.35 MAF below rim stations. It was allocated as 55.95 MAF for Punjab, 48.76 MAF for Sindh, 5.78 MAF for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and 3.87 MAF for Balochistan (Water Apportionment Act 1991). The accord provided for the distribution of any surpluses and the shortages as well. The agreement left water discharge to the sea unresolved subject to a study; however, it allocated 10 MAF in the interim for discharge to the sea (ibid).

Soon after the apportionment an accord was signed, however it marred into controversy in 1994 when Sindh alleged that Punjab was not releasing its agreed quantity of water. Sindh was also blamed for not releasing water to Balochistan (Mansur 2002). It was alleged that Punjab continues to violate even this one-sided agreement with open connivance of Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), IRSA, and the federal and Punjab governments. Sindh’s share of water is being diverted to Punjab unabashed under one pretext or another (ibid).

After the 1994 incident, the Ministry of Water and Power and WAPDA reverted to allocations on the basis of historical use, rather than accord. IRSA was dissolved in 1998, after the then Prime Minister announced controversial plans to build the Kalabagh Dam on the Indus River over the objections of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh. The IRSA was revived in 1999, but as an agency attached to the Federal Ministry of Water and Power, with headquarters in Islamabad. In effect, it has been reduced from an autonomous inter-provincial bargaining arena to an executive agency for short-term operational decision making (Qutub and Parajuli 2004).

During the droughts of 2001 and 2002, IRSA failed to generate consensus over water allocation. Demonstrations in Sindh induced the President/Chief Executive (CE) to override its decisions. Technically, the resolution of such conflicts is a matter
for the CCI, but since it was inactive, the CE dealt with the problem at the apex. Subsequently, provinces have directly approached the Secretariat of the CE, much to the apprehension of IRSA (ibid). Further demonstrating a declining trust in IRSAs’s ability to ensure that its decisions are implemented, the government of Sindh decided to send inspectors to upcountry reservoirs to check storage and diversions in person. Increasingly during 2002, critical decisions were taken in the CE secretariat in consultation with provincial governors. In 2003, the situation changed again with the transfer of executive responsibilities by the President to elected governments at the federal and provincial levels (ibid).

In July 2010, on the issue of opening up Chashma-Jhelum (CJ) Link Canal, Sindh and Punjab came against each other. Sindh wanted reversal of the decision and removal of Shahfaqt Masood (a Punjabi) as a chairman, while Punjab stated it would not compromise with its due share of water. Later on, the matter was resolved by an intervention by then Prime Minister Gilani. In a compromised arrangement Raqueeb Khan from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was appointed as chairman of IRSA (Daily Times 2010). To divert its attention from Punjab centric allegation over water diversions, Pakistan alleges India for water shortages but this was denied by former foreign minister Shah Quereshi, who categorically maintained that Pakistan’s mismanagement of water leads to wastage of 35 percent of its Indus water share and so it is responsible for its own water woes (The Nation 2010). This does not absolve the upper riparian from all allegations.

In 2010, eighteenth amendment was inserted into Pakistan’s constitution. This amendment has tried to address the inter-provincial water disputes also. Under the 1973 constitution, CCI is prescribed to formulate and regulate policies for matters in Part II of the Federal Legislative List such as railways, mineral oil, natural gas, and the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) (Constitution of Pakistan 1973). The Federal Ministry of Water and Power is responsible for water sector policy formulation. This ministry has set up an autonomous agency, the WAPDA, for the development of water resources, including main dams, barrages link canals, public tube wells, and drainage projects, across the country. However, WAPDA retains the management of the multi-purpose reservoirs on the Indus and its tributaries and operates them in consultation with the IRSA and Provincial Irrigation Departments according to the water rights and seasonal allocations to the provinces (Qutub and Parajuli 2004).

Eighteenth amendment has inserted the following provisions (Eighteenth Amendment to Pakistan’s Constitution 2010):

Article 157 (i) “Provided that the Federal Government, prior to taking a decision to construct or cause to be constructed hydro-electric power stations in any Province, shall consult the Provincial Government concerned and

(3) In case of any dispute between the Federal Government and a Provincial government in respect of any matter under this Article, any of the said Governments may move the Council of Common Interests for resolution of dispute”.
These amendments have also tried to strengthen, the weak structures of CCI, to resolve inter-provincial water conflicts in Pakistan. Despite these arrangements, water disputes between two provinces are still there.

**Conclusion**

This paper has discussed the continuity of water disputes between Punjab and Sindh, since British colonial times. Since then, one of the major reasons for dispute is over reliance on supply-side management of water resources. The situation is same, even today. It is being alleged that through multi-purpose projects, Punjab diverts water or choke off the spigots. There are about 19 barrages and 43 canal systems with 48 off-takes on the IRS in Pakistan, creating world’s largest contiguous man-made system of 61,000 km of canals and 105,000 water courses, irrigating 35 million acres of land (Memon 2002). Three storage reservoirs are also built, at Mangla on River Jehlum, at Tarbella, and at Chashma on river Indus, with total storage capacity of 20 MAF. Additionally, 12 link canals are built to transfer water from western rivers to eastern rivers or to the tributaries of the River Indus (ibid). Such a large number of hydrological projects give little space to natural flow of river. This system was exposed during 2010 flood when barrages like Taunsa, constructed to meet such challenges, failed to stop it (Shah 2011). Even in 2014 when floods occurred in Indian and Pakistan side of Jammu and Kashmir, these structures failed to do so. Instead, they were reasons for 2014 floods. The stake holders have used these structures to divert water in their interests instead of providing a space to the rivers for free flow. The silts have never been cleaned from the canals because it may affect the close-by agricultural lands. As the soil fail to hold on water, even a slight rise of water level leads to flood. To meet this sort of challenge, the feudal control over the canals and decision over it have to be checked by the Pakistani state.

Most of the hydrological constructions are cause of disputes between Punjab and Sindh. Kalabagh, in Mianwali district of Punjab bordering Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa is one of the most controversial multi-purpose project in Pakistan. In March 2011, three provincial assemblies—Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan—have passed a resolution against its commissioning (Daily Times 2011). Punjab wants not just Kalabagh, but also two more large dams on the Indus, at Bhasha and Skardu/Katzarah. It feels that the Kalabagh site is the most favourable, compared with the other two, and that it should be built finally (Abbasi and Kazi 2000). The Lahore Chamber of Commerce and Industry has estimated that the dam would produce enough energy to obviate the need to import 20 million barrels of oil (Vaughn et al. 2010). Another controversial multi-purpose project, which has been resolved, in Pakistan was Diamer-Bhasha. Its construction was opposed by Sindh but in 2014, CCI cleared it after breaking the impasse over it. In addition to these projects in August 2000 the federal cabinet of Pakistan approved the Vision-2025 programme to develop its water infrastructure, which has to be implemented in three phases. Priority hydroelectric generations project in phase I includes: Jinnah, Malankhand-III, Allai
Khaman, Golen Gol, New Bong, Khan Khawar, Duber Khawar, and Pehur high level (Rizvi 2001). To meet these challenges, prior consultations with the stakeholders and those who are going to be affected by the upcoming projects would be helpful. The fates of many such partially completed projects are hanging in the air because the people of catchment areas are strongly against their commissioning.

Growing militancy in Pakistan is making the Army stronger than the civilian leadership. The democratization process suffers during the military control of the state apparatus. As a result, the decisions are being taken in an authoritarian way by excluding a mass or majority’s interests. This also affects the water-related or water-infrastructure related decisions.

Finally, political relationship between the two important provinces has to be improved if water disputes have to be managed between them. The domination of Punjab has already created a lot of tensions in Pakistan. In 1971, Pakistan lost its eastern wing due to it, in Balochistan secessionist movement is going on due to domination of Punjabis over the resources, and in some parts of the country strong opposition against Punjab has been unequivocally demonstrated. The units need an equal treatment from the federal government instead of deep seated favouratism towards dominant province.

References


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**Endnotes**

1 This system constitutes river Indus and its tributaries, which are transborder rivers flowing in India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. It includes rivers: Jhelum, Indus, Ravi, Chenab, Sutlej, Kabul, and Beas. Out of it Jhelum, Indus and Chenab’s water is being used by Pakistan. Sutlej, Ravi, and Beas’s water is being used by India. Major portion of river Kabul lies in Afghanistan.

2 In Pakistan there are four provinces Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (earlier known as North-west Frontier Province). Then there is an
almost province-like unit, Gilgit-Baltistan. It is almost province because according to Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order 2009, it will have a Governor as Pakistan has in the other four provinces. The leader of the legislative assembly will be known as chief minister; the assembly will have 33 members, of whom 24 are to be directly elected and; has power to legislate on 61 subjects. The territory will have its own Chief Election Commission and Public Service Commission. This arrangement is almost what provinces in Pakistan have, sans the formal constitutional status. (Subramanium, 2009). Then there are federally administered units like “Azad” Kashmir and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

Like many developing countries, Pakistan too has faced many secessionist movements. In 1971, it lost its Eastern part, where there were grievances against the ruling west Pakistani elites. In Balochistan, the movement is still going on. Sindhis too in past had raised this issue. G.M. Syed, a politician who once supported the Pakistan movement and the two nation-theory became a trap for Sindhis, instead of liberating Sindh, it fell under Punjabi-Mohajir domination and until his death in 1995 he called for a separate Sindhi “nation” implying a separate Sindhi country. (Cohen, 2005).

Till 1947 both East and West Punjab, which are now in India and Pakistan, respectively, were a single unit. The area is also spelled as Panjab (meaning land of five rivers).